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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the work of custody visiting in police stations. Custody 
visitors make what are supposed to be random and unannounced visits to 
custody blocks in all parts of England and Wales. They check on the welfare 
of detainees being held in police custody, and they report their findings to the 
local Police and Crime Commissioner. Custody visiting is an important 
component of the criminal justice system, but it has been almost completely 
ignored by police scholars, and is largely unknown among the general public. 
The thesis analyses the character of official policy about custody visiting since 
the first “lay visiting” schemes in the early 1980s, through to the operation, 
from 2002, of the current statutory scheme known as “Independent Custody 
Visiting”. Using observation and face-to-face interviews in a local case study, 
along with wider desk and archival research and elite interviews, and drawing 
on Steven Lukes’ concept of power, this thesis is an original, in-depth 
investigation of this phenomenon. It is the first rigorous assessment of 
custody visiting, and the first thorough evaluation of its independence and of 
its effectiveness as a regulator of police behaviour. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Police custody blocks are some of the state’s secret places, hidden away from 
public view,1 and are very much the police’s territory. Public controversies 
about what happens in these secret places arise only when there is a death in 
custody. Into this setting, under a statutory scheme, come custody visitors. 
They make what are supposed to be random and unannounced visits to the 
custody blocks in all parts of England and Wales:2 they check on the welfare 
of detainees being held in police custody, and they report on their findings.3  
Custody visiting is an important component of the criminal justice system, but 
it has been almost completely ignored by police scholars, and is largely 
unknown among the general public. This thesis is an original, in-depth 
investigation of this phenomenon, and the first ever rigorous assessment of its 
independence and effectiveness. 
 
This introductory chapter outlines the research, examines the nature of 
custody, and considers the effect of the power of the police on the custody 
visitors. It argues that police behaviour in custody blocks should be subject to 
a greater degree of regulation than currently is the case, and that a reformed 
                                                 
1 Mike Maguire, “Regulating the Police Station: the Case of the Police & Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984” in McConville M and Wilson G (eds), The Handbook of The Criminal Justice 
Process (OUP 2002) 75. The Channel Four series 24 Hours in Police Custody has given the 
public more of an idea what they are like.  
2 There are similar schemes in Scotland and Northern Ireland, which have not been studied in 
this research. 
3 The Police Reform Act 2002 s 51, set up the statutory scheme of custody visiting known as 
the Independent Custody Visiting Scheme, often abbreviated as “ICV” in the official literature. 
Earlier arrangements were known as lay visiting. Much of the official literature is surprisingly 
unforthcoming about the random, unannounced quality of the visiting: see Chapter Two, text 
to note  164-5. See Chapter Six, note 31, for the additional quality of visits being unexpected.    
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system of custody visiting could provide that greater degree of regulation. 
Consideration is given to what the purpose of custody visiting is by looking at 
its origins in the early 1980s. The proposals of Michael Meacher MP and the 
recommendations in the Scarman Report saw its purpose as the safeguarding 
of detainees and reducing the number of deaths in custody. The chapter 
offers a preliminary explanation of the role played by Police and Crime 
Commissioners in running the local custody visiting schemes, and the role 
played by their representative body,4 the Independent Custody Visiting 
Association. It also looks at the involvement of a custody visitor in the 
aftermath of one particular death in custody, and begins to consider why the 
official literature of custody visiting is deafeningly silent about deaths in 
custody.   
 
Overview of the research 
The literature on research design reminds us that a study is a product of many 
interlocking factors, including personal interests and the biography of the 
researcher, and that it is important to be reflective about one’s own positioning 
in relation to that study.5 I became interested in custody visiting while working 
as a custody visitor. I found that I was asking myself basic questions about 
custody visiting. What is it? Who is it for? What should be done with it? I found 
that the academic literature had next to nothing to say about custody visiting, 
                                                 
4 The members of the Independent Custody Visiting Association (ICVA) are Police and Crime 
Commissioners, not visitors: Visiting Times 8/3, Summer 2002 showing clause 4 of the 
constitution, and ICVA articles of association, article 23. ICVA’s funding comes mainly from 
the Home Office, as can be seen from its home page and annual accounts. Visiting Times, 
the articles of association and the annual accounts are on ICVA’s website at icva.org.uk.  
5 Jane Ritchie, Jane Lewis, Carol McNaughton Nichols, Rachel Ormiston, Qualitative 
Research Practice (2nd edn, Sage 2014) 23, where, as elsewhere in the literature, “reflexive” 
is the version of the word. 
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which made me wonder why that should be so.6 I decided to look for the 
answers to my questions by seeking to carry out the research myself.  
 
What happens in custody makes a major impact on each criminal case.7 
Custody visiting provides outside scrutiny of what happens in custody: the 
quality of that scrutiny needs careful exploration. A large number of volunteers 
are involved, devoting a substantial amount of time to custody visiting. There 
are 1,900 visitors,8 probably making at least one visit per month, always in 
pairs, which makes 45,600 visits each year, and each visit takes, say, three 
hours including travelling time: this amounts to over 136,800 hours of 
volunteers’ time, not including the time spent attending training events and 
team meetings and travelling to them, say another 10,000 hours, making a 
total of some 150,000 hours. The Police and Crime Commissioners provide 
management and administration, pay the visitors’ travel expenses, and pay 
subscriptions to ICVA. The police allocate some of their resources to dealing 
with the visitors, but the cost is not known. The amount of public money spent 
on custody visiting, at about two million pounds a year, is not particularly 
significant when set against expenditure on, for example, legal aid or the 
                                                 
6 For instance: Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (4th edn, OUP 
2010); Malcolm Davies, Hazel Croall and Jane Tyrer Criminal Justice (5th edn, Pearson 
2015); Tim Newburn (ed) Handbook of Policing (2nd edn, Willan 2008) 21 but see Chapter 
Six, note 200; Nicola Padfield, Texts and Materials on the Criminal Justice Process (4th edn, 
OUP 2008):  Robert Reiner, The Politics of the Police (4th edn, OUP 2010) but see text to 
note 73; Andrew Sanders, Richard Young and Mandy Burton, Criminal Justice (4th edn, OUP 
2010); Layla Skinns, Police Custody: Governance, legitimacy and reform in the criminal 
justice process (Routledge 2011); Lucia Zedner, Criminal Justice (OUP 2004). 
7 See text to notes 15-27. 
8 Figures provided by Katie Kempen of ICVA (n 4). In 2001 the Home Office said there were 
3,000 visitors: Home Office Press Release 04.05.2001. 
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police, but one is still entitled to ask whether custody visiting as currently 
operating represents value for money.9 
 
This thesis seeks to establish the purposes and ethos of custody visiting, and 
to assess its independence and effectiveness. The research is based on an 
empirical and analytical examination of custody visiting, and is innovative 
because it has gone much deeper into the subject than any undertaken 
before. What previous research there is has not gone much beyond whether 
custody visiting was running well and whether it appeared to confer any 
benefits. For a full evaluation of custody visiting, more fundamental issues 
need to be tackled: policy,10 structure, ethos, independence, effectiveness 
and basic purposes. Previous research has, in almost every case, been 
based on published information, questionnaires and telephone surveys: hardly 
any has been based on interviews,11 and none on observation.12 This 
research is based on a case study carried out at eight custody blocks in the 
same conurbation: this is referred to as the “area studied” in this thesis. I have 
used the techniques of both interviews and observation. This has produced a 
great deal of data for my research, and has enabled me to paint an in-depth 
picture of what was actually happening in the operation of the custody visiting, 
                                                 
9 This is based on figures supplied to me for the area studied. I could not find a national figure 
on the Home Office website. 
10 Policy is described as “An essential feature of any social activity organised on a permanent 
and coherent basis” by Tony Jefferson and Roger Grimshaw, Controlling the Constable: 
Police Accountability in England and Wales (Friederick Muller/The Cobden Trust 1984) 18. 
11 Interviews were conducted by Sandra Walklate for The Merseyside Lay Visiting Scheme 
First Report: the Lay Visitors (Merseyside Police Authority 1986): only part of her report was 
available to me: and a small number of interviews with custody visitors, but not about visiting, 
were conducted by Tim Newburn and Stephanie Hayman, Policing, Surveillance and Social 
Control: CCTV and police monitoring of suspects  (Routledge 2002).  
12 Except for Sean Creighton, Dignity without Liberty, (Bristol Centre for Criminal Justice March 
1991), about the earlier period of lay visiting. 
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and of how participants perceived and understood it: what they did, said, 
thought and felt. 
  
Along with the empirical research, I have analysed the development of policy 
since the origins of custody visiting in 1980. The empirical research and the 
history provide the material for an in-depth inquiry into custody visiting. The 
issues have been refined into the following research questions. 
 
1. Could custody visiting make a more effective contribution to the 
regulation of police detention? This is the basic issue for this research, 
and it is discussed in Chapter Seven after review of all the other 
issues. 
2. What is the relation between custody visiting and police mistreatment 
of detainees, including mistreatment that ends in their death? Why is 
this not mentioned in the official literature? This issue is discussed in 
this chapter, and is discussed further in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.  
3. To what extent is custody visiting independent, in accordance with its 
branding and statutory obligation? This issue is discussed in Chapters 
Two, Three, Five, and Six. 
4. To what extent is custody visiting effective, both as a regulator, and 
according to the claims made for it in the official literature? This issue 
raises the question of what the purposes of custody visiting are and is 
discussed in this chapter, and in Chapters Three and Six. This thesis 
sees regulation of police behaviour in custody blocks as the purpose of 
custody visiting. Several other purposes are claimed for custody 
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visiting in the official literature, notably promoting public confidence in 
the police.  
5. Are the values of custody visiting in practice closer to the due process 
model or the crime control model?13 This is discussed in Chapters 
Three, Five and Six.       
 
Those are the principal issues. At this point I want to place this enquiry in its 
context by explaining what detention in police custody is like. 
 
Detention in police custody 
The parts of police stations in which the police detain and interrogate people 
they have arrested are known as custody suites, which in some areas have 
been superseded by separate buildings with no other function. Both types of 
arrangement are known as custody blocks, and that is the expression used in 
this thesis.14 Police work in custody blocks is, arguably, the most important 
component of the criminal justice system. For most people, the expression 
“criminal justice system” conjures up dramatic images of courtroom trials. 
However, what goes on in custody blocks is of much greater importance, for 
the following reasons. The police have very wide powers of arrest,15 and 
suspects may be injured, or even lose their lives, during arrest and 
                                                 
13 See the discussion of Packer's models of criminal justice in Chapter Two, text to notes 47-
51. 
14 Maguire (n 1) 75 describes the expression custody suites as “euphemistic”. Only certain 
police stations are designated for use for detention: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 
35. This study does not cover arrangements for visiting special custody blocks for the 
detention of suspected terrorists, or immigration removal centres for the detention of persons 
awaiting deportation. 
15 Sanders et al (n 6) 129ff,137-8. Powers of arrest are much wider than they were 40 years 
ago, when suspects being interviewed at the police station were said to be “helping police 
with their enquiries”, but had not actually been arrested. 
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detention.16 It has become the usual practice of the police to interrogate 
suspects only when they are being detained in custody, a practice which has 
been given a measure of approval by the courts.17 The reason for this practice 
is that suspects are more likely to confess while in detention at the custody 
block than they are at home. The custody block, or, as some new blocks have 
been called, “Police Investigation Centre”, has the facilities for gathering 
evidence such as DNA swabs, interview rooms, and breathalyser equipment, 
but it also has the experience of detention, a context conducive to breaking 
the will of the suspect and persuading the suspect, who is now, to use the 
police term, the “prisoner”,18 to co-operate, and to make a confession. 
Detention maximises the power imbalance between detainees and the police, 
contrary to the ethos of what is supposed to be an adversarial system;19 
inadequate legal representation in custody aggravates the typical lack of any 
presumption of innocence in police investigations;20 what a suspect says in 
the police interview while in custody can determine the outcome of the 
subsequent court case;21 whether a suspect is given police bail has a marked 
effect on whether that suspect gets bail from a court later in the process;22 
                                                 
16 As, for instance, did Sean Rigg: see text to notes 131-132. 
17 Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] 1 All ER 1054 discussed in Sanders et al (n 6) 188, 217 
and Al-Fayed v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2004] EWCA 1579.  But the courts 
have also held that a suspect should not be arrested for the purposes of an interview unless 
there is evidence that the suspect would interrupt the interview and leave the police station: 
Richardson v. Chief Constable of West Midlands [2011] EWHC 773, [2011] 2 Cr. App. R 1. 
18 See text to notes 49-50. 
19 Andrew Sanders, “Access to Justice in the Police Station: An Elusive Dream?”  in Young R 
and Wall D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty 
(Blackstone Press 1996). 
20 ibid. 
21 Vicky Kemp, Bridewell Legal Advice Study: adopting a “whole-systems” approach to police 
station legal advice (Legal Services Commission 2013) 51. 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/research/centres/accesstojustice/usefulresources/broa
derconsequences/blast-ii-report.pdf 
22 Sanders et al (n 6) 529. 
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many cases are disposed of in the custody block by a police caution,23 
sometimes where the case against the suspect is insufficiently strong to justify 
that course of action;24 and some arrests are made where it is clear, from the 
outset, that there are no grounds for a prosecution.25 Custody blocks are the 
places where the hundreds of thousands26 of people who have been arrested 
each year are processed. The police have wide discretion in how they operate 
in custody blocks,27 and what they do there is largely invisible to the outside 
world.  
 
What sort of places are custody blocks? In Mike Maguire’s words, they are: 
 
“places hidden from public view, where people are held against their 
will by representatives of the State who possess potentially far-
reaching powers over their physical welfare”.28   
 
One of the police officers interviewed for this research characterised custody 
blocks as  
 
                                                 
23 Richard Young, “Street Policing after PACE: The Drift to Summary Justice” in Cape E and 
Young R (eds), Regulating Policing: The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Past 
Present and Future (Hart 2008) 149. 
24 Vicky Kemp: “PACE, performance targets and legal protections” Criminal Law Review 
[2014] 3 278, 287. 
25 Satnam Choongh, Policing as Social Discipline (OUP 1997): Kemp (n 21) 4. 
26 This figure allows for some people being arrested more than once. In the year ending 
March 2015, there were 950,000 arrests carried out by police in England and Wales. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-powers-and-procedures-england-and-
wales-year-ending-31-march-2015/police-powers-and-procedures-england-and-wales-year-
ending-31-march-2015#arrests-1 accessed 05.06.2016. 
27 Andrew Sanders and Richard Young “The Rule of Law, Due Process and Pre-Trial Criminal 
Justice” Current Legal Problems (1994) 47 125. 
28 Maguire (n 1). 
 9 
“a very locked down environment, the police’s world, which nobody 
else except custody visitors really gets a view into”.29  
 
Those who are detained in these hidden places, this very locked down 
environment, run the risk of being abused by the police, whatever the extent 
of any actual abuse. Detainees are, on some occasions, neglected or 
mistreated by the police: and some die in or following custody. In Newham, 
East London, in 2013, inspectors30 found that  
 
“ ... detainees were provided with poor care or in some cases were 
neglected. The suite was chaotic…detainees were often denied proper 
respect or confidentiality. The cells were dirty... ”31  
 
In 2011, at Chelsea police station, four male officers and one female custody 
sergeant strip-searched a disoriented and vulnerable black woman (who later 
thought her drink must have been spiked) and left her naked in a cell while a 
camera broadcast images of her nakedness on the screens in the block. 
According to her story, when she recovered consciousness in hospital, she 
spoke to the police officer at her bedside. He said she was very well spoken, 
and asked where she was born. When the woman said Hampstead, the 
officer radioed a colleague, and was overheard saying that he thought they 
                                                 
29 S4. 
30 Not custody visitors, whose work is not described as inspection: this was work done by a 
team from the Joint Inspection of Custody Facilities. See text to notes 107-108 and 
https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/joint-inspections/joint-inspection-of-
police-custody-facilities/ accessed 31.01.2016. 
31 See 2014 Joint Inspection Report https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/2014/04/newham-police-custody-suite-2014.pdf accessed 
05.06.2016. 
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had “made a mistake.”32 Did they think that their mistake was only their failure 
to notice that the woman was middle-class? 
 
It is true that, in general terms, recent years are thought to have seen 
considerable improvements;33 for instance, Tom Milsom, a commissioner of 
the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), said in 2014: 
 
“While custody is hugely challenging for the police, they get it right 99% 
of the time”.34  
 
However, serious concern is justified, for two reasons. First, deaths in custody 
are still occurring: there were 21 deaths in 2010/11, 15 deaths in 2011/12, 15 
deaths in 2012/13, 11 deaths in 2013/14, 17 in 2014/15, and 14 in 2015/16, 
with a disproportionately high number from the Black, Asian and Ethnic 
minority (BAME) communities.35 Uncovering information about deaths in 
custody cases is difficult, but even the most suspicious circumstances do not 
lead to unlawful killing verdicts at inquests, or to prosecutions.36 An enquiry 
into deaths in custody was initiated by the Home Secretary in November 
2015.37 The other factor justifying serious concern about custody is that there 
                                                 
32 The Guardian (London 14.06.2015): http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/jun/14/woman-strip-searched-lwins-damages-met-police accessed 21.06.2016. 
33 This was the opinion of some of the longer-serving visitors I interviewed.  
34 Speaking in London at the Public Policy Exchange Conference on Preventing Deaths in 
Police Custody which I attended, 25.11.2014. 
35 Deaths during or following police contact: statistics for England and Wales 2015/2016: 
https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/research_stats/Deaths_Report_ 
Inquest report: http://www.inquest.org.uk/statistics/deaths-in-police-custody accessed 
31.07.2016. 
36 Sanders et al (n 6) 223ff.  
37 The terms of reference include examining the procedures and processes surrounding 
deaths and serious incidents in police custody, and the lead up to such incidents. 
 11 
is no significant external regulation of police behaviour in custody blocks.38 
These two issues, deaths in custody and insufficient regulation, point to the 
need for police conduct in custody blocks to be subject to a system of 
independent scrutiny. The police exercise very significant power in these 
hidden places. As Steve Tombs and David Whyte say: 
 
“Indeed, it might be argued that one of the key features and effects of 
power is the ability to operate beyond public scrutiny and thus 
accountability.”39 
 
The central issue in this thesis is whether that scrutiny is being achieved to 
any meaningful extent by custody visiting, or, if not, whether it could be 
achieved if modifications were made to the scheme.  
Another term for a hidden place is a “closed institution” or a “total institution”: 
while prisons are the obvious example, any police detention facility also 
comes into this category. There is a long history of abuse in closed 
institutions, which are often run by or on behalf of the state.40 Classically, 
closed or total institutions have been seen as places where people, both 
detainees and guards, spent long periods.41 However in the Stanford Prison 
                                                                                                                                            
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-secretary-announces-chair-for-deaths-in-
custody-review: announcement 21 October: accessed 03.11.2015. 
38 See text to notes 74-90. 
39 Steve Tombs and David Whyte, “Scrutinizing the Powerful” in Tombs S and Whyte D (eds), 
Unmasking the Crimes of the Powerful (Peter Lang 2003) 4: emphasis in original. 
40 A number of recent scandals have centred on the treatment of elderly and vulnerable 
people in care homes and children in children’s homes: for care homes, for instance, at 
Braintree, Essex: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27229367 accessed 02.06.2014: and for 
children’s homes, for instance, at Wrexham, North Wales: 
http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/long-awaited-jillings-report-details-extensive-
4881290 accessed 02.06.2014. 
41 Erving Goffman, Asylums (Penguin 1968). 
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Experiment the students who were assigned the role of guards became 
abusive as early as their second day on duty.42 (Incidentally, apart from the 
guards wearing dark glasses, the setting in the film of the experiment looks 
more like a custody block than a prison.) Philip Zimbardo, who ran the 
Stanford experiment, wrote that the parallels with the Abu Ghraib atrocity43 
challenged  
“the traditional focus on the individual’s inner nature and personality 
traits as the primary - and often sole - factors in understanding human 
failings … [P]eople are often in an ensemble of different players on a 
stage with various props, scripts and stage directions. Together, they 
comprise situations that can dramatically influence behaviour.”44  
A key feature of what happened at Abu Ghraib was the contempt shown to 
the prisoners. An echo of that contempt can be seen in the behaviour of two 
police officers in an English custody block in 2010. CCTV images showed that 
they laughed at a detainee they were viewing on CCTV, when they should 
have been looking after him:45 the detainee died soon afterwards. The coroner 
criticised the culture of the police station, and said that she was not convinced 
                                                 
42 Craig Haney, Curtis Banks and Philip Zimbardo, A Study of Guards and Prisoners in a 
Simulated Prison, reprinted from Naval Research September 1973, 7. 
http://www.zimbardo.com/downloads/1973.pdf accessed 12.06.2014: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sZwfNs1pqG0&feature=kp accessed 15.06.2014.  
43 “Pleading prisoners and families outside protest at the horrors of Abu Ghraib jail” The 
Guardian (London 06.05.2004). http://www.theguardian.com/gall/0,8542,1211872,00.html 
accessed 05:06:2016. 
44 The Guardian (London 29.02.2008). 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/feb/29/iraq.usa accessed 05.06.2016. 
45 http://www.irwinmitchell.com/newsandmedia/2014/june/inquest-delivers-verdict-into-death-
of-lloyd-butler-in-police-custody accessed 24.04.2016. The CCTV images show, to use 
Goffman’s theatrical metaphor, “backstage” behaviour: Erving Goffman, The Presentation of 
Self in Everyday Life (Pelican 1971), and Simon Holdaway, “The Police Station”, Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography 1980, 9 1 79-100 at 83: “the front, the idealization, is very 
different from the back region where the real practice of an organisation takes place.” 
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that the culture had changed since the man’s death.46 CCTV has been 
thought to have changed behaviour in the closed environment of the custody 
block.47 However, in that case, ironically, as well as recording the officers’ 
behaviour, CCTV provided the officers with another way to neglect and abuse 
detainees. 
Custody blocks, as total institutions, are places where the power of the state, 
through its agents, the police, takes centre stage. Those who are arrested and 
taken to a custody block are on police “territory” and under the complete 
control of the police.48 This is clearly reflected not just in the design of custody 
blocks but, very significantly, in the language the police use. The police refer 
to those they have arrested as “prisoners”, which is, at the least, inaccurate: 
and, depending on the context, may also be contemptuous, demeaning and 
coarsely triumphalist. The use of the expression appears to be very deep-
rooted in police culture,49 and is a form of what is now called “othering”.50 
                                                 
46 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIfncoPhaQ0 accessed 19.03.2015. 
47 Newburn and Hayman (n 11). 
48 Choongh (n 25) 81. I also observed this for myself.  
49 I have observed police officers up to the rank of assistant chief constable using the 
expression at custody visiting conferences: at one of these conferences, one of the visitors 
registered a complaint about the language. The use of this language may show that the police 
are insensitive to the offence the expression can cause in circles outside the police: or maybe 
the police do not see custody visitors as being outside the police. “Prisoners” has moved on 
from conversational slang to official, formal usage. Here are two instances. One of the 
computer programmes used by custody sergeants in Dyfed-Powys to book in newly arrived 
detainees referred to them as “prisoners”: personal observation during annual training as 
Dyfed-Powys visitor in 2012. At a police station in Luton in 2013, a police officer interviewing 
detainees was referred to as a member of the “Prisoner Handling Unit”: 24 Hours in Custody, 
Channel 4, 06.10.2014. In the area studied in this thesis, there are signs on the walls of 
custody blocks warning “prisoners” not to damage the cells: see Chapter Five, text to note 98. 
50 An example of the use of this word:  “Hillsborough was a story of two things: unaccountable 
power colliding with ‘othering’: the stripping away of humanity from a group of people”. Owen 
Jones, The Guardian (London 08.04.2016): 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/28/hillsborough-could-happen-again-
police-views-liverpool-fans.accessed 21.06.2016. 
 14 
However, the expression “prisoner” is no longer used in the criminal courts in 
England and Wales: the term used is “defendant”:51 should not the police also 
revise their use of language? Some detainees are released with no further 
action, or cautioned, or issued with a fixed penalty notice. The others are 
charged with an offence, and brought before a court, following which they may 
or may not be detained, and if they are detained, either on remand, or after 
sentence, it is not in police custody, but in a prison. And there is another 
sense in which detainees in police custody are not prisoners, in the most 
commonly understood sense of those who are serving sentences of 
imprisonment: they have not been deprived of the right to vote.  
Calling people who are detained in custody prisoners therefore tends to 
contradict that basic tenet of the criminal law, the presumption of innocence. 
There are similarities with the use of the word “terrorist” by politicians. 
Bromwich has written how former U.S. vice-president Cheney 
“ ... worked hard to eradicate from the minds of Americans the idea that 
there could be such a thing as a ‘suspect’. Due process of law rests on 
the acknowledged possibility that a suspect may be innocent; but, for 
Cheney, a person interrogated on suspicion of terrorism is a terrorist. 
To elaborate a view beyond that point, as he sees it, only involves 
government in a wasteful tangle of doubts.”52  
 
                                                 
51 L2, and observation. 
52 David Bromwich, “Working the Dark Side”, London Review of Books (London 08.01.2015) 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n01/david-bromwich/working-the-dark-side: accessed 23.06.2016: 
emphasis added.  
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Presuming that a detainee is guilty smoothly by-passes that wasteful tangle. 
For the vital period preceding a suspect being charged, both the law and the 
practice of the police operate on this basis.53 This is illustrated by the following 
quote from a police video about a suspect called Ben being brought into 
custody:  
 
“There’s nowhere to hide for Ben now, as his personal details and 
biometrics are taken, and, presented with compelling evidence, he will 
have to admit his crime and face the consequences of his actions.”54 
 
The video does not contemplate the possibility that Ben may be innocent.  
 
Public attention has recently been focussed on one aspect of this, the police’s 
treatment of public figures suspected of sex crimes. The prosecution policy 
seemed to be, for a while, one of “automatic belief” of what complainants told 
them,55 and that, combined with the massive publicity the allegations receive, 
has been described as a situation in which  
                                                 
53 The presumption of innocence, as expressed in the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Art 6(3), is that everyone charged (emphasis added) with a criminal offence shall be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty by law. This principle does not apply to the stage which 
precedes the making of the decision whether to charge a suspect: see Chapter Six, text to 
notes 15-25. 
54 From Nowhere to Hide, the video at: 
http://www.norfolk.police.uk/newsevents/features/2011/custody.aspx: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xQGJJWd9t7s accessed 01.04.2016 
55 “Met police may end policy of automatic belief of sex abuse complaints”, The Guardian 
(London 10.02.2016): http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/feb/10/met-police-may-end-
policy-of-believing-sexual-abuse-victims-says-hogan-howe accessed 05.06.2016. 
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“the presumption of innocence has been replaced by the impossibility 
of exoneration.”56  
But the presumption of innocence was never there to be replaced. The 
presumption of guilt has applied, and continues to apply, to the treatment of 
all suspects. What has happened is that the factors of automatic belief and 
massive publicity have been added to that existing status quo of the 
presumption of guilt. Herbert Packer’s classic analysis of contrasting priorities 
and values in criminal justice is very apposite for an examination of these 
attitudes and practices. His crime control and due process models will be 
drawn on in this research, to assist in understanding the nature of the custody 
environment in which visitors carry out their work; and the models will help to 
explain the attitudes of the custody visitors, to assess the effectiveness of 
their work, and to characterise the ideology of the operation.57  
Detention starts with being deprived of autonomy. While the police do have to 
be in control of what goes on in a custody block, there are different ways of 
achieving that aim. Detainees are “booked in” by a custody sergeant sitting at 
a desk raised above them.58 The custody sergeant asks personal questions: 
everyone else in the area can listen in to the answers.59 Detainees are 
fingerprinted and searched, and deprived of all their personal possessions. 
                                                 
56 Zoe Williams, “How do we work out who to believe on child sex abuse?” The Guardian  
(London 08.02.2016). 
https://www.google.co.uk/#q=Zoe+Williams%2C+%E2%80%9CHow+do+we+work+out+who+
to+believe+on+child+sex+abuse%3F%E2%80%9D+The+Guardian++(London+08.02.2016). 
accessed 21.06.2016 
57  See Chapter Two, text to notes 47-51. 
58 This layout does, however, prevent the close physical confrontations which apparently used 
to take place when sergeant and detainee faced each other at the same level across a small 
desk: Jane Warwick interview. For Jane Warwick, see note 135. 
59 Booking-in has a greater degree of confidentiality at some new custody blocks, as I 
observed for myself: see Chapter Five, text to note 97. 
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They soon realise that they have no privacy or confidentiality, while at the 
same time they are being told that they have certain “rights and entitlements”. 
There are plenty of tacit reminders of the power of the police, and images of 
power, in the uniforms worn by the police and custody staff, and in the 
environment of the custody block.60 The concept of power, and the use of that 
emotive word, both play a central role in defining the relationship between 
police and detainees. In the 1990 Strangeways prison riot, some of the 
prisoners used sound amplifiers to broadcast the song “We’ve got the power” 
from the roof of the prison.61 In the same period Fielding found that constables 
derived great satisfaction from “being the power.”62 Egon Bittner pointed out 
that the police alone have the right to use unrestricted coercive force, and that 
they are defined by that monopoly:63 the clearest statement of their power.  
 
The concept of vulnerability is another approach to the issue of power 
imbalance. Some detainees, juveniles and adults who are mentally disordered 
or otherwise mentally vulnerable are classed as vulnerable in custody, and an 
appropriate adult is supposed to be called to accompany them during police 
interviews.64 In the view of an experienced defence practitioner: 
                                                 
60 See Chapter Five, text to notes 93-102 and text after note 102. 
61 “Strangeways, Britain’s Toughest Prison Riot”, BBC2 01.04.2015. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zMl-0JVw3wo accessed 02.05.2016 
62 Nigel G Fielding, Joining Forces: Police training, socialisation, and occupational 
competence, (Routledge 1988) 174. 
63  Egon Bittner, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society, (National Institute of Mental 
Health 1970): https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/147822NCJRS.pdf 
64 This protection is given only during the interviews, and not all of the adults get the 
protection: see There to Help: ensuring provision of appropriate adults for mentally vulnerable 
adults detained or interviewed by the police (National Appropriate Adults Network 2015): 
http://www.appropriateadult.org.uk/index.php/news/9-public-articles/154-theretohelp. The 
Mental Health Crisis Care Concordat is a pledge to reduce the use of police cells to ensure 
that people in mental health crises receive appropriate treatment : 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/281242/36353_
Mental_Health_Crisis_accessible.pdf accessed 04.07.2016, but people in this condition are 
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“all [detainees], in the atmosphere of a police station, are vulnerable, 
and many are frightened and unsure.”65  
 
Some scholars have developed a theory that everyone is in an unequal 
relation to the state, and therefore every individual is vulnerable.66 On that 
basis, all detainees should be classed as vulnerable, and there should be 
mechanisms for protecting all those who are detained in custody.  
 
In any event, the evidence I have gathered supports the view that all 
detainees are vulnerable. For instance, a defence lawyer interviewed for this 
research said some clients found being detained in police custody: 
 
“fairly horrendous … very traumatic.”67 
 
Some of the visitors interviewed for this research stated that some detainees 
told them that being kept in a custody block was worse than being in prison.68 
One of the visitors described the impact of custody on detainees as:  
 
“huge: you can see six-foot-six men crying in the corner: it’s a massive 
effect.”69  
                                                                                                                                            
still detained in police cells. More than 500 people with mental health issues in the Thames 
Valley were locked in police cells in the last two years due to a lack of NHS resources: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-28402509 accessed 21.06.2016. 
65 Anthony Edwards, “The Role of Defence Lawyers in a ‘Re-balanced’ System”, in Cape E 
and Young R (eds), (n 23) 221, 243. 
66 Martha Fineman and Anna Grear (eds), Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law 
and Politics (Ashgate 2014). 
67 L7. 
68 V18. 
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When I was observing them during this study, custody staff were not overtly 
hostile in their approach to detainees, and tried to be friendly: the custody 
staff called the detainees “mate”, and the detainees called the custody staff 
“boss”. The custody staff bantered and joked with the detainees, but the 
detainees were likely to find that the joke was on them: for instance, custody 
staff laughed when a detainee being booked in at the custody desk gave his 
occupation as “life coach”.70 Some detainees responded to their situation by 
acting up and trying to provoke a reaction from the staff: but, whatever 
response the staff make, they have the power.  
 
Research by Layla Skinns has shown that doctors, lawyers and drug workers 
working in custody blocks are subject to police dominance of the custody 
blocks as police territory.71 Skinns says that this dominance is tempered “to a 
degree” by those claiming to be professionally independent of the police: she 
does not say what that degree of tempering amounts to, but she mentions that 
some of her research participants told her that doctors colluded with the police 
                                                                                                                                            
69 V12. 
70 Personal observation at a custody block in the area studied. 
71 Family and friends of people detained in custody may be subjected to this power, even 
without physically going to the custody block. On 17.12.2015 I telephoned a custody block 
(not in the area studied) to enquire after a friend whose solicitor told me had been arrested, 
and was assured by the custody sergeant that he would be told that I had telephoned, and 
was told the same thing when I telephoned again three hours later and spoke to a different 
custody sergeant. I then telephoned again five hours later, and was told by another custody 
sergeant that my request was “unusual”: but I was given the information that my friend had 
been discharged from custody. When I got to speak to my friend later, he told me that the 
custody staff had not passed on my messages to him. Why did the police tell me, twice, that 
my messages would be passed on, if they were not going to pass them on? Was their failure 
to pass on messages an expression of power, or just incompetence? Perhaps I was lucky that 
the telephone was actually answered at all: in 2009 the national average of unanswered calls 
in custody blocks was in excess of 25%: Vicky Kemp, Transforming legal aid: Access to 
criminal defence services, (Legal Services Commission 2010) 49: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/27833/1/Kemp%20Transforming%20CD%202010.pdf 
accessed 06.06.2016. 
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in their assessment of the fitness of suspects.72 Skinns’ research did not 
extend to consideration of whether the police exercise similar dominance over 
custody visitors, another group for which independence is claimed. This thesis 
will investigate how much, and in what ways, custody visitors are affected by 
the power of the police, and by the power of the Police and Crime 
Commissioners who organise them. 
 
The available published research about the attitudes of police to people they 
encounter in their work has not included any consideration of their attitudes to 
visitors. The social categorisations the police have constructed, and which 
have been identified by Simon Holdaway and Robert Reiner, include two 
groups to which visitors might belong: “challengers” and “do-gooders”. 
Challengers are lawyers, doctors, social workers, journalists and researchers: 
do-gooders are anti-police activists. Reiner writes that custody visiting was 
“an attempt to ensure regular penetration of the backstage areas of the police 
milieu by organized ‘challengers’”. He does not say whether the attempt has 
been successful, nor does he say whether the police see visitors as 
challengers.73 Whether the attempt has been successful is, of course, one of 
the principal concerns of this study: along the way, the research will look at 
whether the police see visitors as challengers, do-gooders, or as members of 
                                                 
72 Skinns (n 6) 189. David Dixon claimed that increasing access by people who were not 
police officers had meant that control of these symbolically crucial spaces had been 
challenged: David Dixon, “Legal Regulation and Policing Practice”, Social & Legal Studies 
(1992) 1 515-541 at 529. Choongh countered this by showing that none of these people could 
challenge police control and dominance of that territory, including being told when to wait, 
where to wait, where to stand and when to sit down: Choongh (n 25) 84-85. Dixon did not 
specify the “people who were not police officers”, and the categories in Choongh’s list are 
solicitors, social workers, appropriate adults, and interpreters, with no mention of custody 
visitors. 
73 Simon Holdaway, Inside the British Police: A Force at Work, (Blackwell 1983) 71ff: Reiner 
(n 6) 122ff. These categorisations appear to be still current: see Bethan Loftus, Police Culture 
in a Changing World (OUP 2009) 198ff. 
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some other category. It is unlikely that they see visitors as regulators, the 
subject to which I now turn. 
 
The Regulation of Police Behaviour in Custody Blocks  
The existing arrangements for the regulation of police behaviour in custody 
blocks are not adequate, as is shown in this and in the following section. The 
regulation is either self-regulation or regulation that is largely ineffective. This 
is why there is a need, as well as an opportunity that has so far been missed, 
for custody visiting to contribute towards the regulation of police behaviour in 
custody blocks. I provide the justification for categorising custody visiting as a 
system of regulation in Chapter Two.74  
The issues are: should the police be regulated; if so, can they be self-
regulated, i.e., regulated by themselves; and, if not, how should they be 
regulated, and by whom? The police have considerable discretion in the way 
they operate with detainees, starting from the use of their powers of arrest 
and decisions whether or not to prosecute. They can hold suspects without 
charge for an initial 24 hours, and a superintendent can authorise extension of 
that period to 36 hours: further extensions, to a maximum of 96 hours, have to 
be authorised by a magistrate.75 Often suspects receive no legal advice.76 
Police bail is used in bargaining for confessions, maybe after the suspect’s 
lawyer has left.77 There is little scrutiny by magistrates of police objections to 
                                                 
74 See Chapter Two, text to notes 3-34. 
75 This is for all non-terrorist offences that are indictable or triable either way: PACE s 41 - 44 
as amended. 
76 Sanders et al (n 6) 245ff. 
77 ibid 205-207. 
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bail granted by the court.78 There is no system for the independent scrutiny of 
guilty pleas and no requirement for corroborating evidence.79 The conditions 
of detention in the police station are regulated by codes issued under the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as amended (“PACE”). These codes 
do not have the force of law, which allows the police wide discretion, because 
breach of the regulations does not generally lead to any legal remedy.80  
So the question is whether, and if so how, the police should be regulated. The 
view taken, particularly by the judiciary as recently as 1968, was that the 
police were answerable only to the law.81 Under this approach, it is assumed 
that the simple fact that the rules and controls are stated as the law will 
ensure conformity by the police. Andrew Sanders argues that this “legalistic” 
approach is so naive that it hardly needs discussion.82 This is because the 
system relies so much on self-regulation. That self-regulation is provided by 
CCTV recording, computerised custody records, daily visits by the PACE 
inspector, and inspections once every six years by the Joint Inspection 
Team.83 The police are in control of the system for recording what happens in 
custody blocks, so they are not likely to record abuse, or to record it as 
unauthorised. Sanders says one needs to understand police behaviour to 
work out how to regulate or control them. It is part of “cop culture” that the 
police believe that the naive, well-meaning majority do not know what it is like 
“out there”, and, if they knew, they would not make police officers work “with 
                                                 
78 ibid 205f and 529. 
79 ibid 439, 317-9. 
80 ibid 700ff. 
81 R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118.                      
82 Andrew Sanders, “Can Coercive Powers be Effectively Controlled or Regulated? The Case 
for Anchored Pluralism” in Cape E and Young R (eds), (n 23) 45, 48-49. 
83 PACE Inspectors: see Police and Criminal Evidence Act, s.40. Joint Inspection Teams: see 
note 104. 
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one hand tied behind their backs”: 84 i.e., by being regulated and having to fill 
in records. In any case, Sanders points out that custody records are memory 
aids and legitimating mechanisms, and not much use to suspects. As memory 
aids, custody records may be useful to the custody officer in refreshing 
recollections when giving evidence months later in court. As legitimating 
mechanisms, custody records are as much a way of constructing reality as a 
way of recording it, and they provide protection for officers as much as 
regulation.85   
The most serious aspect of the issue is deaths in police custody. Those 
deaths result from vulnerable suspects being brought into a custody block, 
which Sanders sees as a virtually unregulated place, where no one is present 
most of the time to speak up for, and to protect, the suspect. He sees that an 
enhanced role for custody visitors could make a contribution to countering 
these factors:86 I follow up this suggestion in Chapter Seven.87 Sanders points 
out that PACE fails to require expert assessment of vulnerable people: that it 
allows the police to exercise poor observation and care, does not allow 
relatives, friends or carers all-hours access; that it encourages interrogation 
and isolation techniques that push vulnerable people to the edge; and that it 
enables abuse.88 However, these matters would not be put right by more 
effective regulation alone. There would need to be a reversal of the erosion of 
                                                 
84 Sanders et al (n 6) 69. 
85 Sanders (n 82) 53-55. For the police creating false custody records, see the IPCC Report 
of the investigation into the circumstances of Lloyd Butler’s death on 04.08.2010 whilst in the 
custody of West Midlands Police in December 2011, esp para 368: 
http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/investigation_commissioner_reports/Lloy
d%20Butler%20report%20redacted.pdf accessed 26.06.2014. 
86 Sanders (n 82) 70-73. 
87 See Chapter Seven, text to notes 22-29 and 50-73, and text following note 73. 
88 Sanders (n 82) 66f.  
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the rights of detainees.89 To be clear, custody visiting’s basic role is limited to 
checking on whether the police are respecting the PACE rights of detainees. 
PACE rights do not prevent detainees being arrested on little evidence or from 
being pressurised into making false confessions.90   
 
The link between custody visiting and the issue of deaths in 
custody  
I now start to consider the work of those reformers who believed that opening 
up these hidden places, custody blocks, to outside scrutiny by visitors would 
benefit detainees. In 1980-81 Michael Meacher MP and Lord Scarman both 
proposed visiting schemes with this in mind. Mr Meacher made his proposal 
for custody visiting while giving evidence to the House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee investigating deaths during or following police contact.91 He 
supported his proposal that visitors should have access to police station 
cells92 by a comparison with what were then called mental institutions, another 
category of the state’s hidden places: 
 
“ … where people are in the power of the authorities and out of sight 
and out of hearing of members of the public”.93  
 
                                                 
89 See Edward Cape, “PACE Then and Now: Twenty-one Years of ‘Re-balancing’” in Cape E 
and Young R (eds), (n 23) 191-220. 
90 Sanders et al (n 6) 320. 
91 The expression used in the report is “deaths in police custody”. Here the more precise 
formulation is used: 
ipcc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/research_stats/death_report_guidance.pdf 
accessed 04.05.2016. 
92 This was before the days of designated police stations and custody suites: see note 14. 
93 Third Report of the Committee, House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Session 
1979-80 HC 631, para 422. 
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Mr Meacher’s proposal was that panels of visitors, with a lawyer in each 
visiting group, should have a right of access to police station cells for 
unannounced visits: they would investigate allegations by detainees of police 
violence and report on them to the Home Secretary and the police authority 
for the area.94  
 
The context for Lord Scarman’s proposal for custody visiting was the 
immediate aftermath of the serious civil disturbances which took place in 
Brixton in 1981. The Scarman Report included a recommendation for a 
statutory system of custody visiting, with random checks by persons other 
than police officers, for the independent inspection and supervision of 
interrogation procedures and detention in police stations.95 
 
What did Mr Meacher and Lord Scarman think the purpose of the visiting 
was? Mr Meacher was giving evidence to the Home Affairs Committee 
investigating deaths during or following police contact. He said that he saw 
visiting as a deterrent against the possibility of assault against detainees in 
custody. He also said that the visiting could be no more than a deterrent.96 
From the reference in the Scarman Report to the recommendation of visiting 
made by the Home Affairs Committee, one may infer that Lord Scarman had 
also been considering the issue of deaths during or following police contact. In 
a section of his report just two sentences further on from a reference to that 
                                                 
94 ibid memorandum D1 and para 421. 
95 Lord Scarman, The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981 (Cmnd 8427 1981) 7.7.-7.10. 
96 Third Report of the Committee, (n  93), memorandum D1. As can be seen from what 
follows, the Home Office and all authors of official literature certainly thought even that was 
far too much, demonstrating their ideological distance from Mr Meacher. 
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committee report, Lord Scarman wrote that random visiting to police stations 
would be “salutary”. The Oxford English Dictionary definition of “salutary” is:  
 
“(especially with reference to something unwelcome or unpleasant) 
producing good effects; beneficial.”97 
 
The context and the definition strongly support an argument that Lord 
Scarman was thinking along similar lines to Mr Meacher. We do not know why 
Lord Scarman decided not to spell it out: maybe he felt the need to be 
diplomatic about the police.98 Another factor may have been that although 
rumours of a death following police contact played a major role in the Brixton 
disturbances of 1981, no such death actually occurred.99   
 
Did anyone else at the time see concerns about deaths during or following 
police contact as prompting custody visiting? In their 1990 report to the Home 
Office,  Charles Kemp and Rod Morgan say that the issue of deaths during or 
following police contact was one of two important concerns leading to the 
introduction of visiting schemes, but they offer no evidence to identify anyone 
who took that view, other than, rather surprisingly, the Home Office. However, 
                                                 
97 Scarman (n 95) 7.9: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/salutary accessed 
11.07.2014. The word is derived from the Latin word salus, whose meanings include health 
and safety: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0059:entry=salus 
accessed 29.06.2016. 
98 It may be an instance of the operation of Steven Lukes’ three-dimensional power, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, text to notes 36-45. 
99 Scarman (n 95) 3.29. The 1985 Brixton riots were sparked off by the police shooting and 
paralysing Cherry Groce: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-28138759 accessed 
03.07.2014. 
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the words used by the Home Office, and on which Kemp and Morgan rely, do 
not support that interpretation.100  
 
The principle that places of detention should be visited by independent 
persons is established by human rights law and international treaty 
obligations. The relevant rights under the European Convention on Human 
Rights are those in Article 2, the right to life; those in Article 3, the prohibition 
of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; those in Article 5, 
the right to liberty and security of the person; and those in Article 6, the right 
to a fair trial. The link to custody visiting is found in two United Nations 
instruments. The first is the Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.101 The second United 
Nations instrument is The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture 
                                                 
100 Charles Kemp and Rod Morgan, Lay Visiting to Police Stations: Report to the Home Office 
(Bristol and Bath Centre for Criminal Justice 1990) 107. The words they rely on are as 
follows: “The carrying out of random checks by independent persons on the detention of 
suspects at police stations was first proposed by Lord Scarman’s report on the Brixton 
disorders of 1981. The Government welcomed this as a positive suggestion for bringing the 
community and the police closer together”. These words formed the opening paragraph of a 
letter dated 26.02.1986 from the Home Office to chiefs of police and clerks to police 
authorities. The letter enclosed Home Office Circular No 12/1986: LAY VISITORS TO 
POLICE STATIONS. At face value, the Home Office’s words relate only to police-community 
relations. Kemp and Morgan’s view seems to be that independent checks must, by definition, 
have the purpose of deterring abusive behaviour that might lead to deaths, but that purpose is 
not expressed, and there is nothing on which to build a case that it has to be implied. If Kemp 
and Morgan’s proposition about the Home Office is right, the only support for it is this 
remarkably oblique reference. The circular in all other respects follows a very different line: 
see the discussion in Chapter Three, text to notes 63-74.  
101 Principle 29 reads as follows:  
“1. In order to supervise the strict observance of relevant laws and regulations, places of 
detention shall be visited regularly by qualified and experienced persons appointed by, and 
responsible to, a competent authority distinct from the authority directly in charge of the 
administration of the place of detention or imprisonment.  
2. A detained or imprisoned person shall have the right to communicate freely and in full 
confidentiality with the persons who visit the places of detention or imprisonment in 
accordance with paragraph l of the present principle, subject to reasonable conditions to 
ensure security and good order in such places.”  
Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 43/173 of 09.12.1988. 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r173.htm accessed 06.06.2016. 
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(“OPCAT”).102 States that ratify OPCAT are required to designate a “national 
preventive mechanism” (NPM).103 An NPM has to be a body or group of 
bodies that regularly examine the treatment of detainees, make 
recommendations and comment on existing or draft legislation with the aim of 
improving treatment and conditions in detention. The United Kingdom’s NPM 
in England and Wales consists of some nine bodies, including Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons 
(HMIP), and the Independent Custody Visiting Association (ICVA).104 A 
Memorandum of Understanding of the Joint Inspection of Police Custody 
Conditions in England and Wales, was entered into by the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Association of Police Authorities (APA), 
HMIC and HMIP. The Memorandum of Understanding announced that 
ministers had agreed that the inspection of police custody conditions should 
be carried out jointly by HMIC and HMIP.105 The teams inspect the custody 
blocks in each police area once every six years and publish their reports and 
recommendations. In 2013 the teams inspected custody blocks in seven 
                                                 
102 The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other cruel inhuman or 
degrading Treatment or Punishment: a treaty which supplements the 1984 UN Convention 
against Torture. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCAT.aspx accessed 
31.05.2015. 
103 Not to be confused with that other use of the same initials NPM, New Public Management, 
a “ … term coined in the late 1980s to denote a new (or renewed) stress on the importance of 
management and ‘production engineering’ in public service delivery … ”: 
http://www.christopherhood.net/pdfs/npm_encyclopedia_entry.pdf accessed 15.06.2014.  
104 Written Ministerial Statement, Ministry of Justice: Establishment of the UK’s National 
Preventive Mechanism (NPM) in accordance with the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture (OPCAT) by the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, Michael Wills MP on 
31.03.2009. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090331/wmstext/90331m00
03.htm accessed 06.06.2016. For the Joint Inspection Teams for custody blocks, see: 
http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/MOU-police-custody.pdf accessed 
31.05.2015. For ICVA, see note 4 and the text to notes 118-125.  
105 https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/MOU-police-custody.pdf accessed 
06.06.2016. The last signature on this document is dated 12.12.2011. There must have been 
at least one earlier MOU about this: it is described as “updated 2011” in HMIC’s document 
about the joint inspections of custody facilities which started in 2008: 
https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/joint-inspections/joint-inspection-of-
police-custody-facilities/ accessed 31.05.2015. 
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police areas and made some 186 recommendations relating to the issues of 
respect for detainees, safety, physical conditions, detainee care and individual 
rights. Joint Inspection teams carry out visits after 12 months to check 
implementation of action plans.106 The appearance of ICVA in this list of NPM 
bodies presumably shows that custody visiting was seen by ministers as, at 
least, able to play a role in monitoring and improving the treatment and 
conditions of detainees in police custody, at the level of the most fundamental 
human rights. ICVA’s website states: “Under the United Nations,107 ICVA is 
part of a co-ordinating body108 which appraises [sic] unannounced visits to 
places of detention, to investigate the treatment of people deprived of their 
liberty in the UK. As a [sic]109 National Preventative [sic]110 Mechanism (NPM), 
ICVA can provide advice on Memorandums of Understanding111 to ensure 
that volunteers are appropriately trained and supported in their role”.112 These 
rather quaintly expressed remarks raise the questions of what part custody 
visiting plays in the UK’s NPM, and how ICVA fulfils its role as one of the 
NPM’s constituent bodies. 
 
How this came about is as follows. Following the proposal in the Scarman 
Report, and starting in the mid-1980s, selected and trained volunteers, then 
known as “lay visitors”, began, in some parts of England and Wales, to be 
allowed access to custody blocks, making random unannounced visits to 
                                                 
106 https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/joint-inspections/joint-inspection-of-
police-custody-facilities/ accessed 31.05.2015. 
107 Presumably this is a reference to OPCAT (n 102) and the ministerial statement (n 104). 
108 This may be a reference to the UK’s NPM, but it does not do any co-ordinating work: it is 
simply a group of constituent members: the work is done by its members, in this case by the 
joint inspection teams run by HMIP and HMIC. 
109 It is in fact one of the nine bodies which constitute the NPM. 
110 Both versions of the spelling of this word are found. 
111 The MOU (n 105) is not the only one on this subject. 
112 http://icva.org.uk/what-we-do#National_Preventative_Mechanism accessed 31.05.2015. 
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check and report on the welfare of detainees. From 2002, statute has required 
police authorities, and since November 2012 the Police and Crime 
Commissioners, to make custody visiting arrangements throughout both 
countries, and the visitors continue to be volunteers, under the banner of 
Independent Custody Visiting.113  
 
Independent Custody Visiting does not exist as a separate entity. It is found in 
the custody visiting schemes run by Police and Crime Commissioners in each 
police area in England and Wales and also in the British Transport Police, a 
total of 43 schemes. All the schemes are currently established under the 
Police Reform Act 2002 s 51, as amended, and the 2013 Code of Practice.114 
Visitors for the local schemes are appointed to work only in the area where 
they live: they are not authorised to make visits elsewhere.115 There are 
differences between local schemes, for instance, in the matters on which 
visitors are asked to report.116 One rather startling example of this is that the 
remit of some local schemes117 includes responsibility for checking on the 
welfare of police dogs, which seems incongruous, not least because it 
suggests that there is some kind of equivalence between safeguarding 
detainees and safeguarding dogs. 
 
                                                 
113 Police Reform Act 2002, s 51(2), as amended: in London the role of Police and Crime 
Commissioner is performed by the Mayor. 
114 The codes of practice and their predecessors, the Home Office circulars, are listed in the 
abbreviations. 
115 2013 Code of Practice para 17. 
116 Unlike the report forms in the area studied, the Dyfed-Powys report forms, which I 
completed as a visitor, required that there should always be reports on a specified list of 
conditions in the custody block, e.g., whether the CCTV was working. 
117 Not in the area studied, but e.g., in Devon and Cornwall. http://www.devonandcornwall-
pcc.gov.uk/take-part/police-dog-welfare-volunteers/ accessed 10.07.2015. A visitor in the 
area studied (V5) did express surprise at this. 
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The visitors do not have a corporate identity distinct from their local visiting 
scheme, and there is no national organisation for visitors. The nearest one 
gets to that is ICVA. But ICVA is not an organisation composed of visitors. 
The name “Independent Custody Visiting Association” is misleading:118 it 
suggests that it represents visitors, and sometimes the name is shown (e.g., 
on one Police and Crime Commissioner’s website) as the “Independent 
Custody Visitors Association”.119 The members of ICVA are the Police and 
Crime Commissioners,120 and ICVA is funded by the Home Office and the 
Police and Crime Commissioners.121  
 
ICVA holds two annual conferences. The first is attended by visitors, but they 
do not attend as delegates and there are no votes on policy, and visitors have 
no role in running the conference. The subjects covered at the 2014 
conference, which I attended, were important custody issues, but the 
presentations contained hardly any of the essential detail of how custody 
visiting could engage with those issues.122  ICVA’s other annual conference is 
for scheme administrators only, and visitors are excluded: I asked to attend 
and was refused on the ground that my presence would inhibit debate.123 The 
focus of the administrators’ conferences seems to be how to manage visitors: 
for instance, there was a session at the 2010 conference about how to ensure 
                                                 
118 Like other people, when I first encountered the name I read it incorrectly and was misled 
by it. 
119 By contrast, individual visitors could join ICVA’s predecessor, the National Association of 
Lay Visitors, for an annual subscription of £5: Claire Hall and Rod Morgan, Lay Visitors to 
Police Stations: An Update (University of Bristol Centre for Criminal Justice 1993), foreword. 
120 But not all of the PCCs, according to the now retired chief executive Ian Smith in a 2014 
speech I heard him make.  
121 Visiting Times Summer 2002 showing clause 4 of the constitution, and ICVA articles of 
association, article 23. 
122 The same applies to articles in ICVA’s Visiting Times. 
123 Emails to the author from and on behalf of ICVA. On gatekeepers, see Chapter Four, text 
to notes 30 and 47. 
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that visitors did not acquire employee status.124 I was told that the 
administrators who attend these conferences fall into two distinct groups, the 
first group comprising experienced managers, and the second comprising 
new appointees with no experience, and that the new appointees tend to ask 
questions like the following:  
 
“What do we do about visitors who think they own the scheme, when 
it’s the Police and Crime Commissioner’s scheme?”125 
 
It is not surprising that ICVA felt that my presence would have inhibited a 
frank debate about the sensitive “ownership” issue of whether custody visiting 
is independent, which is also one of my research questions. Under the 
governing statute, the Police and Crime Commissioners are required to 
perform the conjuring trick of running the schemes and, at the same time, 
ensuring that the visitors are independent.  
 
The Police and Crime Commissioners are the successors to the police 
authorities and can be thought of, very loosely, as the local regulators of the 
police. ICVA provides guidance to its members, the Police and Crime 
Commissioners, on custody visiting. The custody visiting schemes can thus 
be seen as forming part of a patchwork of regulation of police behaviour in 
custody blocks, of which the other most significant regulators are the 
partnership between HMIC and HMIP who carry out the joint inspections of 
                                                 
124 Summary of conference proceedings provided to me, and all visitors in that scheme, while 
I was a visitor in Dyfed-Powys.  
125 Identifier withheld to protect anonymity. 
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custody blocks,126 and the IPCC. However, the patchwork does not overlap, 
and is not a perfect cover, but is actually full of holes. Using another 
metaphor, Dame Anne Owers127 has said that no single regulator could fire 
magic bullets:128 but, as I will show, custody visiting does not even have a 
gun, and so it cannot fire any bullets, magic or otherwise.  
  
There is nothing very new about the problem of how to control people with 
power. The most well-known expression of it derives from Juvenal, the 
Roman poet of the second century CE: “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”129 To 
translate literally, if inelegantly: “Who is to guard the guards themselves?” 
Applied to the issue of police regulation, the question could be rephrased as 
“who is to police the police?” or, as the police are themselves regulators of 
many aspects of all our lives, “who is to regulate the regulators?” Taking us 
back again to the subject of death during or following police contact, the 
question is quoted in the 2014 IPCC report about the deficiencies in their own 
investigation of the death during police contact of Sean Rigg in 2008.130 The 
report’s summary of the affair reads as follows:  
 
“Mr Rigg died on the evening of 21 August 2008 after a sustained 
period in police custody. He was apprehended, restrained, transferred 
                                                 
126 See text to notes 105-106. 
127 Chair, Independent Police Complaints Commission from 2012: 
https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/about/who-we-are/our-team/dame-anne-owers accessed 06.06.2016. 
128 At Westminster Briefing Conference on Preventing Deaths and Serious Incidents in Police 
Custody which I attended on 17.11.2015. 
129 Not the first century, as the IPCC report says. The Latin quote, from Satires 6, 347-8, has 
travelled a long way from its original context, which was not political. I am grateful to 
Professor Robert Parker for helping me with this.  
130 IPCC Report, Report of the independent external review of the IPCC investigation into the 
death of Sean Rigg: Review_Report_Sean_Rigg.PDF accessed at ipcc.gov.uk 23.01.2014. 
Juvenal is quoted, in the original Latin, on the page preceding the executive summary. 
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by police van to Brixton Police Station, held in the van parked in the 
police station yard, then detained in the ‘cage’ area of the custody 
corridor, where he collapsed without ever having been admitted to the 
custody suite. During most of this time, Mr Rigg was subject to means 
of restraint (i.e. he was cuffed with his hands behind his back); the 
handcuffs were removed only after he collapsed. After police officers 
tried CPR131 while waiting for an ambulance to arrive, Mr Rigg was 
taken by ambulance to hospital, where he was pronounced dead ... 
The IPCC investigation triggered by his death began later that night.”132  
 
Another police regulator, in the form of the local custody visiting scheme, also 
played a part in the aftermath of the death of Sean Rigg. This came to light in 
the IPCC Report,133 which stated that the “Head of Lambeth ICV” was called 
in to Brixton police station that night, and that she “visited the holding ‘cage’ 
and custody suite and asserted that she was content with what she had 
seen”.134 I have established the identity of this custody visitor: Jane 
Warwick.135 Ms Warwick has told me that what she actually did that evening 
                                                 
131 CPR stands for cardiopulmonary resuscitation. It is a first aid technique that can be used if 
someone is not breathing properly or if their heart has stopped: 
http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Accidents-and-first-aid/Pages/cpr.aspx                          
accessed 12.06.2014. 
132 IPCC report (n 130): part of the executive summary. 
133 ibid, 31 note 56. The report does not comment generally on the role of the Lambeth 
Independent Custody Visiting Scheme, and it appears that they were not consulted for the 
report: ibid Appendix C. 
134 IPCC Report (n 130) para 22 p 31. Another quote from that page reads: “The handwritten 
notes of one of the IPCC on-call team also include the following reference: “0.15hours – ICV – 
no issues”. The original document referred to, of which the IPCC supplied me a copy, is 
Metropolitan Police Service report 590102014141: L41 Rigg Investigation – MPS – 
22.08.2008: IPCCY2254.  
135 Jane Warwick MBE, administrator of the Lambeth Community Police Consultative Group, 
and administrator of the Lambeth Lay Visitors Panel and its successor, from 1990 till 2003: a 
custody visitor in Lambeth from 1995: elected chair of Lambeth Independent Custody Visiting 
Panel in 2008, and still holding that position in 2016. Ms Warwick consented to my making a 
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was rather different, and that, in particular, she did not made the remarks 
attributed to her. The story is told in full in Chapter Six.136 
  
The IPCC Report of the 2008 incident at Brixton police station is a tantalising 
glimpse into the work of the custody visiting schemes at one of the state’s 
“hidden places”,137 and it raises some of the most important issues about 
custody visiting. Why did the police call in a member of the local custody 
visiting scheme that night? What is the role of custody visitors regarding 
deaths during or following police contact? Could custody visitors make an 
effective contribution to reducing the incidence of these deaths, and if so, how 
would that be achieved?  
 
Of particular interest is the fact that the visit by the senior custody visitor to 
Brixton police station was, unusually, not a random unannounced visit, but a 
visit made in response to an invitation by the police.138 The main activity of 
custody visiting is random and unannounced visiting. One purpose of random 
and unannounced visits to custody blocks may be to deter police 
mistreatment and neglect of detainees and to reduce the number of deaths 
during or following police contact.139 As has been shown, this was certainly 
                                                                                                                                            
Freedom of Information Act application which confirmed that she was the custody visitor 
referred to. 
136 Chapter Six, text to notes 192-197. 
137 See text to notes 28-47. 
138 For visits of this kind, see Chapter Three, text to notes 128-131 and Chapter Six, text to 
notes 184-191. 
139 The issue surfaces in published literature - just once. A Council of Europe report in 1999 
considered the question, without citing any evidence, and concluded that deterring deaths in 
custody was neither a purpose nor a function of custody visiting: The Impact of External 
Visiting of Police Stations on Prevention of Torture and Ill-Treatment Council of Europe 1999 
http://www.apt.ch/content/files_res/External%20Visiting%20of%20Police%20Stations.pdfpara 
1.16.accessed 16.10.2014. The issue does not appear in places where one might expect it to 
appear: for instance, ICVA sits on the ministerial board of the Independent Advisory Panel on 
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the view taken by Michael Meacher, and maybe also by Lord Scarman, but 
not that of the Home Office.140 The official literature used to take a very 
different approach to deaths in custody from the approach taken by Mr 
Meacher. It used to say that the role of custody visiting was to help to rebuild 
public confidence in the police in the aftermath of a tragic incident. However, 
since 2003 the codes of practice have been silent on deaths in custody.141 An 
important research issue therefore is to work out whether custody visiting is 
linked to the issue of deaths in custody, and, if it is, why there is nothing about 
it in the current official literature. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have reviewed the questions raised by this enquiry, and set 
out, in broad terms, my approach to researching the answers to those 
questions. The intention is to explain the phenomenon of custody visiting in an 
analytical and critical fashion. The role of the custody visitors is to make 
checks on the welfare of detainees and whether their rights are being 
observed. I have highlighted the following issues which are likely to impact on 
the work of the visitors: the power of the police; the weighting of conditions in 
custody against detainees; the police use of detention to obtain confessions; 
the absence of effective regulation of police behaviour in the custody block, 
and the potential for custody visitors to remedy this, at least in part; the 
national and local structures of custody visiting, in neither of which do visitors 
                                                                                                                                            
Deaths in Custody, http://iapdeathsincustody.independent.gov.uk/about/ministerial-council-
on-deaths-in-custody/ministerial-board/accessed 16.10.2014  but neither on this issue, nor in 
relation to its membership of the NPM, nor anywhere in ICVA’s publications, is a connection 
made between custody visiting and deterring deaths in custody. 
140 See text to note 100, and the note.  
141 See Chapter Three, text to notes 159-160. 
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have any say; the role of ICVA in purporting to fulfil the United Kingdom’s 
international treaty obligations to safeguard detainees; the ownership of the 
local visiting schemes by the Police and Crime Commissioners; where 
custody visitors stand in relation to deaths in custody; and the apparent 
deletion by the authorities of the issue of deaths in custody from the list of 
concerns of custody visiting. In discussing these issues, I have begun to draw 
on the concepts of power, Packer’s models of criminal justice, and 
independence.   
 
The next chapter, Chapter Two, locates custody visiting in the role of 
regulator, and lays down the conceptual framework of the enquiry. As well as 
discussing the concepts already raised in Chapter One, Chapter Two explains 
the intersection of power with Packer’s models of criminal justice; closely 
allied to the concept of independence, the concepts of neutrality and 
impartiality; and the regulatory concepts of legitimacy, accountability and 
effectiveness. Chapter Three provides a critical and analytical history of 
custody visiting, showing the effects of official policy on the independence and 
effectiveness of custody visiting. Chapter Four looks at research design, 
methodology and ethics, showing the substantial amount of observation and 
interviewing I have carried out in a ground-breaking empirical case study of a 
local custody visiting scheme, along with desk and archival research and elite 
interviewing about the history and policy of custody visiting on a national 
basis, outside the ambit of the case study.  
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Chapters Five and Six draw on the results of the case study. Chapter Five 
begins with a discussion of the concept of socialisation; explains how visitors 
within this scheme were recruited, trained and socialised; and sets out my 
findings about their attitudes to their work, and whether they were 
independent of the Police and Crime Commissioner and the police. Chapter 
Six assesses, by applying five criteria, whether custody visiting was effective 
as a regulator of police behaviour in custody blocks, and also considers 
whether custody visiting fulfilled the claims made for the scheme in the official 
literature. Chapter Seven reviews the answers to the research questions, and 
places my research in the context of research into police regulation, noting the 
limitations on my research and the possibility for further research. I conclude 
with recommendations for reform, and an explanation of why and how the 
state could be obliged to have regard to those recommendations. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter explains the concepts which frame this research, and how they 
relate to the issues being explored in this thesis. As has been seen from 
Chapter One, the topics encountered in this study of custody visiting are: 
human rights; criminal justice; policing; detention in the closed institution of 
police custody; and regulation. The literatures relating to those topics provide 
the concepts which frame this research, and the concepts are set out and 
discussed in this chapter. The concepts will be drawn on to evaluate the 
findings from my desk research about the policy of custody visiting set out in 
Chapter Three, and to evaluate the findings from my empirical research, 
about the attitudes of the visitors in Chapter Five, and about the effectiveness 
of custody visiting in Chapter Six. This chapter analyses each concept, in 
detail, and establishes the particular relevance of each concept to the issues 
raised by the research questions set out in the introduction to this thesis.1  
 
The concepts are: power; socialisation; Herbert Packer’s crime control and 
due process models; independence, combined with neutrality and impartiality; 
legitimacy; accountability; and effectiveness.2 This chapter shows what can 
                                                 
1 See Chapter One, text after note 12. 
2 The concept of “responsibilization”, was considered. This is said to consist of “… a new kind 
of indirect action, in which state agencies activate action by non-state organisations and 
actors [to assist in crime control]”. David Garland, The Culture of Control (OUP 2001) 124ff. 
Custody visiting has been put forward as an example of responsibilization by Layla Skinns, 
Police Custody: Governance, legitimacy and reform in the criminal justice process (Routledge 
2011) 34. But, while custody visiting does conform to the concept government wants them to 
as an instance of delegation by government, it does not conform to the ethos of the concept, 
which is about government getting activists to do what the government wants them to do. 
 41 
be learnt from desk research about the relevance of all the concepts to the 
research questions, except for the concept of socialisation which will be 
discussed in the introduction to Chapter Five.  
 
In this study, the concept of power, and the topic of regulation, are both very 
prominent. A major strand of this enquiry is the search for ways by which the 
powerful, the police on their home territory of the custody block, can be most 
effectively regulated, and how we can judge the success of the regulation. I 
now seek to establish that custody visiting is a type of regulation, and then 
examine each concept, starting with the concept of power. 
 
Custody visiting as a type of regulation 
As has been shown,3 custody visiting forms part of the work of a regulator, the 
United Kingdom’s National Preventive Mechanism, which is charged with 
monitoring the treatment of detainees. The review of regulation which follows 
notes that, while regulation is found predominantly in the economic sphere, it 
is also found in other areas of public life; discusses some definitions of 
regulation which can be applied to custody visiting; looks at some of the 
current issues about regulation and their relevance to custody visiting; and 
considers police behaviour in custody blocks as a subject matter for 
regulation. 
                                                                                                                                            
Here government was originally persuaded by activists that a system needed to be operated. 
Custody visiting was not a government initiative, it had its origins in the concerns of people 
outside government, and government took a long time to implement it, in a heavily watered-
down form: see Chapter Three. Responsibilization is therefore not being included as one of 
the concepts in this study.    
3 See Chapter One, text to notes 101-112.  
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I first turn to look at generally accepted definitions of regulation, and to inquire 
whether custody visiting fits those generally accepted definitions. What is 
regulation for? Why has regulation emerged in a particular context? What 
does regulation cover? What does regulation do, and how does it work? And, 
how does the answer to each of these questions apply to custody visiting? 
First, what is regulation for? Regulation exists because it is a means of 
government, and the justification offered by government for regulation is that it 
is assumed to be acting in the public interest.4 What is in the public interest is, 
of course, endlessly debated, and the debates often centre on issues which 
are not primarily economic. However, much of the literature on regulation is 
about economic activity, and speaks of correcting market failure where private 
law remedies do not provide a solution.5 But, as well as criminal justice, there 
are non-economic areas of public life which are regulated: examples are care 
homes (the Care Quality Commission): rented housing in the public sector 
(the Housing Ombudsman): and education (OFSTED). If regulation is about 
preventing failure, the concept of failure can be applied to areas where there 
is no market to fail: it is the state which has failed. Failure of both kinds harms 
individuals and society. The purpose of regulation could be said, simply, to 
prevent harm to individuals and society.6 Custody visiting could prevent harm 
by regulating police behaviour in custody blocks.  
                                                 
4 Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice 
(OUP 1999) 9. 
5 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, quoting Antony Ogus, in An Introduction to Law and 
Regulation: text and materials, (CUP 2007) 18.  
6 This is implicit in Baldwin and Cave (n 4) 109. There appears to be plenty more harm that 
regulation could prevent. Steve Tombs estimates that the lack of effective regulation of 
pollution, food safety and workplace health and safety standards in the UK causes 29,000 
deaths each year attributable to the effects of airborne pollution, some one million cases of 
foodborne illness each year resulting in 20,000 hospital admissions and 500 deaths, and 
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Next, why does regulation emerge in a particular context? Regulators have 
been classified according to whether they have emerged because of the 
public interest, because of some private interest, or because of relations 
between institutions.7 Custody visiting came on the agenda because a 
number of people, most notably Michael Meacher MP and Lord Scarman, 
thought it would be in the public interest. Mr Meacher wanted visiting in order 
to counter violence against detainees by police officers,8 and Lord Scarman 
said that visiting would be “salutary”9 in the wake of the Brixton riots of 1981. 
As we shall see, in the official literature, from the earliest stages, policy-
makers have shifted the focus of the public interest away from safeguarding 
detainees to promoting public confidence in the police.10 
Next, what does regulation cover? The range of subject-matter covered by 
regulation is vast, and encompasses the behaviour of state bodies in the 
public sector as well as the behaviour of businesses in the private sector. 
Hood et al have shown that regulation of the public sector is a substantial 
affair, considerably greater than the resources spent on regulating private 
utilities: but that there is no overall rationalisation, and that the public sector is 
regulated at best patchily. They point to the particular need in public sector 
regulation for there to be some degree of organisational separation between 
                                                                                                                                            
around 50,000 deaths each year as a result of injuries or health problems originating in the 
workplace: “Better regulation: better for whom?”, Briefing 14.04.2016, Centre for Crime and 
Justice Studies:  http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/publications/better-regulation-better-
whom accessed 06.05.2016. 
7 Morgan and Yeung (n 5) 16-78. 
8 See Chapter Three, text to notes 9-10.  
9 Lord Scarman, The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981 (Cmnd 8427 1981) 7.9, and see 
Chapter One, text to notes 97-98. 
10 See Chapter Three, text to notes 67, 73, 128-131, 159-160. 
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regulator and regulatee.11 Independence is a principal issue in this study, but 
because it does not arise solely from the topic of regulation, it is discussed 
later in this chapter. 
The regulation of privatised utilities has been a focus of academic interest in 
regulation. Whether a privatised utility should be regulated, and if so how, is 
seen primarily as an economic question. But economic questions easily turn 
into political questions, and political questions are by definition areas of 
controversy, including controversy about whether an activity should be 
regulated at all.12 And where the object of regulation is not primarily an 
economic activity, politics are even more likely to be the source of 
controversy. Controversies about regulation outside the economic sphere13 
have, in recent years, been very prominent and very political, notably 
controversies relating to the press, politicians’ expenses and the police. The 
recommendations of the Leveson Inquiry14 for regulation of the press by a 
body other than the press itself were hotly contested, and that controversy 
itself played a part in the resignation of a cabinet minister relating back to 
what she had done when politicians regulated themselves about their 
expenses:15 and there have been numerous recent controversies involving the 
                                                 
11 Christopher Hood, Colin Scott, Oliver James, George Jones and Tony Travers Regulation 
Inside Government: Waste-Watchers, Quality Police and Sleaze-Busters (OUP 1999) 5. 8- 9.  
12 Morgan and Yeung (n 5) 3. 
13 Some standard texts completely ignore all non-economic areas: e.g., Baldwin and Cave (n 
4). 
14 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http:/www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/ 
accessed 13.06.2014. 
15 Maria Miller: The Guardian (London 09.04.2014.) 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/apr/09/maria-miller-quits-pm-sleaze accessed 
22.06.2016. 
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accountability of the police for their behaviour,16 which is custody visiting’s 
remit. 
What does regulation do and how does it work? It has been found easier to 
provide a functional definition of regulation than a definition which seeks to 
establish what the scope of regulation is or should be.17 Julia Black offers the 
following functional definition of regulation: 
“the sustained and focussed attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of 
producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may 
involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering and 
behaviour-modification.”18 
One of the purposes of custody visiting is to improve the standard of care of 
detainees, and this has certainly been a “sustained” attempt, if not very 
“focussed”: custody visiting schemes have operated over most of England 
and Wales since at least 2002/3, and there were “lay visiting” schemes 
operating in some areas from the mid-1980s. Black’s definition does not 
require a regulator to use all or any of the three mechanisms she specifies. 
Custody visiting uses just one mechanism, that of gathering information. The 
                                                 
16 Above all, Hillsborough, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/apr/26/hillsborough-
inquests-jury-says-96-victims-were-unlawfully-killed accessed 17.06.2016; and the police’s 
admission of their use of undercover police to spy on the family in the Stephen Lawrence 
affair http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/undercover-with-paul-lewis-and-rob-
evans/2013/sep/19/undercover-police-and-policing-doreen-lawrence accessed 23.10.2014. 
17 Morgan and Yeung (n 5) 3. 
18 Julia Black, “Critical Reflections on Regulation”, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 
(2002) 27 1, 26.  The classic functional definition in Christopher Hood, Henry Rothenstein and 
Robert Baldwin, The Government of Risk (OUP 2001), p 23 requires regulators to have the 
means of standard-setting, information-gathering and enforcement.  Black says that a 
regulator does not need to achieve all these tasks. In this case, the regulator may be said to 
rely on other regulators for those it does not perform itself. 
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formal mechanisms of behaviour modification are provided by other 
regulators, namely the Police and Crime Commissioners, senior police 
officers and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and joint 
inspections of custody blocks by HMIC and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Prisons (HMIP) and the IPCC. In other words, custody visiting has to rely on 
other regulators to ensure that any identified deficiencies are remedied. The 
role of custody visitors is to make random unannounced visits to custody 
blocks where they check the conditions of detention and seek interviews with 
detainees. Following this information-gathering, what mechanisms exist to 
achieve behaviour modification where authoritative standards have not been 
met? As will be seen in Chapter Six, the only means available to custody 
visiting is persuasion.19   
 
Two issues have been prominent in the debates about regulation: the role of 
the state, and self-regulation. First, what is the role of the state in regulation, 
and how does the state apply regulation? Commentators have noted a move 
away from “command and control” to what have been called “decentred” 
systems and self-regulation. A nautical metaphor has become fashionable, 
identifying the functions of rowing and steering. The state steers the 
regulators to regulate in the appropriate direction: and the regulators steer the 
regulatees to row in the appropriate direction. 20 The metaphor is extended by 
                                                 
19 The lowest point on the regulatory pyramid: John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and 
Responsive Regulation (OUP 2002) 31.  
20 Adam Crawford, “Networked governance and the post-regulatory state? Steering, rowing 
and anchoring the provision of policing and security” Theoretical Criminology (2006) 10 4 449: 
David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government; how the Entrepreneurial Spirit is 
Transforming the Public Sector (Plume 1993). 
 47 
the expression “anchored pluralism”,21 which is used to mean that regulation 
should be provided by several institutions, each ultimately controlled by the 
state. The idea is that a number of different agencies can regulate the same 
institution or activity. Anchors can be in the plural as well. The state is not the 
only anchor: other anchors can be different parts of the state and/or other 
institutions.22 The resulting systems of accountability are much more complex 
than the traditional linear hierarchy. Entities subject to regulation may be 
accountable to several different regulators, at different levels of power and 
importance, and those regulators may themselves be accountable to several 
other institutions. The system by which various entities are held to account 
can be analysed in terms of intersecting networks of “interdependence” where 
there is no single supremely powerful central point, or of “redundancy” where 
more than one mechanism operates to provide the accountability.23 Academic 
skills are needed to analyse these networks: the lack of clear accountability 
causes voters to be disillusioned.24 While the custody visiting schemes form 
part of such a network, it is fortunately not a very complex one. The 
theoretical structure is as follows. The schemes regulate the police: the 
schemes are anchored to the Police and Crime Commissioners: and the 
Police and Crime Commissioners are also regulators of the police.   
                                                 
21 Ian Loader and Neil Walker, “Necessary virtues: the legitimate place of the state in the 
production of security” in Wood J and Dupont B (eds), Democracy Society and the 
Governance of Security (CUP 2006).  
22 Julia Black, “Decentring Regulation: The Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-
Regulatory’ World” Current Legal Problems (2001) 54 103,112. 
23 Colin Scott, “Accountability in the Regulatory State”, Journal of Law and Society (2000) 27 
1 38: Ian Loader, “Plural Policing and Democratic Governance”, Social and Legal Studies 
(2000) 9 323. 
24 Steve Richards, “The reason voters feel powerless: because it’s the truth”, The Guardian 
(London18.06.2014):http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/18/voters-
powerless-accountability-britain-nhs-schools accessed 17.06.2016. 
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Those who think that only the state should, or maybe that only the state can, 
be the ultimate source of control for a regulator point to the state as the 
source of legitimacy and authority, and highlight its positive aspects in 
contrast to earlier attitudes that the state is a necessary evil.25 Coercion is one 
of the instruments of correction used by regulators, and the state is the only 
legitimate source of coercion, but there are other instruments of correction 
available to regulators, one example being publicity. The “regulatory pyramid” 
developed by John Braithwaite starts with persuasion in the largest section at 
the base of the pyramid, and proceeds upwards, if necessary, to various 
means of coercion in the smallest sections at the apex.26 Hence the state 
does not need to be the “anchor” of all forms of this regulation. But it is not 
easy to apply these points to the custody visiting schemes. First, are the 
schemes really in the role of an independent regulator? This study will 
determine whether the custody visiting schemes, which are controlled by the 
Police and Crime Commissioners, can fairly be characterised as independent. 
Second, the schemes’ powers of persuasion are limited, because the Police 
and Crime Commissioners do not issue critical publicity about police 
behaviour in custody blocks,27 and because the visitors have no power to 
publicise anything without the agreement of the Police and Crime 
Commissioner.28 
The second prominent issue in the regulation debates has been self-
regulation. It is relevant to this enquiry because police behaviour in custody 
                                                 
25 Loader and Walker (n 21).  
26 Braithwaite (n 19) 31. 
27 At least, not in Avon and Somerset, nor the area studied, see Chapter Six, text to notes 
155-158. 
28 2013 Code of Practice, paras 80-82. 
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blocks is largely self-regulated.29 Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave note that 
self-regulation is often found in professions and trades as a means of holding 
government regulation at bay: that it may (or may not) be subject to a form of 
governmental structuring or oversight: and that it has proved popular with 
governments, as it reduces costs.30 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung note 
that it is often claimed that industry has superior informational capacities, so 
industry self-regulation is more likely to be efficacious. Against that, they note 
that self-regulation may be self-serving attempts to fend off unwanted state 
intervention, and it reduces accountability and enforcement.31 These 
discussions are all concerned with consumer issues and the conduct of 
bodies other than the state, but that is no reason not to apply them to political 
controversies and to state bodies. In the “non-economic” cases mentioned 
above,32 the controversies have been about the behaviour of an institution 
and whether it should be allowed to regulate itself, producing the vivid image 
that those who regulate themselves are “marking their own homework”.33  
Adam Crawford has drawn attention to the reaction away from self-regulation, 
and shown how the state intervenes directly in controlling education and 
people’s behaviour generally and their social life.34 However, custody visiting 
is not part of this general recent fashion for greater regulation. Custody 
visiting did not originate from government policy, and is not in any way typical 
of regulators of recent origin.  
                                                 
29 See Chapter One, text to notes 81-85. 
30 Baldwin and Cave (n 4) 39f.  
31 Morgan and Yeung (n 5) 92-96. 
32 See text to notes 13-16. 
33 “In praise of ... not marking one’s own homework”, The Guardian (London 10.04.2014). 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/10/in-praise-of-not-marking-ones-own-
homework accessed 17.06.2016. 
34 Crawford (n 20). 
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From this survey I conclude that custody visiting does qualify as a type of 
regulation, albeit an unusual one. Along with the concept of independence 
which derives also from other topics, the concepts of legitimacy, accountability 
and effectiveness, which derive from the topic of regulation, are discussed 
towards the end of the chapter.  
 
Lukes’ theory of power and Packer’s models of criminal 
justice 
Chapter One demonstrated the power of the police in custody blocks,35 and 
the power of the police is a constant, whether it is exercised in their own 
territory or elsewhere, and whether conflict is overt or implicit. The concept of 
power underpins every aspect of this thesis. What follows is a very brief and 
highly selective introduction to the study of this concept, which is derived from 
the work of Steven Lukes. 
 
In his work on power, Lukes saw A as exercising power over B where A 
affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests.36 This is a broad concept. The 
use of the very general word “affects” shows that A’s exercise of power over B 
need not be clearly visible. Interests are also given a wide interpretation. 
Lukes says that interests are not only what people want and prefer, whether 
expressed directly or indirectly:  
                                                 
35 See Chapter One, text to notes 14-73. 
36 Steven Lukes Power, a Radical View 2nd edn (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 30. On (much 
later) reflection he found this unsatisfactory. Among a number of revisions to his theory in the 
second edition, Lukes saw power as a dispositional concept; it does not need to be exercised, 
it is an ability or a capacity; and he narrowed the question down to: “how do the powerful 
secure the compliance of those they dominate?” which in my view fits the enquiry in this 
thesis; ibid 109ff. 
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“The radical, however, maintains that people’s wants may themselves 
be a product of a system which works against their interests, and, in 
such cases, relates the latter to what they would want and prefer, were 
they able to make the choice.”37  
 
I think it is fair to gloss what Lukes calls “the choice” as “an informed and free 
choice”, made by people who clearly understand clearly what is in their 
interests. 
 
Lukes analysed the operation of power in three “dimensions”. One-
dimensional power is getting people to do things they wouldn’t otherwise do.38 
Two-dimensional power is getting people not to do the things they would like 
to do.39 Both one-dimensional and two-dimensional power relate to situations 
where there is overt conflict: but, as Lukes points out, power is not exercised 
only in situations of overt conflict: A may exercise power over B by 
influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Lukes’ three-dimensional 
power stops demands being made and conflicts arising by controlling others’ 
thoughts and desires, and by keeping certain issues off the agenda: 
 
                                                 
37 ibid 38. 
38 ibid 16-19. 
39 ibid 20-25. 
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“Thought control takes many ... forms, through the control of 
information, through the mass media and through the processes of 
socialization.”40 
 
 And Lukes continued, displaying a marked degree of passion: 
 
“...is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent 
people, to whatever degree, from having their grievances by shaping 
their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they 
accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can 
see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural 
and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and 
beneficial? To assume the absence of grievances equals genuine 
consensus is simply to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated 
consensus by definitional fiat.”  
 
It is in this three-dimensional form that power is at its most effective when it is 
also least observable, and it prevents conflicts from arising in the first place.41 
This must also be by far the most common way in which power operates.42  
                                                 
40 ibid 27. The concept of socialisation (UK spelling) is explained at the beginning of Chapter 
Five. 
41 ibid 27-28. Compare Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire, (1776-1789: Penguin Classics 1996) chapter iii on the first Roman emperors, 
Augustus and his successors: “The masters of the Roman world surrounded their throne with 
darkness, concealed their irresistible strength, and humbly professed themselves the 
accountable ministers of the senate, whose supreme decrees they dictated and obeyed.” The 
last part of this wonderful sentence is also apposite in this study, because of the desire of the 
police to appear accountable (or, as they like to put it, to have “transparency”) which I noted in 
several interviews I conducted with police officers, and because of the equation with the law 
of the wide discretion within which they exercise their power: see Andrew Sanders and 
Richard Young “The Rule of Law, Due Process and Pre-Trial Criminal Justice” Current Legal 
Problems (1994) 47 125. 
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Lukes has to argue against those who say one cannot study, let alone 
explain, what does not happen. He cites research which sought to explain 
“things that do not happen” on the assumption that “the proper object of 
investigation is not political activity, but political inactivity”. The research asked 
why the issue of air pollution was not raised as early or as effectively in some 
cities in the United States as it was in others. The research showed that, in a 
city where a powerful steel company had a substantial industrial and political 
presence, regulation of air pollution was not even discussed, and that the 
company did not enter the political arena on the issue; in contrast to that, air 
pollution regulation was introduced in a neighbouring city which was equally 
polluted and had a similar population; the essential difference in the 
neighbouring city was that the powerful company was just one of several steel  
companies in that city and did not have a strong political presence there.43 
Reviewing this and other examples, Lukes argues that unconscious inaction is 
a decision, and a decision may be taken because of the power of an 
institution.44   
 
Commenting on Lukes, Keith Dowding says that more account should be 
taken of intentions rather than having resort to what he calls the “black box” of 
socialisation and acquiescence. The first port of call to explain behaviour 
should be the reasons people give for their action. That said, he agrees with 
Lukes that people acquiesce in their own domination. They do so either by 
                                                                                                                                            
42 For a graphic account of this sort of power, see Nick Davies, Hack Attack: How the truth 
caught up with Rupert Murdoch (Chatto & Windus 2014) 163 ff. 
43 Lukes (n 36) 45. It was some 13 years later when air pollution regulation was introduced in 
the city where the powerful company’s factory was located. 
44 ibid 52 ff. 
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actively believing the values of their oppressors, or by merely being resigned 
to them. That resignation may be subliminal, and people’s autonomy may be 
affected by influences, even if those who are influenced are unaware of how it 
is happening, and even if those from whom the influences originate do not 
consciously intend it.45  
 
Drawing on these insights, this thesis will investigate the failure by some 
custody visitors to raise, or even to consider, issues where there might be 
conflict with the police. Where that occurs, the explanation may be that they 
intend the behaviour. If so, the next question is why they intended it, which 
could lead to an enquiry about their mindset when they were recruited and the 
explanation for that mindset, and/or whether they have been socialised in their 
training and induction. Alternatively, custody visitors might not be aware of the 
failure to raise certain issues, in which case a more subliminal explanation is 
necessary. In either case, Lukes’ three-dimensional power would appear to be 
an important factor in keeping issues off the agenda. His theory has been 
applied to the relationship between a police authority and its chief constable. 
Brogden argued, from a case study, that the power of the chief constable 
normally lay in the chief constable’s ability to manipulate the political agenda, 
to prevent potential conflict becoming overt issues: usually this was achieved, 
not by specific acts of oppression, but by the police authority’s acceptance of 
the chief constable’s perspective.46  As we shall see, there are parallels in the 
                                                 
45 Keith Dowding, “Three-Dimensional Power: A Discussion of Stephen Lukes’ Power: A 
Radical View” Political Studies Review 2006 vol 4 136-145. For the relationship between 
power and legitimacy, see text to notes 105-106 and after 106. 
46 Mike Brogden, “A police authority: the denial of conflict”, Sociological Review (1977) 25 2  
325 cited in Robert Reiner, “Where the Buck Stops”, in R Morgan and D Smith (eds) Coming 
to Terms with Policing: Perspectives on Policy (Routledge 1989) 198-199. See also text to 
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way that the Police and Crime Commissioners operate custody visiting 
schemes: the commissioners, and the visitors themselves, rarely stray outside 
the invisible boundaries established by the police through their dominance of 
custody blocks. 
Lukes’ theory of power is drawn on to assist in the understanding of the next 
concept, Herbert Packer’s crime control and due process models of criminal 
justice. These models express extremes, at the opposite ends of a spectrum 
of attitudes about values,47 and they provide answers to the fundamental 
questions of who, or what, custody visiting is for. Packer’s crime control model 
majors on the importance of the unobstructed efficiency of the police 
operation, and on the factual presumption of guilt, while the due process 
model majors on the primacy of the individual, the normative presumption of 
innocence, and the need for limitations on official power. The crime control 
view is that the most efficient system is for the police not to be hindered in 
obtaining confessions. In marked contrast, the due process view insists on 
safeguards for suspect detainees, because of the concern that confessions 
are unreliable if induced by physical or psychological coercion, and that there 
should be limits on permissible coercion, even at the expense of losing 
reliable confessions.48  
Packer’s models are very useful49 in enabling us to characterise the different 
views held about criminal justice. Packer’s models articulate attitudes which 
                                                                                                                                            
notes 95-113 on the independence of police authorities and Police and Crime 
Commissioners. 
47 Andrew Sanders, Richard Young and Mandy Burton, Criminal Justice (4th edition OUP 
2010)  21 ff. 
48 Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, (Stanford University Press 1968) 158 
and 163. 
49 Despite their limitations, on which the literature is not cited here. 
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are strongly differentiated, deeply held, value-based, and ideological. Due 
process adherents, liberal defenders of civil liberties, have been sidelined. 
The crime control view has frequently been promoted by conservative, labour 
and coalition governments, and by some parts of the media. Criminals are 
seen as evil, and there need to be tough measures to deal with them: so the 
answers, loudly proclaimed, are to reduce the rights of suspects, convict more 
of them, and send more of them to prison for longer periods.50 However, 
despite that, research has shown that the views of the public can be closer to 
due process, being more likely to support prevention and rehabilitation than 
punishment.51 
 
One way of resolving the conflicts between the values of Packer’s models is 
found in the concept of “balance”. This is the notion that there is a balance to 
be struck between the interests of the state and the interests of suspects; that 
the weight given to those interests has an equal and opposite effect, like the 
operation of a see-saw; that the interests of the state are identical to the 
interests of victims; and that the rights of suspects should therefore be 
reduced. This idea, which has been very prominent in official discourse, has 
                                                 
50 This is illustrated by widespread hostility to alleged terrorists seeking to avoid extradition 
and the call to “get rid of” the Human Rights Act, both favourite topics in the tabloid press: for 
instance, Melanie Phillips in the Daily Mail: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-
1092847/The-proper-response-Human-Rights-Act-rid-it.html accessed 05.03.2016. The 
responsibility of the tabloids and of the UK’s adversarial political system for this is 
demonstrated, convincingly, in the context of reactions to the murder of James Bulger, by 
David Green in When Children Kill Children: Penal populism and political culture (OUP 2008). 
See also Ann James and John Raine, The New Politics of Criminal Justice (Longman 1998), 
at 73-5, and Ed Cape, “PACE then and now: 21 years of rebalancing” in Cape E and Young R 
(eds), Regulating Policing: The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Past, Present and 
Future (Hart 2008). 
51 Mike Hough and Julian V Roberts, “Public Opinion, Crime and Criminal Justice,” in Maguire 
M, Morgan R and Reiner R (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 5th edn (OUP 2012). 
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attracted telling criticism.52 The concept of balance could be applied to the 
conflicting purposes of custody visiting in the following way. It would be 
argued that, so as to improve the rights of victims, the due process values of 
respecting the rights of individual detainees and safeguarding their welfare 
(and reducing the number of deaths in custody) should be traded off in favour 
of the public interest, with its crime control values of promoting confidence in 
the police. But the application of Lukes’ three-dimensional power means that 
the police do not need to advance that argument: indeed, they do not have to 
do or say anything. Three-dimensional power secures what the dominant 
party wants, because that is the line that others believe is what the dominant 
party wants, and that is the line that the others decide that they too must 
follow.  
 
I now turn from the concept of power to the regulatory concepts, and whether 
custody visiting has the necessary characteristics of a regulator. However, in 
seeking to act as a regulator, custody visiting is always subject to the power of 
the police. 
 
Independence, Neutrality and Impartiality 
Independence is of fundamental importance in a study of custody visiting. Its 
formal title in all the official literature is “Independent Custody Visiting”. The 
legislation is headed “Independent custody visitors for places of detention”, 
and provides that: 
                                                 
52 Michael Zander, “PACE, Past, Present and Future”, LSE Law Society and Economy 
Working Papers 1/2012, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2012-01_Zander.pdf 
accessed 02.03.2015: Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (fourth 
edition OUP 2010) 41ff: Sanders et al (n 47) 725. 
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“... every Police and Crime Commissioner shall make arrangements for 
detainees to be visited by persons appointed under the arrangements, 
(“independent custody visitors”); and [that] the arrangements must53 
secure that the persons appointed under the arrangements are 
independent of both the Police and Crime Commissioner and the chief 
officer of police ...”54  
 
Statute law gives the quality of independence emphatic prominence, using the 
word “independent” repeatedly. 
 
As explained in the introductory chapter, the requirement of independence 
also derives from two United Nations instruments.55 Specifically, this arises 
because, nationally, custody visiting schemes, through the Independent 
Custody Visiting Association (ICVA), are one constituent of the UK’s National 
Preventive Mechanism (NPM), which the United Kingdom has an obligation to 
set up on an independent basis.56 Regulatory bodies are often described as 
“independent”;57 no doubt with the intention of bolstering the positive 
connotations of independence, those who write the marketing material say the 
                                                 
53 emphasis added. 
54 Police Reform Act 2002, s 51(2), as amended by Police and Social Responsibility Act 2011, 
Schedule 16, part 3, s 299. 
55 See Chapter One, text to notes 101-103. 
56 The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other cruel inhuman or 
degrading Treatment or Punishment: a treaty which supplements the 1984 UN Convention 
against Torture: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCAT.aspx accessed 
31.05.2015. 
57 For instance: the Independent Police Complaints Commission http//www.ipcc.gov.uk/; the 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation 
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/; accessed 16.10.2014 and the 
Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority 
www.parliamentarystandards.org.uk/accessed 16.10.2014. 
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regulatory bodies are “robust” as well as independent.58  Independence is one 
of the qualities of good regulation in the Hampton Report, a government 
publication whose purpose was announced to be the promotion of efficient 
and effective approaches to regulatory inspection and enforcement.59 The 
label “independent” announces that custody visiting is free from political 
interference; that it is working in the public interest, rather than in the interest 
of the body it regulates; and that custody visiting has managed to avoid being 
taken over by the body it regulates, a process known as “regulatory 
capture”.60  
 
Independence can be understood in various ways. One way to look at it is in 
structural terms. At first sight a body or person contained within another would 
seem to have no independence at all, but this impression may be misleading. 
Factors which influence behaviour may come into play, such as the 
surrounding circumstances and conditions, and the personalities of 
individuals. All these factors have the capacity to affect the degree of 
independence, which, like freedom, is rarely an absolute condition.61 
Independence, like freedom, implies that there is someone or something to be 
                                                 
58 For instance: “The chairman of the Press Complaints Commission has promised that the 
replacement body will be a robust, independent regulator with teeth”: The Guardian (London 
09.03.2012). http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/mar/09/pcc-chairman-robust-regulator 
accessed 07.06.2016. The replacement body, like its predecessor, a self-regulator, is The 
Independent Press Standards Organisation, IPSO:www.ipso.co.uk/accessed 30.09.2014. 
59 Philip Hampton, Reducing administrative burdens: effective inspection and enforcement 
(2005 HM Treasury):  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/bud05hampton_150305_640.pdf accessed 
29.05.2016. 
60 See text to notes 75-76. 
61 Hartley Dean and Peter Taylor-Gooby, Dependency Culture: The Explosion of Myth (1992 
Harvester Wheatsheaf) 172-3.  
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“independent of”. Independence is best seen as relational,62 as something 
which can exist only as the state of not being dependent on someone or 
something else.63 
 
The notion of independence, for many lawyers, centres on the doctrines of the 
separation of powers and the rule of law, and the great importance attached 
to the independence of the judiciary. There has been much discussion about 
whether judges are truly independent, and examining this literature briefly is 
helpful in the context of this study. Judges have a strong tradition of 
independence, of acting without being influenced by the executive branch.64 
However, John Griffith examined the attitudes of senior judges and found that 
they decided against government only very occasionally. His thesis was that 
judges see their role as supporting the institutions of government as 
established by law, and that judges see their role that way because of the 
type of people they are, with a particular social class, background, education, 
training and professional career path. So, for Griffith, the incorruptibility and 
independence of the English bench were not in issue: but he was firmly of the 
view that the judges were not neutral.65  
The independence question often depends on relations between different 
organs of the state. Here the example of the judiciary is particularly 
instructive. High Court judges have what is known as “tenure”, which means 
                                                 
62 See text to note 11 on “relational distance” between regulator and regulatee.  
63 Morag McDermont, Governing Independence and Expertise: The Business of Housing 
Associations (Bloomsbury Publishing 2010) 157. 
64 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane 2010) 25. 
65 John A G Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (Fontana 1977).  
 61 
that it is very difficult for the state to dismiss them.66 Tenure safeguards the 
independence of judges after they have been appointed: but does the state 
ensure that independent-minded people are appointed in the first place? 
Formerly operated by the Lord Chancellor, the task of appointing judges is 
now in the hands of an “independent” commission, and the same statute 
which set up the commission provides that the Lord Chancellor and other 
ministers must not seek to influence judicial decisions.67 However, the 
executive branch does make very important decisions about judges. The 
government decides how many judges there are to be, which broadly 
determines the caseload of each judge: the government decides how much to 
pay the judges: the government appoints members of the judicial 
appointments commission: and the government requires judges to attend 
training and continuing education courses, and to be subject to performance 
evaluation.68 This illustrates, at the highest level of the state, how the 
independence question applies to organs of the state which depend on other 
organs of the state. There is always likely to be some structural connection, 
and some dependency must follow. The question therefore is how to assess 
the extent, the degree and the effects of that dependency. At some stage, the 
                                                 
66 Act of Settlement 1701, and Senior Courts Act 1981, s 11(3). But junior judges can be 
summarily dismissed by the executive: see “Judges sacked for watching porn” BBC news 
website, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31920906 accessed 17.03.2015. 
67 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s 61 (the commission) and s 3(5) (no influence over judicial 
decisions). But ministers do make strongly worded attacks on court decisions adverse to the 
government. For instance: “… The Home Secretary … has accused judges of ‘subverting’ 
British democracy and making the streets of Britain more dangerous by ignoring rules aimed 
at deporting more foreign criminals…:” The Guardian (London 17.02.2013). 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/feb/17/theresa-may-attacks-judges-deportation 
accessed 07.06.2016. 
68 So far, this applies much more to the junior ranks: Rosemary Hunter, “Judicial Diversity and 
the ‘new’ Judge”, in The Futures of Legal Education and the Legal Profession, Sommerlad H, 
Harris-Short S, Vaughan S and Young R (eds), (Hart 2015) 91-2. 
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level of dependency makes it impossible to apply the adjective “independent” 
in any meaningful way. The difficulty is in identifying that threshold.   
Most regulators are state bodies of one kind or another. It follows that where a 
regulator is appointed by the state to regulate another state body, there must 
be some degree of dependency on the state. The degree of the dependency 
will be shaped by the extent to which the dependency derives, not so much 
from the structure, as from the surrounding circumstances, the personalities of 
individuals, and other influences. For instance, is the workforce of the 
regulator partly comprised of former employees of the body being regulated? 
Are all the resources which are used by the regulator being provided by the 
body which is being regulated? What sort of backgrounds do the people who 
work for the regulator come from? What kinds of attitudes do they have? How 
easy is it for managers to dismiss the individuals carrying out the regulatory 
work? In other words, do those individuals, like judges,69 have tenure?70   
Stephen Savage has researched these issues by asking people who worked 
for three police complaints bodies to define independence. Their definitions 
were: impartiality; distance, or separateness; and objectivity. Impartiality was 
seen as neutrality, being “straight down the middle”, making a choice between 
contested narratives.71 The (apparently undifferentiated) concepts of 
impartiality and neutrality are therefore seen as aspects of, or indications of, 
independence, rather than separate qualities. Neutrality and impartiality can 
                                                 
69 See text to note 66. 
70 A point also made about the rights of members of National Human Rights Institutions 
appointed by governments, by Rachel Murray, “National Human Rights Institutions. Criteria 
and factors for assessing their Effectiveness” Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2007) 
25 2 189, 197. 
71 Stephen Savage, “Thinking Independence: Calling the Police to Account through the 
Independent Investigation of Police Complaints” British Journal of Criminology (2013) 53 94. 
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however be differentiated. Neutrality suggests an absence of strong, decided 
views.72 Custody visitors could be required to show their neutrality by not 
identifying with either the detainees or the police. Tests have been developed 
in case law for measuring impartiality: whether there are conflicts of interest, 
and whether there is the appearance of bias. Judges sometimes have to 
disqualify themselves from hearing cases in which they have, or appear to 
have, a conflicting interest, and where there is a real danger of bias, they 
must do so.73 This test has not been applied to police complaints bodies or to 
custody visitors. If the test were to be applied at the strictest level, it would 
disqualify any investigator working for a complaints body who had worked for 
the police, as many of them have done: the same would apply to custody 
visitors who had done so: and, in both cases, the test would disqualify those 
who had worked for detainees. The question then is whether it makes any 
sense that the only people who can perform these functions are people with 
no experience or expertise in the area, which seems a very perverse result. 
The qualities of both neutrality and impartiality make a direct impact on 
trustworthiness. In their work of making checks on the conditions of detention 
in police custody, custody visitors need to have the trust of detainees, so that 
the detainees are prepared to be candid with them, and the visitors need to 
have the trust of custody staff, to ensure their co-operation throughout their 
visits.  
To return to Savage’s findings, distance and separateness were seen as not 
being “of” the police and not being accountable to them, and in police 
                                                 
72 https://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/neutrality accessed 20.06.2016.  
73 Pinochet, in re [1999] UKHL 1, and Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67. 
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complaints it can be important, “presentationally”, to provide tactical 
reassurance to complainants that “we’re nothing to do with the police”. As 
noted as long ago as 1990, the practice has been for police to introduce 
visitors to detainees.74 Savage noted that the next most frequently cited 
definition of independence was objectivity, in the sense of a search for the 
truth, being evidence-based and only evidence-based. This quality is clearly 
relevant to custody visiting. Visitors who relied wholly on police 
representations of custodial conditions, rather than inspecting the cells for 
themselves, would not be taking an objective or an independent stance. 
Savage noted obstacles to, and restraints on, independence, in three 
categories: being too “close” to the police or too “soft” on them, in trying to 
maintain working relationships: disparity of resources, with the police having 
far more resources than the complaints bodies; and the obligation to rely on 
police support, which can cause serious delays. It is easy to see the parallels 
here between the complaints bodies and custody visiting.  Custody visitors 
have to work with the police; the police have far more resources than the 
Police and Crime Commissioners; and custody visitors have no resources 
except for their time. 
The theory of “regulatory capture” is also relevant here. This is the theory 
which seeks to explain that regulatory agencies are weak and ineffective 
because they are unduly influenced by, or have been “captured” by, the body 
they are supposed to regulate. This has been associated particularly with the 
“revolving door syndrome”, or “poachers turned gamekeepers”, where 
                                                 
74 This was noted in 1990: see Charles Kemp and Rod Morgan, Lay Visiting to Police 
Stations: Report to the Home Office (Bristol and Bath Centre for Criminal Justice 1990) 49. 
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members of regulatory bodies leave to start a new job in the industry they 
have been regulating, or vice versa.75 The three forms of capture identified in 
that research can usefully be applied to the investigation of custody visitors. 
Do visitors identify with the police? How much sympathy do they have with the 
police in having to deal with detainees? Are the visitors tough enough to 
challenge police practices?  A case study in Australia attributed the capture of 
a police complaints body to a number of factors, one of which was the 
structural issue of there being no clear separation between the police and the 
regulator.76  
Another approach to the independence of public bodies monitoring the 
criminal justice system has been taken by Stephen Shute.77 His objects of 
study include inspection bodies like HMIC and HMIP, whose joint inspection 
teams inspect all custody blocks every six years. Shute includes custody 
visiting in that category of inspection bodies.78 Custody visiting does not have 
much in common with either of these inspection bodies, or with the complaints 
bodies reported on in Savage’s article: but they are the closest bodies with 
which we can compare custody visiting. Shute identifies three kinds of 
independence, financial, political/operational, and judgmental. Shute says that 
judgemental independence means that inspectorates have the right to decide 
for themselves what form their reports should take; what content they should 
have; how they should be phrased and presented; and what their intended 
                                                 
75 Tom Makkai and John Braithwaite, “In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of 
Regulatory Capture” Journal of Public Policy (1992) 12 1 61. 
76 Tim Prenzler, “Civilian Oversight of the Police: A test of Capture Theory”  British Journal of 
Criminology (2000) 40 4 659. 
77 Stephen Shute, “On the Outside Looking In: Reflections on the Role of Inspection in Driving 
up Quality in the Criminal Justice System” Modern Law Review (2013) 76 3 494.  
78 2013 Code of Practice para 50 does include the expression “inspection” in its description of 
the work of custody visitors, but does not use the word “inspect” to describe their duty in 
relation to the welfare of detainees, such as their treatment by the police and custody staff. 
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audience might be. Shute also argues that regulatory capture is prevented by 
the involvement of lay79 people such as Sir Thomas Winsor, who was the first 
person whose career had not been in the police to be appointed Chief 
Inspector of Constabulary.  
 
What is the meaning of the word “independent” in the title “Independent 
Custody Visiting”? We have seen how the legislation which established the 
scheme made repeated use of the word “independent”.80 The legal meaning 
of the word “independent” could be determined by applying the rules of 
statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation might be relevant if there were 
to be a court case on the issue, but none has so far been reported, and it is 
unlikely that there will be one. It is more fruitful to think about what the word 
“independent” may have meant to the policy-makers in the Home Office, and 
how their use of the word would have been understood by the wider public, as 
well as visitors, custody staff and scheme administrators. 
 
The policy-makers may well have had in mind that the original practice, which 
was still being followed in some areas, was to appoint members of the police 
authority as visitors. The Home Office used the terms “independent” and 
“conflict of interest” in the narrow sense that people were eligible to be 
appointed as visitors unless they were actually working at the time in the 
                                                 
79 Custody visitors have always been lay, in the sense of not being serving police officers, but 
very few have had professional expertise like Sir Thomas Winsor, a lawyer and rail regulator: 
https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/about-us/who-we-are/tom-winsor/ accessed 
03.08.2016. 
80 See text to note 54. 
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police, as justices of the peace or as members of the police authority.81  But 
people who cease to work for institutions often continue to have the same 
mindset afterwards: and candidates for appointment as visitors might have 
family or social connections with the institutions, and/or settled attitudes 
incompatible with keeping an open mind about custody.82 No consideration 
was given to a mechanism by which independent-minded people could be 
recruited: for instance, by using another organisation to carry out the 
recruitment.83 In addition, and this is perhaps even more remarkable, the 
independence of the visitors was not seen as being in any way affected, let 
alone capable of being defeated, by the fact that every aspect of the visiting 
was controlled by the police authority.  
 
My interim conclusion is that neither the visitors nor the visiting were 
independent of the police authority, in terms of structure and management. 
The next question is whether the arrangements could correctly be described 
as securing the independence of the visitors from the chief officer of police as 
well as from the police authority.84 The answer to this question depends on 
the extent to which the police authority was itself independent of the chief 
officer of police. What was the role of the police authority?  
                                                 
81 Explanatory Notes to Police Reform Act 2002, s 51, para 284: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/30/notes accessed 09.02.2014 The 2003 Code of 
Practice paras 18 and 22. As is stated by another government document, this narrow 
definition of the expression “conflict of interest” ignores the risk that the perception of a 
conflict can be as damaging as an actual conflict: one example given is the perception of 
rewards for past contributions or favours. See Public Appointments: probity and conflict of 
interest: a guide for candidates: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/73247/Conflicts
ofInterestDCMS: accessed 05.02.2014. 
82 See the concepts of distance and separateness identified by Savage: text to note 74. 
83 Like the Judicial Appointments Commission and judges: text to note 67. 
84 Paraphrased from Police Reform Act 2002, s 51(2), as amended by Police and Social 
Responsibility Act 2011, Schedule 16, part 3, s 299. 
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From 1964 the police authority had the power to call for a report from the chief 
constable, but the chief constable could withhold information if the Home 
Secretary agreed.85 However, as the Patten Report on Policing in Northern 
Ireland observed about the system in England and Wales, the police authority 
seemed to have no power to follow up issues arising from the report:86 and 
the report could not deal with “operational matters”.87 The Patten Report made 
the radical proposal that a new, more democratic body should have the power 
to require the chief constable to provide explanations for operational 
decisions, and to follow up the report with further inquiries.88 The government 
rejected these recommendations. Some commentators take the view that the 
reason for this failure was that the report gave insufficient attention to the role 
of the state and the vested interests within policing.89 The result is that many 
policing issues receive no public consideration in Northern Ireland.90 Under 
the Police Act 1996, which has even less to say about accountability, the role 
of the police authority was to maintain the local police force and to write a 
report showing whether policing targets have been met.91  
 
                                                 
85 Police Act 1964, s 12. 
86 The Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland, A New Beginning - Policing 
in Northern Ireland (“The Patten Report”), (1999)  para 5.10. The report is known as “the 
Patten Report”: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf: accessed 05.02.2014. 
87 An attempt to rationalise the distinction between strategic and operational matters has been 
made, at some length, in the 2011 Policing Protocol Order, para 30, under s 79 Police and 
Social Responsibility Act 2011.  
88 The Patten Report (n 86), recommendations 25 and 26. 
89 Paddy Hillyard and Mike Tomlinson, “Patterns of Policing and Policing Patten” Journal of 
Law and Society (2000) 27 3 394. 
90 John Topping, “Accountability, policing and the Police Service of Northern Ireland: Local 
practice, global standards?” in Lister S and Rowe M (eds),  Accountability of Policing, 
(Routledge 2016). 
91 Police Act 1996, s 9. 
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A quote by a chair of a police authority writing in the early days of lay visiting 
throws some light on the relationship: 
 
“ ... it is the police officers who are very much in control ... It seems 
ridiculous that a police authority should have to negotiate painfully and 
over many months to obtain the right to issue a leaflet setting out a 
detained person’s rights – and to obtain this right in police stations 
which it maintains, staffed by officers for which it pays!” 92 
 
Here the police authority eventually got its way, but only after a great deal of 
resistance by the police. One wonders how many police authorities would 
have taken this line. According to Laurence Lustgarten, the police authorities 
were “bereft of power ... [and] ... with a few well-publicised exceptions ... pliant 
bodies whose members view[ed] themselves as a sort of cheerleader corps 
for their force”.93 The fact was that the police authority could not control the 
police, and were effectively in the power of the police,94 and the police could 
ignore the views of the police authority: in a serious crisis, the police authority 
was overridden by the Home Secretary and the chief constable.95 On that 
basis, the police authority was not independent of the police or of central 
government. If some of this evidence looks rather dated, a recent survey 
reported that a member of a police authority said that he sometimes asked in 
                                                 
92 Gabrielle Cox, “Openness and Accountability” in Benyon J and Bourn J (eds), The Police: 
Powers, Procedures and Proprieties (Pergamon 1986) 165, 168 and 170. 
93 Laurence Lustgarten, The Governance of Police (Sweet and Maxwell 1986) 87.  
94 See Brogden (n 46) and text to the note. 
95 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Northumbria Police Authority 
[1987] EWCA Civ 5. See also Sarah Spencer, Police Authorities during the Miners’ Strike 
(Cobden Trust 1985). In Chapter Three, text to notes 97-102, I argue that in the development 
of policy about custody visiting, it was the police, in the form of ACPO, who decided what 
should be done, and the Home Office either anticipated their wishes or followed them. 
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a meeting what would happen if they voted against something, only to be told 
that it would go ahead anyway.96   
 
It will be interesting to see whether this has changed with the abolition of 
police authorities and the election of Police and Crime Commissioners. One 
important change is that statute has given the Police and Crime 
Commissioners the power to suspend or remove a chief constable.97 The 
Police and Crime Commissioner for Avon and Somerset has used these 
statutory powers and removed the chief constable.98 Police authorities had no 
such power.99 However, even if the Police and Crime Commissioners do 
assert more independence over the police, their power derives from a populist 
mandate to reduce crime,100 so they are unlikely to hold different views from 
the police about custody. Another way of approaching the question of the 
independence of Police and Crime Commissioners from the police would be 
to apply the regulatory capture theory.101 Former police officers have become 
Police and Crime Commissioners,102 and people employed by the police in 
various capacities have joined the staff of Offices of Police and Crime 
                                                 
96 Floyd Millen and Mike Stephens, “Policing and Accountability; the working of police 
authorities”, Policing and Society (2011) 21 3 265-283. 
97 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, s 38. 
98 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-somerset-33815925; accessed 02.02.2016. In 
Gwent, the Police and Crime Commissioner for Gwent obtained the resignation of the chief 
constable http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-south-east-wales-22853282 accessed 
02.02.2016. The Police and Crime Commissioner for South Yorkshire suspended the chief 
constable over Hillsborough: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-36154201 accessed 
20.06.2016. 
99 Lustgarten (n 93) 84f. 
100 Robert Reiner, “Power to the People? A social democratic critique of the Coalition 
Government's police reforms”, in Lister M and Rowe M (eds), (n 90) 139. 
101 See text to notes 75-76. 
102 In Gwent: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-south-east-wales-22862490 accessed 
26.04.2016 and in Gloucestershire: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-gloucestershire-
20341918 accessed 26.04.2016. 
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Commissioners.103 This very limited evidence shows the argument might have 
some traction. 
 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy and accountability are seen as necessary attributes of 
regulators.104 The concept of legitimacy combines the ideas of authorisation, 
acceptability and fairness. As can be seen from the discussion of 
independence above, custody visiting, like some other institutions, claims 
legitimacy by the use of the adjective “independent”. 
Legitimacy needs to be distinguished from power. While legitimacy serves to 
clothe power with authority, it secures compliance by influence rather than 
coercion, and it provides the “moral glue” for the internalisation of social 
norms and values.105 Is, therefore, legitimacy readily distinguishable from 
Lukes’ three-dimensional power theory? Lukes’ theory helps us to understand 
how organisations with a great deal of power, like the police, use their 
legitimacy to get people to do what they want them to do, so that they do not 
have to coerce them. Diarmaid Harkin has compared Lukes’ views with those 
of Tom Tyler, as follows.106 Lukes sees people’s beliefs, consent and 
recognition of the legitimacy of the police as much a result of power relations 
as they are a cause of those power relations. He argues that ideological 
manipulation shapes behaviour in favour of the powerful: authority works on 
                                                 
103 e.g., four members of the 16 staff of the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for 
Dyfed-Powys formerly worked for Dyfed-Powys police: http://www.dyfedpowys-
pcc.org.uk/en/work-with-me/my-team/ accessed 26.04.2016. 
104 Baldwin and Cave (n 4) 77-79, and Morgan and Yeung (n 5) 221. 
105 Adam Crawford and Anthea Hucklesby, “Introduction”, in Legitimacy and Compliance in 
Criminal Justice, Crawford A and Hucklesby A (eds), (Routledge 2013) 1-3. 
106 Diarmaid Harkin, “Police legitimacy, ideology and qualitative methods: A critique of 
procedural justice theory” Criminology and Criminal Justice (2015) 15 5 594. 
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individuals by forging ideological alignment and influencing, shaping and 
determining their very wants. By contrast, Tyler argues that if the police 
demonstrate fair procedures, there will be increased police legitimacy. It may 
be the case, as Harkin argues, that both the authority of the police and their 
use of fair procedures contribute to their legitimacy. My own view is that 
Lukes’ theory has greater explanatory force in understanding why people see 
the police as legitimate. 
Legitimacy and power do not necessarily go hand in hand. Custody visiting 
has precious little power, and cannot derive its legitimacy from power, but it 
does need to be legitimate. Legitimacy is vital for any regulator, because what 
they do has to be respected. This is particularly true in the case of custody 
visiting, because of the legitimacy of the object of its scrutiny, the police. 
Legitimacy for a regulator derives, first, from a legislative mandate.107 Custody 
visiting’s legislative mandate108 requires Police and Crime Commissioners to 
set up local visiting schemes, but does not say what the schemes are 
supposed to do.109 Codes of practice which have been issued about custody 
visiting do provide some of the detail, although much of it is about what 
visitors should not do.110 The code does however say that visitors should 
attend police stations to make checks on the treatment of detainees and the 
conditions in which they are held, and to check that their rights and 
entitlements are being observed, and report on them to the Police and Crime 
                                                 
107 Baldwin and Cave (n 4) 78. 
108 Police Reform Act 2002, s 51(2), as amended by Police and Social Responsibility Act 
2011, Schedule 16, part 3, s 299. 
109 As often happens with legislative mandates set out in statutes: Baldwin and Cave (n 4), 
78. 
110 For example, not involve themselves in a police investigation: 2013 Code of Practice, 
paras 50 and 60. 
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Commissioner; there is nothing about what the Police and Crime 
Commissioner might then do with the reports. The visiting is said to offer 
protections and confidentiality to detainees and the police and reassurance to 
the community at large.111 This may be being presented as a statement of 
fact, or as a desired outcome, or probably both at once; but the reassurance 
to the community is not backed by any rigorous evidence about the 
effectiveness of the visiting scheme.112 The legislative mandate is, therefore, 
rather vague, and its success is very hard to measure.  
A legislative mandate is not sufficient to provide legitimacy if the organisation 
is not also acceptable. For instance, bodies set up to deal with complaints 
against the police have been criticised because of the level of police 
involvement in investigations of the complaints, and those bodies were 
abolished.113 The same issue is still affecting public attitudes towards the 
latest body to be created for this purpose, the IPCC.114  
There are two other sources of legitimacy for custody visiting. The first is Lord 
Scarman. His report is often referred to in the official literature: 
                                                 
111 ibid paras 2, 50, 58 and 77. 
112 See Chapter Three, text to note 190. 
113 The Police Complaints Board was set up by the Police Act 1976 s 1, and abolished by the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act s 83(3).  The Police Complaints Authority was set up by the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 83(1), and abolished by the Police Reform Act 2002 
s 9 (7). The Independent Police Complaints Commission was set up by the Police Reform Act 
2002 s 9 (1), and is still in existence. It has been subject to much criticism, and on 22.07.2014 
the Home Secretary, Theresa May, announced a review which would look at making it more 
independent, The Guardian (London 23.07.2014) https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/jul/23/theresa-may-independent-review-deaths-police-custody-speech accessed 
17.06.2016.  
114 e.g., “An end to ‘police investigating police’: Police complaints investigators not trusted and 
corrupt officers should have pensions docked, say MPs” The Independent 23.05.2014 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/an-end-to-police-investigating-police-
police-complaints-investigators-not-trusted-and-corrupt-8680722.html accessed 08.06.2016 
and http://news.sky.com/story/1045977/police-watchdog-woefully-inadequate-say-mps 
accessed 23.05.2014. 
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“Custody visiting owes its origin to Lord Scarman.”115 
But the words used are often more emotive than that: 
“Lord Scarman believed that the independent visitor scheme would 
give the public reassurance that people were detained in appropriate 
condition [sic] and their welfare looked after. He was right.” 116   
At first sight this could be seen as merely providing historical background, 
even if it is not entirely accurate,117 but it is also a claim to legitimacy by 
recalling the name of this revered judge. The next sources of legitimacy are 
human rights law and the United Nations treaty about protection from torture 
in detention,118 neither of which, unlike Lord Scarman, are publicised in the 
official literature. This may arise from the perception of the Police and Crime 
Commissioners, who publish that literature, that Human Rights and the United 
Nations do not have the same appeal to the public as the memory of Lord 
Scarman.  
In several major respects, these sources of legitimacy may be lending custody 
visiting more legitimacy than it deserves, since the design and practice of 
                                                 
115 Found in much of the official literature: e.g. Essex Police Authority Independent Custody 
Visiting Scheme Annual Report 2010/11, www.essex.pcc.police.uk/wp-
content/uploads/.../ICV-Annual-report-2010.11-doc.doc accessed 17.06.2016. 
116 Speech by Jane Kennedy, Merseyside PCC, on 21.09.2013, at the North West Regional 
ICV Conference at Haydock Park, Merseyside: 
http://www.merseysidepcc.info/UserFiles/file/speech%20to%20Custody%20Visitors.pdf 
accessed 08.06.2014.    
117 Michael Meacher is never mentioned. 
118 ECHR articles 2, 3, 5 and 6 in particular, the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, and The Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture and other cruel inhuman or degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
“OPCAT”: a treaty which supplements the 1984 UN Convention against Torture. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCAT.aspx accessed 31.05.2015. 
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custody visiting does not live up to the standards originally envisaged.119 Does 
this impair its legitimacy? If the public knew about these issues, would that 
make a difference to the level of legitimacy? 
Julia Black states that an organisation is regarded as legitimate if it is socially 
credible and socially acceptable. She says that this follows Max Weber’s view 
that power (including regulatory) relations are legitimate when those engaged 
in them perceive or believe them to be so: other than that perception and 
belief, there are no other criteria to assess the acceptance. Legitimacy is not 
therefore necessarily a question of whether an organisation has legal validity, 
the “legislative mandate” discussed above. Nor is legitimacy dependent on 
moral acceptance. Black notes the pragmatic issue of whether the 
organisation meets interests or expectations, and the cognitive issue of 
whether what the organisation does is “taken for granted”.120 People’s 
reasons for acceptance of any organisation, but perhaps especially a 
regulator, derive from what they know about the organisation. Presumably, 
therefore, to prove custody visiting’s legitimacy, it must first be established 
that people have heard of it; and then one might go on to seek to ascertain 
their opinion about it. This research will seek to establish the levels of 
knowledge and acceptance of custody visiting among those who encounter it. 
If it turns out that very few people know about it, consideration will have to be 
given to what that says about the organisation’s quality of legitimacy.   
                                                 
119  See Chapter Three, text to notes 191-194. 
120 Julia Black, “Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric 
regulatory regimes” Regulation & Governance (2008) 2 2 137. 
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The final aspect of legitimacy is due process,121 i.e., having fair and open 
procedures, with attention being paid to equality, fairness and consistency of 
treatment, and allowing public participation. Custody visiting does not meet all 
these requirements of due process. It may display the virtues of equality and 
fairness in its dealings with both detainees and the police, but both those 
qualities are very hard to measure. Whether its operations are consistent, 
when there are 43 separate schemes and a large number of volunteer 
visitors, is impossible to say: the work of ICVA with the scheme administrators 
may provide a certain level of consistency.122 But there is no opportunity for 
public participation. Although the visitors are members of the public, and the 
public could be said to participate in that way, the visitors have no way of 
communicating with the rest of the public, do not liaise with any community 
organisations, and are not allowed independent publicity of any kind.123 There 
is very little public access to what is going on, except by reading the bland 
and uncritical reports published on Police and Crime Commissioners’ 
websites.124 
 
Accountability  
Accountability is a concept which raises three different questions in the study 
of custody visiting. It is easy to confuse them. The first question is whether 
                                                 
121 The reality of the procedures: Packer’s use of this expression is descriptive of an attitude. 
122 I cannot verify this as I was not permitted to attend their annual conferences for scheme 
administrators: see Chapter One, text to note 123. 
123 Contrary to what Lord Scarman wanted: see Chapter Three, text to notes 39-41. In the 
2013 Code of Practice, para 77, one reads that visitors’ reports “must go to the PCC and 
other parties as determined locally”. As far as I know, there were no other parties receiving 
the reports in either Dyfed-Powys, where I was a visitor, or in the area studied. 
124 See Chapter Six, text to notes 155-158. 
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accountability, as a characteristic of regulation,125 is an attribute of custody 
visiting. This is the question discussed here. The second and third questions 
relate to the accountability of the police. They are: whether, as the official 
literature claims, custody visiting enhances the accountability of the police, 
discussed elsewhere:126 and whether the police are accountable to the Police 
and Crime Commissioner, which is part of the discussion of the concept of 
independence above.127 
Like independence,128 accountability has become a “hurrah” word.129 One 
needs to get behind the marketing to find out what these words mean. Keith 
Syrett’s definition of accountability is: 
 “answering for, explaining or justifying one’s actions or decisions, 
usually to some external body which is independent of the original 
decision-maker/actor.”130  
Accountability requires there to be a process. As Michael Lipsky wrote: 
 “One is always accountable to someone: accountability is not 
abstract.”131  
The party calling the other party to account seeks answers and rectification 
and may impose sanctions for non-compliance. Thus there are three steps: 
                                                 
125 See fn 104. 
126 See Chapter Three, text to note 189, and Chapter Six, text to notes 207-211. 
127 See text to notes 84-103. 
128 See text to notes 57-60. 
129 Mark Bovens, “Public Accountability” in E Ferlie, L E Lynn and C Pollitt (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Public Management, (OUP 2005) 182, 184.  
130 Keith Syrett, The Foundations of Public Law (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 160. 
131 Michael Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucrats: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services 
(Russell Sage Foundation 1980) 160. 
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information, discussion and consequences.132 A number of other meanings 
have been identified. These range from the associated concept of 
responsibility, which does not require any accounting to be done, to the 
means of imposing control.133 This analysis keeps to the basic meaning of 
external scrutiny. This relationship of external scrutiny is a communicative 
process, and it is the route through which pragmatic and moral/normative 
legitimacy claims are validated.134 As has been shown, custody visiting’s 
legislative mandate is far from precise. Baldwin and Cave state that regulators 
with imprecise mandates may nevertheless claim the support of the public, 
because they are properly accountable to and controlled by democratic 
institutions.135  
Making an analysis of custody visiting in terms of accountability requires one 
to search for occasions when accounting could be said to take place. A 
process of accounting could be discerned at two different levels. The first level 
is in the relations between the custody visitors and the Police and Crime 
Commissioner. The second level is in the relations between the custody 
visiting scheme, in the persona of the Police and Crime Commissioner, and 
the various bodies to whom the Police and Crime Commissioner may be said 
to account, which are: the voting public; the Police and Crime Panel which 
                                                 
132 Gijs Jan Brandsma and Thomas Schillemans, “The Accountability Cube: Measuring  
Accountability”, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2013,  23  4, p 953.  
133 Baldwin and Cave (n 4) 78-9: Bovens (n 129) argues that it should not be equivalent to 
control. Scott sees control and accountability operating on a continuum: Colin Scott, 
“Accountability in the Regulatory State” Journal of Law and Society (2000) 27 1 38, 39. 
134 Black (n 120). 
135 Baldwin and Cave (n 4) 69. 
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scrutinises the work of the Police and Crime Commissioner;136 central 
government; and political sponsors.137  
The process of accounting would need to be examined in all of these 
relationships. At the first level, the Police and Crime Commissioner is a 
democratic institution, elected by voters in each area, so one could argue that 
custody visitors are accountable to an elected official. However, accounting is 
usually made to a different body: the Police and Crime Commissioner 
completely controls the visitors and they do not have a separate corporate 
identity.138 At the second level, the only information available to the public, to 
the Police and Crime Panel, to central government, and to political sponsors, 
is a report,139 and there is no provision for any questioning of the way that 
custody visitors go about their work. Each body would have different 
sanctions available: the public could, eventually, vote the Police and Crime 
Commissioner out of office; the Panel could issue advice; the government has 
power over Police and Crime Commissioners, but this seems to be less than 
they used to have over police authorities;140 and political sponsors could 
withdraw their support. The “three-step test”141 can also be applied to the 
results of the empirical research, to establish whether there have been 
information, discussion and consequences. 
 
 
                                                 
136 set up under Police and Social Responsibility Act 2011, ss 28-33. 
137 John Raine, “Electocracy with accountabilities? The novel governance model of Police and 
Crime Commissioners” in Lister S and Rowe M (eds), (n 90) 111. 
138 See text around note 84. 
139 See Chapter Six, text to notes 160-163. 
140 See text to notes 97-103. 
141 See text to note 132. 
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Effectiveness  
This thesis examines the quality of effectiveness, to establish how well it is 
carrying out its work of regulation. Effectiveness is defined as “the degree to 
which something is successful in producing a desired result”,142 or a purpose. 
Effectiveness is important for any regulator, simply because an ineffective 
regulator will fail to achieve its only purpose, that of regulation. However, not 
all writers on regulation adopt the language of effectiveness: for example, 
Baldwin and Cave use the terms “expertise” and “efficiency”.143 The issue of 
efficiency is seen in terms of whether the discharge of the legislative mandate 
is value for money and/or whether the regulation leads to efficient results, 
which is measured in terms of economics,144 a measurement which would 
present formidable difficulties, beyond the expertise of this researcher. In any 
case, efficiency is primarily about the use of resources, while effectiveness is 
about the results that are achieved, which is the issue in this thesis. 
 
Expertise offers a much more fruitful perspective than efficiency. Expertise is 
relevant if the regulatory function requires the exercise of expert judgment. 
The downside may be that the general public have less trust in custody 
visiting carried out by experts simply because they are experts.145 But can lay 
persons deal with the work of custody visiting satisfactorily? The approach to 
this question taken by Lord Scarman and the Home Office differs markedly 
from the approach taken by Michael Meacher MP and the United Nations. 
Lord Scarman said the visitors should be persons, other than police officers, 
                                                 
142 https://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/effectiveness accessed 20.06.2016.  
143 Baldwin and Cave (n 4) 80-82. 
144 ibid 81. 
145 ibid 80. 
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who were members of newly created police liaison committees in London and 
police authorities newly oriented to consultation elsewhere.146 The Home 
Office did not want visitors to be criminal justice professionals, such as 
lawyers and probation officers.147 By contrast, Mr Meacher, in his evidence to 
the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee in 1980, proposed that each 
group of visitors should include a lawyer.148 The United Nations treaty 
requires visitors to be “qualified and experienced persons”, and people with 
the “necessary expertise”.149 Most visitors gain the necessary experience only 
by carrying out the visiting work: and, to be equipped with the necessary 
expertise, they would need specific training.  
 
This discussion of expertise shows how there can be conflicts between 
concepts, as to which should be prioritised. Visitors should have a good 
understanding of what is being regulated. People with professional experience 
of the criminal justice system should therefore be better equipped for this role 
than amateur volunteers, but that professional experience might reduce the 
degree of their neutrality. Similarly, visitors who positively identify with 
detainees should be better equipped to communicate with those detainees 
and to understand their needs, but that also might compromise their neutrality. 
In designing a system of regulation, choices of this sort have to be made.  
 
As well as the volunteer/expert issue, questions of the other attributes of 
visitors are relevant to effectiveness. What sort of people apply, and what sort 
                                                 
146 Baldwin and Cave (n 4) 80. 
147 but then seemed to change its mind: see Chapter Three, text to notes 127 and 161. 
148 See Chapter Three, text to note 13. 
149 See Chapter Six, text to notes 165f. 
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of people are selected? What qualities are the scheme administrators looking 
for? Are they careful to ensure a wide spread of types of people, spanning the 
differences in gender, race, religion, physical ability, age and sexual 
orientation? Diversity among visitors is important, because of diversity of the 
detainees: diversity should enhance the effectiveness of visiting by improving 
the quality of visitors’ communication with the detainees.  
 
The effectiveness of custody visiting as a regulator could be assessed by 
reference to the degree of protection it gives to detainees. But that would not 
be the whole story, because of the significant inherent limitations which 
prevent visiting from increasing its effectiveness. Visitors regulate police 
detention by checking compliance with PACE rights. But what do the PACE 
rights amount to? First, PACE allows the custody sergeant to delay the 
operation of the PACE rights.150 Second, it will always be impossible for 
custody visiting to provide adequate protection to detainees against all and 
any breaches of PACE: visitors make occasional visits, and even if they 
visited much more often, they cannot always be there to prevent the police 
from breaching PACE. Third, some scholars take the view that PACE rights 
are in any event insufficient to protect detainees, so checking on the extent of 
compliance by the police with the PACE rights can take the protection of 
detainees only so far.151 In other words, it is possible for detainees to be 
                                                 
150 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 58(8). 
151 e.g., Andrew Sanders, “Can Coercive Powers be Controlled or Regulated? The Case for 
Anchored Pluralism” in Cape E and Young R (eds), (n 50) 68. 
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subjected to inhumane treatment and pressure leading to false confessions 
without there having been any breaches of PACE.152 
 
It would be strange for any regulator to stigmatise behaviour that is not 
prohibited by the law, or, in this case, behaviour that is not prohibited by a 
code of practice which is seen as having the force of law: what legitimacy 
would the regulator have, and how could the regulator’s criticisms be justified? 
There are other limitations on the potential of custody visiting to be an 
effective regulator. Visitors cannot check on how detainees are being treated 
while they are in police interview, nor on those who are being interviewed 
without also being formally detained, which could be at a police station not 
designated for custody, or indeed anywhere.153 
Subject to these limitations, how can the researcher assess effectiveness as a 
regulator? The purpose of regulation of the police is to ensure that the police 
respect the rights of detainees and safeguard their welfare. The most serious 
consequence of police misbehaviour in custody blocks is the death of a 
detainee. In assessing whether custody visiting made, or could have made, 
an impact on the incidence of police behaviour, the first and most basic fact to 
establish is whether the visiting actually took place, which can be ascertained 
from the statistics. If that is established, the pattern of the visiting needs to be 
analysed. The random quality of the visits was an important feature of the 
                                                 
152 Sanders et al (n 47) 319ff. Compare the situation visitors would be in with that of the IPCC 
when they found that, in a case of a death following custody, reasonable force had been 
used, and the only recommendation was that further training is needed: 
https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/merseyside-police-must-improve-safety-training-its-officers 
accessed 20.05.2016. 
153 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 29.  
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recommendations in the Scarman Report,154 but curiously neither the 
circulars, not the statute, nor the codes of practice use the word random to 
describe the visiting. In the Home Office letter covering the 1986 circular, and 
in the 2001 circular, mention is made of random checks being a feature of 
Lord Scarman’s proposals, but randomness is not specified as a feature of the 
visiting contemplated by the circulars. Those circulars use the word 
“unannounced”: two other circulars use no adjective at all, and neither the 
word “random” nor the word “unannounced” can be found in any of the codes 
of practice to describe visiting except once, indirectly. Both words form part of 
the description of visiting work in some of the local official literature.155 The 
effect of the omission of these words is to take custody visiting further away 
from being a regulator, let alone an effective regulator.  
Random unannounced visits are an instance of what Hood calls “contrived 
randomness oversight”, and which he describes as a technique of public 
management, whereby uncertainty is deliberately introduced into a social 
setting to influence behaviour.156 Hood et al give unannounced spot checks by 
the Prisons Inspectorate as an example of contrived randomness oversight, 
and report that several of their interviewees said that unannounced spot 
                                                 
154 Scarman (n 9) 7.7-7.10. 
155 The covering letter for the 1986 Circular refers to the carrying out of random checks, as 
does the 2001 Circular, both in the context of Lord Scarman's proposals. The 1986 and 1991 
Circulars use the word unannounced but not the word random. The 1991 and 1992 Circulars 
say that visits would normally be unscheduled, in contrast with “special” (i.e., by invitation of 
the police) visits: see Chapter Three Text to notes 126-128, and Chapter Six, text to notes 
184-198. The 1992 Circular and the 2003 and 2010 Codes of Practice use neither the word 
unannounced nor the word random. The 2013 Code of Practice refers to the visits being 
unannounced, but only indirectly to contrast with the practice for detainees suspected of 
terrorist offences: see Chapter Three, text to note 180 and the  note. However, the Mayor of 
London’s handbook reads: “Once a week two visitors from a local panel attend a police 
station at a random, unannounced time to make an inspection and speak to detainees.” 
https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/mayors-office-policing-and-crime-mopac/community-
safety/independent-custody-visitors#Stub-162971 accessed 26.04.2016. 
156 Christopher Hood, The Art of the State (OUP 1998) 237. Randomness oversight is also 
known as “intermittency”: Black (n 120) at 158 n 8. 
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checks were far more effective than visits announced in advance.157 This 
technique is followed by the Care Quality Commission in its inspection of care 
home services.158 Here the issue will be the extent to which the visiting really 
is random and unannounced, and the extent by which that quality can be 
eroded by habitual visiting at specific times.  
The frequency of visits is another means to measure effectiveness. The 
current code of practice159 mentions effectiveness, but the wording gives no 
inkling as to what level of frequency would be needed to achieve 
effectiveness, let alone how to assess what was meant by being effective. 
Some UK regulators (but not the custody visiting schemes) are obliged to fix 
the frequency of their visits according to a risk assessment.160 This means 
that the amount of regulation should depend on an assessment of how well 
the bodies the regulators inspect score and therefore how frequently (or 
infrequently) they need to be inspected. Should custody visiting follow this 
regime? Should the local schemes apply risk assessments to determine the 
frequency of visits? This raises the question of what the risk is that is to be 
assessed. For example, is it that detainees have not been told their rights? Or 
is it that detainees are being mistreated? 
What do visitors actually do on their visits, and what checks do they make? 
Summaries of the visitors’ reports are published by the Police and Crime 
                                                 
157 Hood et al (n 11) 17. 
158 http://www.cqc.org.uk/content/what-we-do-inspection accessed 08.06.2016. 
159 2013 Code of Practice, para 40. 
160 This is implicit in the statutory principles: “(a) regulatory activities should be carried out in a 
way which is transparent, accountable, proportionate and consistent; (b) regulatory activities 
should be targeted only at cases in which action is needed:” Legislative and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2006, s 21. Custody Visiting, ICV and ICV Schemes do not appear in the list of 
bodies to which the law applies: SI 2007 No. 3544. 
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Commissioner. The visitors’ work involves looking round the custody block, 
making checks on some individual issues, and checking that detainees’ rights 
are being respected by seeking interviews with them. These checks will be 
reviewed in order to assess their contribution towards effectiveness. But there 
are a number of significant restrictions on what visitors can do. The police can 
delay access to the custody block, and they can deny access to particular 
detainees.161 The way visitors are introduced may cause detainees not to trust 
the visitors.162 Visitors are told not to get involved with the criminal 
investigation, and that if a detainee does talk about the investigation, the 
visitor must tell them that they will be passing the information on to the 
custody officer and that it may be disclosed in legal proceedings, which would 
mean that visitors could be required to give evidence in court about the 
content of an interview.163 If a detainee wishes to make a complaint against 
the police, the visitor must not deal with the matter and should advise the 
detainee to address it to the custody officer: visitors may include this issue in 
their report which may be read by the custody officer.164 In these 
circumstances, it is less likely that there will be meaningful communication 
between the visitor and the detainee.  
 
Visitors may, at their option, view custody records, provided that the detainee 
consents or is intoxicated and therefore incapable of consenting: not if the 
detainee is merely asleep. The record may be used to check what detainees 
tell visitors: it may contradict what the detainees say, or it may back them up. 
                                                 
161 2013 Code of Practice, paras 49 and 55. 
162 See text to note 74. 
163 2013 Code of Practice, para 60.  
164 ibid, paras 74-5. 
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How useful this really is depends on the extent to which the record system is 
accurate, self-serving or deliberately falsified,165 and whether the visitor can 
understand the records. 
  
The effectiveness of the reporting system will be seen to depend on the 
thoroughness of the work of the visitors, the effect of discussions of their 
reports with the custody sergeant, and how the reports were dealt with by the 
scheme administrator. The final question bearing on effectiveness, and allied 
to the reporting mechanism, is whether the visitors have any public voice. 
From the desk evidence, it would appear that they have no local or national 
voice.166 Would visitors be more effective if they could express themselves 
independently of Police and Crime Commissioners and the Independent 
Custody Visiting Association (ICVA)? 
 
To answer the questions raised by these issues, the following five criteria of 
effectiveness were developed and will be applied to the empirical research: 
 
1. Whether the visits actually took place: the precondition of 
effectiveness. 
                                                 
165 See Chapter One, text to note 85, and the note. 
166 Except for the following story, where the Mayor of London’s Office for Policing and Crime 
apparently withdrew accreditation from an outspoken custody visitor. The visitor publicly 
criticised the treatment of two brothers, aged 11 and 14, who were both held in custody at 
Bexleyheath Police Station, as “inhumane”: Bexley Times (28.01.2014): 
http://www.bexleytimes.co.uk/news/bishop_criticises_inhumane_treatment_of_11_year_old_ 
boy_at_bexleyheath_police_station_1_3256801 accessed 04.07.2016. According to his blog, 
the custody visitor concerned was an Archbishop of the Open Episcopal Church, and his 
accreditation as a custody visitor was removed for allegedly failing to treat fellow Independent 
Custody Visitors with due respect and courtesy: 
http://www.bishopjonathanblake.blogspot.co.uk/2014/07/the-pretence-of-independent- 
custody.html accessed 04.07.2016.  
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2. Whether the police behaved differently towards detainees because 
they knew that custody visitors might arrive at any time, without notice, 
or because a visit was actually in progress. 
3. Whether visits caused police behaviour to be changed/aligned, either 
at the time or subsequently. 
4. Whether the reporting system caused police behaviour to be 
changed/aligned. 
5. Whether custody visiting enabled the public to know what was 
happening in custody blocks.  
 
The research will look into whether general changes in police behaviour were 
prompted by visitors’ reports, given that the reports were usually likely to be 
about the complaints of individuals. The report of a detainee complaining 
about not getting a phone call could raise the questions of whether the 
visitor’s report led to the individual who complained getting a phone call, 
and/or whether the complaint of the one individual led to more detainees 
getting phone calls.  
 
Measuring the effectiveness of a regulator is problematic when there are other 
regulators at work in the same field: the Police and Crime Commissioners, 
HMIC and the IPCC. And there may be other factors at work. For instance, 
some scholars believe that the introduction of CCTV in custody blocks has 
had a marked effect on police behaviour.167 It is difficult to attribute any 
particular outcome, change or effect to one or more of a multiple of possible 
                                                 
167 Tim Newburn and Stephanie Hayman, Policing, Surveillance and Social Control: CCTV 
and police monitoring of suspects (Routledge 2002) 157. 
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causes. And, as will be seen, in many cases the best that can be done is to 
assess the likelihood of effectiveness. In the case of visitors’ meetings with 
detainees I was able, however, to make a direct assessment of the 
effectiveness of their interaction. 
 
Conclusion   
This chapter has explained the relevance of regulation in this thesis, and set 
out the concepts, some of which derive from regulation and others from the 
topics of human rights, criminal justice, policing, and detention in the closed 
institution of police custody. These concepts underpin this research, and this 
chapter has explained how they will be drawn on in the examination of my 
research findings.  
I have demonstrated that custody visiting does find its place as a regulator, 
which enables the analysis of custody visiting as regulation to proceed. Lukes’ 
concept of power explains how power operates, subliminally, without needing 
to be exercised, and how this applies to relations with the police. Packer’s 
models of criminal justice enable one to establish the ideology of custody 
visiting and the attitudes of the visitors, and the application of Lukes’ concept 
of power explains why the orientation might well turn out to be crime control. I 
have shown how independence is a matter of degree, and that it depends, not 
only on the structure of custody visiting and whether the visitors had tenure, 
but also on who the visitors were, and what sort of attitudes they had towards 
custody. This discussion showed that the concepts of neutrality and 
impartiality can usefully be drawn on as allied, and distinct, qualities. These 
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concepts will be drawn in to assess the data I have collected about the 
attitudes of the visitors in Chapter Five.  
The chapter then looked at the necessary attributes of a regulator: legitimacy, 
accountability and effectiveness. Both legitimacy and accountability were 
shown to turn on the extent of public knowledge about custody visiting. 
Measuring effectiveness is not so easy to tackle. How should custody visitors 
regulate the police, who hold all the power, on their home territory, and what 
should we expect to be the outcome of their work of visiting, checking, and 
reporting? The five criteria of effectiveness set out above will be the principal 
means by which the concept of effectiveness will be drawn on for the 
examination of my empirical research about the work of custody visiting in 
Chapter Six. 
Before the explanation of the research methods in Chapter Four and the 
results of the research in Chapters Five and Six, Chapter Three provides an 
analysis, from desk and archival research, of the policies which have been 
followed in custody visiting since its inception in the early 1980s. The 
discussion in this chapter of the concepts of power, criminal justice models 
and independence provide the conceptual basis for this analysis of the 
policies. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
POLICY 
 
The concepts discussed in Chapter Two can now be drawn on for a critical 
and analytical history of custody visiting, centring on the policy issues. 
Particularly relevant are the concepts of power, Herbert Packer’s models of 
criminal justice, and independence. The story begins in 1980, when Michael 
Meacher MP made the first proposals for custody visiting. In 1981 the 
Scarman Report included a recommendation for a statutory scheme of 
custody visiting, which the government declined to implement. Custody 
visiting operated from 1984 on a rather haphazard and unofficial basis, and 
was known as “lay visiting”; the current statutory scheme of “independent 
custody visiting” was initiated in 2002. This chapter analyses both the policies 
of the proponents of custody visiting and the policies of the government and 
the police, and demonstrates how, in both phases, the powerful influence of 
the police impacted on the original regulatory purpose and orientation of 
custody visiting, and on the independence of the visitors.  
 
Michael Meacher MP  
In 1980, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee was considering 
deaths in police custody.1 It was in evidence to this committee that Michael 
                                                 
1 Third Report of the Committee, House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Session 
1979-80 HC 631. 
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Meacher MP2 made his proposal for custody visiting. There had been much 
recent public concern stemming from the media allegations relating to three 
high-profile cases: the case of Blair Peach at a demonstration in 1979; the 
case of Liddle Towers after release from police custody in 1976; and the case 
of James Kelly after being arrested in 1979. The committee noted that only 
the death of James Kelly counted as a death in police custody under their 
definition.3 The definition of deaths in custody currently offered by the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission encompasses cases where 
people die both during and following police custody, and the overall 
categorisation is given as “deaths during or following police contact”, which 
would have covered all three instances.4 Working with that definition, the 
committee noted that, between 1970 and 1979, 274 people died while in the 
custody of the police, and that the announcement of this statistic gave rise to 
further public anxiety. The committee reviewed a sample of cases and 
considered what general lessons could be learned, and what recurrent pattern 
of events could be observed.5 For example, the committee expressed concern 
                                                 
2 Michael Meacher MP (04.11.1939 – 21.10.2015) was a Labour Member of Parliament from 
1970, initially for Oldham West, and for Oldham West and Royton from 1997 until his death in 
2015. Some members of the Home Affairs Committee expressed their gratitude to Mr 
Meacher for his campaign: e.g., Alex Lyon and Robert Kilroy-Silk at paras 433 and 361 
respectively. Mr Meacher had become interested in deaths in custody and the idea of custody 
visiting as a result of conversations with a retired Methodist minister, Rev. Ralph Bell, now 
also deceased, at Otterburn, Northumberland, where the concern had been the death of 
Liddle Towers, in Newcastle-on-Tyne, not far away. As well as taking a prominent role in the 
proceedings of the Home Affairs Committee, Mr Meacher asked parliamentary questions 
about deaths and injuries sustained by persons detained by the police, and about complaints 
against the police, on 15.11.1979, 31.01.1980, 28.02.1980, 17.07.1980 and 15.12.1982: and 
also on three occasions in 2009 and 2011. With Frank Hooley MP and others he presented a 
bill about deaths in custody to Parliament on 23.01.1980. He took part in House of Commons 
debates on the subject on 18.12.1979, 17.04.1980, 31.07.1980, 20.03.1981, and 09.07.1981.  
3 Home Affairs Committee (n 1), Report, 1 and 2. 
4 https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/page/deaths-during-or-following-police-contact: accessed 
13.06.2016. 
5 Home Affairs Committee (n 1), Report, 2. 
 94 
about the welfare in police custody of intoxicated people, who were a large 
proportion of the people who had died in custody.6  
 
Michael Meacher MP gave evidence to the committee. He called for a public 
inquiry7 into deaths in custody, as it was his view that there was a clear 
correlation between the numbers of complaints against the police alleging 
assault and the numbers of deaths in police custody.8 He made four 
proposals for reform. The first proposal was that, as a deterrent against the 
possibility of assault against those held in custody, the Home Secretary 
should set up, on an experimental basis in half a dozen areas, a panel of 
visitors with right of access to police station cells for unannounced visits, or 
with minimum practical notice, to take statements from “prisoners”9 who had 
allegations to make of police violence against them, to seek to validate the 
truth or otherwise of such statements; and to make regular reports to the 
Home Secretary and to the police authority of the area.10 The context of the 
visiting proposal is demonstrated by Mr Meacher’s other three proposals, 
which were: to review whether the powers of police committees should be 
extended to achieve proper public accountability; to set up an independent 
police complaints body; and to inquire into prosecution policy and practice.11  
On the last point, it is clear, from Mr Meacher’s answer to a question, that his 
                                                 
6 ibid 14-15. 
7 The Home Secretary turned down Mr Meacher’s call for a public inquiry on 01.03.1980: ibid 
117. 
8 Home Affairs Committee (n 1), Memorandum submitted by Mr Michael Meacher MP on 
Deaths in Police Custody, B. 
9 This was the expression used in the evidence. 
10 Memorandum (n 8), D1. 
11 ibid D 2-4. 
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concern was that there had never been a prosecution of a police officer where 
there was an allegation of assault and where a person had died in custody.12 
 
In answer to questions from the chairman of the committee, Mr Meacher said 
that he thought that a group of two or three visitors should always include a 
lawyer;13 and that his suggestion did not show distrust in the police, but that 
where people were in the power of the authorities and out of sight and out of 
hearing of members of the public, as was the case in mental institutions, 
these safeguards were valuable.14 In answer to another question, Mr Meacher 
spoke about an inquest relating to a man who died in hospital a few days after 
spending a night in custody. He had been arrested in the evening and was 
brought to a police station suffering from a serious head injury. The cause of 
that injury was itself at issue. But particularly relevant to the need for custody 
visiting was the police’s neglect of this man’s welfare. The police first said that 
the deceased man had been visited regularly during the night, but under 
questioning from the coroner admitted that they had made no visits to the 
man’s cell between 2am and 6am.15 
 
A member of the committee asked Mr Meacher whether he was implying that 
there was a systematic, consistent system of brutality at police stations. Mr 
Meacher denied he was suggesting that. But he did say that there was a 
degree of violence by the police which in any particular case might or might 
                                                 
12 ibid minutes of evidence 478. 
13 ibid 421. 
14 ibid 422. 
15 ibid 428. 
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not be justified, and that visitors could act as a deterrent.16 Another member of 
the committee, John Wheeler, said that he and other MPs, along with lawyers, 
doctors, other police officers uninvolved with a particular case and judges 
called at police stations unannounced: he asked whether Mr Meacher agreed 
that those visits were a contribution to the safeguarding of both police officers 
and those held in police stations. Mr Meacher’s answer was that he doubted 
that visits of this sort were sufficiently systematic or frequent.17 Mr Wheeler 
also said that he did not understand how people were afraid to make 
complaints against the police; and he said he was amazed that, with so many 
people passing through, so few people died in police stations.18   
 
The committee did not endorse Mr Meacher’s visiting proposal. They said 
they were satisfied that the prescribed procedures could afford adequate 
protection to detained persons provided they were strictly adhered to. So their 
recommendation was that Chief Police Officers should arrange for sufficient 
random checks to be carried out to ensure that the procedures were properly 
observed:19 presumably these checks would be carried out by other police 
officers.  
 
Those were the circumstances in which Michael Meacher made his proposal. 
Particularly interesting were his recommendations that each group of visitors 
should include a lawyer, and that visitors should investigate allegations by 
detainees that the police had assaulted them. The suggestion that each group 
                                                 
16 ibid 461-467. 
17 ibid 446-460. This may be the only reference to this practice. 
18 ibid 452, 378. 
19 ibid report 13. 
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should include a lawyer would give the visiting work a professional edge that 
would make it much more effective, but this has never been official policy. As 
to visitors being involved with complaints, successive circulars and codes of 
practice issued by the Home Office have said that visitors should advise a 
detainee who makes an allegation of misconduct against a specific police 
officer to address the complaint to the duty officer in charge of the station, and 
earlier publications warned that visitors who took part in complaints would be 
in breach of their duty of impartiality.20  
 
Mr Meacher’s thinking about custody visiting was firmly embedded in the need 
for greater police accountability, and was based on the following assumptions: 
that safeguards are needed because police custody is hidden from the public; 
that the number of injuries and deaths in police custody should be reduced; 
that random visiting would be a deterrent against police misbehaviour; that 
some at least of the visitors should be lawyers; that the police do not always 
tell the truth about what happens to detainees in custody; and that the police 
complaints system needed to be reformed, with visitors playing a role. Mr 
Meacher’s proposal was for regulation of police behaviour. Random visiting is 
a recognised attribute of regulation:21 the effectiveness of the visitors would 
have been improved by some of them being lawyers. In terms of Packer’s 
models of criminal justice,22 Mr Meacher was a due process adherent, who 
                                                 
20 1991 Circular para 39; 1992 Circular para 36; 2001 Circular para 90; 2003 Code of Practice 
para 74; 2010 Code of Practice para 55; 2013 Code of Practice para 75. 1986 Circular para 
21, said only that visitors should not involve themselves in these complaints. The Dyfed-
Powys police authority scheme handbook, 2008 version, (copy in my possession), para 4.9, 
said that if a visitor made a complaint, the police authority could suspend or curtail the duties 
of that visitor in the interests of impartiality: (emphasis added). 
21 See Chapter Two, text to notes 156-158. 
22 See Chapter Two, text to notes 47-51. 
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saw the need for interventions on behalf of detainees. He understood their 
vulnerability in the face of police power in a closed institution.23 He parted 
company with the crime control view articulated by Mr Wheeler that no new 
safeguards were needed, that detainees did not need help to make 
complaints, that the death toll was no concern, and that the police should be 
allowed to get on with their work without interruptions. 
 
The Brixton Riots and the Scarman Report 
In 1981 there were serious civil disturbances in England, in particular in 
Brixton, south London, over the weekend of 10-12 April. The government 
reacted very quickly. The Home Secretary, William Whitelaw MP 
(Conservative), announced the setting up of an inquiry in the House of 
Commons on 13 April, and on 14 April he appointed Lord Scarman, a senior 
judge,24 to hold the inquiry.25 The terms of reference were to inquire urgently 
and to report with the power to make recommendations.26 The report was 
published on 25 November 1981. It summarised the events as: 
 
“… scenes of violence and disorder ... the like of which had not 
previously been seen in this century in Britain. In the centre of Brixton a 
few hundred young people - most, but not all of them, black - attacked 
                                                 
23 See Chapter One, text to notes 40-47 and 64-69. 
24 Leslie George Scarman, Baron Scarman, OBE, PC (29.07.1911 – 08.12.2004) was an 
English barrister and judge who served as a Law Lord (the equivalent role now is a Justice of 
the Supreme Court) from 1977 until his retirement in 1986. He is best known for chairing the 
Brixton inquiry. He also chaired inquiries into the Northern Ireland riots of August 1969 (1969 -
1972), the Red Lion Square disorders (1975) and the Grunwick dispute (1977). 
25 Under Police Act 1964, s 32, which is no longer in force: the provision empowered the 
Home Secretary to cause a local inquiry to be held by a person appointed by him into any 
matter connected with the policing in any area.  
26 Lord Scarman, The Brixton Disorders 10 - 12 April 1981 (Cmnd 8427 1981), 1.1. 
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the police on the streets with stones, bricks, iron bars and petrol 
bombs … These young people … brought about a temporary collapse 
of law and order in the centre of an inner suburb of London … the toll 
of human injury and property damage was … comparable with the 
aftermath of an air-raid.”27  
 
The report reviewed the social and economic conditions and the disorders in 
detail, and then proceeded to a section on the police. The report paid tribute 
to the police, but found that they had to carry some responsibility for the 
outbreak of disorder.28 Part V of the report, headed “Policing - proposals and 
recommendations”, contained a section on monitoring, which said that the 
pattern of complaints against the police had to be kept under review, and that 
policy decisions had to be reviewed to avoid racial stereotyping. It went on to 
say that the allegations of police misconduct did not relate only to what 
happened in the street but extended to behaviour in police stations, 
particularly in the questioning and detention of suspects, and it supported the 
introduction of an element of independent inspection and supervision of 
suspects in police stations.29 A subsequent section on consultation and 
accountability said that statutory accountability was the key to successful 
consultation and socially responsible policing, and that exclusive reliance on 
voluntary consultation machinery, which had failed in Brixton, would not do. 
The report found that the police were accountable, but that there was no link 
between accountability and consultation. The link was “tenuous to vanishing 
point” in London: more effective, but insufficiently developed, outside London. 
                                                 
27 ibid 1.2-3. 
28 ibid 4.97. 
29 ibid 5.38-40. 
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In the section on consultation and accountability in London, the report 
recommended the formation of statutory liaison committees, and said it was 
essential that the local machinery should not be a “statutory talking shop” but 
should have “real” powers. Those powers should include both a role in the 
reformed complaints procedure and in the inspection of detention areas within 
police stations.30 
 
The report’s recommendations on custody visiting are one part of a package 
which contains two other linked recommendations, about the need for greater 
police accountability, and for the reform of the procedure for police 
complaints. The recommendations about visiting are found in a number of 
different parts of the report. The summary recommendation for law reform 
simply states: 
 
“I recommend provision for random checks by persons other than 
police officers on the interrogation and detention of suspects in the 
police station.”31 
 
The detail is found in earlier paragraphs in Part VIIC,32 which is headed “Lay 
police station visitors”. The report mentioned the Home Secretary’s current 
review of the “whole problem of safeguards for suspected persons under 
interrogation or detention in police stations”,33 and went on to state that more 
needed to be done to safeguard those suspects than reforming the complaints 
                                                 
30 ibid 5.55-71. 
31 ibid 8.60. 
32 ibid 7.7-7.10. 
33 Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure: The Philips Commission 1979-81: 
(Cmnd 8092, 1981). 
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system.34 Next, the report mentioned the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee Report on Deaths in Police Custody.35 This reference suggests 
that Lord Scarman saw the issue of deaths in police custody as an important 
concern. His report endorsed the Committee’s recommendation for random 
checks.36 It follows from the stipulation that visits should be random (the 
expression “at any time” is also used) that the visits should be unannounced, 
although that word does not appear. The report added that, as a safeguard, 
those recommendations would be greatly strengthened if the system of 
checks were backed by a statutory system of independent investigation and 
supervision of interrogation procedures and detention in police stations. The 
report considered a system comparable to Prison Visitors,37 and rejected the 
view of a House of Commons Committee of Inquiry that such a system would 
be unlikely to have any significant effect. That committee had been inquiring 
into interrogation procedures, and it was the conduct of interviews that the 
committee thought would not be affected by visiting.38 
 
The report stated that it would be “salutary” if it were known that certain 
people had the right to visit police stations at any time and had the duty to 
report on what they observed. Those people would be, outside London, 
                                                 
34 Scarman (n 26), 7.7-7.10. The next section of the report, at paras 7.11ff, went on to 
recommend major reforms to the police complaints system. 
35 Scarman (n 26), 7.8 The report quotes the committee’s recommendation that Chief Police 
Officers should arrange for sufficient random checks to be carried out to ensure that the 
procedures were properly observed: the report, at 7.10, makes the important qualification that 
the checks should be carried out by persons other than police officers. The report refers to the 
Home Affairs Committee’s report as HC 632: the correct reference is HC 631. 
36 See text to note 19. 
37 The only system that could be considered as a model: see Chapter Seven, text to note 46.  
38 Committee of Inquiry into the Interrogation Procedures in Northern Ireland, (Cmnd 7497, 
1979): para 193 is part of para 27 in the summary available at: 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/bennett.htm: accessed 06.02.2014. 
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members of police authorities freshly oriented towards consultation,39 and, in 
London, members of statutory liaison or consultative committees.40 It follows 
from the section quoted above41 that these mechanisms would provide 
publicity for the issues raised by the visitors and the complaints, and it also 
follows that the publicity would be independent of the police. Part VIIC 
concludes: “I do not offer a blueprint for legislation. It should not, however, be 
difficult to include amongst the provisions which I recommend for the 
strengthening of local accountability and consultation, provision for random 
checks by persons other than police officers42 on the interrogation and 
detention of suspects in the police station. I so recommend”.43 As will be seen, 
the Government found it suited them that they had not been given a 
“blueprint”.44 
 
I can now summarise the salient issues about these proposals as follows. The 
contexts of the Scarman Report’s proposals for custody visiting were concern 
about injuries and deaths in custody, and the need for reform of the system of 
complaints against the police. A statutory scheme of independent supervision 
and inspection of the conditions of detention and of interrogation can correctly 
be categorised as regulation of police behaviour. The checks were to be 
random, another important feature of regulation, and the checks were to be 
made by people, other than police officers, who were members of the 
proposed police liaison committees in London and re-oriented police 
                                                 
39 Scarman (n 26) 5.59-5.66. 
40 ibid 5.67-5.70. 
41 See text to note 30 and Scarman (n 26) 5.69. 
42 Differing on this point from what appears to have been the decision of the Home Affairs 
Committee: see text around note 19.  
43 ibid 7.10: italics as in the original. 
44 See text to notes 52-53. 
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authorities elsewhere, which would have provided a degree of independence. 
The involvement with local consultative machinery would have given publicity 
to the visitors’ findings, as well as the necessary qualities of accountability 
and legitimacy. The publicity would have empowered the regulatory work of 
the visitors to be effective as a means to achieve change in police 
behaviour.45 But very few of these ideas have survived in the two versions of 
custody visiting which have followed, lay visiting and independent custody 
visiting. However, the prestige of Lord Scarman’s name is frequently claimed 
to legitimize custody visiting.46 
 
The Scarman Report received a great deal of media attention, which was 
mostly favourable.47 The Report was debated in the House of Commons on 
10 December 1981, just fifteen days after it had been published.48 The Home 
Secretary welcomed the lay visitors proposal as “a constructive and positive 
suggestion for bringing the community and the police closer together”, and 
said that the government would work out how best to carry it forward.49 Roy 
Hattersley MP (Labour) said of Lord Scarman’s recommendation for visitors to 
make checks on the conditions of interrogation that it would not work without a 
statutory code for interrogation, providing for penalties if the code were 
breached by the police. He challenged the Home Secretary to implement the 
report in its entirety by turning it into legislation.50 In the House of Lords 
                                                 
45 See Chapter Two, text to notes 26-28. 
46 See Chapter Two, text to notes 115-116. 
47 John Benyon, in “The riots, Lord Scarman, and the political agenda” in Benyon J (ed), 
Scarman and After (Pergamon Press 1984) 3 - 19. The report became a best seller: see Rod 
Morgan, “Talking about Policing”, in Downes D (ed), Unravelling Criminal Justice (MacMillan 
1992) 165. 
48 HC Deb 10 December 1981 vol 14, No 27 cols 1001-1080. 
49 ibid 1004. 
50 ibid 1013-14. 
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debate on the Scarman Report, on 4 February 1982,51 the Home Office 
minister Lord Belstead quoted Lord Scarman’s words that he had “refrained 
from offering a blueprint”52 for legislation on custody visiting, and that the 
government were considering the practicalities of a scheme in the 
arrangements that they were following up for local liaison and consultation.53  
  
The government’s remarks in these two debates did not refer to the details of 
the proposal for visitors, in particular the recommendation that visitors should 
check the conditions of interrogation, despite the reference to that point in Mr 
Hattersley’s speech. And the government ignored another point made by Mr 
Hattersley, that they should implement the whole of the report by legislation. 
The government had its own agenda, which was to implement by legislation 
the Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure: this was 
achieved in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE”).54 So, there 
was nothing in PACE about Lord Scarman’s proposals for a statutory system 
of custody visiting or for reforming the police complaints system, although 
statutory liaison was introduced in the form of consultative committees.55 The 
PACE codes of practice56 were a major reform of detention standards, but 
they lacked the force of law and redress for breach that Mr Hattersley had 
                                                 
51 HL Deb 4 February 1982 vol 426 cols 1396-1474. 
52 Scarman (n 26) 7.10: text to notes 42-44. 
53 HL Deb ( n 51) col 1399. 
54 The original bill was lost by the calling of the 1983 general election. 
55 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, s 106. These committees were a very important part of 
Lord Scarman's policy: see Morgan (n 47) and Rod Morgan, “‘Policing by consent’: 
legitimating the doctrine”, in Morgan R and Smith D J (eds), Coming to terms with policing: 
perspectives on policy (Routledge 1989), where he comes to no conclusion as to whether this 
development had legitimated policing by consent beyond in local elites. 
56 Code C for detention.  
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argued for.57 The codes provided detailed rules about custody, against which 
visitors could make their checks.  
 
In the absence of legislation for custody visiting, the first custody visiting 
schemes began their work, as “lay visiting”. The Greater Manchester Police 
Authority, fully supported by the chief constable James Anderton, decided to 
go ahead with lay visitors from May 1983.58 The visitors were members of the 
police committee59 and visited police stations without notice. Similar schemes 
were being introduced elsewhere in the country.60 The Home Secretary, now 
Leon Brittan (Conservative), announced on 6 July 1983 that lay visiting rights 
to police stations were  
 
“to be extended to more areas as part of a scheme to bring the police 
and community closer together ... Mr Brittan announced ... that the 
project, operative in Greater Manchester for the past two months, and 
[would] be extended to include the West Midlands, South Yorkshire, 
Humberside, Leicestershire, and Cheshire police forces. Under the 
scheme, members of local police committees [could] call on police 
stations in the area at random and check on the wellbeing of prisoners, 
who [could] refuse to see [them]. One London police district, Lambeth - 
which [included] the Brixton area - [would] also take part in the pilot. 
                                                 
57 Which still, largely, do not exist: Andrew Sanders, Richard Young and Mandy Burton, 
Criminal Justice (4th edn OUP 2010) 663ff. 
58 Benyon (n 47) 110; Gabrielle Cox, “Openness and Accountability”, in Benyon B and Bourn  
C (eds) The Police: Powers, Procedures and Proprieties (1986) Pergamon 168. See further 
on Greater Manchester the text to note 64 and Chapter Two, text to note 92. 
59 The Scarman Report had mentioned that members of police committees could take the role 
of visitors: Scarman (n 26) 7.9. 
60 Benyon, “The policing issues” in Benyon J (ed) (n 47) 110. 
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But as the capital [had] no police committee, the Home Secretary 
[intended] to appoint a panel of community representatives.”61 
 
One of the first tasks the Community/Police Consultative Group for Lambeth 
set itself was to establish a scheme for lay visitors. The Group entered into 
negotiations with the Home Office and the Lambeth Panel of Lay Visitors started 
work in January 1984.62   
 
The Policy of the Home Office and of the police: the 1986 
Circular 
The Home Office embarked on developing a policy for custody visiting, and 
issued a draft circular in autumn 1984 about establishing visiting schemes 
nationally, but it took until February 1986, some four years after the Scarman 
Report, for the Home Office to issue the final version.63 Two reasons are 
given for the delay: objections by the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(“ACPO”) who insisted on changes to the text, and a dispute between Greater 
Manchester police authority and its chief constable about whether visitors 
should be able to give detainees leaflets about their rights.64  
 
                                                 
61 "More Lay Visits to Police", The Guardian, (London 07.07.1983): 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxyd.bham.ac.uk/docview/186523486/D8F392C16BEC4943P
Q/22?accountid=8630 accessed 20.06.2016. 
62 Sean Creighton, Dignity Without Liberty: A Report on Lay Visiting to Lambeth Police Stations, 
(Bristol Centre for Criminal Justice March 1991). Other sources of information about Lambeth 
are found in the Archives of the Lambeth Panel of Lay Visitors to Police Stations (London 
Borough of Lambeth Archives 2000/70 Box 10, Folder 4).  
63 The Home Office had apparently issued a circular in May 1983, entitled “Lay Visitors to 
Police Stations: Guidelines [Provincial Forces]”, according to Charles Kemp and Rod Morgan,  
Lay Visiting to Police Stations: Report to the Home Office (Bristol Centre for Criminal Justice 
1990) 5. They do not include the circular in the list of references and I have not been able to 
track it down. 
64 ibid 7. See the trenchant remarks made by the chair of the police authority about the 
leaflets affair: Chapter Two, text to note 92. 
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The Home Office circular to police forces and police authorities was entitled 
“Lay Visitors to Police Stations”.65 The opening words of the covering letter 
referred to  
 
“ … the carrying out of random checks by independent persons on the 
detention of suspects at police stations [as] first proposed in Lord 
Scarman’s report ... ” 
 
The covering letter stated that, following the establishment of pilot lay visiting 
schemes, enough had been learnt  
 
“ … to enable the Home Secretary to commend similar arrangements 
wherever local wishes and circumstances might make them 
appropriate … ”  
 
with a preference for urban areas.  
 
This was the first of several circulars on the subject that the Home Office has 
issued from time to time over the following years. The 1986 Circular is worth 
examining in detail for two reasons. First, because it tells us what type of visits 
the lay visitors made, or were supposed to be making, despite some local 
variations. Second, because it is reasonable to assume that it sets out the 
                                                 
65 1986 circular. Kemp and Morgan (n 63) say that the version currently available was the one 
sent to the provinces, and that the version used for London apparently differed in some 
respects: the two amendments required by ACPO (see text to notes 67 and 82) were not 
included. 
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Home Office’s policy. Significantly, the first paragraph of the guidelines reads 
as follows: 
 
“The purpose of lay visiting arrangements is to enable members of the 
local community to observe, comment and report upon the conditions 
under which persons are detained at police stations and the operation 
in practice of the statutory and other rules governing their welfare, with 
a view to securing greater understanding of, and confidence in, these 
matters. It is emphasised that these are the only purposes for which lay 
visitors are permitted to visit police stations.” 66 
 
Both of these sentences merit close attention. The first sentence shows that 
the visiting is not for the benefit of the detainees. Rather, the visiting is the 
means to secure public confidence in the detention arrangements.67 Here one 
can start to trace the conflict about the purposes of custody visiting which 
persists to this day, and the clear choice made by the authorities for, in terms 
of Packer’s models, a crime control purpose. Crime control’s priorities are 
efficiency, with the police not being hindered in their work: confidence in the 
police will keep tighter regulation at bay. Packer’s opposing, due process, 
model prioritises concerns for the welfare of the individual and the need for 
limitations on police power.68 The second sentence was added at the 
insistence of ACPO.69 The sentence might prompt the reader to wonder what 
                                                 
66 ibid para 1. 
67 A point made in another context by Richard Young and Andrew Sanders, “The Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice: A Confidence Trick?” (1994) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 14 3 435. 
68 See Chapter Two, text to notes 47-51. 
69 Kemp and Morgan (n 63) 7.  
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other purposes ACPO had in mind for which lay visiting was not to be 
permitted. Two likely candidates are: checking on the conditions of 
interrogation as Lord Scarman had proposed,70 and assisting detainees with 
complaints, as Michael Meacher had proposed.71 Both these purposes were 
specifically prohibited in the circular.72 A third likely candidate for a purpose 
ACPO did not want to see was deterring the police from assaulting detainees, 
thus reducing the number of deaths in custody. This had been included in 
Michael Meacher’s evidence, and was implicit in the Scarman Report, but it  
was not even mentioned in the circular, because it was unmentionable.73 This 
was the first of many instances of the authorities either burying this central 
purpose of a regulator of police behaviour in custody blocks or calling on 
visitors to build confidence in the police after a death.74  
 
For the organisation of the visits, the circular spoke of the preparation of a 
visiting programme within which unannounced visits could be made.75 It will 
be recalled that the covering letter spoke of random visiting: one wonders why 
the circular did not use the word “random”. As it happened, the word “random” 
is never used in any of the Home Office circulars and codes of practice, and 
the word “unannounced” is used only to differentiate visits to terrorism 
suspects.76 The Home Office did not attribute regulatory qualities to custody 
visiting in 1986, nor have they done so at any time since. 
                                                 
70 See text to note 31. 
71 See text to notes 8-10, 20. 
72 1986 Circular paras 21 and 15.  
73 Meacher, text to note 8: Scarman, text to note 36. 
74 Burying the subject is discussed in the text following note 160. For confidence building, see 
the text to notes 129-131 and the text following note 131, Chapter Five, text to note 202, and 
Chapter Six, text to notes 185-197. 
75 1986 Circular para 2. 
76 See text to note 180, and Chapter Two, text around note 155. 
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Let us look at how the policy-makers approached meetings between visitors 
and detainees. If the officer in charge establishes that a detainee wishes to 
meet the visitors, the detainee will be required to sign an “undertaking” to that 
effect. One might expect detainees at the police station to be suspicious about 
signing documents, so this stipulation would not have encouraged them to 
meet the visitors, a problem of which at least one lay visitor became aware: 
 
“Too often, a detained person was asked to sign ‛here and here’ 
without being told what was printed on the lines directly above his/her 
signature. Very often, the detained person indicated that he/she had no 
idea what he/ she signed.” 77 
 
It is unlikely that those who drafted the circular had seen things from the 
detainees’ point of view.  
 
As to how the visitors’ meeting with the detainees should be conducted, the 
circular stipulates that visitors must meet detainees in the sight and hearing of 
the escorting police officer.78 This would make the whole interaction between 
visitor and detainee immediately known to the police, and would be likely to 
prevent any meaningful dialogue, as the detainee would have no confidence 
in the integrity of the process.  
 
At the meeting, visitors 
                                                 
77 1986 Circular para 14; Lee Bridges and Andrew Sanders, “Access to legal advice and 
police malpractice” Criminal Law Review [1990] Jul 494. 
78 1986 Circular para 18: emphasis added. 
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“should ... decline to discuss more than the conditions in which persons 
are detained.”79  
 
Contrary to Lord Scarman’s recommendation, visitors were not to be allowed 
to attend a police interview with a detainee,80 and they were also prohibited 
from meeting a detainee if the police thought that might prejudice an 
investigation.81 And, “in the interests of maintaining their impartiality,” visitors 
were to take no part in complaints of maltreatment or misconduct made by or 
on behalf of detained persons.82 These restrictions vividly point up the 
concern to limit the impact of visiting as much as possible, reinforced by the 
provision which was apparently also included at the insistence of ACPO: 
visitors acting consistently in breach of the rules could be struck off.83 The 
circular goes on to warn about the potential consequences of breaches of 
confidentiality by visitors. They might incur civil liability to the detainees, and, 
they could be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act 1911 for disclosing 
facts relating to police operations or the security of police stations.84  
 
This last point makes it clear that the Home Office wanted to keep firm control 
of what visitors said outside the visiting arrangements, and that visitors acting 
as whistle-blowers would not be tolerated. Merseyside visitors were reported 
as having felt constrained by their commitment to the Official Secrets Act from 
                                                 
79 ibid para 22. 
80 ibid para 21. 
81 ibid para 16. 
82 ibid para 21: emphasis added. 
83 ibid para 25. 
84 ibid para 27. 
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contributing to the “community forums”.85 There was an obvious conflict with 
the purpose of the forums, which was to improve communication between the 
community and the police: visitors were expected to attend the forums and 
identify themselves as visitors.86 Some custody visitors were at one stage 
required to “sign the Official Secrets Act”, i.e., to sign a form acknowledging 
the operation of the Act in their work. As signing the form did not change the 
legal obligation, the question is what the purpose of this curious and 
intimidatory practice was: the most likely explanation is that its purpose was to 
deter whistle-blowers.87  
 
What sort of people did the Home Office want to become visitors? 
Recruitment would be in the hands of the police authority, but it would be 
“open” to them to recruit from outside their membership: for instance, 
members of local consultative groups, experienced prison visitors and those 
involved with young people; but not magistrates. They should be independent 
persons of good character, who  
 
“ … will be expected to make informed judgements in which the 
community can have confidence and which the police will accept as fair 
criticism when it is justified … ” 
 
                                                 
85 For the community forums, see the text to note 55 and the note, and for the Lambeth 
Community Consulting Group, the text to note 111. 
86 Sandra Walklate, The Merseyside Lay Visiting Scheme First Report: the Lay Visitors 
(Merseyside Police Authority 1986) para 3.8. 
87 http://policeauthority.org/metropolitan/partnerships/icv/conferences/2006-03/index.html 
accessed 09.06.2016. Even temporary gardeners have been obliged to sign the Official 
Secrets Act: see Stan Cohen and Laurie Taylor, Prison Secrets (NCCL/RAP 1976) 6 - 12.  
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but people with convictions for offences punishable with imprisonment which 
had not been spent under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 might not 
be suitable.88  
 
What of the frequency of visits? In urban areas, a visit between every one to 
four weeks was suggested, and for rural stations, no more than annually.89 
The circular went on to recommend that visitors should visit in pairs, and not 
in larger parties, so as not to over-burden the police and produce a false 
picture of station routine.90 In addition, visitors should bring urgent matters 
(such as injury) to the immediate attention of the officer in charge. Visitors 
were to complete report forms setting out what they had observed on their 
visit. There were to be three copies: one to be left at the police station, one 
sent to the chief constable, and one sent to the clerk of the police authority.91 
The reports would also be sent to HMIC who would then be available to offer 
advice to the police authority about the visitors’ findings.92 The one group not 
to have copies were the people who had originated the reports: the visitors. 
Presumably they would have to rely on their memory when it came to 
following up their concerns: and, in any case, there was no procedure for 
following up the concerns, or at least, no mention of any procedure in the 
circular. So it is hard to see how visitors could expect to be able to make 
specific checks that anything was being done in response to their concerns. 
The Home Office policy here appears to be that the security of information 
about police stations was more important than rectifying conditions in the 
                                                 
88 1986 Circular paras 3-5. 
89 ibid para 7. Emphasis added: this does seem very inadequate. 
90 ibid para 9. 
91 ibid paras 28-9. 
92 ibid para 31. 
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stations.93 And the police authority were “responsible” for informing the public 
about the results of its programme of visits,94 which shows that the policy was 
to prevent the visitors from having an independent voice.   
 
What did visitors make of all this? A report on the Merseyside panel found that 
some of the visitors felt they had no power. One visitor was quoted as saying: 
 
“The lay visitor is not equal to the station sergeant:  he calls the shots.”  
 
And, away from the custody block, the report found that the police were the 
exclusive providers of training for visitors.95 This thesis investigates the power 
of the police over visitors, both in the custody block and through their training,  
and the process of socialisation, which causes them to adopt certain attitudes, 
or reinforces the same attitudes which they already hold. Like most power, it 
operates without there being any overt conflict, and is an example of Lukes’ 
theory of three-dimensional power.96 
 
If the custody sergeant was calling the shots with the visitors, who was calling 
the shots in developing policy: ACPO or the Home Office? The insistence of 
ACPO that the circular emphasise the limitations of the purposes of custody 
visiting,97 and that it provided for the dismissal of visitors,98 raises fascinating 
questions about the nature of the power relationship between the police and 
                                                 
93 Follow-up procedures were provided for in later circulars and codes of practice. 
94 1986 Circular paras 28-30. 
95 Walklate (n 86) paras 3.7 and 4.2. 
96 See Chapter Two, text to notes 36-46. 
97 See text to notes 66-69. 
98 See text to note 83. 
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the Home Office, and about the role of ACPO. One of the chief constables 
interviewed by Robert Reiner said: 
 
“I largely feel bound by Home Office circulars. Because they are a 
regurgitation of what we’ve told them already, through ACPO.”99 
 
The chief constable is saying that he did what the Home Office told him to do, 
and that he did so because that was what his representatives had told the 
Home Office to tell him to do. Reiner described this as a “consensual process 
of policy formulation”,100 but the word “consensual” suggests rather more give 
and take than a negotiation in which one party agrees to everything that the 
other party wants. And in this case, where there had not been a consensus, 
ACPO “insisted” and prevailed. ACPO was a powerful institution in its own 
right: Wall noted the “continued strengthening of ACPO” as one of the factors 
which would “effectively bypass... conventional...or... democratic [policy-
making] processes”.101  
 
Reiner saw the Home Office as the dominant party, but I think it was the 
police who had the upper hand throughout the process. That ACPO was said 
to have insisted on these two points suggests that they were the only points of 
significant disagreement about the text of this circular, of which the first draft 
was produced by the Home Office. The Home Office knew what the police’s 
                                                 
99 Robert Reiner, Chief Constables, (OUP 1991) 272. 
100 ibid 271. 
101 David S Wall, The Chief Constables of England and Wales: the socio-legal history of a 
criminal justice elite (Ashgate 1998) 316. The importance of ACPO as a campaigning group 
and its effectiveness in shaping policy is confirmed by the more recent assessment of Sarah 
Charman, “Lobbying and Representation: An Analysis of the Emergence of the ‘Senior Police 
Voice’ during the Late Twentieth Century” Contemporary British History (2011) 25 2  277. 
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attitude was likely to be, and, in the hope of avoiding conflict, may well have 
worked to produce a first draft that they thought the police would accept. It is 
possible that the Home Office, in all except those two points, actually 
anticipated the views of the police about custody visiting. This behaviour of 
avoiding conflict, by second-guessing the views of the dominant party, can be 
seen as evidence of the operation on the Home Office of the power of the 
police, and is another instance of Steven Lukes’ three-dimensional power.102   
 
The Lambeth Lay Visitors 
The 1986 Circular shows that the Home Office and the police wanted to confine 
the visiting arrangements as much as possible. Particularly striking is the 
requirement that the visitors must meet detainees in the sight and hearing of 
the escorting police officer. Practice had varied on this between the lay visiting 
schemes: at one extreme, in South Yorkshire concerns about visitor safety led 
to the rule being that there were to be no private conversations with 
detainees.103 At the other end of the spectrum, the Lambeth Lay Visitors 
appear, in December 1987, to have insisted on the conversations being out of 
the hearing of the escorting officer, and pursued the point by suspending visits 
for just over a fortnight.104 This stand had a much wider impact, if only for a 
while. The 1991 Circular for London said that, where this could be done with 
safety, conversations should take place, wherever practicable, out of sight of the 
escorting officer, but only if it could be done with safety, as well as out of hearing 
                                                 
102 Reiner (n 99) 271 relies on Lukes’ theory to support the opposite conclusion that the Home 
Office was the dominant party. 
103 Walklate (n 86) para 2.2. 
104  Creighton (n 62). 
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of the officer.105 The 1992 Circular for the rest of the country did not contain this 
provision, and it has not reappeared in subsequent circulars or codes of 
practice.106 The Lambeth visitors also ensured that the denial by the police of a 
visit to a detainee should be recorded on the custody record by an officer with a 
rank no lower than that of inspector:107 the rank was raised to that of 
superintendent in the 1991 and 1992 Circulars.108  
 
Beyond the points just noted, the way the Lambeth group operated seems to 
have been substantially, and ideologically, different, both from many of the 
other schemes at the time, and from the current arrangements. They even 
managed to counter the national trends on ethnic origin and age, and some 
black people in their 20s were recruited as visitors.109 Here are some 
examples of the different approaches they took. They held their own meetings 
in their own venue, with the police attending part of the meeting by 
invitation.110 The Lambeth visitors’ work was tied in with work of the local 
police community consulting group, which gave them a voice,111 and they 
even used to issue press releases, for instance about the “disgraceful” 
conditions at a police station.112 The Lambeth group was probably the only 
panel to produce independent quarterly reports. The reports gave accounts of 
                                                 
105 1991 Circular para 31. 
106 1992 Circular para 28. 
107 Walklate (n 86) para 2.2: Creighton (n 62) 33. 
108 1991 Circular para 30 and 1992 Circular para 27. Now, by Police Reform Act 2002 s 51 (4) 
(a), the level has reverted to the rank of inspector or above. 
109 Elizabeth Burney “Inside the Nick”, New Society (London, 08.11.1985) 239-40 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxye.bham.ac.uk/docview/1307104486/915B3329095541A7P
Q/8?accountid=8630 accessed 20.06.2016. 
110 Lambeth archives (n 62). 
111 Creighton (n 62) numerous references: Lambeth archives (n 62). 
112 Lambeth archives (n 62). 
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their visiting and of progress made towards improving conditions of custody. 
This led to the following rather sardonic comment by one of the visitors:  
 
“The panel can demonstrate its influence in securing better conditions, 
although it must be small comfort to someone who is knocked about in 
the police van on the way to the station to know he will be given a hot 
dinner when he gets there.”113  
The Lambeth visitors organised some of their own training.114 On their visits, 
the Lambeth visitors asked the custody staff how many detainees were 
detained in hospital, and why they had had to go to hospital, and 
arrangements for visiting were made with local hospitals.115 The Lambeth 
visitors advised detainees about the formal complaints procedures, but they 
were sensitive to some detainees not wanting the police to know about their 
complaints, so they reserved the right not to record them on the official visit 
report which would be seen by the custody sergeant.116 The Lambeth visitors 
tried to find some way of monitoring police interviews, by looking through a 
window in the interview room so they could observe what was happening,117 
or by finding a break in the interview.118 All these instances illustrate that the 
Lambeth lay visitors had, in terms of Packer’s models, a due process 
approach to their work, prioritising the welfare of detainees, and that they 
operated independently from the police.  
                                                 
113 Burney (n 109). 
114 Creighton (n 62) 16. 
115 ibid 33. 
116 ibid 52.  
117 ibid 63. 
118 Lambeth archives (n 62). 
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The differences between Lambeth and other schemes can be seen from 
Charles Kemp and Rod Morgan’s studies which reported that by October 
1989 all but five of the police authorities, and all but two of London boroughs, 
had visiting schemes, but that many of the schemes, especially those outside 
London, were found to be rudimentary and ineffective.119 In London visitors 
were appointed by the Home Secretary as the police authority: contrary to 
what one might expect, this led to the London panels having more autonomy 
than those in the provinces.120 Visitors had had some chance, through 
community consultation, to publicise their findings: but this had never been 
part of the official practice, and the legislation providing for community 
consultation was repealed in 1996.121 Research in the London Borough of 
Brent in 2002 found that detainees did not recognise the term “lay visitors”, 
generally knew nothing about them, and had not met them: however, the 
custody staff knew when visits were likely to be made, and the times the 
visitors chose were not times when the cells were most occupied.122  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
119 Kemp and Morgan (n 63)16ff. 
120 ibid 21. 
121 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 106 was repealed by Police Act 1996, ss 103(3), 
104(1), and Sch 9 Pt I. 
122 Tim Newburn and Stephanie Hayman, Policing, Surveillance and Social Control: CCTV 
and police monitoring of suspects (Routledge 2002) 133, 137-9. 
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Policy in the 1990s: Deaths in Custody 
In the early 1990s, the Home Office issued two further circulars, in 1991 for 
London,123 and in 1992 for the rest of England and Wales.124 The opening 
paragraph omitted the “only purposes” homily of the 1986 Guidance and 
substituted it with: 
 
“These arrangements also provide an independent check on the way 
police officers carry out their duties with regard to detained persons.”  
 
The principal means by which visitors would carry out that check was by 
satisfying themselves that detainees have had their rights explained to them 
and received written notice of what their rights were.125 The requirement in the 
1986 Circular that detainees sign written consents for visitors to see them was 
dropped.126  
 
These circulars contain interesting suggestions about the suitability of former 
special constables as visitors: 
 
“The police authority may, however, wish to consider whether it would 
be appropriate to appoint an ex-special constable depending on where 
the person served and the length of time which has elapsed since the 
                                                 
123 1991 Circular. 
124 1992 Circular. 
125 1991 Circular para 37: 1992 Circular para 34. 
126 Kemp and Morgan (n 63) 50-51 say that requiring detainees to sign a consent form had 
been strongly opposed by several London panels, and that a majority of divisional police 
officers agreed with the panels’ view, and that a force direction from Scotland Yard confirmed 
that consent forms should not be used. 
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appointment ended. In the light of their increasing involvement in the 
operation of the criminal justice system applications from members of 
the probation service would appear to be unlikely to succeed because 
of the possibility of a conflict of interest.”127  
 
The circulars make out that the position of former special constables differed 
from that of former police officers, but both would have had similar attitudes 
and similar conflicts of interest. Apart from the fact that they worked part-time, 
former special constables would be involved with the criminal justice system 
just as much as probation officers. And similar weight was not given to the 
factor of where applicants had been working. There was a great deal of 
special pleading here.  
   
There is a section in these circulars on deaths in custody, stating that a 
representative of the lay visitors would, out of courtesy, be notified of a death, 
but that visitors were not allowed to view the body in the cell.128 Because the 
police did not have an absolute obligation to inform visitors of a death, visitors 
would not necessarily know that a death had taken place, at or following 
detention, at the police station they were visiting. They might arrive there the 
next day, and not know anything about it: but every police officer would know. 
This has probably happened on numerous occasions. Failing to provide 
visitors with this information conveys a lack of trust, candour and respect for 
visitors and their work, regardless of whether it impairs the effectiveness of 
                                                 
127 1991 and 1992 Circulars para 6. 
128 ibid para 31: emphasis added. The circular did not say whose act of “courtesy” it was to 
pass this information on to the lay visitors. The point was dropped after the introduction of the 
statutory scheme: see text after note 160. 
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the visiting, which it surely does. This needs to be considered alongside the 
practice of so-called “special visits”, which had already made an appearance 
in the 1986 Circular.129 The 1991 and 1992 Circulars read as follows on this: 
 
“Visits will normally be unscheduled. There may be instances, 
however, when there is particular tension within the local community 
about the treatment or well-being of one or more persons detained at 
police stations within the area which a visit might help to defuse. The 
officer in charge of the station should therefore make arrangements 
with the lay visitors for special visits to take place at short notice.”130  
 
In one case known to me, the tension was about the death of a detainee.131  
But it was for the police, not the visitors, to decide what involvement the 
visitors had in a case of the worst harm that a detainee can come to in 
custody. By this approach, the Home Office showed that what they wanted 
visitors to do was to help rebuild public confidence in circumstances where 
the police might have caused the death of a detainee, rather than empower 
the visitors to gain the knowledge and experience needed to make a 
contribution towards reducing the number of deaths of detainees. In other 
words, the Home Office’s priority was promoting confidence in the criminal 
justice system, not preventing the deaths of detainees: as noted above, a 
crime control orientation. 
 
 
                                                 
129 1986 Circular para 9. 
130 1991 and 1992 Circulars para 16. 
131 See Chapter Six, text to notes 192-197. 
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Introduction of the Statutory Scheme 
In 1998 a report prepared for the Home Office showed that up to a quarter of 
the local schemes were not working properly,132 and that recruitment of 
visitors reflecting the local community had often not been achieved.133 Lay 
visiting appeared to be a haphazard operation. The absence of formal legal 
authority for the visiting had been found to create difficulties, with police 
sometimes not recognising the right of the visitors to make a visit.134 
 
In the year 2000 a Home Office working party considered the future of 
custody visiting. The members of the working party were representatives of 
the police, police authorities, the Home Office and the Police Complaints 
Authority:135 no one was there to represent either visitors136 or detainees: they 
had no say and no power in the creation of the statutory scheme. This is an 
                                                 
132 Mollie Weatheritt and Carole Viera (1998) Lay Visiting to Police Stations, a report 
commissioned by the Home Office, Home Office Research Study 188 (Home Office 1989) 4. 
This was based on reports from triennial inspections by HMIC. 
133 ibid 21. 
134 Information provided to the author by a Dyfed-Powys police officer who had been working 
in Essex at the time. 
135 2001 Circular para 2. The working party was composed of representatives from the 
Association of Chief Police Officers, the Association of Police Authorities, the Association of 
Police Authority Clerks, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Home Office, the 
Metropolitan Police Authority, the National Association for Lay Visiting (renamed the 
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136 Despite its name, ICVA was not representing visitors (and still does not represent visitors). 
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Crime Commissioners or their equivalents: Visiting Times 8/3, Summer 2002 showing clause 
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A new structure for lay visitors to people in custody” in 2001, but the League were not listed 
as having been represented at the discussions, and there is no knowing whether any of the 
working party read their briefing paper. In any case, having read it myself, I find it 
disappointing in that it completely failed to address the issues.  
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example of what Mick Ryan has labelled “a closed policy-making process”.137 
According to Paul Rock, criminal justice policy about victims evolved in a 
similar way: the Home Office created a fantasy image of victims and had no 
actual contact with them, and the priority was always to maintain public 
confidence.138 In the case of custody visiting, there was never any need to 
create a fantasy picture of detainees, as they have always been demonised. 
But in other respects the process was the same. First, there was no 
consultation with detainees or anyone who could represent them; and, 
second, the policy-makers made confidence in the police the most important 
priority.  
 
The working party decided to support the establishment of a statutory scheme 
for custody visiting. The reasons for this were said to be to ensure uniformity 
and a formal legal relationship with the police.139 All police authorities would 
be required by law to organise custody visiting in their areas on similar lines.  
 
The Home Office issued a press release140 and the Home Office’s Police and 
Powers Unit issued a fresh circular about custody visiting, both on 4 May 
2001.141 The press release said that independent oversight of police custody 
facilities was being “further enhanced” with the publication of new Home 
Office guidance on the operation and management of the estimated 3,000 
                                                 
137 Mick Ryan, The Politics of Penal Reform (Longman 1983) 81. The same was almost 
certainly true of other occasions when policy was discussed, but for those occasions we do 
not have the benefit of a list, as we do here. 
138 Paul Rock, Helping Victims of Crime (OUP 1990) 88, 257. 
139 Visiting Times 7/2 December 2000. Lay visiting had already been put on a statutory basis 
in Northern Ireland, in 2001: Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, s 73. 
140 Police Custody Visiting Guidance Updated Today, Home Office News Release 
04.05.2001. 
141 2001 Circular. 
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visitors, and that the visiting system, known as “lay visiting”, would be 
renamed “independent custody visiting” to help it become more accessible 
and understood by the wider community. Despite this rebranding, the 
expression “lay visitors” has persisted, with some police officers still using it in 
2015:142 and the statute brought in an increase in the control of custody 
visiting exercised by police authorities, and a decrease in the degree of 
independence enjoyed by visitors.  
 
The circular was much more enthusiastic about visiting than its predecessors. 
It said that the visiting had developed into an “essential” aspect of the scrutiny 
of police practice and procedures: as well as the protection it offered to 
detainees, it drew on the “concerned commitment” of volunteers and helped to 
build partnerships between the police and the communities they served: and it 
was strongly supported by the police as a necessary and normal part of the 
arrangements for securing the accountability of the police.143 Referring to the 
recent implementation of the Human Rights Act, the circular said that the 
treatment of those in police custody was one key indicator of the extent to 
which we were embracing the culture of rights which the legal changes were 
intended to reinforce; independent custody visiting provided an important 
check on that treatment, and police authorities should ensure that the visiting 
arrangements were as effective as possible, without specifying where that 
effectiveness lay and how it could be assessed.144 The circular did however 
                                                 
142 Observation and interviews. 
143 2001 Circular para 4. 
144 ibid para 5. 
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note that custody visiting remained relatively little known to the public at large, 
and did not have a high profile, even within the criminal justice system.145  
 
The Police Reform Bill which contained these proposals started in the House 
of Lords, and the Lords debated the relevant clause146 on 12 March 2002.147 
There had been nothing about custody visiting in the white paper,148 but 
government policy was set out in the explanatory note.149 It said that placing 
custody visiting on a statutory basis would immediately raise the profile of the 
whole system and provide consistent standards. The note went on to say: 
 
“ … police authorities, when recruiting, shall ensure that any volunteer 
appointed to become a custody visitor must be independent of the 
police authority and the chief officer of the relevant police force. This 
will ensure that there is no conflict of interest.”150 
 
It takes a degree of wishful thinking to write a passage like that, which says 
that the organisation which recruits visitors also has to ensure that the visitors 
are independent of that organisation. 
 
Contributing to the House of Lords debate, Lord Elton (Conservative) said that 
the scheme had the one principal aim, which was either to bolster or to 
restore public confidence in the way that the police handle those who are 
                                                 
145 ibid para 12. 
146 Then numbered 45. 
147 HL Deb 12.03.2002 cols 686-674. The issue of visiting did not feature in the House of 
Commons second reading debate on 07.05.2002.  
148 Home Office, Policing a New Century; A Blueprint for Reform (Cm 5326, 2001) 
149 Explanatory Notes to Police Reform Act 2002, s 51: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/30/notes: accessed 09.02.2014. 
150 ibid para 284. 
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“charged with crimes”.151 He said that the lay visitors had become tokens 
rather than forces for good. Quoting the opening words of the explanatory 
note set out above, he pointed out that the draft bill called for “independent” 
visitors. He criticised the system of the police authority appointing visitors. He 
said that more had to be done to connect the visitors with the public rather 
than connect them through the police authority. The Home Office Minister, 
Lord Rooker, repeated points made in the explanatory note, and added two 
more which were not found there. His first point was that there was a 
“contradiction” in what Lord Elton had said about who appointed the custody 
visitors: once the police authority had appointed these people they would “in 
no way” be connected with the police or the criminal justice system. His 
second point was that the scheme would be governed by independent people 
from the local community. 152  
 
Lord Rooker’s two points cannot be justified. Under the code of practice, yet 
to be published, and in accordance with the circular, already published, 
visitors would be working in a system run by the police authority, which cannot 
be described as “in no way connected with the police or the criminal justice 
system”. As regards the scheme being governed by independent people from 
the local community, if Lord Rooker meant that each local scheme would be 
governed by the police authority, that raises the question of the independence 
of the police authority from the police, where a prima facie case can be made 
                                                 
151 Those charged with crimes, unless released on bail, are remanded in custody in a prison. 
Presumably he meant to say: “those who have been arrested on suspicion of having 
committed crimes”. 
152 HL Deb 12.03.2002 cols 701-2. Lord Elton referred to paragraph 256 of the Explanatory 
Note. In the version now available it is paragraph 281.  
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that the police authority was not independent:153 if his remark meant that the 
visitors would be running the scheme, that is certainly not justified, as the 
police authority was going to be firmly, and solely, in control. Strictly speaking, 
it is the visitors who are required by the statute to be independent, not the 
scheme itself: but the scheme is called “independent” in all official 
publications.  
 
The legislation, headed “Independent custody visitors for places of detention” 
provided that every police authority was to make arrangements for detainees 
to be visited by persons appointed under the arrangements (“independent 
custody visitors”); and [that] the arrangements had to secure that the persons 
appointed under the arrangements were independent of both the police 
authority and the chief officer of police.154 The basic points set out were: 
access to the police stations, examining records, meeting detainees and 
inspecting facilities,155 and the circumstances in which access could be 
denied.156 Following consultation with police authorities and the police,157 the 
Home Secretary was to lay before Parliament a code of practice about the 
scheme.158 Once again, neither visitors, detainees or defence lawyers were to 
be consulted.  
                                                 
153 See Chapter Two, text to notes 85-96. 
154 Police Reform Act 2002, s 51(1)-(2), later amended to take account of the change to 
Police and Crime Commissioners.  
155 Police Reform Act 2002, s 51(3). 
156 Police Reform Act 2002, s 51(4)-(5). 
157 Police Reform Act 2002, s 6 and s 7. S 51(7) was amended by Police and Justice Act 
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Police Authorities and the Association of Chief Police Officers. 
158 Police Reform Act 2002, s 51 (8). 2003 Code of Practice and the subsequent revisions in 
2010 and 2013 were not issued as statutory instruments.   
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The code of practice was issued in 2003. It is in similar terms to the 2001 
Circular, although the circular was over three times longer than the code of 
practice. One significant change was on the issue of informing visitors about 
deaths in custody. The 1991 and 1992 Circulars had said that the officer in 
charge of the station should arrange to notify visitors of a death, “out of 
courtesy”.159 The 2001 Circular said that the police authority “must be 
informed as soon as possible about a death,” but without saying that the 
police authority had to inform the visitors.160 Then the 2003 Code of Practice 
dropped the subject altogether, and it has not made an appearance since. So, 
first the visitors were not informed, and then the police authority were not 
informed. This is another instance of the way in which policy-makers have 
sought to obscure and dismantle the connection between deaths in custody 
and custody visiting. 
 
The differences in the various official documents create uncertainty. Here are 
just a few examples, on the issue of independence: in each case the circular 
contained more significant detail than the code of practice. In contrast with the 
circular, the code of practice puts no qualifications on the eligibility of former 
magistrates and people who have held posts in the police, and the issue of 
the eligibility of lawyers and probation officers is simply omitted.161 The 
circular says that there may be some visits at the invitation of the police: the 
                                                 
159 ibid para 31. 
160 Presumably the police had the obligation to inform the police authority. This is found in the 
2001 Circular para 61, which continued as follows: “Consideration will then need to be given 
to whether a visit would be helpful in terms of informing and reassuring the local community. If 
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code of practice does not.162 Yet another document, the ICVA national 
standards, says that it might be appropriate for panel members to take part in 
recruitment:163 the code of practice does not. In addition to these documents, 
police authorities issued local scheme handbooks with their own takes on 
various points.  
 
A lot of paid work must have gone both into writing these various layers of 
documents, and in providing training programmes based on them. As unpaid 
volunteers, visitors might feel bemused by the large number of somewhat 
different obligations, presented with varying levels of detail, and wonder which 
document prevailed. Working that out is no easy task.164 Here are some of the 
considerations. The code of practice was issued pursuant to statute, but was 
not a statutory instrument, and therefore may come into a category known as 
“quasi-legislation” which is said also to include government circulars.165 
Laurence Lustgarten found that chief constables treated circulars as though 
they were binding law.166 The governing statute said that police authorities 
and independent custody visitors had to “have regard” to the code of practice, 
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which is weaker than an obligation to comply with it. Codes have formal and 
official promulgation. Circulars go only to the police and police authorities, 
now the Police and Crime Commissioners. The obligations which are not 
found in the code of practice but which are found in the national standards do 
not have the status or force of obligations found in the code of practice, 
whatever that might be; the obligations found in the national standards may, 
or may not, derive what status and force they have from the code of practice; 
but the national standards may be nothing more than a wish list. The 
bemused visitor might conclude that the hierarchy of the official documents is 
(1) statute; (2) code; (3) circular; or (2=) code and circular; (4) standards; and 
(5) local handbook; but the visitor would do well to remember that the 
handbook contained the terms of their contract for the visiting work, with 
provisions for sanction and dismissal in the case of breach. 
 
Why is there all this complexity? Perhaps it results from the anxious concern 
of those who drafted the documents to establish precisely what visitors could 
not do as well as what they could do. Another reason for the complexity could 
be the fact that no visitors or detainees, or people representing them, or 
custody staff, took any part in drafting the documents. The complexity is, at 
the least, undesirable and it may be completely unnecessary. From the point 
of view of those who are directly involved, visitors, detainees and custody 
staff, the guidance should be simple, and it should be found in one document, 
not five. 
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Operation of the Statutory Scheme  
By becoming statutory, custody visiting probably achieved much wider and 
more uniform coverage, but it is not easy to assess its operations. There are 
some very occasional newspaper items, and otherwise the information 
consists of the following: issues of Visiting Times, a newsletter sent out at 
least once a year by ICVA; sections in some police authorities’ annual 
reports: and reports on custody suites by Joint Inspection Teams reports into 
custody suites.167 None of these sources is satisfactory. Visiting Times and 
the police authority reports contain news round-ups where contributions from 
the police authorities will say what is going well in their area, and little that is 
critical is reported. The HMIP/HMIC reports rarely say much about the visiting 
schemes except what appears to be a standard formula to the effect that they 
are working well, and much more rarely to report, with slightly more detail, 
that they are not working well. Very occasionally something more startling 
emerges. For instance, visitors to a West Midlands custody block found a 
remand prisoner, whom local prisons had been too full to accept, slumped 
against the door of his cell with a ligature round his neck. The report claimed 
that if he had not been found when he was, there would definitely have been 
a death in police custody that day.168  
 
                                                 
167 These reports are made in compliance with the UK’s treaty obligations under the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention against Torture, a United Nations instrument: see Chapter One, 
text to note 102. The obligation is to ensure regular independent inspection of places of 
detention. The programme of inspecting about 12 custody suites a year began in 2008, and 
the inspections include the independent custody visiting schemes at each custody suite 
inspected. https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/joint-inspections/joint-
inspection-of-police-custody-facilities/ accessed 10.06.2016. 
168 Visiting Times 8/3 summer 2002. 
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Two new codes of practice were published in 2010 and 2013. There were two 
significant changes in the 2010 Code of Practice. The first was the provision 
of the option that visitors could introduce themselves to detainees, rather than 
that the escorting police officer should make the introduction,169 a practice 
which had been noted as a problem 20 years earlier.170 The second 
significant change brought in by the 2010 Code of Practice was the provision 
for custody visits to persons detained under the Terrorism Acts (known as 
TACT detainees).171 The 2013 Code of Practice was brought in to deal with 
two issues: access to video and audio recordings of interviews with TACT 
detainees and the transfer of custody visiting from police authorities to the 
Police and Crime Commissioners. The issue of access to the recordings 
arose under a statute172 which provides for the preparation by independent 
custody visitors of reports of visits to TACT detainees, and the submission of 
the reports to the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.173 In some but 
not all cases, visitors would be able to listen to the audio recordings and view 
the video recordings (with or without sound) of police interviews with those 
detainees which have taken place during their detention at the suite.174  
 
                                                 
169 2013 Code of Practice para 53.  
170 Kemp and Morgan (n 63) 49.  
171 2013 Code of Practice para 37 - 8. I have not carried out empirical research about custody 
visiting of TACT detainees.  
172 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 117 (4) - (8), brought into force in April 2013 by Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009 (Commencement no 12) SI 2013/705.  
173 The current Independent Reviewer, David Anderson QC, is the first to operate these 
arrangements. See his Report of the Independent Reviewer of the operation of the Terrorism 
Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006: at para 7.23 he notes the reports he receives 
from custody visitors: 
 https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Terrorism-Acts-Report-2015-Print-version.pdf. accessed 
10.06.2016. 
174 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 117 (7), and the 2013 Code of Practice exclude access 
where the police reasonably believe it is not practicable at the time, or the police reasonably 
believe access could interfere with the process of justice.  
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Why was this change brought in? The government’s explanatory notes do not 
provide an explanation.175 The reason seems to be the need to deal with 
human rights law.176 Terrorist suspects may be held for up to 14 days, which 
is much longer than the 96 hour maximum for other suspects, so the length of 
the detention might be held to infringe a detainee’s right to be brought before 
a judge promptly, unless safeguards are in place.177 In this case the 
safeguards are thought to be the access to the recordings, the preparation of 
the reports and their submission to the independent reviewer. The code 
stipulates that visitors may request access to the recordings only either (i) at 
the request of the detainee or (ii) where they have particular concerns about 
the conduct of an interview. The code goes on to say that visitors can request 
access only to ensure that the detainee has been offered their rights and 
entitlements, their health and well being have been ensured throughout, and 
that the relevant statutory code has been followed.178 It is significant that the 
code of practice goes beyond the statute in controlling this access, and again 
shows the concerns of those who contributed to the drafting of the code, in 
which group there were, as usual, no visitors and no representatives of the 
interests of detainees: the authorities exercised their power by excluding them 
from having any say in the matter.179 
                                                 
175  Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s 117, Explanatory Notes: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/notes/division/5/1/3/5/7 accessed 10.06.2016. 
176 A minister’s statement on 25.03.2013, mentioning enhanced safeguards for terrorist 
suspects in police detention, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130325/wmstext/130325m0
001.htm,leads to the answer in the Government’s Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Powers (Cm 8004 Jan 2011) 7 - 14. 
177 ECHR Article 5.1(c): Ireland v United Kingdom [1978] ECHR1: Brogan v United Kingdom 
11 EHRR 117 1998. 
178 2013 Code of Practice para 66. 
179 Summary of responses received to the Home Office consultation on the revised Code of 
Practice on Independent Custody Visiting March 2013: 
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Contrary to what one might expect, access to these recordings is still not 
allowed for visits to other detainees, which raises the question of why, if 
access to the recordings is allowed for visits to detainees suspected of 
terrorism, it is not allowed for visits to those who are not. The answer may 
simply be that the government knew that human rights law required there to 
be a change for TACT detainees, and that there was no similar compelling 
requirement to make a general change in respect of all detainees.180 It is very 
likely that no thought was given as to whether it would be desirable and/or 
logical to allow access to these recordings in respect of all detainees. This 
would have been the point of view of Packer’s due process model, concerned 
with safeguards for detainees, but no one who contributed to the consultation 
is likely to have seen that as a priority.  
 
The code of practice introduced another change, which was to allow meetings 
between visitors and TACT detainees to take place in an interview room, 
consultation room, or some other convenient place, rather than in their 
cells.181 It is not clear to me why it was felt necessary to make this change: it 
may be for the same reason as for allowing access to recordings. I found that 
meeting detainees in a consultation room improved the quality of the 
                                                                                                                                            
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/172845/consult
ation-response.pdf: accessed 05.02.2014.  
180 Police Reform Act 2002, s 51, as amended by Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 117(5-8). 
There was a consultation about the change to the code of practice. All the points were raised 
by either Police and Crime Commissioners, the police or ICVA, and not by visitors, and no 
one raised the point about extending access to video and audio recordings. 
181 2013 Code of Practice para 58. 
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meetings.182 This would improve visitors’ meetings with all detainees, not just 
TACT detainees: but, again this does not appear to have been addressed.   
 
The code says that visits to terrorist suites should be arranged with the police, 
although unannounced visits are permitted. The code states that it is unlikely, 
given the low number of arrests under the Terrorism Acts, that a terrorist 
suspect would be in detention during visits conducted on an ad hoc basis.183  
 
The second issue covered by the 2013 Code of Practice was also responding 
to a statute: the abolition of police authorities and their replacement by the 
Police and Crime Commissioners in November 2012.184 The code imposes on 
the Commissioners the same duties as used to be placed on the police 
authorities.185    
This chapter has analysed the chronological development of policy about 
custody visiting. One can also seek to establish the current state of policy 
from a review of the various claims which are made for custody visiting in the 
official literature, as follows: 
                                                 
182 See Chapter Six, text around note 110. 
183 2013 Code of Practice para 43. This is the only use of the word “unannounced” in the 
2003, 2010 and 2013 Codes of Practice. The use of the word “permitted” shows the crime 
control mindset of the policy-makers. 
184 Police and Social Responsibility Act 2011, Schedule 16 part 3.s 299: the Police and Crime 
Commissioner in London is the Mayor. I was told that the parliamentary draftsmen forgot that 
looking after custody visiting was one of the duties to be taken up by the PCCs, and the 
statute came close to omitting this provision altogether: source not identified, to protect 
anonymity. Perhaps the draftsmen, like almost everybody else, had never heard of custody 
visiting: see Chapter Six, text to notes 197-205. 
185 2013 Code of Practice paras 8-10.  
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1. That custody visiting enables volunteers to attend police stations to 
check on the treatment of detainees and the conditions in which they 
are held and that their rights and entitlements are being observed.186 
2. That custody visiting offers protections and confidentiality to detainees 
and the police.187 
3. That custody visiting offers reassurance to the community at large.188 
4. That custody visiting contributes to police accountability.189 
It is not easy to say what official policy line emerges from this, because there 
are conflicts between the claims, and those conflicts amount to an essential 
ambiguity as to what the policy really is. On the one hand, there are the 
purposes in claim 1, the first part of claim 2, and claim 4 (“Purpose A”) and, on 
the other, the purpose in the second part of claim 2 and claim 3 (“Purpose B”). 
Let us call purpose A the protection of detainees, and purpose B the 
reassurance of the public. Reassuring the public could be achieved in one of 
two ways. The first way would be the success of the scheme in protecting 
detainees and informing the public about that success. Alternatively, the 
reassurance could be achieved by marketing the existence of the visiting 
scheme, without disclosing anything about the scheme, in particular whether it 
succeeded in protecting detainees. I believe the latter is the right 
interpretation, as it would be in line with the predominant priority for criminal 
                                                 
186 2013 Code of Practice para 2. 
187 ibid. 
188 ibid. 
189 2001 Circular para 4. 
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justice policy of all recent governments, which has been to reassure the 
public.190  
  
Conclusion 
Both Michael Meacher MP and Lord Scarman saw the need for regulation of 
police behaviour in custody blocks, and custody visiting as a means to provide 
that regulation. Scarman recommended that the visiting should be backed by 
a statutory system of independent inspection and supervision of interrogation 
and detention procedures in police stations by members of his proposed 
police liaison committees in London and, in the provinces, police authorities 
reoriented towards consultation. This would have given custody visiting a 
measure of the qualities regulators need: independence, legitimacy, 
accountability, and effectiveness. The proposals of both Meacher and 
Scarman showed a due process orientation, with the emphasis on greater 
protection for detainees.  
 
Meacher’s recommendations were forgotten, and although the Scarman 
Report received massive publicity, the government declined to implement it. 
Apart from not being a statutory scheme, the voluntary lay visiting scheme, 
which the Home Office later felt obliged to support, differed from Scarman in 
two crucial aspects: the checks were to be on the conditions of detention, with 
no checks on the conditions of interrogation;191 and the visits were not to be 
                                                 
190 e.g., Richard Young and Andrew Sanders, “The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: A 
Confidence Trick?” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1994) 14 3 435-448. 
191 Scarman, text to note 37; lay visiting, text to note 70.  
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random.192 Thus departures were made from Scarman in respect of each of 
the very few specific stipulations he actually made about the visiting.193 And, 
in general terms, so much of the tone was different. There was no privacy or 
confidentiality between visitors and detainees, and there were numerous 
restrictions on what visitors were allowed to do. Scarman had used the 
expression “inspection and supervision”: the lay visitors were not doing much 
inspecting, just making a series of checks, and they certainly were not 
supervising. The one exception to all this was the degree of independence 
obtained by lay visitors in some parts of London.194 
 
The custody visiting scheme, which finally became statutory in 2002, and the 
codes of practice, were prepared without any consultation with visitors or 
detainees.195 The statutory scheme adopted much of the lay visiting scheme, 
but did not revive the consultation machinery which provided the means for 
publicity.196 Custody visiting was branded “independent”, but published 
government policy contradicted that claim, and the visitors were put under the 
complete control of the police authorities, now the Police and Crime 
Commissioners. The codes of practice dropped the use of the word 
“unannounced”197 to describe the pattern of visiting, and did not use the word 
“random” at all.198 The orientation was crime control, causing the police the 
least disruption to their work. Most significantly, the policy-makers completed 
                                                 
192 Scarman, text to note 37; lay visiting, text to notes 75-76. 
193 See text to notes 39-43. 
194 See text to notes 103-121. 
195 See text to notes 135-136. 
196 See text to note 121. 
197 See text to note 183 and the note. 
198 See text to note 76. 
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the process of obliterating the notion that the purpose of custody visiting was 
to deter police assaults and reduce deaths in custody.199  
 
This story has some similarities with the attempted reforms of police 
complaints procedures. Graham Smith argues that, because the process 
takes such a long time and has no effective input from complainants, the 
reforms are never adequate. Smith also notes opposition to reform by the 
police, and their lobbying strength, with a number of different organisations 
representing their interests.200 While there are some differences from the story 
of custody visiting, there are also some telling similarities: the length of time 
taken to bring the reforms in;201 the opposition to reform by the police;202 the 
number of organisations representing police interests (five out of the ten 
bodies on the working party and the type of people involved in policy-making 
(no input from detainees);203 and, above all, the behaviour of successive 
governments, which either failed to implement the Scarman Report’s 
recommendations, or neutered them when they were, finally, implemented. 
 
This chapter has shown how the police and the Home Office have directed 
custody visiting away from its role as a regulator. In that process it has been 
possible to discern the dominant power of the police, influencing policy, at 
almost every stage, with little or no overt conflict: and the police got their way. 
This power produced a visiting scheme with a crime control orientation posing 
                                                 
199 See text to notes 159-160 and the text following note 160. 
200 Graham Smith, “A Most Enduring Problem” (2006) 35 1 Journal of Social Policy 121. 
201 21 years, from 1981, the year of the Scarman Report, to 2002, the year of the Police 
Reform Act. 
202 See text to note 64. 
203 See text to notes 135-136. 
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fewer problems for the police, but the scheme was still there, with some due 
process features, and the police did not seek to oppose the scheme 
altogether. The question arises as to why, if they had the power to do so, the 
police did not seek to stop the scheme at an early stage, or seek to dismantle 
it later. An answer to this will be offered in the final section of Chapter Seven.   
 
Following this review of the desk research, the next chapter, Chapter Four, 
explains the design of the empirical research. The findings from that part of 
my research illustrate the effects of police and Home Office policy on custody 
visiting in the area studied, and those findings are set out in Chapters Five 
and Six. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
This chapter sets out the researcher’s background and motivation for carrying 
out this research, and explains how the research was designed to take 
account of those special factors, as well as to ensure that the approach was 
the most suitable for understanding the subject-matter. The research centres 
on a local case study, where the methods used were observation and 
interviews, but also, as has been seen in Chapter Three, there is an analysis, 
based on desk research and elite interview data, of the history and policy of 
custody visiting in England and Wales, and the thesis also touches on some 
current national issues, where the research draws on further such interview 
data and on conference observation.  
The chapter explains the reasons for the choice of the case study method, 
and why interviews and observation were needed, with some use of official 
statistics, rather than surveys and questionnaires. The questions of selection 
and access are discussed, with an account of how the interviews and 
observation were planned and conducted. The chapter shows how problems 
were resolved, in establishing the locations for the case study, in interviewing 
a sufficient number of participants, and in finding the right way to study the 
operation of certain concepts, such as power and independence. The chapter 
explains how the data were subjected to a process of thematic analysis to 
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produce the research findings, and concludes with a review of the ethical 
considerations.1  
The principal concern in this thesis is the effect of the power of the police on 
all aspects of custody visiting, work which is carried out in the custody block, 
one of the state’s hidden places, with a number of different interests in play: 
what might be called the micro-dynamics of power. As explained by Steven 
Lukes, power operates in circumstances where there is no overt conflict, and 
may achieve the result that those affected by the power refrain to take any 
action, whether the inaction is conscious or unconscious.2 It was therefore 
essential to design a means to discover those events which did not happen, 
as well as those events which did happen. This arose, in general terms, from 
the issue of whether visitors challenged the police. For example, I observed 
that some visitors did not ask the custody staff why detainees had been taken 
to hospital from the custody block. Noticing that this had not happened, that 
this question had not been asked, resulted from a consideration of how the 
visitors, as effective regulators, would go about this work, whether they would 
ask this question, and what other questions they would ask. I found that I had 
to look beyond the standard visiting model followed by the visitors to a model 
that would be better suited to their role as regulators. Similar considerations 
                                                 
1 For ease of reference, the research questions are set out here: 
One: Could custody visiting make a more effective contribution to the regulation of police 
detention? 
Two:  What is the relation between custody visiting and police mistreatment of detainees, 
including mistreatment that ends in their death? Why is this not mentioned in official 
literature?  
Three: To what extent is custody visiting independent, in accordance with its branding and 
statutory obligation? 
Four: To what extent is custody visiting effective, both as a regulator, and according to the 
claims made for it in the official literature? 
Five: Are the values of custody visiting in practice closer to the due process model or the 
crime control model? 
2 See Chapter Two, text to notes 36-45. 
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arose with the concept of independence, where I was seeking to establish the 
attitudes of the visitors: inaction, just as much as action, could provide 
evidence which could be analysed by drawing on this concept. For example, 
some visitors would, however unconsciously, show their closeness to the 
custody staff by shutting the cell door themselves at the end of a visit to a 
detainee, while others would show a greater degree of separateness by 
leaving it to the custody staff to perform this quintessentially custodial act.  
Also, in assessing how visitors developed their attitudes to their work, I 
needed to note not only what the sources of their socialisation were, but also 
the absence of those influences that one might have expected the visitors to 
encounter, if they were being trained to be effective regulators of police 
behaviour in custody blocks.  
The same principle applied to the official literature about custody visiting. Just 
as I needed to look out for events which did not happen, I found that I also 
had to look out for words which the government did not use in its publications. 
I had to work out which words one would one expect to find in government 
publications about custody visiting as a regulator, and look out for them. This 
meant studying the official literature and looking for these needles in that 
haystack, and eventually realising that very few of the needles were there to 
be found. Some of the words which one would expect to be used to describe 
the essential qualities of regulatory visiting were simply not used at all. This 
was a valuable discovery. It helped me to understand official policy about 
custody visiting, and pointed to the possibility that the authorities had never 
intended that custody visiting should have a regulatory function. Above all, I 
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found that the official literature kept right off the subject of custody visiting as 
a deterrent to police misbehaviour that could lead to deaths in custody.  
 
Background and motivation 
I have felt strongly motivated to carry out this research. My motives for doing 
this research are partly personal, partly academic, and partly social: the 
pursuit of a solution to what I regard as a problem in the criminal justice 
system that I had experienced personally, along with the desire both to 
contribute to knowledge, and to develop social policy. My interest in this 
research began while I was working as a custody visitor in rural Wales 
between 2009 and 2012. My only familiarity with the phenomenon arose from 
my own experience working as a visitor in two of the custody blocks covered 
by the local scheme. So my experience as a visitor was itself a kind of (very 
amateur) case study: my understanding of custody visiting depended almost 
entirely on my experience of that one instance.3 I felt that I wanted to read 
about custody visiting from standpoints other than those of the official 
literature. I found that very little had been published, and decided that my time 
would be better spent studying and writing about custody visiting, rather than 
continuing to work as a visitor. I believe that the context of detainee welfare in 
custody blocks and the substantial amount of volunteers’ time spent on 
custody visiting make studying it very worthwhile.4 I came to the conclusion 
                                                 
3 With the permission of the police authority supervising the local scheme in which I worked, 
and the permission of the neighbouring police authority, obtained after a long delay, I visited a 
custody block in that neighbouring area. I met the visitor who acted as the co-ordinator for the 
team visiting that custody block, and noted certain differences between the two areas in the 
organisation of the rota and the reporting of visitors’ concerns, but detected no differences in 
general matters of principle. 
4 See Chapter One, text to notes 8-9. 
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that I would not be able to write a worthwhile book on this subject without 
academic help. That is why I applied to the University of Birmingham Law 
School to write a PhD thesis on this subject, with a view to publishing a book 
based on the thesis. 
I have tried to assess for myself how I approach the question of the validity of 
this research. In general terms, I share the view that the real world does exist 
independently of our own individual subjective understanding, but that it is 
accessible to researchers only via the participants’5 interpretations, which may 
then be further interpreted by the researcher; and that to counter the 
inevitable degree of subjectivity, the researcher should try to be as objective 
and neutral as possible in the collection, interpretation and presentation of 
data, and to reflect on the ways in which bias might creep in.6 With my 
experience of the subject of the study I have, inevitably, developed some 
views about it, notably about its independence and ethos, and about who 
benefits from it. Had I not developed some views, I would not have been 
motivated to do the research. But another process has been at work. I 
became aware during the course of the research that, like the visitors I was 
studying, I too had become socialised by the experience of being a visitor, 
and later I found that I was socialised by the research itself. I found that I had, 
perhaps unconsciously, adopted attitudes which made me less ready to 
challenge the status quo. As a former visitor, I could be called a “former 
insider”. There is an emotional element generated by the experience of having 
                                                 
5 This expression shows more respect to these people than “subjects”: Gary Thomas, How to 
do Your Research Project (Sage 2013) 45. I also prefer it to “respondents”. 
6 Jane Ritchie, Jane Lewis, Carol McNaughton Nicholls and Rachel Ormston, Qualitative 
Research Practice: A guide for social science students and researchers (2nd edition Sage 
2014) 22-3. 
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been an insider, which should be acknowledged:7 in my case, a strong feeling 
of dissatisfaction with the way the scheme operated. I have had to be aware 
of the need to take account of the overlay of my previous experience on every 
aspect of the research. Inevitably I have found myself making comparisons 
between what I had encountered as a visitor and what I was encountering as 
a researcher, some of which are useful. I also found that I needed to be aware 
of my status and of my feelings as a researcher in the custody block, in this 
instance as an outsider: I was affected by the power of the police as much as 
all the other outsiders in the custody block, including the visitors. I had to keep 
my reactions and behaviour under review, so as to minimise the effect of that 
power on the truth of my observations and the fairness of my interpretations. 
Another consequence of being a former insider is that I did not have “the 
advantage of naivety”.8 Most of the visitors I observed and interviewed knew 
that I had been a visitor before, and may have seen me as someone who was 
looking at their performance with an experienced and a critical eye. I believe 
researchers gain much more insight and information by appearing to want to 
learn,9 and while I did want to learn, the visitors might have felt I did not, so a 
greater effort was required of me to seek to overcome that.  
During my work as a visitor I had been aware of the barriers preventing my 
communicating effectively with the detainees. When I came to carry out this 
research I realised that this would again be a concern. The barriers were 
created by my identity and the detainees’ perception of my identity, and by the 
                                                 
7 This is the issue known as “positionality” or being an “insider”: see Yvonne Jewkes “An 
Introduction to ‘Doing Prison Research Differently’” Qualitative Inquiry (2014) 20 4 387. 
8 John Conley and William O’Barr, “Rules versus Relationships” in Halliday S and Schmidt P 
(eds), Conducting Law and Society Research, (CUP 2009)122. 
9 Keith Hawkins, “Environment and Enforcement” in Halliday S and Schmidt P (n 8), 101. 
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detainees’ identity and my perception of their identity. I was aware that 
barriers of this type may inhibit good communication with detainees and other 
interviewees. I believe there are no short cuts to overcoming these barriers, 
except to seek the rapport and the trust of the people from whom data are 
sought. 
 
The case study approach 
Like all research design, my approach has had to be a compromise10 between 
the ideal method of studying this subject and the resources available. In this 
case the subject is a system in which there are an estimated 1,900 
volunteers,11 managed by staff employed by the Police and Crime 
Commissioners. Each visitor makes about one visit per month, and the aim is 
that one pair of visitors from each panel makes a visit to the local custody 
block once a week. The ideal method of studying the subject would include 
examinations of custody visiting in several, or maybe all, parts of the country: 
but the resources available for this study are one researcher, assisted by two 
supervisors, working for three years. My research design was driven by the 
need to capture a range of views and experiences in order to evaluate the 
regulatory performance of the scheme, for which qualitative design is entirely 
appropriate. That is why I chose the local case study approach, as I wanted to 
find a manageable way to make an in-depth study of a national phenomenon.   
Case studies are suitable for a number of different types of investigation. A 
case study of custody visiting is located squarely in one the traditions of this 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (4th edn 2012 OUP) 41. 
11 Figure obtained from ICVA. 
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approach, the study of organisations and institutions.12 Custody visiting is both 
an organisation and an institution, established by statute,13 with work being 
carried out by volunteer visitors and managed by the Police and Crime 
Commissioner. The same operation is carried out in each police area in 
England and Wales. I found the following definition of the case study helpful: 
“ ... an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding 
a larger class of (similar) units. A unit connotes a spatially bounded 
phenomenon ... observed ... over some delimited period of time.” 14 
The case study I have carried out fitted this definition. A local custody visiting 
scheme is a single unit, and a temporally delimited study of it can facilitate the 
understanding of the larger class of similar schemes. As will be explained, I 
used multiple forms of data collection appropriate to a case study, principally 
observation and interviewing, over a core period of about fifteen months.  
Another useful definition of the case study gives it as:  
“ ... an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity 
and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, programme or 
system in a ‘real life’ context. It is research-based, inclusive of different 
methods and evidence-led.”15 
                                                 
12 This is one of the categories identified by Colin Robson. The others in his list, which he 
says only scratches the surface, are:  individual case studies; sets of individual case studies; 
community studies; social group studies; studies of events, roles and relationships; and cross-
national comparative issues. Colin Robson, Real World Research: A Resource for Users of 
Social Research Methods in Applied Settings (3rd edn Wiley 2011) 138-9. 
13 Police Reform Act 2002 s 51. 
14 John Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?” American Political Science 
Review  (2004) 98 2 341, 342. 
15 Helen Simons, Case Study Research in Practice (Sage 2009) 21. 
 151 
The “real life” of custody visiting is seen in the study of the instances of its 
operation from multiple perspectives, the results of observation and 
interviews. As Robert Yin tells us: 
“Whatever the field of interest, the distinctive need for a case study 
arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena.”16 
Custody visiting is clearly a complex social phenomenon. The work puts the 
visitors, who are volunteers, into contact with three very different groups of 
people. The first group, the detainees, are members of the general public who 
are being detained, however temporarily, in a closed institution, and are in a 
state of crisis. The second group, the police, are agents of the state with 
coercive powers operating that detention, and it is their routine work. The 
visitors check and report on how members of the first group are treated by 
members of the second. The third group, the staff of the Police and Crime 
Commissioner, manage the visitors and discuss, with the police, the issues 
the visitors raise in their reports. These interactions all take place within a 
local custody visiting scheme, and they combine to produce various 
outcomes. It should be possible to attempt to make evaluations of both the 
quality of the interactions and the quality of the outcomes.  
Yin points out that, because it uses observation and interviews, methods 
which are clearly suited to the subject-matter of the interaction of human 
beings, case study is preferable in that context to other systems, such as 
experiment, survey or record analysis, which do not use those methods.17 I 
                                                 
16 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (5th edn Sage 2014) 4. 
17 ibid 8. 
 152 
believe I was using the method described by Glen Bowen as “naturalistic 
inquiry”, where  
“the investigator studies real-world situations as they unfold naturally 
instead of manipulating research outcomes a priori. Further, the 
researcher recognizes the existence of multiple constructed realities.”18 
However, case studies do need to place the object of study into a theoretical 
context: 
“For a ‘case’ to exist, we must be able to identify a characteristic unit, 
whose unity is given (at least initially) in concrete historical 
experiences. This unit must be observed, but it has no meaning in 
itself. It is significant only if an observer … can refer it to an analytical 
category or theory … If you want to talk about a ‘case’, you also need 
the means of interpreting it or placing it in a context.”19 
Custody visiting’s “characteristic units” are its local settings. In this thesis, 
custody visiting is interpreted in the characteristic unit of one local custody 
visiting scheme. As described below, the research was carried out at seven 
different custody blocks in that local scheme, each with its own visiting team, 
and, briefly, at the new dedicated custody facility. The data about these 
characteristic units were then examined and analysed by drawing on the key 
concepts discussed in Chapter Two. This process led to findings being made, 
and those findings provided the bases for answers to the research questions. 
                                                 
18 Glen Bowen, “Naturalistic inquiry and the saturation concept: a research note”, Qualitative 
Research (2008) 8 1 137, 138. 
19 Michael Wieviorka “Case studies: history or sociology?” in  Ragin C C and  Becker H S 
(eds). What is a case? Exploring the foundations of social inquiry (CUP 1992) 159, 160. 
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The concepts all derive from the topics which themselves are the context in 
which custody visiting operates. Each of those concepts is an analytical 
category or theory. 
This research is an attempt to “make sense of or interpret” custody visiting “in 
terms of the meanings people bring to [it]”.20 The people who bring meanings 
to custody visiting are found in all parts of England and Wales. On one view 
therefore, this research might be thought to require a much wider spread of 
information than can be obtained from parts of just one local scheme. But the 
only way for a lone researcher to gather data about a much larger number of 
local schemes would have been by the method of survey and questionnaire. 
The idea was rejected at an early stage. A great mass of information would 
have been obtained, but it would not have been useful, for the following 
reasons. First, it is not just the visitors one would wish to study, but all the 
other categories of people found in custody blocks: the police, civilian custody 
staff, detainees, and lawyers. It would have been difficult to reach members of 
these other categories by a survey, and it would have been impossible to 
ascertain the identity of members of that very important category, the 
detainees, let alone reach them. Second, the nature of the information one 
would wish to obtain from all these people would not fit usefully into the 
survey format of yes/no answers or graded expressions of agreement or 
disagreement.  Nor would results of that kind be much help in making sense 
of, and/or in interpreting, custody visiting in terms of the meanings people 
bring to it: each result would be no more than what Ben Bowling has labelled 
                                                 
20 Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (eds), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research 
(Sage 2011) 3. 
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a “decontextualised snapshot”.21 Survey material would not have been 
suitable for this study, whatever scale it was conducted on. The researcher 
needs to find out how the participants approach the answers to the questions 
and why they approach them in a particular way, and to have conversations 
with them in which ideas can be developed and incidents can be recalled.  
A case study is carried out by the researcher being physically located in the 
place where the phenomenon operates, or, as here, where an instance, or 
instances, of the phenomenon operate. Time and access to fieldwork are 
always limited, so Robert Stake recommends selecting cases that are easy to 
get at and hospitable to inquiry, without too much concern about their 
typicality.22  The area chosen for the case study provided some diversity. My 
experience as a custody visitor was in an under-populated rural area, where 
data were scarce, distances were long, and there was little variety in the 
environment, so it was not surprising that the area I chose for the case studies 
was a much more heavily populated and largely urban area, affording a 
variety of locales, all within easy reach, and likely to provide me with a large 
quantity of data.  
 
That left the question of whether there were specific issues arising from a 
rural setting which I might miss by running the case study in an urban area. 
This issue would affect the value of my research, because differences of 
principle would limit the extent to which conclusions could be drawn from my 
research about custody visiting in general. In the event, my experience in a 
                                                 
21 Ben Bowling, “Racial Harassment and the Process of Victimisation” in Perry B (ed), Hate 
and Bias Crime: A Reader (Routledge 2013) 61, 62. 
22 Robert E Stake, The Art of Case Study Research, (Sage 1995) 4. 
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rural scheme enabled me to be reasonably confident that there were no 
significant differences between the operation of urban schemes and the 
operation of rural schemes. And there were two other issues which could limit 
the value of my conclusions. Custody in the whole of the chosen area was run 
directly by the police, not partly outsourced, as in one of the areas studied by 
Layla Skinns,23 and custody visiting was run directly by the Police and Crime 
Commissioner, unlike in one area where some aspects have been 
outsourced.24 These were not issues which I could take into account in 
selecting the area for the case study, and they could be the subject of further 
research. 
 
Research beyond the case study and literature review 
This research has gone beyond the confines of the local case study. I carried 
out desk research about the history of custody visiting from 1980. I reviewed 
archival material about lay visiting in the form of the archives of the Lambeth 
Panel of Lay Visitors to Police Stations. I have obtained interviews with the 
late Michael Meacher MP, who originally proposed custody visiting; with the 
veteran custody visitor Jane Warwick, who helped me to understand the 
relationship between custody visiting and deaths in custody, and enabled me 
to unravel the facts behind an important and misleading account in an IPCC 
report, where I also used the machinery of the Freedom of Information Act; 
and with Katie Kempen, the chief executive of ICVA. I attended a number of 
conferences about policing issues and deaths in custody, which enabled me 
                                                 
23 Layla Skinns, Police Custody (Routledge 2011). 
24 In Dyfed-Powys, to, amongst others, PAVO (Powys Association of Voluntary 
Organisations): conversations with Dyfed-Powys visitor and PAVO officer. 
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to obtain some comparative information, as well as stimulating ideas about 
the case study research. These investigations have made this research much 
more than just a local case study, even if the case study does lie at the heart 
of the research design. 
 
I have looked at several literatures in order to carry out this research, both on 
the topics and concepts framing the thesis, as well as the history and practice 
of custody visiting. Initial searches in databases made it clear that there was 
very little available. For the history, I found that the Scarman Report was a 
good place to start: it took me back to Michael Meacher and forward to 
commentaries about the proposals for custody visiting, and the development 
of lay visiting. This enabled me to find the material, including archives held in 
Lambeth. Five reports of research had been published between 1986 and 
1999, only one of which involved any face to face interviewing, with the others 
all relying on telephone surveys and questionnaires. The reports did not go 
beyond how the schemes were running, and what evaluation there was did 
not consider the underlying question of whether lay visiting was framed in the 
right way or should be framed in some other way: in particular, whether it 
should, or should not, be run by police authorities, an issue which was 
suggested by the results of research into London panels.25 There has been no 
published research about custody visiting since 1999, apart from the 
occasional page in other works. For the current picture, I read through Visiting 
Times, published by ICVA, reports by the Joint Inspection Teams,26 and 
                                                 
25 See Chapter Three, text to note 120. 
26 See Chapter One, text to notes 105-6. 
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reports and marketing material posted on the internet by Police and Crime 
Commissioners.   
 
I also had to consider literature relating to the concepts in this study, power; 
socialisation; Packer’s crime control and due process models and the allied 
concept of balance; independence, combined with neutrality and impartiality; 
legitimacy; accountability; and effectiveness. I trawled through the stock of 
textbooks in the university’s law library, and looked through general books on 
criminology and criminal justice, using indexes and pursuing references which 
looked promising. As well as Westlaw, I used Google and Google scholar, 
Hein on Line and Web of Science search engines, and occasionally found that 
Wikipedia was able to point me in the right direction. The journals I looked at 
systematically were the British Journal of Criminology, Criminology and 
Criminal Justice, and Policing and Society, but found no material in them that 
was directly relevant to custody visiting, but there was material on other 
issues with a bearing on my research such as public confidence in the police.  
 
Access 
Access in the area chosen for the case study was not a problem, as it 
sometimes is with state agencies.27 The initial negotiations were conducted by 
my lead supervisor28 with the Police and Crime Commissioner, from whom 
permission was obtained and with whom a confidentiality agreement was 
signed, and permission was also obtained from senior police officers who 
                                                 
27 Steve Tombs and David Whyte, “Scrutinizing the Powerful” in Unmasking the Crimes of the 
Powerful, Tombs S and Whyte D (eds), (Peter Lang 2003) 3, 32-36. 
28 My lead supervisor tells me that it is fairly normal for someone of perceived higher status 
than a doctoral student to take the lead in opening the initial door. 
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required information about the research project to be filed with them. Detailed 
discussion with the scheme administrator (a member of the Office of the 
Police and Crime Commissioner) provided the necessary information with 
which to plan the research. The scheme administrator facilitated access to the 
visitors, initially by allowing me to attend meetings and training sessions, and 
then putting me in touch with them so I could make arrangements for 
accompanying them on visits and arranging interviews. I was security vetted 
by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and issued by the police 
with an identity tag of the type issued to custody visitors. Local custody 
inspectors were also helpful in facilitating my access to custody sergeants, 
custody staff and detainees, although on one occasion an inspector sought to 
make this access subject to the unacceptable condition that the visits were 
announced in advance.29 
 
Another gatekeeper, encountered in the research beyond the case study 
discussed in the next paragraph, was the Independent Custody Visiting 
Association (ICVA), who declined to let me attend scheme administrators’ 
annual meetings, but did allow me to attend their national conference. ICVA 
told me that my attendance at the scheme administrators' meetings might 
inhibit debate. One inference that could be drawn from the resistance of ICVA 
was that there were aspects of the administration of custody visiting that they 
did not want me to observe. What I was allowed to observe, what I was not 
                                                 
29 Another reason these visits did not go ahead was a safety consideration: see text to note 
67. For the scheme administrator, see Chapter Five, text to notes 34-37. 
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allowed to observe, and who made the decisions, were important forms of 
data in their own right.30 
 
The fieldwork: data collection 
The fieldwork was largely carried out in the second year of the three year 
study, as is the usual practice. There were three stages in the fieldwork: 
familiarisation, the pilot study, and the actual case study. Alongside that, for 
the work beyond the case study, there were three interviews with named 
people, attendance at conferences and archival research. The three stages 
enabled me to progress from a general appreciation of the operation of the 
local scheme to close contact with all the participants and each of the custody 
blocks. The familiarisation stage took place between January and June 2014. 
The pilot study stage was conducted in July and August 2014. The greater 
part of fieldwork for the case study was carried out between September 2014 
and June 2015. The relatively small amount of fieldwork which could not be 
carried out earlier took place between 1 July 2015 and 15 March 2016, after 
which no more was done. The fieldwork extended into this period for two 
reasons: effective opportunities to interview detainees did not arise until 
August 2015, and it was during this period that a new style of custody block 
was opened.  
The familiarisation fieldwork took the form of observation: visitor team 
meetings, visitor induction, training sessions, and annual meeting. These 
observations provided valuable background understanding of the organisation 
                                                 
30 A point made by Victor Jupp, Methods of Criminological Research (Routledge 1996)148-9: 
and see Chapter One, the text to notes 123-125. 
 160 
of custody visiting, its language, and its ethos, and were very useful 
preparation for the later stages.31  
A pilot study is recommended by Yin, on the basis that it helps to refine the 
data collection plans with respect to both the content of the data and the 
procedures to be followed.32 So the next stage was a pilot study, in which the 
fieldwork consisted of the same combination of methods as for the actual 
case study: observation at a custody block, accompanying visitors on visits, 
and interviews with visitors. Preparing for the pilot study included selecting 
venues which could be used for the actual case studies as well as for the 
pilot. Various possible locations were considered. Those originally selected for 
the actual case study were three very different locales: one city centre 
location, one location which combined a prosperous suburb with a deprived 
estate, and one inner-city area. The pilot study was conducted at one of the 
custody blocks which had not been selected for the case studies, located in 
another prosperous suburb. 
In the pilot study I extended my observation to three-hour sessions in police 
stations (during which, as it happened, no custody visits were in progress) 
and to accompanying visitors on visits. These three-hour sessions were also 
part of visitors’ training, so they enabled me to stand in the shoes of visitors 
and to experience what they might have experienced and to observe what 
they might have observed. It also enabled me to get a better understanding of 
the world of the custody block. I did two shifts, one daytime and one late night, 
                                                 
31 as recommended by Richard Sparks, Anthony Bottoms and Will Hay Prisons and the 
Problems of Order (OUP 1996) 346. 
32 Yin (n 16), 96. 
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in each of the seven custody blocks. Accompanying visitors is discussed in 
more detail below. 
The pilot was particularly useful in alerting me to the fact that it was not 
sufficient to contact visitors by email sent to them on my behalf by the scheme 
administrator, as few of them responded. In the pilot just one visitor had 
responded, so I approached the others through that visitor. A balance had to 
be struck between not pressurising the visitors on the one hand and not 
getting sufficient data on the other. I decided that, for the actual case studies, 
I would attend a visitor team meeting and explain the project in detail before 
asking for their help.  For the pilot I had set this out in emails, but it became 
apparent that not all the visitors had read the emails, and that some of them 
thought my research was about checking up on their performance or that of 
their team. I therefore had to explain to them that this simply was not so.  
The pilot also enabled me to think about the most effective way of collecting 
data from the visitors. I thought it would be best to accompany each visitor on 
a visit first, with the option of spending a few minutes debriefing immediately 
afterwards. The interview with each visitor should then take place on a 
separate occasion, a few days later, and the questions could be angled 
towards issues that had arisen from what happened, or did not happen, on the 
visit.33 While this would have been ideal, I found that it could be followed only 
very rarely, because of the difficulties involved in making arrangements.   
The first category of data that I collected was observation of people in the 
context in which the activities of interest occurred. This encompassed 
                                                 
33 See text around note 2. 
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observation of: custody blocks in three-hour sessions during daytime and late 
night shifts, accompanying visits by visitors to the custody blocks, visitor team 
meetings, visitor training sessions, and visitor regional and national 
conferences. The second category of data is my interviews, with visitors, 
detainees, police officers and civilian custody staff, lawyers, and, outside the 
case study, Michael Meacher MP, a veteran custody visitor in London, and a 
prominent figure in custody visiting’s national organisation ICVA. Observation 
and interviews are both methods clearly suited to studying interactions 
between human beings, and to understanding the “complex social 
phenomenon” 34 created by those interactions: how and why people behave in 
that context. Observation allowed me to see for myself: interviews enabled me 
to obtain people’s views and to hear their stories. The third category of data is 
statistics and documents. I have not been involved in the collection of 
statistics, and find that those which are published reveal no more than very 
basic information, little of which is useful for evaluation purposes, except for 
ascertaining the timing of visits.35   
The initial plan was to concentrate on three visiting teams to create three case 
studies. I attended the team meeting for what was then to have been the first 
case study to ask the visitors for their help. In the event no visitors at all 
attended that meeting, which took place at the height of the holiday season: 
the scheme administrator told me that it was unprecedented for there to be no 
visitors attending a team meeting. The visitors had not been forewarned that I 
would be there asking their help, so that was not the reason for their non-
                                                 
34 Yin (n 16) 4. 
35 See Chapter Six, text to notes 34, 43, 50 and 155-158.  
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attendance. The police did not attend either. So I communicated with the 
members of that team via the scheme administrator and was able to reach 
some of them. I then decided to take on a fourth location for a case study 
where I had already attended two team meetings, but only three visitors 
attended the meeting which I attended to make my formal request for 
assistance. Again, the scheme administrator wrote to the rest of the team 
about my request. Gradually, the numbers of visitors I was reaching built up, 
partly through the messages sent out by the scheme administrator, and partly 
through the “snowball” effect: visitors whom I had met and accompanied on 
visits and/or interviewed recommended my research to other visitors.  
In another attempt to increase the number of visitors participating, I went to a 
regional conference run for the area studied and three neighbouring areas, at 
which I started to seek access to the custody visiting schemes in those areas. 
The Police and Crime Commissioners in two of those neighbouring areas did 
not respond to my enquiry: an approach by my supervisor might have made a 
difference. In the third, the Police and Crime Commissioner referred me to a 
senior police officer. That officer sought to impose conditions on my access 
that I was unwilling to accept. The conditions were that he had sight of my 
interview schedules, and that I wrote him a report on the custody facilities in 
their area.  
I decided that I should seek access to a larger number of custody blocks in 
the chosen area, and I should treat that area as one case study, rather than 
as a number of individual case studies. I gradually increased the number of 
visiting teams in the chosen area from three to seven. This not only increased 
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the number of visitors and custody blocks, but it also widened the scope of the 
research into four further areas, enabling me to interview a much wider range 
of participants: not only visitors, but also detainees, police and custody staff, 
and lawyers. This led to my being able to investigate custody visiting in seven 
different custody blocks in a variety of locales: city centre, inner city, and 
suburbs, both prosperous and deprived. I have therefore treated my thesis as 
a single case study based on research at seven locations in the one area, 
rather than multiple case studies based on research at multiple locations.  
Widening the scope of the study also gave me access to a substantial number 
of participants. I observed and/or interviewed 33 visitors, interviewed 24 of 
them, and accompanied 29 of them on visits, some on more than one visit, on 
21 different occasions. I met other visitors at training sessions and team 
meetings, but they are not included in this discussion of the profile of the 
visitors.  Of the 33 visitors, 18 were men, and 15 were women: 22 were white, 
five black, four Asian, all of them Indian,36 and two mixed heritage. As regards 
their ages, no visitor was under 20, two were in their 20s, two were in their 
30s, four were in their 40s, 11 were in their 50s, 12 were in their 60s, and two 
were in their 70s, with none over 80. About half of the visitors had university 
degrees and/or professional backgrounds, in science, law, healthcare, social 
work and education. There were no manual workers. A sample that was more 
representative of the general population in the area studied would have had 
an equal number of men and women, fewer white people, a wider spread of 
Asians, more people under the age of 50, some manual workers, and some 
                                                 
36 One of whom told me he was fluent in two languages and in two dialects of those 
languages, as well as in English. 
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unemployed people. As regards marital status and sexual orientation, while 
some visitors told me they were married, the information I obtained about 
these issues is far from complete. I did not put any questions about personal 
matters to the interviewees, nor did I give them a form to complete 
anonymously. As well as not being representative of the general population in 
the area studied, the sample of visitors is not representative of the visitors in 
the local scheme, as the only qualification for inclusion in the sample was 
being prepared to participate in the research. There was no way of avoiding 
this. Some of the visitors simply did not respond to my requests for their help. 
One visitor whom I had already met at two team meetings told me, during our 
discussions after an accompanied visit, that there would be no interview: this 
visitor has since resigned from the scheme as well.37 My research demanded 
that I capture a wide range of views: the selection of interviewees was as 
purposively heterogeneous a sample as it was possible to obtain in the 
circumstances.38 
 
In the case study, interviews were extended to the police, other custody staff, 
detainees, and defence lawyers, and the scheme administrator. The aim was 
to gain the largest possible number of different perspectives.39 Some of the 
custody staff were told by their custody inspector to give me an interview, 
others agreed when I approached them myself. I tracked most of the lawyers 
down through the local law society.  The interviews with the detainees were all 
conducted in a consultation room in the custody block where they were 
                                                 
37 Information from AD. 
38 Ritchie et al (n 6) 114. 
39 Carolyn Hoyle,  “Being a ‘nosy bloody cow’: ethical and methodological issues in 
researching domestic violence” in Doing Research on Crime and Justice, King R D and 
Wincup E (eds) (OUP 2000) 385, 398ff.  
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currently being detained. I arranged to meet all the other interviewees in 
venues with which they were comfortable: their homes, places of work, hired 
meeting rooms, cafes. There were also three named interviewees. The table 
which follows sets out the statistics for my interviews and observation.  
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FIELDWORK TABLE 
INTERVIEWS: ALL FACE-TO-FACE 
Interviewee type Number Average length Total hours 
Visitors 23 1 hr 23 hrs 
Detainees 17 20 mins 5 hrs 40 mins 
Police and civilian 
staff 
24 30 mins 12 hrs 
Lawyers 7 30 mins 3 hrs 30 mins 
Scheme 
Administrator 
2 sessions 1 hr 30 mins 3 hrs 
Michael Meacher 1 1 hr 1hr 
Jane Warwick 1 2 hrs 2 hrs 
Katie Kempen 1 1 hr 30 mins 1 hr 30 mins 
Grand Total 76  51 hrs 40 mins 
 
 
OBSERVATION 
Observation type Number Average length Total hours 
Accompanied visit 21 1 hr 10 mins 24 hrs 30 mins 
Team meeting 21 1 hr 30 mins 31 hrs 30 mins 
Training 3 5 hrs 15 hrs 
Custody block 14 3 hrs 42 hrs 
ICV conferences 2 5 hrs 10 hrs 
Grand Total 61  123 hrs 
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The interviews were “semi-structured”, a format which enabled the process to 
be both consistent and flexible. I had prepared a schedule split up into the 
issues that I wanted to cover,40 and for each issue there was a series of 
questions. These issues were different aspects of custody visiting, such as 
questions to the visitors about their training, rather than direct questions about 
the concepts of the research. Some of the questions could appear under a 
number of different issues, so care had to be taken not to go over the same 
ground twice.41 I tried to keep to the schedule, but some of the interviews took 
a different tack. Where that happened, I went back to my schedule to ensure 
that as many of the questions as possible had been answered. With the 
visitors, where issues had come up during a visit, I raised those issues during 
the interview. A technique which I found very helpful was the use of a 
“vignette”. A vignette can be either an account of an actual event, or a 
hypothetical, but nevertheless concrete and realistic, scenario.42 I chose a 
hypothetical vignette and explained it to each interviewee, so that each of 
them could comment on how they would deal with the particular situation 
posited. I believe that this produced more focussed answers than unspecific 
general questions about the same issues,43 and that it enabled me to collect a 
number of different perspectives based on the same proposition. The 
questions changed over the period. For instance, visitors could never think of 
anything worth mentioning when I asked them to tell me about the strangest 
thing that had ever happened on a visit, so l stopped asking the question. The 
                                                 
40 As recommended by Robson (n 12) 286: Ritchie et al (n 6) 149 use the expression “Topic 
Guides”. I was able to give the schedule I had prepared for interviewing police and custody 
staff a trial run on a friend who had, in a previous life, been a custody sergeant. 
41 Ritchie et al (n 6) 149.  
42 ibid 165f. 
43 Hoyle (n 39) 399.  
 169 
interviews were preserved on the digital recordings made of them. The only 
parts of the interviews that were typed up were anonymised summaries and 
extracts. 
 
Both for the pilot study and for the actual case studies, there were four types 
of observation. The first observation method was to accompany visitors, who 
always visit in pairs, on their visits, which were, like all visits by custody 
visitors, not by appointment with the custody sergeant but arranged between 
the visitors: for this research the visitors then contacted me to complete the 
arrangement. I accompanied visitors on 21 visits. The second observation 
method was by observation at team meetings, for which the scheme 
administrator gave me the venues, dates and times. I attended 21 team 
meetings lasting about 90 minutes each. The third observation method was by 
observation at training sessions, each lasting between four and six hours. The 
fourth method was attendances at custody blocks on different days at different 
times: on each occasion I worked from a fixed position near the custody 
sergeant’s desk for a period of about three hours. This enabled me to gain an 
understanding of the work of the custody block in a way that cannot be 
achieved in the course of a visit, as visits rarely last longer than about 90 
minutes. These sessions were by prior arrangement with the custody 
inspector and/or the custody sergeant. I carried out 14 of these observations. 
Outside the case study, I attended two visitors’ conferences and three 
conferences run by commercial conference organisers, the latter not strictly 
observation: each of these conferences lasted about five hours. 
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All the observations were carried out overtly, but with the aim of obtruding as 
little as possible. I did not use electronic recording devices, nor did I use 
specially designed complex observation sheets which can be a serious 
distraction,44 but I did make as many notes as I could. Inevitably, not 
everything can be covered, and the note-taking distracted my own attention 
and the attention of the participants, but the aim was to provide as much 
information as possible about what I observed. The observations began with 
descriptions of the locations.45 Custody blocks were described in great detail 
as they are not places with which many people are familiar. The older blocks 
can be all or any of the following: dark, too cold or too hot, noisy and smelly. 
Essentially I was recording events, conversations and behaviour. The 
participants were described, and their actions related, including my own. My 
own actions in the fixed observation were very few. When accompanying 
visitors I explained my role to detainees and others we encountered, observed 
the visitors’ interaction with detainees, and made notes about those 
interactions. The observations were unstructured: no regular observations 
were made of specific incidents, situations or activities, but I did use certain 
headings to remind me to check instances of not only what did happen, but 
also what did not happen: for example, visitors challenging the police, and 
failing to challenge them. As much as possible, quotes were verbatim.46 The 
observations were then typed up from the notes, with some general 
comments about issues arising and occasional notes of my own feelings 
about what I had observed.  
                                                 
44 Benjamin Goold, CCTV and Policing: Public Area Surveillance and Police Practices in 
Britain (2004 OUP) 47 says complex recording sheets are impractical and tend to make police 
officers nervous.  
45 Robson (n 12) 325. 
46 Ritchie et al (n 6) 259.  
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During the third year of my research there were two important developments. I 
was able, for the first time, to interview detainees at one of these police 
stations. There had been two obstacles to this. First, it was ethically 
unacceptable to interview detainees, as vulnerable people, without any notice: 
the question was how to ensure that some notice could be given. Second, an 
interview conducted with a detainee, under the same conditions as the visitors 
met the detainees, i.e., in their inadequately furnished and denigrating cells, 
would not be likely to produce a useful result. I raised the issue at a team 
meeting, and the custody inspector, whom I had interviewed for the research 
and with whom I had built a relationship of trust over the previous twelve 
months, himself suggested a solution to this problem. The solution was that I 
accompanied visitors on Sunday afternoons, when some of the detainees had 
been interviewed and charged and were being detained pending their 
appearance at the magistrates’ court the next day: I could then give them one 
hour’s notice of the interview, which gave them more time to consider whether 
to consent to my request. I obtained, by negotiation, the concession that I 
could interview the detainees in the relative privacy of a consultation room 
furnished with tables and chairs. My failure to gain access in the other police 
areas, and my success in finally gaining satisfactory access to detainees, both 
re-emphasise the importance of gatekeeping in this research.47 The second 
development was that a new dedicated 60-cell custody facility was opened. 
This marked a fundamental change in the management of custody. Almost all 
of my investigation has been related to the old style of block. The question 
                                                 
47 See text to notes 27-30. 
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therefore arises whether my investigation remains valid despite those 
changes. I went on a guided tour with a group of custody visitors, and 
accompanied two of them on a visit.  From these observations, I deduce that 
the issues of principle for custody visiting are the same in the new blocks as in 
the old. In some ways, matters have got worse: access by lawyers to the 
custody block has been restricted, and their access to detainees has been 
made more difficult, with lawyers being required to be locked in consultation 
rooms with their clients. The same unsatisfactory and potentially dangerous 
conditions were offered to me for interviewing detainees at the new site, so I 
chose not to interview detainees there. 
One issue which I needed to investigate, for which methods other than 
observation and interviewing, such as a survey, might have been the answer, 
was whether the public have heard of custody visiting. But a survey would 
have been problematical, because obtaining a sufficiently large sample would 
have been prohibitively expensive. The solution was to put the question to all 
the interviewees. 
I have carried out a large number of observations and conducted a large 
number of interviews. I re-interviewed only one participant, the scheme 
administrator. I believed that those large numbers of observations and 
interviews would be sufficient for this study to reach what is known as 
“saturation”: i.e., that no more data are required. I had selected what I 
believed to be a “cohesive” sample from one visiting scheme. The principal 
indicator of saturation was simply that I found that I was observing, hearing 
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and then reviewing data about the same things several times over.48 In any 
case, as a practical matter, it would have been difficult for me to find more 
time for these data collection activities: as noted above, all research design is 
a compromise.49 However, evidence of one aspect of custody visiting did not 
appear until during an accompanied visit which I made at a very late stage. 
That aspect related to the concept of power, and how power operates in the 
relationship between custody visitors and the police. It was fortunate that I 
had been obliged to conduct a larger number of accompanied visits than I had 
planned.50 It was on the 21st accompanied visit that I saw, for the first and 
only time, the power relationship between visitors and police spelled out in 
overt conflict. I had not expected to see this, as I had come to believe that the 
relationship was one where power operated subliminally and without overt 
conflict, and I had found that this had been confirmed by my observation on all 
previous 20 accompanied visits. This experience demonstrates that it is 
impossible to be certain that other important data may not be lurking in the 
next observation or interview. What happened in this case allowed me to 
establish that overt conflict did occur very occasionally, and it enabled me to 
draw inferences, from my observation of the overt conflict, about the usual 
situation where I believed conflict was latent.  
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Janice M Morse, “The Significance of Saturation”, Qualitative Health Research (1995) 5 2 
147. 
49 Bryman (n 10). 
50 This arose because I did not, until a late stage in the fieldwork, gain access to detainees for 
interviews as part of accompanied visits. 
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Data analysis   
The purpose of the analysis of the data was to provide answers to the 
research questions. I used a system known as thematic analysis, which: 
 
“involves discovering, interpreting and reporting patterns and clusters 
of meaning within the data.”51 
 
The analysis involved the following stages: familiarisation, summarising, 
interpretation, and explanation.52 I started the process by compiling a list of 
codes relating to issues arising from the topics and concepts. Organising the 
data was assisted by using the computer-assisted data analysis software 
package NVivo. Although these packages are described as data analysis, 
they are aids to analysis, not the analysis itself.53 
 
The data were reviewed to see which code they related to, and whether the 
data produced other issues which needed to be added to the list. For 
instance, I was not able to interview detainees until a late stage. I was aware 
that visitors did not give feedback to detainees about the outcomes of the 
requests that visitors passed on to the custody staff. However, it was only 
after listening to the detainees that I realised the importance that I should 
attach to this, and that it was an example of crime control orientation, because 
it showed that the visitors, however unconsciously, did not value the welfare 
                                                 
51 Ritchie et al (n 6) 271.  
52 ibid 295ff. 
53 ibid 290. 
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of detainees sufficiently to take the extra time and trouble to let them know the 
outcomes. 
 
The codes I worked with initially went through several changes. They started 
with a list of the key concepts and the factual issues. This list had to be 
expanded to take account of fresh issues, and then collapsed so as to group 
them under key headline issues: model of visiting and visitors’ rights of 
access, visitors’ interviews with detainees, reporting, police accountability, 
whether visitors should have a wider role, management and institutions, and 
other miscellaneous topics. The codes were then collapsed again to be 
grouped as much as possible under the key concepts. Because it took place 
at a late stage, interviewing detainees led to the setting up of a whole new set 
of codes.54 I inputted the data with those codes, and was thus able to retrieve 
the data relating to each theme/issue to compile the evidence. This process 
was applied to both the written accounts of the observations and the digitised 
recordings of the interviews. I have found it necessary to listen to the 
interviews and read the written data more than once. Re-listening to the 
interviews was very useful, as it enabled me to hear the nuances. Reading 
transcripts would not have given me that advantage, and having to deal with 
transcripts would have been a huge burden.  
 
The manner in which I marshalled the data enabled me to review the 
evidence on each point and then make my findings. I was able to establish the 
views and modes of behaviour of the majority, as well as noting significant 
                                                 
54 See text to note 47. 
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instances of dissent. Looking at their views in this way provided a check 
against the possible effects of my own bias. I looked for explanations of both 
the majority view and the views of the dissenters. My explanation for the 
majority of visitors following the lines taken by the Police and Crime 
Commissioner was that it arose from their mono-cultural socialisation, and 
that the dissenters had resisted the effects of that process. I appreciate that 
this is a subjective analysis, and that the data might make different impacts on 
other researchers.   
 
 
 
Ethical considerations  
The principal ethical issue in research involving contact with people is to 
ensure that they are not harmed by the research or caused stress or 
anxiety.55 The approach I took on ethical issues was based on the Socio-
Legal Studies Association’s ethical statement.56 In particular, the research 
complies with their first principle of accurate and truthful reporting for the 
benefit of society.57 Clearance was obtained from the University of 
Birmingham’s Ethics Committee on the basis that I followed certain 
procedures, as documented below. 
To recap, the participants were visitors, police officers, civilian custody staff, 
detainees, defence lawyers, the scheme administrator, and three named 
individuals. I considered what I was asking each of these various participants 
                                                 
55 Robson (n 12) 194. 
56 Statement of Principles of Ethical Research Practice: 
http://www.slsa.ac.uk/images/slsadownloads/ethicalstatement/slsa%20ethics%20statement%
20_final_%5B1%5D.pdf accessed 20.05.2016. 
57 ibid 2.1. 
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to do, whether they were vulnerable, and how to protect them. I was asking 
for their help in allowing me to observe and interview them. With the obvious 
exception of the detainees, almost all the participants in the case studies were 
not vulnerable, and all were adults. Special consideration had to be given to 
dealings with the detainees. But all participants could have been rendered 
vulnerable had I failed to respect the confidentiality of their personal data, 
some of which was sensitive. At no point did I conceal the purpose of the 
research from the participants or deceive any of them or put them at risk.58 In 
the observation, and in particular in the interviewing, it was necessary to use 
social skills to develop rapport with the participants. Some scholars have 
pointed out the dangers of “faking friendship” in creating power imbalances: to 
counter that tendency, the researcher needs to use experience and reflexivity 
to be clear about the boundaries of the role.59 From the pilot I realised that it 
was vital, to avoid misunderstandings, that the interviewees were given full 
information about my background, the reasons for doing the research, the 
self-funding, the role of the Police and Crime Commissioner and the police, 
and my independence from them both.  
All participants whom I interviewed were treated in accordance with the 
“Participant Map of Research Ethics” which is a guide to the ethical principles 
that should be observed before, during, and after the interview. Amongst its 
principles for the time before the interview are unpressurised decision-making 
about taking part; and openness, honesty, and being able to correct 
misunderstandings. For the interview itself, the principles include that the 
                                                 
58 Thomas (n 5) 45. 
59 Ritchie et al (n 6) 84.  
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interviewee should feel valued and respected; and that s/he should be asked 
questions that are relevant, not repetitive, and clear. After the interview, the 
principles include the right to privacy and anonymity, and that the research is 
used for social benefit.60  
I realised that ethical dilemmas might arise during the fieldwork. Ritchie et al 
say that the researcher needs to develop an ethical conscience and to use 
reflexivity and discussion with others, and that thinking issues through from 
the perspective of a participant is fundamental.61 For instance, there is the 
potentially life and death issue of ligature points. I noticed that visitors did not 
generally make checks for ligature points. In the event, I did not notice any 
ligature points myself that they did not report. Had I noticed ligature points 
which they did not report, I would have had to draw them to the visitors’ 
attention, as matters that should be reported to the custody sergeant, or 
reported them myself to the custody sergeant, which would have been difficult 
to do without the visitors knowing. Taking that action might have damaged my 
relationship with the visitors, because they would have seen me as checking 
up on them, an impression I had found it necessary to try to dispel from an 
early stage. I would have been forced to choose between reporting a 
potentially life and death issue and making my research less valuable. In the 
event, I was not obliged to choose between these two options. A solution 
could have been to telephone the custody sergeant about the ligature point 
later, although it is not always easy to get through to them.62 
                                                 
60 From J Graham, I Grewall and J Lewis  Ethics in Social Research: the Views of Research 
Participants, (Cabinet Office 2007) 6, reprinted in Ritchie et al (n 6) 83. 
61 Ritchie et al (n 6)108. 
62 Vicky Kemp, Transforming legal aid: Access to criminal defence services, (Legal Services 
Commission 2010) 49. 
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Funding  
I told all the participants, and mention here, that this research was entirely 
self-funded, except for some small grants from the University of Birmingham 
towards travel, conference and equipment costs. There is, therefore, no 
sponsor of this research: by contrast, three of the reports about lay visiting 
were funded by the Home Office.63 Self-funding removed one of the barriers to 
this kind of research, that government would have been unlikely to fund it:64 
and it enables this research to claim its independence, a quality so central to 
this study.  
 
Visitors 
During the familiarisation phase, I had met some of the visitors at one of the 
visitor team meetings and/or an induction and training session or the annual 
meeting. I informed the visitors about the research project by a brief 
presentation, and I asked them if they wished to participate on the basis of the 
terms set out in participant information sheets. These information sheets 
explained the nature of the research, mentioned its authorisation by the Police 
and Crime Commissioner and the University of Birmingham, and what the 
research issues were. The information sheets stated that I wished to attend 
team meetings and training sessions, to accompany pairs of visitors on their 
                                                                                                                                            
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/27833/1/Kemp%20Transforming%20CD%202010.pdf 
accessed 06.06.2016. 
63 Charles Kemp and Rod Morgan, Behind the Front Counter: Lay Visitors to Police Stations 
(Bristol and Bath Centre for Criminal Justice 1989), an earlier version of the next publication; 
Charles Kemp and Rod Morgan, Lay Visiting to Police Stations: Report to the Home Office 
(Bristol Centre for Criminal Justice 1990); Claire Hall and Rod Morgan, Lay Visitors to Police 
Stations: An Update (The Bristol Centre for Criminal Justice 1993), and  Mollie Weatheritt and 
Carole Vieira, Lay Visiting to police stations, a report commissioned by the Home Office, 
Home Office Research Study 188 1998. 
64 Tombs and Whyte (n 27), 29-32. 
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visits to the custody block and to interview them about the work: all with a 
view to using the information gained in seeking answers to the research 
questions. The information sheet informed visitors that the results of the 
research would be published, but that this would be done in a way which 
ensured that all the information they provided would be kept confidential and 
that each of them would remain anonymous and unidentifiable: any data 
collected for the research would be used strictly in compliance with data 
protection legislation. The visitors were put in direct email and mobile phone 
contact with me. This was done so that the arrangements could be made 
without the involvement of the scheme administrator, who was thus prevented 
from knowing the details of the timings of the visits. It was for the visitors, not 
myself, to initiate each arrangement. This meant that visitors were not under 
any pressure to participate and that they were opting into the research on an 
entirely voluntary basis. I informed them that if, after this stage, they decided 
that they did not want to be involved with the research, they would be free to 
withdraw by a specified date, and that if they did, none of the information 
involving them would be used in the research and all such data would be 
destroyed. The special arrangements for visiting when I could also interview 
detainees meant that I had to approach visitors and ask them if they could 
visit on specific Sundays,65 but, by the stage when this took place, the visitors 
were used to me and felt able to refuse, and some did refuse. 
At the start of each interview, I sought the visitor’s consent and captured the 
response by the digital recorder. This enabled the genuineness of the consent 
given, and the level of understanding of the participant, to be open to 
                                                 
65 See text to note 47. Sunday visits were not popular with visitors. 
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subsequent review in a way that is not true of written consent forms. It was 
most unlikely that any of the visitors or staff managing them would lack the 
competence to consent, and none of them did lack that competence, but I 
would not have interviewed those I perceived to be lacking that competence.  
I started by assuring the interviewee that s/he would remain completely 
anonymous and that no records of the interview would be kept with their name 
on them; and that nothing identifying them would be passed on to the Police 
and Crime Commissioner or the police. I said they could bring the interview to 
an end at any time if they wished, and that in that case I would not use any of 
the information they had given me. I asked if on that basis they were happy 
for the interview to proceed.   
Consent to observation at team meetings and training sessions and other 
similar occasions was obtained in the following way. Those attending were 
given a chance to object by having seen the participant information sheet 
before the start of the meeting or session: I confirmed my presence at the 
start of the meeting, thus providing an opportunity for questions about the 
research: and I then checked that no one objected to being observed. 
 
Other participants 
The ethical considerations for the other categories of people being observed 
and/or interviewed were as follows. Observation of these people took place 
only in custody blocks, where participants were either being detained, or 
working. The professionals present would not expect privacy. As in studying 
 182 
crowd behaviour, the researcher could not be expected to obtain consent from 
every participant. Where possible, an explanation was given, and the custody 
staff had been notified of times when I would be carrying out observation from 
a fixed point and that I would be accompanying visitors on their visits.  
As regards the detainees, they are vulnerable simply by virtue of their 
detention: and those under 18, or under the influence of drink or drugs, or 
otherwise perceived by me to lack understanding, were excluded. Written 
consent forms were not used because, as legal documents, they would have 
been viewed with suspicion by the detainees and would have created a 
barrier to communication, as they had long ago been found to do for visiting, 
by both visitors and the police.66 As cells are cramped spaces for three extra 
people, I initially tried listening from outside the cell. I soon realised this was 
unsatisfactory, as I could not see what was happening, and sometimes I could 
not hear what was being said either. I then tried accompanying the visitors 
into the cell where visitors asked for consent to the meeting and explained my 
role. I relied on that as implied consent. Later, on reflection, I realised I should 
also have been asking for explicit consent, and I did so from then on. When it 
came to interviewing detainees, I asked for their consent and let them have a 
participant information sheet when first meeting them during my visit to them 
with the visitors, and, somewhat later, I sought and obtained their consent 
before commencing the interview. When seeking interviews with other 
participants, I handed them a participant information sheet and followed the 
same procedures for interviews as those used for the visitors. For all the 
interviews, confidentiality was preserved by the use of a password protected 
                                                 
66 See Chapter Three, text to note 77, and text to note 126, and the note. 
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digital recorder from which the recordings were deleted on being transferred 
to storage. The storage was on a password protected “iron key” and a double- 
protected computer. After the submission of this thesis, the main participants 
are to be provided with a summary of the findings, and the means to obtain a 
fuller account.  
 
 
My own safety and the safety of others 
In the course of the fieldwork I had to travel to and from unfamiliar locations, 
sometimes in the middle of the night. I planned the travel accordingly to 
ensure the safest practicable means of travel to and from each location at the 
particular time of day or night. I conducted interviews in the homes of people 
whom I had not met before, or sometimes only once or twice before, and in 
other places with which I was unfamiliar. I always carried a mobile phone with 
me and, for evening and late night appointments, let a family member know 
where I was going, whom I was meeting, and when I would be expected 
back,67 and made a phone call afterwards to confirm all was well.  
There was one setting in which I believed I would be putting my personal 
safety at risk. For the purpose of interviewing detainees at the new custody 
facility, I would have been locked in a consultation room, so I did not conduct 
any interviews there.68  
As a visitor, I had never found myself in a situation where I felt concern about 
my personal safety, nor had I witnessed harm being inflicted by the police on 
a detainee. However, these things do happen. I decided that if, during the 
                                                 
67 Thomas (n 5) 53. 
68 See text following note 47.  
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fieldwork, I found myself observing harm being inflicted on someone in a 
custody block, ethical considerations would impel me to step out of the 
researcher role, and I hoped I would have the courage to try to do something 
to stop the harm. At no time did a situation like that arise. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the initial difficulties, I was fortunate in being able to carry out a large 
amount of interviewing and observation to carry out this research, as set out 
in the table above.69 This has provided me with a wealth of data for the case 
study, some of it certainly repetitious, but all containing a wide range of views 
and experiences, and I was lucky to gain a compelling insight into the 
operation of police power on the visitors in the final accompanied visit.70 I was 
also able to carry out substantial desk and archival research, and elite 
interviewing, into the history and policy of custody visiting, both nationally and 
in the London borough of Lambeth.  
 
I found it was useful for me to write a draft of this chapter at an early stage, as 
it helped me to think systematically about research design issues, while still 
being prepared to adapt and make creative use of opportunities as they arose 
during the fieldwork. I was encouraged to pursue a gradualist approach to 
obtaining access and ethical approval as the ambit of the project expanded. 
Three applications were made to the university’s ethics committee for ethical 
approval, and I applied to the police to increase access on two further 
                                                 
69 See the table set out after the paragraph following note 39. 
70 See text after note 50.  
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occasions. I believe, with the police in particular, that this gradualist approach 
enabled me to build up trust and to obtain what I needed when I needed it. 
Just one portmanteau application made at the start would have been unlikely 
to produce the same favourable result.  
 
Reviewing my research with the benefit of hindsight, I find that there are some 
things that I would have done differently. Access: I should have asked my 
lead supervisor to approach Police and Crime Commissioners in neighbouring 
areas, although in the end I did not need more data from those areas. 
Detainees: I should have sought permission from detainees to observe 
visitors’ meetings with them from the outset, although no harm was done by 
my not having done so, and I should have tackled access to detainees for 
interviews earlier: it was a combination of luck and a good relationship with a 
custody manager that enabled me eventually to obtain this access.  
 
Following this review of the research design and the ethical issues, the next 
two chapters, Chapters Five and Six, set out the results of the empirical 
research, which are my findings, from interviews and observation, about the 
attitudes of the visitors and about the effectiveness of the visiting work. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE INFLUENCES ON VISITORS AND  
 THEIR ATTITUDES TO THEIR WORK 
 
This chapter starts to set out the findings of my case study. It provides a 
description and an analysis of the influences on the visitors at all the various 
stages of their work, and examines the characteristics of the people who 
applied to become visitors, and the effects on their attitudes of their 
orientation, training, and experiences as visitors. In Chapter Three I explained 
how official policy had been developed in accordance with the wishes of the 
police resulting in custody visiting having a crime control orientation. Custody 
visiting was given the branding of independence in the statutory scheme 
introduced in 2002, where statute specifically stated that the visitors had to be 
independent, but also, paradoxically, established that there was no structural 
independence for them in the local schemes. This will be tested against the 
findings of the empirical research in this chapter. Chapter Two showed that 
the quality of independence is not defined only by reference to structure but is 
also determined by the attitudes of the visitors.1 This chapter seeks to assess 
the extent of the visitors’ independence by examining their attitudes and 
comparing them with those of the Police and Crime Commissioner and the 
police.   
 
                                                 
1 See Chapter Two, text to note 61.  
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How individuals form attitudes is heavily affected by power relationships.  In 
Chapter One I said I would seek to explore whether visitors were affected by 
the power of the police. For a definition of this power, I relied on Steven 
Lukes’ concept of three-dimensional power. His one-dimensional power gets 
people to do things that they would not otherwise do, and his two-dimensional 
power gets people not to do things that they would like to do. Both those 
dimensions operate in a context of overt conflict. Operating in contexts where 
there is no overt conflict, Lukes’ three-dimensional power stops demands 
being made, and conflicts arising, by controlling others’ thoughts and desires, 
and by keeping certain issues off the agenda: these outcomes can be 
achieved by the control of information and what is known as “socialisation”.2 
This chapter investigates whether, and if so how, socialisation enables the 
Police and Crime Commissioner and the police to achieve these outcomes in 
the visitors.  
 
 
Socialisation 
The word “socialisation” is used to refer to the process by which people are 
subjected to influences from their social environment on their attitudes and 
behaviour.3 The process can be explained by Erving Goffman’s very 
influential theory of the presentation of self in social interactions, where the 
individual, in dealing with the various situations encountered, plays various 
roles, like an actor on a stage in different dramas. An important component of 
                                                 
2 See Chapter Two, text to notes 40-45. 
3 Gloria Luong, Antje Rauers and Karen L Fingerman, “The Multi-Faceted Nature of Late-Life 
Socialisation: Older Adults as Agents and Targets of Socialization” in Grusec J E and 
Hastings P D (eds), Handbook of Socialization, (The Guilford Press 2015) 109, 110. 
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Goffman’s argument is that participants (or actors) accept the same definition 
of the situation in which each of them is playing a role, because acting out of 
place would cause embarrassment.4 How do new recruits to custody visiting 
find what the definition of their work is, and are stronger pressures than the 
desire to avoid embarrassment brought to bear on them to accept the 
definition? How do those pressures operate through the socialisation 
process? This chapter will set out the influences operating on new recruits to 
custody visiting, and show that they are likely to have caused almost all of 
them to learn and accept the definition of their work.  
 
Anthony Giddens et al provide a useful overview of how sociologists use the 
word “socialisation”, describing it as: 
 
“the process whereby ... children learn the ways of their elders, thereby 
perpetuating their values, norms and social practices ... Although 
cultural learning is much more intense in early childhood than later, 
learning and adjustment go on through the whole life cycle ... In [later 
childhood and maturity], other agents of socialisation, such as schools, 
peer groups, organisations, the media, and the workplace, become 
socialising forces. Social interactions in these contexts help people to 
learn the values, norms and beliefs of their culture.”5  
 
Giddens et al mention the “workplace” as one of the socialising forces. This 
chapter will explain the meaning of this term, and demonstrate the socialising 
                                                 
4 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Pelican 1971, 83. 
5 Anthony Giddens, Mitchell Duneier, Richard P Applebaum, Deborah Carr, Introduction to 
Sociology, (Norton 2000) 84-5. 
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effect of the workplace on the custody visitors. The focus of socialisation 
theory and research has been on childhood and adolescence.6 In this study 
we are looking at adults, but similar principles apply where the workplace is 
the context of their socialisation. The workplace is a setting where much 
significant socialisation takes place: people spend a lot of time there, both 
physically and virtually; it is where they meet others who are engaged in the 
same work, including their bosses; it is the setting for their employment and 
their careers.  
 
Similar effects of socialisation have been observed in the context of voluntary 
work.7 Custody visiting is voluntary, it is not employment,8 and it is very much 
part-time, but what the visitors do is certainly a form of work.9 The visitors 
agree to carry out some tasks, on certain terms, for the Police and Crime 
Commissioner. The visitors’ principal workplace is the custody block, even 
though they spend just a few hours there each month. It is of course very 
significant for the issue of the effect of police power on visitors that the 
custody block, the part-time workplace of the visitors, is the full-time 
workplace, and the territory, of the police and custody staff. Other places 
where the visitors work occasionally, at meetings or for training, are generally 
either police or Police and Crime Commissioner buildings. Many visitors 
                                                 
6 Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, “Socialization in Emerging Adulthood: From the Family to the Wider 
World, from Socialization to Self-Socialization” in Grusec J E and Hastings P D (eds) (n 3) 85, 
86. 
7 Sibylle Studer and Georg von Schnurbein, “Organizational Factors Affecting Volunteers: A 
Literature Review on Volunteer Coordination”, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary 
and Nonprofit Organizations (2013) 24 2 403. 
8 It has been a concern of ICVA and the scheme administrators that visitors do not gain the 
legal status of employees: see Chapter One, text to note 124. 
9 V4 described it as a “hard job”. 
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referred to the scheme administrator10 as their boss. They might meet him in 
person only quite rarely, but they received frequent emails from him. So, as is 
the case with many other workers, the visitors’ workplace is physically split 
between several locations, and some of the contact is remote and virtual: but, 
wherever contact is made, the dominant influence is the Police and Crime 
Commissioner and/or the police. 
 
Academic research into socialisation in the workplace sees it as a learning 
process where newcomers are in transition from the status of organisational  
outsider to the status of organisational insider. Socialisation is seen as a key 
factor in transmitting an organisation’s cultural norms and values to 
newcomers. The recruitment process is seen as important as the start of the 
newcomer’s relationship with the organisation. Orientation,11 the next stage of 
the socialisation process, has been found to be more effective if done by in-
person attendance, where the newcomers are made to feel comfortable and 
welcome. Socialisation continues by training: this may be done collectively or 
individually, with fixed sessions or at random. The training may involve using 
experienced members of the organisation as role models, which has been 
found to be a very effective practice.12 Newcomers become aware that it is 
important to build relationships with leaders and mentors. The outcomes of 
the adjustments achieved for newcomers by this process of socialisation 
should be: clarity and confidence about one’s role in the organisation: feeling 
accepted in the organisation: knowledge of the organisation’s culture, 
                                                 
10 See text to notes 34-37. 
11 or “Onboarding”: see Howard J. Klein, Beth Polin and Kyra Leigh Sutton “Specific 
Onboarding Practices for the Socialization of New Employees” International Journal of 
Selection and Assessment (2015) 23 3 263 
12 ibid para 5.4. 
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including its politics, language, values and traditions: and, ultimately, job 
satisfaction.13 These issues, which have been identified by researchers, are 
all relevant to the socialisation of custody visitors, as will be seen in the 
following analysis.  
 
This chapter’s account of how the visitors were socialised has been compiled 
from my observations and interviews for this research. Some of the visitors I 
interviewed had been working as visitors for over ten years. They therefore 
would have received much of their socialisation in earlier years, and it would 
not have been the same “training” as the session I observed and describe 
below.14 However, all the visitors had received their orientation from the same 
official, the scheme administrator. It is likely therefore that the orientation that 
all the visitors received was broadly similar.15 The interviews given to 
prospective visitors played an important role in educating applicants about the 
values of the custody visiting scheme. New recruits thus learned the 
importance of the “leader” (the scheme administrator).  
 
In his study of the police, Fielding noted the important distinction between 
formal and informal socialisation. Formal socialisation is found in the planned 
efforts of the organisation to transform recruits into novice members.16 For the 
new recruits this comprised the orientation/training sessions, induction and 
team meetings. The visitors’ informal socialisation arose from contact, not 
                                                 
13 Allison M Ellis, Talya N Bauer, Berrin Erdogan, “New-Employee Organizational 
Socialization: Adjusting to New Roles, Colleagues, and Organizations”, in Grusec J E and 
Hastings P D (eds) (n 3) 301, 314-5. 
14 See text to notes 63-83 and the text following note 83.  
15 Confirmed by AD. 
16 Nigel Fielding,  Joining Forces: Police training, socialisation, and occupational competence, 
(Routledge 1988), 1. 
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only with the other visitors, but also from the contact they made with police, 
who have been found to have a strong occupational culture17 and also to be 
very effectively socialised.18 The civilian staff, with whom the visitors had more 
contact on their visits than with the police, were also a source of socialisation 
for the visitors.19 
  
Other sources of socialisation influenced the visitors. They were themselves 
influencing their own development in their choice of part-time work.20 They 
were also subject to the socialising influences of other agents, such as their 
peers, and the media.21 It would be very difficult to assess the strength of 
these influences on the visitors: but as all the visitors were subject to similar 
socialisation by the Police and Crime Commissioner and the police, that 
process is accessible to the researcher.   
 
One of the influences on custody visiting might be thought to be the visitors 
themselves: did they have an influence on the scheme, on the Police and 
                                                 
17 e.g., Malcolm Young, An Inside Job, (OUP 1991), 59. 
18 Fielding (n 16) 15-16. 
19 There is so far no detailed study of the culture of the civilian custody staff. Skinns has 
researched the relations between civilian custody staff and the police. One of her 
interviewees said there was “a them and us thing with the police and the civilian staff, and the 
civilian staff aren’t allowed to join the Police Federation”. She found a variety of views about 
how well the two groups worked together as a team, with some police officers pulling rank on 
the civilian staff. She suggested that the custody block remained police territory in which 
civilian staff were the deputies, not the equals of the police: Layla Skinns, Police Custody: 
Governance, legitimacy and reform in the criminal justice process (2011 Routledge) 146-150. 
My own view is that the civilian staff I observed did feel under the power of the police, not 
least because of their subordinate employment status: they were the ones who made the tea. 
A detailed study has been made about conflicts between the cultures of the investigating staff 
and the sworn officers: Beyond cop culture: the cultural challenge of civilian intelligence 
analysis in Scottish policing by Colin Atkinson (2013): PhD thesis, University of Glasgow:  
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/4662/ accessed 03.08.2015. Atkinson’s thesis shows that in Scottish 
policing the arrival of predominantly young and more academic female investigating staff 
presented a challenge to “cop culture”.  
20 Luong et al (n 3) 110. 
21 Robert Reiner, The Politics of the Police, (4th edn, OUP 2010) 177-102. 
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Crime Commissioner and on the police? Socialisation theories about the 
family used to be based on the process being only one-way: parents setting 
the agenda, children as the passive absorbers. More recently some theorists 
have argued that, in families, the process of socialisation should be seen as 
two-way,22 incorporating the influences of both parents and children.23 The 
study of socialisation in the workplace has not taken the same line, and has 
kept to the one-way model, where influences are imparted by the organisation 
and received by the newcomers. The significant interaction has been found to 
be the socialisation applied by management to whatever range of newcomers 
they recruit.24 Perhaps this is because workplaces are very different from 
families, with power much more firmly rooted with managers than has become 
the case with parents. As will be demonstrated, the socialisation of the new 
recruits to custody visiting followed this general rule. The visitors did not 
influence the scheme, the Police and Crime Commissioner or the police.25  
 
Fielding called socialisation a process of “identity transformation”.26 While that 
expression may be apt to describe the effects on people in their early twenties 
starting on a career as police officers, it is not apt to describe what happens to 
visitors, mature adults, working part-time as volunteers. A filtering process 
                                                 
22 Eleanor E Maccoby, “Historical Overview of Socialization Research and Theory” In Grusec 
J E and Hastings P D (eds) (n 3) 17. 
23 Leon Kucyznski, C Melanie Parkin and Robyn Pitman, “Socialization as Dynamic Process: 
A Dialectical, Transactional Perspective”, in Grusec J E and Hastings P D (eds) (n 3) 135, 
135-6. 
24 Ellis et al (n 13). 
25 This is not to deny that significant improvements in the conditions of custody were achieved 
by the Lambeth Lay Visitors, which would have been accompanied by some measure of 
change in the attitudes of the police and maybe also of the then police authority for London, 
the Home Secretary: see Chapter Three, text to note 112-113. In the area studied, I know of 
only two minor practical improvements prompted by visitors’ reports, and where visitors’ 
reports prompted a change in the behaviour of the custody staff, the change would be no 
more than was needed to restore established practice: see text to note 188. 
26 Fielding (n 16) 1. 
 195 
had worked on the profile of the recruits, which both preferred certain types of 
applicant and eliminated other types, but, despite that, the applicants were not 
a homogeneous group. What this chapter will show is that the majority of 
visitors who had been working in the scheme were found to hold the same 
kind of values as each other; and that those values were largely the same as 
those held by the Police and Crime Commissioner and the police. 
 
 
Profile and Background of the Visitors 
This investigation starts by looking at the types of people who applied to 
become visitors. Fielding emphasises the importance in the socialisation 
process of prior life styles and contacts.27 The researcher seeks to know: what 
sort of people applied to be visitors; what their attitudes were to criminal 
justice; and whether they had any previous experience of the police, and, if 
so, what kind of experience.  
 
A description of the visitors participating in the research is set out in Chapter 
Four.28 Some of the visitors told me that they had had significant prior life 
experiences relating to policing or the criminal justice system before becoming 
visitors. Two of them, one black and one mixed heritage, had relatives who 
had been in trouble with the police. The first visitor told me about a relative 
who had hanged himself while detained in a “remand home”, while the second 
visitor said a relative’s life had been “ruined” by the actions of the police. An 
Asian visitor told me how the police had beaten up an Asian friend in custody. 
                                                 
27 ibid 17. 
28 See Chapter Four, text to notes 36-38, and the fieldwork table which follows. 
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I also encountered the following. One white visitor was a retired magistrate: 
another white visitor was a retired prison governor: another white visitor had 
been heavily involved with Neighbourhood Watch: two white visitors had 
worked alongside the police in other state agencies: an Asian visitor had had 
very close relations with the police through his work: two white visitors had 
sons in the police; and the father of one white visitor had been in the police for 
30 years.29  
 
The types of people who applied to become visitors came from a fairly narrow 
spectrum. They were older than the average, from a number of racial 
backgrounds, but with Asians under-represented and whites over-
represented; predominantly middle class; and about half were professional 
and/or had university degrees. At the times when they had applied to become 
visitors, they had various different attitudes to criminal justice. Where their 
attitudes were known or could reasonably be inferred, the visitors fell into two 
principal groups. The first group of visitors had had negative experiences of 
the effects of police and the criminal justice system on relatives and friends.30 
The work and family backgrounds of the second group of visitors strongly 
suggested that they were likely to be favourable to the police.  
 
The scheme administrator told me that he thought there were four categories 
of motivation to volunteer as custody visitors: doing something that would look 
good on a CV, “putting something back”; filling spare time in retirement; and 
curiosity. None of the visitors I interviewed fell into the first category: those 
                                                 
29 Identifiers not provided in this paragraph in order to preserve anonymity. 
30 But not of the negative effects on themselves, because if they had had a criminal record, 
they probably would not have passed the vetting: see text to notes 60-61. 
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who had joined for this reason had left soon after the training.31 I found that 
the visitors’ motivations generally came into one or more of the other three 
categories, and within those categories, there was quite a range of 
motivations. Some said they thought that the visiting work would be of benefit 
to them beyond just satisfying their curiosity, but one visitor candidly admitted 
that a tour of a mothballed custody block at a police Christmas party had 
made him feel “intrigued” to see the real thing, and another had been 
attracted by the sense of mystery about what one would find in these places 
that very few other people went to. One wanted to use the opportunities that 
visiting would provide to persuade detainees to “come off crime”. Another 
visitor said, in terms, that the motivation sprang from a belief that our 
institutions should not be taken for granted, and that checks on behalf of the 
community were vital to counter any abuse by the police.32  
 
 
Who were allowed to be visitors? 
As required by statute,33 the custody visiting scheme in the area studied was 
operated by the Police and Crime Commissioner. The management of the 
scheme was entirely in the hands of a relatively junior official, referred to in 
this study as the scheme administrator.34 The fact that no one else in that 
office did any work on custody visiting, apart from line managing the scheme 
administrator, suggests that custody visiting was not regarded as important. 
                                                 
31 AD at a team meeting. 
32 Identifiers omitted to preserve anonymity. 
33 Police Reform Act 2002, s 51. 
34 In at least one part of England and Wales this function has been outsourced: see Chapter 
Seven, text to note 48. The cost of the scheme was about £35,000 per annum: based on 
figures supplied by AD. 
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However, the scheme administrator was experienced, enthusiastic, and 
dedicated to his vision of custody visiting: he saw its purpose as reassuring 
the public about the police.35 He received guidance from the Independent 
Custody Visiting Association (ICVA) which is a body whose only members are 
Police and Crime Commissioners,36 and from the Home Office, both in their 
codes of practice and, I believe, through ICVA. The scheme administrator did 
not receive guidance from any other sources. His own socialisation was, 
therefore, as mono-cultural as the socialisation that he imparted to the 
visitors, discussed later in this chapter. The Office of the Police and Crime 
Commissioner was, alongside the police, a very small operation, and for 
custody visiting, it used the resources of the police for public relations, 
technical support such as computers, vetting, and security.37 The Police and 
Crime Commissioner’s remit for the local custody visiting scheme was 
therefore partly fulfilled by the police.  
Visitors are managed, hired, and can be fired, by the Police and Crime 
Commissioner. The extent of this control is starkly illustrated by a comment 
made to me by the scheme administrator. He told me that, in a scheme in 
another area, one group of the visitors were refusing to let their scheme 
administrator attend team meetings, and that his advice to the scheme 
administrator was to dismiss all the visitors in that group.38 One of the indices 
                                                 
35 AD interview and observation. 
36 AD interview. For ICVA, and the scheme administrators’ conference see chapter 1, text to 
notes 118-125. 
37 Personal observation: AD interview. Savage identified this question of resources as 
indicators of independence, or the absence of that quality: see Chapter Two, citation in note 
71, and para following text to note 74. 
38 AD interview. 
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of independence is “tenure”, enjoyed by senior judges:39 clearly visitors have 
no tenure. Nor is any thought given to whether another body should recruit 
and appoint visitors, as is the case with judges.40 
The statutory requirement was that visitors (not visiting) were to be  
“independent of both the Police and Crime Commissioner and the chief 
officer of police of the police force maintained by the Police and Crime 
Commissioner”.41  
However one distinguishes between visitors and visiting, neither custody 
visitors nor custody visiting schemes have ever had structural independence 
from these bodies, especially since the introduction of the statutory scheme; 
and police authorities were not independent of the police, which may be also 
true for Police and Crime Commissioners.42 Thus the police influenced the 
visitors on two fronts. The visitors, in being managed by the body charged 
with supervising the police, were indirectly subject to the power and influence 
of the police as it affected the Police and Crime Commissioner: and the 
visitors were also more directly subject to the power and influence of the 
police in the course of their work, in the custody block and at team meetings, 
as discussed below. As Lukes has explained, those who feel another’s power, 
which may be by the means of socialisation, take, or omit to take, actions in 
                                                 
39 See Chapter Two, text to note 66. 
40 See Chapter Two, text to note 67. 
41 Police Reform Act 2002, s 51, as amended by Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 117, and 
Police and Social Responsibility Act 2011, Schedule 16 part 3 s 299(1). 
42 See Chapter Two, text to notes 85-103. 
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accordance with what they believe that power is directing, without any actual 
exercise of the power.43 
The next question is whether visitors were independent, in terms of the 
mindset and behaviour: whether, despite the structure and their lack of tenure, 
they exercised independent judgment.44 Account must be taken of two very 
significant contexts: the narrow socialisation of the visitors, and their 
relationship to that very powerful institution, the police. Management of the 
visitors was a major component of this narrow socialisation, and its 
narrowness was very much bolstered by their orientation, induction and 
working practices described below: management excluded all other 
influences. The role of visitors was to monitor a powerful institution, but that 
institution played a completely dominant role in their socialisation, which 
would be likely to compromise their ability to think and act independently. 
 
In order to recruit visitors, the scheme administrator sent out press releases to 
local papers and postings on social media.45 Another source of recruits was 
the “Key Individual Network”,46 a list kept by the police of people who had 
expressed an interest in policing issues.47 One visitor got to know about 
custody visiting from meeting police officers through work:48 others heard 
                                                 
43 See Chapter Two, text to notes 36-45. 
44 See Chapter Two, text to and following notes 71-74. 
45 V9 said that a press release which said that applicants had to have “a good reputation in 
the community” had been a discouragement, as the visitor interpreted it as a requirement that 
applicants were members of a profession.  
46  For an example of the Key Individual Network, see (not from the area studied) 
parishes.lincolnshire.gov.uk/Files/225/Heckington_NPT_Model.doc accessed 10.06.2016. 
47 AD: none of the visitors I interviewed had been referred this way. 
48 V8, who, because of the approach, originally thought that a background in security was a 
qualification for becoming a visitor: compare the impression V9 obtained (n 45). 
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about it through Neighbourhood Watch:49 some had been involved with other 
neighbourhood policing initiatives.50 There was no evidence of referrals 
through organisations which promote the interests of suspects, such as 
Liberty, Nacro or Inquest.  
 
Some categories of applicant were excluded, but others that one might expect 
to be excluded were allowed to apply. Neither serving police officers nor 
former police officers, including special constables, could apply to become 
visitors. Only one police officer had ever been appointed visitor, and at the 
time he applied he had already been retired from the police for 20 years. But 
there was no bar on applications from close relatives of serving police 
officers.51 No applications were accepted from serving magistrates52 or from 
retired magistrates until they had been 10 years off the bench.53 Serving 
probation officers were excluded.54 No defence or Crown Prosecution Service 
lawyers had ever applied, and no applications would have been considered 
from them if they had served in those capacities within the previous five 
years.55 Two applicants who had been working alongside the police on 
prosecutions for other state agencies were not excluded.56 Here, the question 
arises as to whether the syndrome known as “regulatory capture” 57 could be 
said to have occurred. This arises where the people who work for a regulator 
were formerly employed by the body which they are now charged with 
                                                 
49 V13 and V10. 
50 V7, V20, and V23. 
51 2013 Code of Practice para 22. 
52 ibid. 
53 AD interview. 
54 Local handbook. 
55 AD interview. 
56 Two visitors, not identified in order to protect their anonymity.  
57 See Chapter Two, text to notes 75-76. 
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regulating, and the effect is that the regulator has been taken over by those it 
is supposed to be regulating, rendering the regulator ineffective. Here the 
evidence does not support the argument that custody visiting in the area 
studied had formally been captured by the police and those associated with 
them.  
 
One might however argue for some kind of informal, ideological capture. The 
evidence about referral routes, about the visitors’ previous significant 
experiences of criminal justice, and about their motivation for applying, does 
point in that direction. In terms of Packer’s models of criminal justice,58 there 
was a minority of applicants with a due process orientation who one would 
expect to show more concern for detainees, and a majority with crime control 
orientation who one would expect to prioritise the efficient operation of police 
work.  
 
Applicants were interviewed by the scheme administrator. Applicants whose 
answers stereotyped detainees as criminals and “hoodies” were not rejected, 
but the scheme administrator took the opportunity to provide them with some 
“education”. The scheme administrator did reject an applicant who expressly 
approved the original actions of the police in framing suspects in a notorious 
miscarriage of justice case. Applicants were asked to disclose offences they 
had committed even when they were teenagers, which could have been 
several decades earlier. Applicants who were found to have lied, particularly 
                                                 
58 See Chapter Two, text to notes 47-51. 
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about criminal convictions, were rejected.59 
The vetting was carried out by the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO). Applicants were rejected automatically if they had been convicted of 
an offence punishable with imprisonment in the previous five years. The 
Police and Crime Commissioner could exercise discretion where the vetting 
reports raised questions about applicants’ earlier history with the police, 
including cautions, or other matters, such as whether close family members 
had criminal convictions, and the scheme administrator mentioned two 
occasions when that discretion had been exercised in favour of allowing an 
application to proceed. This policy was tougher than the code of practice, 
which sets no specific threshold, and says simply that the circumstances must 
be considered, and that past offending is not an automatic barrier to 
acceptance.60 The scheme administrator agreed with me that the local policy 
excluded applicants who might relate well to detainees, but he said that it was 
“a fine line”.61  
The scheme administrator made formal appointments after the six months’ 
probation, and renewals every three years. Visitors could be warned, 
suspended or dismissed for misconduct or poor performance: this was very 
rare. Some visitors served for as long as 15 years. Very few resigned. One 
visitor’s resignation was prompted by fundamental issues: 
 
“I don’t know whether we’re there to help the process of the detainees 
                                                 
59 AD interview. 
60 2013 Code of Practice, para 21. 
61 AD Interview. 
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being looked after, or if we’re there to report back … I don’t think either 
is particularly efficient, because … there’s always some sort of issue 
which probably could be sorted out if someone had the time to speak to 
them; and with the reporting you never get the feedback as to whether 
issues were being dealt with or not.”62  
 
This visitor had not accepted the terms of the arrangement, was discontented 
with its ambiguity of purpose, and believed that it could be much more 
effective if it were organised differently.  
 
Through the scheme administrator, the Police and Crime Commissioner was 
in complete control of whether visitors were recruited and whether they 
continued in post, except for those who resigned voluntarily. It is difficult to 
see how one could justify the use of the word “independent” to describe the 
visitors in that relationship.  
 
Orientation and Training 
Academic studies of socialisation in the workplace stress the importance of 
what is called “new employee orientation”,63 and say that it should be aimed at 
helping the new recruit to feel comfortable and welcome: it should provide the 
basics, such as where to get additional information, rather than focussing on 
paperwork. The scheme administrator provided the new custody visiting 
recruits with this orientation, although it was called training: more experienced 
                                                 
62 V12.  
63 Ellis et al (n 13) 306-307. 
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visitors provided the actual training64 during the visitors’ induction.  
 
I attended one of these first sessions for recruits: it took about six hours on a 
Saturday. The session was held in a room in the Police and Crime 
Commissioner’s offices, which formed part of the police headquarters 
building. On display were large publicity photos of police, including shots of 
women and BAME people, both as police and as members of the public: the 
same photos are displayed in the public areas of police stations.65 The new 
recruits were therefore receiving positive messages about the police from 
these images.  
  
The session was delivered solely by the scheme administrator. This was the 
first time the new recruits heard about custody visiting in detail in a group, 
corporate, workplace setting. The new recruits were more likely to be 
influenced by what they saw and heard in a presentation, given by someone 
in authority over them, than by what they might read in the scheme 
handbook.66 Some of the new recruits might not have read the handbook, and 
some might never read it: only one visitor67 ever referred to the handbook in 
my presence. The scheme administrator was the boss,68 and that position of 
authority, and his charm and skill in delivering the training, enabled him to 
achieve a considerable degree of socialisation in the new recruits. What he 
said, what he did not say, and the absence of speakers with other points of 
                                                 
64 ibid, where they say that kind of training should follow orientation. 
65 UK police forces spend £36m per year on PR and communications: Press Gazette 
01.05.2015.  http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/uk-police-forces-spend-more-than-36m-a-year-
on-pr-and-communications/ accessed 11.06.2016. 
66 Local custody visiting schemes publish their own handbook.  
67 V5, who had held a senior professional position. 
68 See text to note 10. 
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view, all reinforced his power over the proceedings. His aim was to get the 
new recruits to commit to the local scheme in order to secure its future. This 
was a very significant stage in the socialisation process, and it is reasonable 
to infer that the scheme administrator intended that this session would assist 
in the fulfilment of the purposes which academic studies assign to effective 
socialisation: lowering the turnover of personnel, laying the groundwork for a 
committed and productive workforce, and transmitting the organisation’s 
cultural norms and values.69 
 
The scheme administrator had an easy, approachable manner. He sought to 
convey the reassuring message that the work was not technical: 
 
“visiting and PACE70 are mainly common sense.” 
 
As will be shown in this and the next chapter, there are many aspects of 
custody visiting which are technical and for which training is needed; and the 
numerous provisions of PACE and its codes cannot be boiled down to 
common sense, whatever that means. The scheme administrator’s approach 
was to take short cuts through the material, on the basis that it did not matter 
very much. I found it was a commonplace attitude among visitors and police 
officers that the standards to be applied to custody by visitors should be those 
of the man in the street, not those of a lawyer.71   
 
                                                 
69 Ellis et al (n 13) 302. 
70 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
71  e.g., S4, who said visitors should be “people like my Mum and Dad”, which also says 
something about the age profile. 
 207 
The scheme administrator told the new recruits that the Police and Crime 
Commissioner had shown his independence from the police, without saying 
how he had done so, and he told them that custody visiting was part of how 
the Police and Crime Commissioner held the police to account.72 He claimed 
legitimacy for custody visiting, first from Lord Scarman, and then from the 
principal criminal justice statute, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(“PACE”). He said that the Scarman Report’s recommendations about 
custody visiting were included in PACE. This was seriously misleading. No 
part of the recommendations in the report was enacted until some 18 years 
later, and some of the recommendations have never been enacted or put into 
practice.73 PACE’s main purpose was to implement the recommendations of 
the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure.74  
 
The scheme administrator observed that the only two changes that had to be 
made in custody arrangements in order to comply with the Human Rights 
Act75 were about special food for people with particular religious beliefs and 
changes of clothing. This made human rights law seem trivial. An important 
change in human rights law, which the scheme administrator omitted to 
mention, was the National Preventive Mechanism, under which custody 
visiting plays a part in fulfilling this country’s international treaty obligations 
about the inspection of the conditions of detention in police custody.76  
 
The scheme administrator made a Powerpoint presentation. The slides in the 
                                                 
72  But later, in interview, he told me that no visitors’ reports had ever been used in that way. 
73  See Chapter Three, text to notes 191-199. 
74  See Chapter Three, text to notes 54-57. 
75 The Act of 1998. 
76 See Chapter One, note 102, and Chapter Six, text to notes 165-178.  
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presentation said that the primary objective of custody visiting was to secure 
public confidence in the police: safeguarding the welfare of detainees seemed 
to be an afterthought.77  The image of a team was used, composed of visitors, 
the Police and Crime Commissioner and the police. This researcher did not 
find it difficult to spot the power imbalances in this team, and its incompatibility 
with the independence of custody visiting, but most visitors seemed to buy 
into the approach.78 
 
The scheme administrator did mention deaths in custody, including one that 
had taken place locally, but he did not explain how custody visiting related to 
the issue. He mentioned a Home Office “Learning the Lessons” committee on 
“Near Misses” (i.e., people in custody who came close to death) but did not 
say what the lessons were. There were a number of life-and-death issues 
here which he omitted to mention, such as the value of visitors challenging the 
police about whether intoxicated detainees should be in hospital rather than in 
custody. The scheme administrator did not mention challenging the police as 
one of the procedures that visitors might sometimes follow.  
 
The scheme administrator warned the recruits about over-familiarity with 
detainees: 
 
“Don’t shake hands with detainees. If they have scabies, the whole 
block has to be closed down.” 
 
                                                 
77 The same impression is conveyed by the statement about custody visiting on the Police 
and Crime Commissioner’s website in the area studied.  
78 See text to notes 103, 124, 125 and 204 and Chapter Six, note 124. 
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The scheme administrator’s warning about scabies was guaranteed to 
socialise them away from detainees. The scheme administrator did not 
mention the pitfalls arising from over-familiarity with the police and custody 
staff: the risk was that detainees could get the impression that the visitors 
were colluding with the staff.79 No training was given in this session (or any 
other session) about how visitors should build rapport with the detainees in 
the interviews conducted in their cells. This is surprising, given the importance 
the scheme administrator attached to these interviews, way above any other 
checks made during the visit. Role-play might have been useful here, but it 
was not used. No presentations were made by police officers,80 and none by 
defence solicitors, probation officers or experienced visitors, let alone former 
detainees. 81  Some ten years earlier, visitors had been taken to magistrates’ 
courts to help them understand that part of the criminal process:82 this had 
been discontinued. The visitors’ training was mono-cultural, all given by the 
scheme administrator, socialising the new recruits into seeing things from one 
point of view: his own. 
 
Two essential pieces of information, which would have enabled the new 
recruits to gain a much better understanding of custody, were missing. These 
are: that the ambit of arrest has been greatly increased; and that the police 
                                                 
79 See text to notes 170-176.  
80 Police officers helped with the initial training in a previous year: V9, and they help with 
advanced training. 
81 AD interview, who said it was not always possible for him to secure the attendance of the 
visitor he would choose for this. The much smaller number of visitors who attend regional and 
national conferences do hear from a wider range of speakers, but not, in my observation, from 
defence lawyers or detainees. V5 said that a defence lawyer had addressed visitors in 
training in an earlier year, and V8 said that an experienced custody visitor attended an earlier 
initial training day and answered questions with the practical guidance which the scheme 
administrator could not give. V23 said that former detainees should give training. 
82 L6. 
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use arrest and detention for investigation purposes. There was no mention of 
the fact that some of the detainees were innocent, that some of them were not 
a danger to anyone, and that some of them had been wrongly arrested, and 
that some of them are released “NFA” - with no further action. The scheme 
administrator’s failure to make these points led to many of the new recruits 
thinking that all detainees “must have done something bad to be in there”, or it 
reinforced their existing view on those lines, as can be seen later in this 
chapter.83 
 
The session did not deal with many practical issues that arise during a visit, 
which were left to the induction stage, discussed next. As a training course, 
which was how it was billed, the day was superficial. But as orientation, it was 
very effective. The scheme administrator was telling the new recruits that 
dealing with the work would not be difficult; that they did not need to worry 
about the law; that the work would not involve them in confrontations with the 
police; that they would be working with the police as members of a team; that 
detainees were people to keep your distance from; and that the principal 
purpose of custody visiting was to promote confidence in the police. The 
orientation was universally crime control, and the day was a powerful exercise 
in socialisation. 
 
Socialisation continued with a round-up session for new recruits three months 
later. For all visitors there was an annual meeting with the Police and Crime 
Commissioner with pens awarded for ten years’ service; an annual “advanced 
                                                 
83 See text to note 154. 
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training” session: and a very small number of visitors attended regional and 
national conferences. Training sessions often included demonstrations of 
restraint techniques. My impression was that the managers thought that 
visitors liked watching these demonstrations, and that they would be 
reassured by them: a pleasant way for the visitors to absorb the crime control 
message that the police can be trusted to use these techniques safely. 
Generally, the presentations at these training sessions and conferences 
provided interesting background information about custody, but little of the 
material was of much direct help to visitors in how they went about their work, 
and there were no critical reviews of the work of custody visiting, nor of how it 
was carried out.  
 
Probation and Induction 
The probation period ran for six months from the initial training session. 
During that time the new recruits gained experience of the world of the 
custody block in three ways. They accompanied experienced visitors on their 
visits,84 and they carried out three-hour observations from behind the custody 
sergeant’s desk, both of which are discussed in this section. They also 
attended team meetings, which are discussed separately below.85  
 
The custody block is the visitors’ principal workplace, and its special qualities 
made a huge impact on the new recruits. They were unlikely ever to have 
                                                 
84  A visitor (identifier omitted to preserve anonymity) told me that during one year, in one 
area, there had been no experienced visitors available to fulfil this role, so some new recruits 
were left to work out all these matters for themselves. AD denied the allegation. 
85 See text to notes 103-117. 
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seen the inside of a custody block before except on television,86 and many of 
them said how apprehensive they had been on their first visit about meeting 
detainees:  
 
“I was nervous, I was unsure, I didn’t know what to expect ... I was very 
apprehensive about seeing someone who’s been arrested: it’s some 
kind of an ogre or demon? But it wasn’t, it was a normal human being 
like us, very polite, answering our questions.” 87 
 
While the orientation session had not conjured up images of detainees as 
ogres and demons, there had been nothing to counter those images. The new 
recruits tended to see the custody block from the point of view of the scheme 
administrator and of the experienced visitors who accompanied them. While 
some adjustment was taking place, as shown by the quote above, the new 
recruits would not take the point of view of a detainee. Only three visitors told 
me that they were acquainted with people who had been detained in a 
custody block,88 and no visitor had ever been detained in one.  
 
New recruits became familiar with the way visits were arranged. Some visits 
did not appear to be unannounced, because the police would have some 
degree of advance warning of their arrival. This would occur in the following 
three circumstances. The first was when visitors arranged to meet, not outside 
the police station, but near the front desk, thus giving more notice of the visit 
                                                 
86 The exception, V20, had been to custody blocks before as a social worker, and was 
apprehensive of both custody sergeants and detainees. 
87 V8.  
88 V16, V19, V20. 
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during the wait for the arrival of the second visitor, as the front desk staff could 
let the custody staff know about the first arrival. The second was when the 
arrangement was for a visit to take place after a visitor team meeting held in 
the same police station; the custody manager could inform his staff about the 
time of the team meeting and the potential for a visit taking place. The third 
was when the arrangement was for successive visits to two different police 
stations on the same evening. Custody staff would get used to the pattern 
routinely followed by some visitors of visiting two stations in succession on the 
same evening; visitors might, in the course of their conversation,89 tell the staff 
at the first station that they were going on to the next station; and the police at 
one station could phone ahead to the next station to warn their colleagues 
that visitors were on the way. Visitors did not see a problem with any of these 
practices. One of them said:  
 
“The whole point is that we turn up unannounced ... ” 
and then went straight on to refer to the practice of making successive visits 
on the same evening.90 Socialisation seemed to impair the ability of visitors to 
take a critical approach. As George Orwell put it, phrasing a paradox in 
characteristically everyday language: 
“To see what is in front of one’s nose needs a constant struggle.”91  
                                                 
89 I did not observe this, but believe it is quite likely that it took place. 
90 V4. 
91 George Orwell, “In Front of Your Nose,” Tribune (22.03.1946): The Collected Essays and 
Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, Volume 4, In Front of your Nose, (Penguin 1970) 
150. 
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Not many people put up any kind of struggle, constant or otherwise, 
particularly against the pressures of socialisation, and they do not even 
realise that there is any need to do so. The whole point of the scheme was 
being lost without the visitors being aware of what was happening.92  
 
Visitors made their visits at three different types of custody block. The first two 
types were within police stations: six modern blocks with about 15 cells, and 
one much older block with about 40 cells. The third type was a brand new 
purpose-built custody facility with 60 cells. From my previous work as a visitor 
in Dyfed-Powys, I was familiar with the smaller type of custody blocks, but did 
find myself thoroughly disoriented by the large block in the much older 
building. That block seemed to be dark, cramped, and confusing. The 
landings, with open metal stairs and metal netting, recalled images of 
Victorian prisons.93 The cells were very small, some so small that the 
standard issue mattresses could not be laid flat. The toilets inside the cells 
could be flushed only from outside, by the staff: one visitor to this station said 
it was undignified for detainees not to be able to flush their own toilets.94 
There was little ventilation in the open areas, and none in the cells, and the 
heating was inadequate, so the block was hot and smelly in the summer, and 
cold and smelly in the winter.95 One visitor, who had already visited other 
custody blocks, described the first visit there as “absolutely terrifying”.96 
                                                 
92 Myself included. I became accustomed to hearing visitors telling me that they made 
successive visits on the same evening, and it took me some time to realise that the second 
visit might not be unannounced, or at least not unexpected. 
93 One visitor with experience of prisons, not identified here to preserve anonymity, observed 
that some of the fittings still being used in this block had ceased to be used, many years 
earlier, in prison buildings.  
94 V8. 
95 The evidence for this and the preceding paragraph is my own observation. 
96 V12. 
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The 60-cell block is a huge, anonymous new building. There is a barrier at the 
entrance to the car park, which means that the custody staff will know when 
visitors have arrived, even if they come on foot. The block is a complex 
building on two stories. On the ground floor there is a high point from which a 
member of the civilian staff keeps a panoptical eye on the whole floor, and 
custody sergeants’ desks like booths which give detainees more privacy for 
booking-in, each looking towards one of the five wings, with twelve cells in 
each wing. The cells are larger than those in the older blocks. Also on the 
ground floor are interview rooms, consultation rooms, and evidence recovery 
rooms. The first floor is for the staff. The consultation rooms are locked during 
interviews between solicitors and detainees: the local solicitors found this 
unacceptable, but were told it was standard Home Office design. Solicitors 
were also kept out of all other areas in the block except a waiting room near 
the main door.97 
 
In the older locations, the central area is dominated by the custody sergeants’ 
raised desk which faces towards the holding cage where detainees waited 
with their arresting officers until they could be booked in. Notices read, in 
block capital letters:  
 
“Notice to all prisoners. If you damage a cell you will be prosecuted.”  
 
The wording of these notices brought the culture of the police to the 
                                                 
97 L1: email to the author. 
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immediate attention of anyone who read them. It was a strong reminder that 
the police word for detainee is inaccurate and demeaning.98 The new recruits 
saw (and heard) the word “prisoner” used to refer to detainees on several 
occasions on every visit, and became socialised by the familiarity of the 
usage. 
 
Each cell had a mattress covered in blue plastic on a raised level (lower, for 
their own safety, for detainees who were intoxicated) and a pillow, also with a 
blue plastic cover. There were no televisions or radios in the cells: reading 
material might sometimes be provided. In a corner or an alcove, there was a 
toilet with a small supply of toilet paper, but no wash hand basin except in the 
new 60-cell facility. There was a CCTV camera in most cells. The camera 
could not transmit images of the detainee using the toilet, but not all the 
detainees, or all the visitors, knew that. There was a buzzer in each cell to call 
the staff.99 Detainees’ shoes were kept outside the cell doors, to prevent the 
detainees using the laces to hang themselves. I often heard detainees 
shouting, swearing and screaming, either trying to communicate with each 
other, or making a protest. Parts of the blocks sometimes stank of toilet smells 
and of stale sweat. One detainee told me that he became aware of the 
availability of showers only after he had heard about it from a visitor.100  
 
The new recruits became accustomed to the crime control orientation which 
                                                 
98 See Chapter One, text to notes 49-51. 
99 As far as I could tell, the staff did not routinely deactivate the buzzers, as observed in 
Satnam Choongh, Policing as Social Discipline, (OUP 1997) 80. 
100 D1. On an observation, I heard custody staff say that they could think of no reason why 
one of their detainees would want to brush his teeth except that his girlfriend was coming to 
visit him in the block. 
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resulted from the deficiencies in the way they worked, or were allowed to 
work, including: delays in being admitted; the brevity and poor quality of the 
interviews; the proximity of the escorting officer during the interviews; and the 
absence of feedback by visitors to detainees about the response of the 
custody staff to their requests and concerns; the haphazard approach to 
checks on matters such as whether all the staff were carrying ligature knives 
on their belts and whether the CCTV was working; the weakness of the 
reporting system; the rarity of challenges by the visitors; and the restrictions 
on the ambit of the work of the visitors. 
 
On their three-hour observations, new recruits would, as I did, see much more 
than on the visits. Custody blocks are, for the custody staff, places of work, 
where, just as in other places of work, there are hourly rounds of tea with 
each member of staff having their own personal mug,101 cakes for birthdays, 
and a lot of banter. I saw that banter is shared with many of the other regulars 
who call, such as investigating officers, drug referral officers, and arresting 
officers, but not with the detainees’ lawyers. Detainees who happened to be in 
the public area at the time were generally ignored in the banter, unless, of 
course, it was about them.102  
 
I saw the custody sergeant booking in detainees and asking them what were, 
inevitably, personal questions, in front of everyone else who happened to be 
in that public area. I saw the new arrivals being relieved of their mobile 
                                                 
101 One of the custody sergeants I observed had a Monopoly “Go to Jail” mug with a police 
officer blowing a whistle: which is, I suppose, a crime control image. Detainees’ drinks were 
served in plastic cups, on the grounds of health and safety. 
102 See Chapter One, text to note 70.  
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phones and all their other possessions. I saw that it was impossible for some 
detainees to have a phone call made on their behalf: the detainees could not 
remember the number, because it was stored under the person’s name on 
their mobile phone, and the mobile had been seized to obtain evidence. I saw, 
and could not avoid overhearing, the telephone calls detainees made to their 
solicitors or their family members, because the calls had to be made in the 
public area near the custody sergeants’ desk.  These experiences would have 
reinforced the new recruits’ impressions of how detainees were treated by the 
police and custody staff, and socialised them into expecting the treatment as 
the norm. The new recruits were on police territory, which coloured the whole 
experience. Every moment in the custody block was controlled by this 
powerful institution.  
 
Undoubtedly, visiting with a mentor and the three-hour observation would be 
valuable experiences in understanding the work of a custody block. But the 
responses to those experiences were likely to follow the paths already laid 
down by the scheme administrator and by their mentors, and the responses of 
the visitors were also very likely to be heavily influenced by the police and 
custody staff. It is very unlikely that new recruits would see things from the 
detainee’s point of view.  
 
Visitor Team Meetings 
Meetings were held for each local panel of visitors: they usually lasted just 
over one hour. At first sight, the “team” seemed to mean the group of visitors 
working at one or more local police stations, but the word “team” also recalls 
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the image of the team used in the initial session for recruits; as well as the 
visitors, the team comprised the Police and Crime Commissioner and the 
police,103 both of whom were represented at these meetings, respectively by 
the scheme administrator and the custody inspector. The venue was usually a 
conference room in the police station where the group visited:104 the visitors I 
interviewed did not think this was a problem. In my view, the venue was police 
territory, which confirmed that the police held the power. At none of the 
meetings which I observed did the visitors seek to discuss matters in the 
absence of the police and the scheme administrator.105 Either they did not 
think there was any call for that, or they were afraid to do so: or both.  
 
The meetings were held once every four months. Because of declining levels 
of attendance, the scheme administrator was considering holding them just 
once every six months. The scheme administrator convened all the meetings, 
and he chaired most of them as well.106 He said he preferred it that way, to 
keep the meetings shorter:107 another explanation could be that it reinforced 
his control over other aspects of the meetings, as well as their length. Usually 
between four and ten visitors attended. Most of the visitors I interviewed did 
attend the meetings, and said they thought the value of the meetings was 
impaired by the poor attendance.108 One visitor remarked that: 
  
                                                 
103 See text to note 78. 
104 The only other location used was a room in the Police and Crime Commissioner’s offices, 
part of the police headquarters building. 
105 By contrast, in the lay visiting era of the 1980s and 1990s, the meetings of the Lambeth 
group took place in their own meeting room, not in the police station, and the police attended 
only part of each meeting: see Chapter Three, text to note 110. 
106 Meetings at two of the locations were chaired by visitors. 
107 AD interview. 
108 e.g., V9. 
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“It’s usually the same people that turn up all the time: there’s only a few 
of us, probably about three or four.”109 
 
Several visitors said they thought the meetings were useful, but they did not 
give that opinion with much enthusiasm. Some wanted to hear from the 
police, and thought that the police should always be present to answer 
questions, but noted that they did not always provide answers. Only three 
visitors thought that they were inhibited by the presence of the police.  
 
The scheme administrator distributed an agenda and a report at each 
meeting. He did not send these documents to the visitors by email in advance 
of the meeting, or afterwards, prioritising attendance over the provision of 
information.110 There were no minutes of the meetings.111 The agenda was 
always the same: apologies, visit issues/performance, custody visitor roster, 
force custody update, and any other business. In the visit issues/performance 
section, the scheme administrator reviewed the statistics for the number and 
frequency of visits, checking that targets for visiting were being met, and 
noting that the recently introduced system of self-introduction was increasing 
the number of detainees being interviewed by visitors. He highlighted the type 
of report which he wished to encourage the visitors to emulate. He was 
looking for detailed narrative about the visits to the detainees, rather than, at 
the other extreme, a report which said only: “5 PICs:112 no issues.” He asked 
visitors to obtain and record positive feedback from detainees as well as the 
                                                 
109 V19. 
110 Observation and AD interview.   
111 except at one panel, where the visitor chair compiled minutes, and the practice ceased 
during my period of observation. 
112 Persons in custody.  
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negative feedback. The reports which I read show that some visitors complied 
with both requests. 
 
The force custody update section was for the police representative to provide 
information. This often consisted of progress reports about the forthcoming 
change to the much larger custody blocks, and improvements in dealing with 
people with mental health issues. The police sometimes took the opportunity 
to send out pro-police messages, including about deaths in custody.113 The 
police also commented sometimes about criminal justice issues at team 
meetings. On one occasion, an inspector said it had been wrong for a lawyer 
to advise a detainee to say “no comment” in police interview. Lawyers were 
never invited by the scheme administrator to explain their role to visitors, so 
there was no chance of visitors appreciating why lawyers sometimes advised 
detainees to respond in that way.  
 
The team meetings were not a forum for debate. The reports distributed at the 
meetings did not generate much discussion. One visitor said he thought some 
of the visitors were reticent at team meetings because the police were there, 
or because they felt intimidated by the longer serving visitors.114 The team 
meetings failed to be part of the reporting process, mainly because of the 
deficiencies in that process.115 And, when visitors did raise an issue, the 
police would have an answer that closed off further discussion. For instance, 
at one team meeting, a visitor raised concerns about a detainee with a broken 
                                                 
113 See text to note 202. 
114 V4, who thought the more experienced visitors could be “intimidating”. 
115 See Chapter Six, text to notes 146-154. 
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leg in a full length plaster. The inspector responded by saying that the leg 
would have been supported on a pillow. There was no further discussion 
about why the police had found it necessary to detain this suspect in a cell, 
rather than just arrange an appointment for an interview.  
 
Visitors were aware of the delays which extended the time detainees had to 
spend in custody. Custody sergeants told me that the delays were routinely 
caused by interviewing not being done outside office hours. However, the 
subject was not discussed at team meetings. One visitor would have liked to 
have participated in the debates about these types of questions, but knew it 
would not happen: 
 
“It might be good to be in on a few police meetings when they’re 
discussing operations around custody. I don’t think they’d want us to be 
there.”116 
 
That visitor could see the value of debating these issues, but had accepted 
that, because of the power of the police, there was no way of doing so. 
 
There were no coffee breaks, and usually no coffee either, at these meetings. 
One visitor observed that this deprived visitors of the chance to have informal, 
private chats with each other.117 Also, the meetings were never attended by 
“outsiders”, people like ward councillors, probation officers, and defence 
solicitors. Who was there, and who was not there, made a big contribution to 
                                                 
116 V9. 
117 V5. 
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the socialisation of the visitors into a generally passive, pro-police, stance.  
 
At two team meetings which I observed, in different areas, police officers 
praised the independence of the custody visiting scheme, and police officers 
often made the same point to me in interview. The police could argue that the 
existence of the scheme, and the fact that the scheme did not make criticisms 
of the police, demonstrated, independently, that all was well on the custody 
front. But both the theory and the practice of the team meetings always 
pointed away from the visitors being independent. The meetings confirmed 
the mono-cultural socialisation of the visitors, and reminded them that the 
police had the power. Visitors were told what to do, and what to think. What 
they were being told to do was to carry out their work in the way the Police 
and Crime Commissioner and the police wanted. What they were being told to 
think was crime control. 
 
Visitors’ attitudes from interviews and observation on visits 
This section looks at the attitudes of the visitors, as expressed to me in  
interviews and observed on accompanied visits, on all matters except deaths 
in custody, which is dealt with later in the chapter.  
 
I asked visitors whether they thought that the visiting scheme was 
independent, whether the scheme should be managed by a body other than 
the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner, and whether they felt 
independent of the Police and Crime Commissioner and of the police. Most 
visitors did not feel any lack of independence, and thought the Office of the 
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Police and Crime Commissioner was the right body to manage the scheme. 
One member of the minority said the scheme was: 
 
“A system within a system … someone’s pulling the strings from 
somewhere else.”118 
 
This quote displays considerable unease with the lack of independence as it  
resulted from the structure, which made the “string-pulling” inescapable. 
Some visitors realised that the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner 
and the police were closely connected, and that the distinction was not 
understood by the general public, or by the detainees;119 some visitors were 
themselves confused between the Police and Crime Commissioner and the 
police;120 and some did not know that the Police and Crime Commissioner 
had replaced the police authority.121  
 
Two visitors said that there was too much association with the police and 
custody staff for their work to be wholly independent.122 One visitor made this 
comment about the scheme administrator:  
 
“He knows a lot of policemen, he’s friends with them, it must be quite 
hard for him to maintain that [independence].”123 
 
                                                 
118 V19. 
119 V2, V3. 
120 e.g., V10. 
121 e.g., V18. 
122 V2, V12. 
123 V9. 
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Maybe that was a way of saying that he did not maintain his independence, 
and that he should have done so. Visitors were certainly aware of his pivotal 
importance in the scheme. Some visitors distinguished between, on the one 
hand, their dependence on the organisational role of this official on behalf of 
the Police and Crime Commissioner and, on the other hand, their 
independence in making decisions as individual visitors, but none of them 
said they might be influenced by the Police and Crime Commissioner in how 
they made those decisions. Visitors found that they had no public voice. 
However, some did say that they would go over the head of the Police and 
Crime Commissioner to their MPs if they found they were unable to get 
anything done about a really serious concern: but this had never happened.  
 
All the visitors thought they were independent of the police, including the 
visitor who said: 
 
 “I do the job best knowing [the police] accept me as part of a team.” 124 
 
This visitor both wanted to be accepted by the police, and adopted the key 
image of the team.125 This image was reified by the practice of some visitors 
shutting the cell doors on the detainees after their interviews.126 The practice 
may well have given the detainees the impression that visitors were members 
of a team whose purpose was to confine detainees, albeit with some degree 
of humanity. 
 
                                                 
124 V1. 
125 See text to note 78. 
126 Observation. 
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Of the three visitors whose relatives were police officers, only one of them 
seemed to think these relationships might raise conflicts of interest or 
questions about impartiality.127 Most visitors said they were neutral: a neutral 
visitor should feel neither on the side of the detainees nor on the side of the 
police. Some said that they took the point of view of the detainees,128 but a 
larger number were on the other side of the spectrum. Of those, one visitor’s 
level of neutrality was “70/30” on the side of the police, partly because of 
predisposition, and partly because of familiarity with custody staff.129 Another 
said that both visitors and the Police and Crime Commissioner saw custody 
from the point of view of the police.130 Another thought that a belief that there 
was no need for visitors to check on the police was consistent with the 
neutrality of visitors.131 
 
One visitor, without any sense of irony, expressed neutrality in these terms: 
  
“If I can help the police I will, if I can help the criminal I will.”132  
 
This showed this visitor’s crime control orientation in the assumption that all 
detainees were guilty. Visitors were not there to help detainees who were 
innocent, as innocent detainees did not exist. 
 
Visitors were asked who they felt responsible to, and one mentioned only 
                                                 
127 Identifiers omitted to preserve anonymity. 
128 V6, V19. 
129 V8. 
130 V12. 
131 V10: see text to note 151. 
132 V13. 
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“police officers” in answer to this question,133 and another only “detainees”.134 
However, most visitors said they thought they were responsible to the Police 
and Crime Commissioner, and most of them saw the responsibility as also 
being owed to the detainees, the police, and the general public, and one 
visitor included those sectors of the public who did not trust the police.135 One 
visitor saw the Home Secretary as the person to whom visitors were ultimately 
responsible.136 Almost all the visitors said that they thought the work was 
important and useful,137 and some mentioned Scarman,138 following the 
scheme administrator’s lead.139 
 
I sought to categorise visitors’ attitudes in terms of Packer’s analysis. One due 
process adherent said that two other visitors should not continue to act as 
visitors, because they thought that all detainees were in custody because they 
had done something wrong and should be punished.140 In fact, most visitors 
were crime-control oriented. The narrow socialisation the visitors received had 
played a large part in developing and confirming these attitudes. One visitor 
told a detainee: 
 
 “The more you co-operate, the sooner you’ll be out.”141  
 
The detainee might well have heard that as advice to make a confession. This 
                                                 
133 V10. 
134 V9. 
135 V21. 
136 V7.  
137 except V12. 
138 e.g., V8. 
139 Observation on several occasions, including during the training, for which see text to note 
73. 
140 V17. 
141  Identifier omitted to preserve anonymity. 
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is a very clear illustration of the crime control attitude of some visitors. It ran 
also ran contrary to the remit that visitors should not to get involved in any 
part of the investigation.142   
 
Visitors did not however share the Police and Crime Commissioner’s line that 
the principal purpose of custody visiting was to build public confidence in the 
police. Most of them saw it as promoting police accountability and 
transparency.143 One visitor said, emphatically, that the purpose was to 
safeguard detainees.144 Some visitors said that there had been mistreatment 
of detainees in the past, and that custody visiting had been brought in to deter 
neglect and abuse, but that things had improved, partly because of the 
visiting.145 When I asked one of the visitors whether random unannounced 
visiting deterred mistreatment of detainees because they know you might turn 
up at any time, the visitor replied: 
 
“I think it’s good for the detainees, but I haven’t heard of this idea.”146 
 
This is further evidence of how the original purpose of custody visiting has 
almost vanished into total obscurity.147 Another visitor, in a minority of one, 
made the perceptive observation that while the “whole reason” for the visiting 
scheme was to prevent incidents in custody and to protect the welfare of 
detainees, the scheme was not sufficiently related to that as a purpose, and 
                                                 
142 2013 Code of Practice, para 60. 
143 e.g., V15. From my interviews with the police, it seemed that “transparency” was the term 
they preferred to use, so maybe the visitors who used the term had picked it up from them. 
144 V14. 
145 V3, V17. 
146 V2. 
147 See Chapter Three, text to notes 73-74,128-131,and 159-60. 
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visitors were not made to think they had a real duty.148 Most visitors saw the 
purpose as “to keep the police on their toes”.149 But some visitors failed to see 
any connection between their work and protecting detainees. For instance, 
one visitor said: 
 
“I trust the police would carry out their duty to the best of their ability.”  
 
I asked this visitor what, in that case, the point of the visiting was. This was 
the answer: 
 
“Well, it does beg the question if I believe that, why do we have 
custody visits, if I’m prepared to trust the behaviour of the police? I 
suppose there always [have] to be checks in place, no matter how 
reliable the system is, and the sporadic nature, the random nature of 
the inspection, the visits, perhaps does influence…I’ve never thought of 
it in those terms. I suppose, because I’ve never found anything 
extraordinarily out of order, that I just expect the whole thing to be 
running like a Swiss watch all the time.” 150 
 
Here is an edited extract from an interview with another visitor with similar 
crime control attitudes, unable to see the need for intervention: 
 
JK: Do you think the scheme has any effect on how the police behave, 
knowing you could turn up at any time? 
                                                 
148 V12. 
149 e.g., V8, V15. 
150 V1. 
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V10: I would hope not, I would hope they would behave, no matter 
what … they are professional people and, OK, and sometimes it’s 
going to be difficult, when it’s all kicking off down there, to remain calm. 
But I firmly believe that they do a good job, and that they don’t overstep 
the mark. 
JK: Does that mean you think the visiting isn’t necessary? 
V10: No, I think it’s still necessary because it offers the detainees 
somebody neutral to talk to, so it’s necessary for them, it’s not 
necessary to check up on the police.151 
 
This visitor saw the visiting work as providing the detainees with company.  
The visitor clearly trusted the police to behave properly at all times, and did 
not see that visitors had any role to play in checking on their behaviour. The 
visitor thought that all the visitors had to do to be neutral was not to be police 
or civilian custody staff.  
 
Some visitors felt it was important to reassure detainees that they would be 
looked after, particularly those who were in custody for the first time.152 They 
did not seem to have any qualms that an unqualified reassurance might be 
misleading. Exceptionally, one visitor, rather than giving a reassurance, tried, 
unsuccessfully, to intervene. Here is an edited extract from the visitor’s report:  
 
“Officers explain[ed] the PIC was having mental health issues and was 
violent, self harming … they were awaiting the crisis team. [Later t]he 
                                                 
151 V10. 
152 e.g., V3 and V11. 
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PIC was much calmer, and pleaded to be allowed to call their 
solicitor ... The PIC suggested the call be made in the cell with officers 
holding the phone. The [escorting officer] said that was not an option. 
The tearful and frustrated PIC claimed the only reason now that they 
were agitated and self-harming was because they could not get to call 
their solicitor. I did ask the [escorting officer if] an officer [could] make 
[the] call for the PIC ... I already knew the answer, but felt I had to ask 
anyway. [The answer was no.] ... Couldn’t help feeling quite 
inadequate.”153 
 
Visitors rarely saw custody from the detainee’s point of view, and tended to 
have stereotyped views about detainees. One visitor I interviewed said that 
one had to keep an open mind, but at the same time the detainees were 
potentially “bad people ... the extremes of society”.154 Another said, first, that 
detainees were “not people one would associate with normally”, and then, in 
the next breath, that sometimes they were “just normal people who ended up 
in a bad situation”.155  
 
Some of the police I interviewed stereotyped detainees as liars.156 At one 
team meeting, the scheme administrator said that detainees did not always 
tell the truth, and visitors agreed.157 When a detainee made an allegation 
which was disputed by the police and custody staff, one way of checking it 
was to look at the custody record. Visitors felt the custody record settled the 
                                                 
153 An extract from reports distributed at a team meeting. 
154 V23. 
155 V12. 
156 e.g., S2. 
157 Observation. 
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matter: they did not seem prepared to entertain the possibility that the police 
might have falsified the record,158 as they have been found to do on 
occasion.159 Again, this attitude could be attributed to their socialisation: they 
never encountered anyone who might tell them that the police sometimes 
falsify records. 
 
On all the occasions when I accompanied visitors, a member of the custody 
staff always remained close to the cell door, usually able to hear the meeting, 
if not able to see it as well. Very few visitors were concerned about the effect 
on the detainees and on the quality of their meetings with the detainees.160  
Most visitors thought that the extra work for the short-handed custody staff 
would rule out interviews in a consultation room where detainees would feel 
more able to talk, so they never raised the idea: an example of Lukes’ three- 
dimensional power keeping issues off the agenda. 
 
I asked visitors how they would cope with being detained in custody, and most 
of them said they would hate it. However, on a guided tour of the new 60-cell 
block, one of the visitors, said, not as a joke, that the new facility was so nice 
that the police were spoiling the detainees. Another visitor said one of the 
older custody blocks was like a three-star hotel.161 Few visitors appeared to 
share these views. No three-star hotels confine guests to a small cell, where 
the only furniture is a bench; the only bedding a plastic-encased mattress and 
                                                 
158 e.g., V3 and V19, and discussion at the team meeting. 
159 See Chapter One, note 85. 
160 V5, V9. 
161 V1. 
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plastic-encased pillow,162 with one blanket (sometimes more on request) but 
no sheets; the only television screen is one that watches the occupant; the 
switch for the only light is operated from the other side of a locked door; and 
the only bathroom equipment is a toilet with a very limited supply of toilet 
paper, and no wash hand basin.163  
 
Most visitors said that the police and civilian staff did a very good job, and 
looked after the detainees, in what were sometimes quite difficult 
circumstances, coping both with abuse from some of the detainees, and with 
the effects of staff shortages. A minority of visitors held rather different views. 
One visitor made the point that detainees were treated properly while visitors 
were in the block, and another pointed out that people behave differently 
when they are being observed.164 Some visitors said that the treatment of 
detainees did depend on how the detainees behaved and whether they were 
compliant.165 One visitor opined that the detainees always felt they were being 
fobbed off, and that they were probably right to think so.166 Some visitors said 
they disliked the way some custody sergeants made fun of detainees, but 
conceded that they did not challenge them.  
 
The police and the civilian staff often referred to the detainees as prisoners.167 
Some visitors used the word, others were very careful not to use the word, 
                                                 
162 At a team meeting, I heard a custody manager say that he used to think he would never 
see the day when detainees were given pillows. 
163 The absence of a wash hand basin offends basic standards of hygiene. It also makes it 
impossible for Muslims to wash before praying, as V7 noted. Wash hand basins have been 
installed in the cells in the new 60-cell block: see text to note 97. 
164 V11, V14. 
165 V4, V9. 
166 V12. 
167 See text to note 98, and Chapter One, text to notes 49-51. 
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and some did not think it mattered. Another enduring aspect of police culture 
is what Bethan Loftus calls its “masculine ethos”.168 A female visitor, younger 
than the average, said she had been patronised on visits by the custody staff, 
subjected to sexist treatment, and not taken seriously. She went on to say that 
she had received even more of this kind of treatment from other visitors.169 
Some visitors, therefore, either adopted this aspect of police culture, or had 
already been behaving in this way. 
 
Some years ago there were bars in police stations, and visitors used to have 
a drink with the police after visiting at one of the police stations in the area 
studied.170 Times have changed. None of the visitors said they had a social 
relationship with the custody staff outside the block, but they did get to know 
some of them.171  As one visitor said: 
 
“If you know [them] you can have a banter with them, a bit of a chat.”172 
 
This visitor showed no concerns about the relationship. Another visitor said 
that the familiarity was superficial, and that if they had shared a joke, and then 
the visitor found something wrong, there would be no reticence in raising it.173  
However, getting friendly with the police and custody staff could convey the 
impression to the detainees that the visitors were in collusion with them, but 
                                                 
168 Bethan Loftus, Police Culture in a Changing World, (OUP 2009) 120. 
169 Identifier not given, to preserve anonymity. 
170 AD interview. 
171 A point made by S9, noting that some visitors act as appropriate adults, and therefore 
spend a great deal more time in the block than visitors. Two of the visitors I interviewed acted 
as appropriate adults.  
172 V10. 
173 V4. 
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only one visitor was concerned about this: 
 
“If the person in custody sees you being over-friendly with the custody 
staff, then they assume you’re police officers as well, and they probably 
won’t talk to you … we have to act in a way that gives the detainee 
confidence that we are separate from the police.”174  
 
This is an important recognition of the need for the quality of separateness, of 
not being too close, as part of independence,175 which only one visitor 
expressed. However, it is not easy to appear to be aloof from a person one 
has got to know.176 This underlines the importance of proper training in the 
first place. 
 
Another aspect of independence is how “soft”177 the visitors were in their 
dealings with the police, coupled with how much the visitors were affected by 
the power of the police, in Lukes’ three-dimensional version of the power 
relationship: the visitors behaved in the way they thought the police wanted 
them to behave. Only one visitor said that the police were very much in 
control of each visit, and that they used safety concerns to justify their 
decisions about what the visitors could and could not do. This visitor felt that 
the visitors should be stronger in insisting on making some kind of visual 
checks on all the detainees.178  
                                                 
174 V3 and V22. 
175 See Chapter Two, text to note 71. 
176 On one occasion I allowed myself to appear too friendly when greeting a police officer in 
the presence of detainees in the custody block. 
177 See Chapter Two, text in para after note 74. 
178 V12: I think the visitor meant that it was rare for visitors to be stronger in this way. 
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Visitors did not confront the police, and challenges were very rare.179 One 
visitor said: 
 
“I think if you see something that needs challenging you’ve got to say 
so.” 
 
But, when asked for an example, the visitor answered, after a pause for 
thought:  
 
“I don’t think I have challenged them, but I think that’s mainly because 
there hasn’t been anything to challenge them about.” 180  
 
But there certainly were things to challenge the police about: for instance, 
delays in admission to the custody block. On one occasion the custody block 
staff said that they were busy and that the visitors would not be allowed in the 
custody block for at least an hour. The visitors did not challenge this, and they 
left, and did not return later, so the purpose of the visit failed completely.181 
One, untypical, visitor felt suspicious about delays but did not challenge the 
staff about the reasons they gave for them,182 and some did not even ask to 
be told the reason.183 The only action visitors took was to report that there had 
been delays.184 Visitors showed a general reluctance to ask questions: for 
                                                 
179 Observation. 
180 V7. 
181 V9. 
182 V19. 
183 e.g., V1. 
184 Visitor reports. 
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instance, several said they would not enquire why a detainee who had been in 
the custody block had gone to hospital:185 it may be right to draw the 
conclusion that some visitors could not contemplate the possibility that the 
reason for a detainee having to go to hospital could be neglect or abuse by 
the police or custody staff. In the case of denial of access to certain 
detainees, visitors did not ask whether an officer of the rank of inspector had 
made the determination, as required by statute.186 These failures showed a 
lack of concern for the truth and for objective reporting, concerns that are 
characteristic of independence.187 
 
A key time for challenge was the moment when the visitors presented their 
report to the custody sergeant towards the end of their visit. On the only 
occasion when I observed a challenge being made at this stage, the 
challenge was not effective, and it was really about something else. The 
visitors had reported what they believed were inconsistencies in a custody 
record, for which the custody sergeant had given an explanation which the 
visitors did not accept. However their real complaint was that the custody 
sergeant had kept them waiting for two separate periods totalling about 45 
minutes. In my experience, and in that of the visitors, being kept waiting after 
admission to the custody block was very unusual. One of the visitors said that 
the sergeant was showing his power by sending visitors off to wait in the 
consultation room, like naughty children, and that it was the worst way he had 
been treated in 17 years. The visitors became progressively more annoyed, 
while the sergeant remained cool and detached throughout. The visitors 
                                                 
185 V8. 
186 Police Reform Act 2002 s 51(4). 
187 See Chapter Two, text after note 74. 
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asked to see the duty inspector, and they raised the issue about the report 
with the inspector, but they said nothing about the custody sergeant keeping 
them waiting. The inspector persuaded the visitors to rewrite their report in a 
form which the custody sergeant signed. The ineffectiveness of this shows the 
power of the police over visitors. I believe the visitors were subject to the 
power of the police in all circumstances, including the very numerous 
occasions when there was no overt conflict. Here, where there was overt 
conflict, the visitors were still affected by the power of the police in Lukes’ 
three-dimensional form: they could not bring themselves to complain about 
what had really annoyed them, so they picked on something else, which was 
too technical for them. So the visitors achieved nothing.  
 
These visitors told me they did not expect to make any headway by including 
the matter in their report. I did not discuss this incident with the scheme 
administrator, but he did tell me during interview that his policy was to 
approach these problems by speaking to the custody manager. He gave the 
following example. On one occasion, before the days of self-introduction, 
custody staff told detainees that visitors were waiting outside the cell to check 
on their welfare; the staff asked the detainees if they were OK; the detainees 
answered that they were; and there was then no meeting between visitors and 
detainees. Visitors raised this with the scheme administrator, he mentioned it 
to the inspector, the inspector spoke to the staff, and the staff stopped 
behaving that way.188 The scheme administrator would, no doubt, have 
argued that in this instance his policy was effective, because it achieved the 
                                                 
188 V11: V8 told me a similar story. 
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right result for future visits. However, I heard of no other instances of this kind, 
an impression reinforced by the low expectations of the experienced visitors in 
the previous example. 
 
I observed some, but not all, visitors recommending detainees to get a 
solicitor: they did not always mention that the legal advice would be free. Most 
of the visitors did not seem to be impressed by solicitors. On one occasion at 
a team meeting, I heard this comment from a visitor: “solicitors are against the 
police”.189 Legal advice was often given to detainees by telephone, and the 
calls had to be made near the custody sergeants’ desk.190 Most of the visitors 
did not think this was a problem, and one visitor said: 
 
“I think it’s probably right, because we don’t know what type of offence 
they’ve committed.”191 
 
Packer’s crime control adherents want to stop, rather than just inhibit, lawyers 
advising suspects, because they see it as outside interference, making it less 
likely that the suspect will provide a confession. This visitor’s remark also 
shows uncritical support for that most basic crime control tenet, the 
presumption of guilt. Visitors did not understand the role of the lawyers, as no 
lawyer had ever made a presentation to them, from which they might have 
gained some idea of the arguments for the due process model of criminal 
justice. 
                                                 
189 Identifier not given to preserve anonymity. 
190 On the need for private booths, see Skinns (n 19) 215. 
191 V11.  
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Socialisation and the changes in visitors’ attitudes 
The attitudes of the visitors after socialisation can now be compared with the 
attitudes they held when applying to join. Before doing so, it is worth 
emphasising that the fundamental element of the socialisation of the visitors 
was that it was firmly anchored to the Police and Crime Commissioner and to 
the police. The visitors did not meet representatives of other groups who work 
in custody and in the criminal justice system, which would have helped to give 
them a more comprehensive and balanced view. Visitors received all their 
information and socialisation from the Police and Crime Commissioner, the 
police, and from the more experienced visitors, who had themselves been 
socialised in the same way.  
 
The following table sets out: what the issues were; what attitudes the police 
and the Police and Crime Commissioner would like the visitors to take about 
each issue; what attitudes the visitors took on each issue; whether the 
attitudes the police and the Police and Crime Commissioner wanted were the 
attitudes adopted by the visitors; and where the views were not aligned, 
whether the visitors challenged the police and the Police and Crime 
Commissioner in any way.  
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VISITORS’ ATTITUDES TABLE 
ISSUE POLICE/POLICE 
AND CRIME 
COMMISSIONER 
VIEW  
VISITORS’ VIEW  VIEWS 
ALIGNED? 
CHALLENGE? 
Visitors’ attitude to the police Favourable  Agreed Yes No 
Whether promoting 
confidence in police a primary 
objective of visiting 
Visitors should 
see it that way 
No agreement No No 
Whether safeguarding 
detainees a primary objective  
It is not No clear view No No 
Whether visiting independent It is Agreed, mostly Yes, largely No 
Whether visiting promotes 
police accountability 
It does Agreed Yes No 
Whether visiting legitimate It is Agreed Yes No 
Whether visitors need to 
know about the law, including 
the Human Rights Act 
They do not need 
to 
Agreed  Yes No 
Whether stereotyping 
detainees a concern 
It is not Agreed, mostly  Yes, largely No 
Whether detainees are 
treated well in custody 
They are Agreed Yes No 
Whether visitors should worry 
about adopting police culture 
They should not Agreed, mostly No No 
Whether visitors need   
training for interviewing 
They do not Agreed, mostly Yes, largely No 
Whether visitors need to tell 
detainees the staff response 
to their issues  
They do not Agreed, mostly Yes, largely No 
Whether chatting with the 
police and custody staff a 
problem 
It is not Agreed, mostly Yes, largely No 
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ISSUE POLICE/POLICE 
AND CRIME 
COMMISSIONER 
VIEW  
VISITORS’ VIEW  VIEWS 
ALIGNED? 
CHALLENGE? 
Whether visitors should  
challenge the police 
They should not  Agreed, mostly Yes, largely Very rarely 
Whether detainees should be 
able to phone lawyers/ family 
in private 
They should not Agreed, mostly Yes, largely No 
Whether visiting is just a 
reporting function 
It is  Agreed Yes No 
Whether visitors should have 
a public voice 
They should not Agreed, mostly  Yes No 
Whether visitors need training 
from others  
They do not Disagreed No No 
Whether it is right to assess 
visiting only statistically  
It is Not clear, but only one 
found it a concern 
Not possible to 
say 
No 
Whether visitors should have 
any other role 
They should not Mixed views No No 
Whether visitors should be 
able to track concerns 
They should not Most agreed Yes, largely No 
Whether visitors should 
discuss wider issues 
They should not Mixed views No No 
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The table shows that visitors’ attitudes on the general issues were in line with 
what the Police and Crime Commissioner and the police wanted them to be, 
and that where they were not aligned, visitors very rarely made a challenge. 
Some of that might have arisen from their background and their attitudes on 
arrival, and some might have resulted from their socialisation. However their 
attitudes towards criminal justice and the police were very likely to have been 
affected by the narrow socialisation they received, by the constant message 
that the police and the Police and Crime Commissioner were in charge, and 
by the persistent crime control orientation. The visitors did not have a clear 
idea of the purpose of the visiting scheme. This may reflect the conflict 
between the various different purposes that are put forward,192 and the fact 
that the issue had never been properly discussed with them.193  
 
It is easier to assign the visitors’ attitudes to their socialisation where the 
attitudes relate to the specifics of the visiting scheme. Most visitors were 
uncritical of the system. They carried out their work in the way they had been 
trained, and they accepted the way the scheme was run, with all its 
limitations. As none of them knew anything about those details before they 
applied, their acceptance of the way the scheme was run can have originated 
only from the socialisation they received. That conclusion suggests that they 
would also be susceptible to influences from the same sources on a broader 
range of issues. 
 
                                                 
192 See Chapter Three, text to notes 186-190. 
193 See text to note 77. 
 244 
The research identified two groups of visitors with contrasting experiences of 
the police and the criminal justice system.194 One way of evaluating the 
strength of the socialisation could be to examine whether the attitudes of the 
members of the group with negative experiences appeared to have changed 
after socialisation. Of the three members of this group, the views of the first 
appeared to have become generally more favourable to the police. The 
second was seeing custody more from the police’s point of view, but 
otherwise that visitor continued to feel on the side of detainees. The third 
visitor was pleased to see improvements in how people with mental heath 
problems were treated, and sympathised with the police being short-staffed 
and under pressure. This shows some movement in this group towards being 
more favourable to the police, and all three of the visitors seemed generally 
happy with the scheme.  
 
I now look back at the outcomes of the adjustments that the process of 
socialisation should achieve.195 My assessment is that most of the visitors felt 
clarity and confidence about their role in the organisation; that most of them 
felt accepted in the organisation: that most of them knew the organisation’s 
culture, including its politics, language, values and traditions; and that, 
ultimately, most of them derived job satisfaction from their work as visitors.196 
There was a much smaller group of just two visitors, who might be called 
“deviants”. One of these visitors resigned,197 and the other was questioning 
                                                 
194 See text to notes 28-32. 
195 See text to notes 3-26. 
196 Ellis et al (n 13) 86. 
197 V12. 
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the practices of custody.198 Both these visitors were glaring exceptions from 
the norm, which showed the strength of the effects of socialisation on all the 
others. 
 
In any event, whatever attitudes they had at the time of recruitment, most 
visitors went with the flow. The widespread alignment of the visitors’ attitudes 
to those of the police and the Police and Crime Commissioner shows that 
their attitudes moved, on a broad front, from the less determined mindsets 
they had held on arrival, to predominantly crime control mindsets. Some of the 
visitors thought they were independent in the decisions they made, but this 
analysis supports the view that they were heavily affected, both by their 
socialisation, and by other effects of the power of the police operating in 
Lukes’ three-dimensional form. This is particularly apparent when one sees 
what this meant for the issue of deaths in custody. 
 
Socialisation about deaths in custody 
A key question for this research is the relation between deaths in custody199 
and custody visiting.200 The following account traces the principal events 
relating to the role of custody visitors who visited the custody block where a 
particular death had taken place some years earlier: this was one of the 
blocks in the area studied. The story begins with the death. It seems likely that 
visitors were not told about it at the time, when they were making visits soon 
after the death, and when the police officers and custody staff would have had 
                                                 
198 V4. 
199 or rather: deaths during or following police contact, the IPCC wording: 
https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/page/deaths-during-or-following-police-contact. 
200  See Chapter One, text to notes 91-141. 
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it fresh in their minds. Indeed, I believe that they did not find out about it until 
some considerable time afterwards.201 And, as often happens, the inquest 
was not arranged until several years later. A team meeting took place at the 
station where the death had occurred, a few months before the date fixed for 
the inquest. The custody inspector told the visitors that, because of the man’s 
medical condition, the police had not been responsible for the death, and he 
asked the visitors to put over that line to people who asked them about it.202  
 
At the inquest, the jury found that the police did have some responsibility for 
the death, and the coroner was critical of the police. Neither the Police and 
Crime Commissioner nor the police informed visitors about the inquest result. 
They might have heard about it from some other source, but the remarks of 
the inspector, whom they knew and presumably trusted, would remain 
uppermost in their minds, and might even have prejudiced them against 
accepting the jury’s verdict and the coroner’s criticism of the police.  
 
At the next team meeting, the inquest was not on the agenda, the police 
officer did not mention it, and no visitor raised the issue. A few months later, 
there was an annual training day for visitors. There was no reference to the 
inquest. One visitor told me in interview about having wanted to raise the 
subject of the inquest at this session, but having felt unable to do so.203 Two 
months later, at a team meeting, the scheme administrator distributed a paper 
based on the facts of this death, without mentioning that it was based on 
                                                 
201 This impression is gained from the visitor interviews, and from one interviewee in 
particular, where the identifier is not given to preserve anonymity. 
202 I was present and recorded this remark in my field-notes. I later heard that a similar 
request was made by a different inspector at another team meeting: AD interview.   
203 V18. 
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those facts.  
 
So, to summarise: visitors did not hear about the death until some time after it 
took place; when the police felt the visitors had to be told, they gave them the 
line that the police had not been to blame; that version of events blotted out 
the impact of what actually happened at the inquest; the visitors did not raise 
the inquest with the custody inspector at the next team meeting; the inquest 
was not mentioned at training sessions: and the scheme administrator did not 
mention that some training material which he gave to visitors was based on 
this local case. This demonstrates the ideology of crime control, where the 
drive for efficiency supersedes due process concern for the welfare of 
individuals, even their right to life, and the powerful effect on the visitors of 
their socialisation. The police sought to neutralise a potentially toxic issue, 
and they succeeded in getting almost all the visitors “on side”, to continue with 
the team metaphor.204 The scheme administrator appears to have been 
ambivalent on the issue: he did mention this death at a training event I 
attended,205 but was silent about it on all the other occasions, when it just so 
happened that the police were present: perhaps this was another instance of 
the operation of Lukes’ three-dimensional power.  
 
Simon Pemberton has argued that there is a discourse of “state talk” about 
deaths in custody which legitimises what the state has done to a detainee, 
neutralizing empathy for their victim, the detainee. Pemberton sees this as 
being achieved by the police in a number of ways, including by arguing that 
                                                 
204 See text to notes 78, 124 and 125. 
205 Text following note 78. 
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deaths in custody are caused by inherent physiological weakness.206 This 
approximates to what happened in this case. The police sought to enlist the 
visitors to spread their version of events: an instance of “state talk”. 
 
In interviews, I asked visitors a series of questions about deaths in custody. 
First, they were asked about their feelings on hearing of a death in custody. 
Naturally, they were saddened. One reaction was:  
 
“it’s always a bit worrying, a bit disappointing to think that, in spite of 
your best efforts [to check on people’s welfare], there's still been a 
death in custody.”207 
 
This visitor saw custody visiting as part of the safeguards. More typical was 
another visitor who said the feeling of disappointment would arise because: 
 
“normally, they’re very good”:208  
 
“they” being the police and custody staff: no role for visitors. 
 
Visitors did not think there was any problem with the way the authorities 
handled these deaths, with the sole exception of this visitor, who had been 
studying a university course on related issues: 
 
                                                 
206 Simon Pemberton, “Demystifying Deaths in Police Custody: Challenging State Talk”, 
Social & Legal Studies (2008) 17 2 237. 
207 V17.  
208 V7. 
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“It’s quite bad that you could be arrested and die, and there are no 
repercussions, no outcome for the family, no prosecution.”209 
 
No other visitor took this line: and none of them had received any training 
about the issue as visitors, which accounts for their naivety. 
  
Visitors were asked whether they felt custody visiting had anything to do with 
deaths in custody. There were those who thought it did, but not in any very 
precise way.210 Most of the visitors thought that they were kept informed by 
the scheme administrator about deaths in custody, but it became clear that 
this was far from prompt.211 Only one visitor could recall correct information 
about the death in custody described above,212 and, if visitors could recall 
anything, it tended to be the line the police had given them at team meetings. 
 
I asked visitors whether they would feel at a disadvantage if they visited a 
station soon after a death in custody had occurred there and they did not 
know about the death. Many thought they would feel at a disadvantage. They 
said they would want to check whether a custody visit had taken place while 
the person who had died had been at the block.213 They said they would want 
to know what had happened and who was to blame. But none of them 
seemed to realise that no information of that kind sees the light of day until the 
                                                 
209 V9. 
210 See text to notes 145-151. 
211 V2. 
212 V16 the exception. 
213 e.g., V17. 
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inquest, which can be years later.214 Only one visitor thought a senior officer 
should explain the death at the next team meeting.215  
 
However, two visitors said they would not be at a disadvantage making a visit 
without knowing about a recent death. The first said: 
 
“No, I think it would be a disadvantage to know ... My opinion is that our 
role is to turn up and, regardless of what’s gone on ... we should turn 
up as neutrals that have to take into account the atmosphere and 
what’s happening as we know it at that time. I think if we were to know 
about it before that would colour our perception ... we should be 
completely independent of the new set of circumstances we see as we 
walk in that door.”216  
 
This visitor thought that a person who is being neutral and independent 
should also not be in possession of the facts. Another visitor said: 
 
“I think it is for the sergeant in charge to inform me if there’s anything 
they think I ought to know which is material to my visit, for example if 
there was a particularly disruptive prisoner, but the fact that they’ve had 
an incident yesterday, is that material to my visit today? No.”217  
 
This visitor took a very narrow view of what information was material.  
                                                 
214 11 years in one case: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-north-west-wales-27887355: 
accessed 14.07.2015. 
215 V16. 
216 V22. 
217 V15. 
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I found both of these comments very puzzling. Perhaps these visitors, by 
appealing to concepts of neutrality, independence and materiality, were trying 
to rationalise their lack of knowledge, consistent with the socialisation they 
had received and with the controls imposed on the information they were 
given.  
 
Another visitor said he would expect the police to tell him about a recent 
death: 
 
“I have always found the police to be reliable and honest folk … If an 
incident had happened the day before, frankly I would expect the 
custody sergeant to make a visitor aware of that.”218 
 
This visitor trusted the police to provide information of this kind. The problem 
was that no one had the obligation to tell the visitors what had happened, 
promptly or at all.219 
  
I asked visitors if they would change their visiting practice after a death in 
custody at the station they visited. Some said they would increase the number 
of visits and be more rigorous, but whether they did so would depend on what 
the reasons were for the death. One visitor said that the police should come 
up with a plan to deal with the issues.220  
 
                                                 
218 V1. 
219 See Chapter Three, text to notes 128-131 and notes 159-160.  
220 V8. 
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Finally, visitors were asked to consider a vignette. They were asked to 
imagine that, on a visit, they saw a detainee holding his head, moaning, and 
otherwise unresponsive. They tell the custody sergeant they think he should 
call an ambulance. The custody sergeant refuses, repeatedly, to do anything 
about it. Several visitors said they couldn’t imagine this happening.221 Five 
visitors said they would do no more than just report it: here is an edited extract 
from the interview with one of them:222  
 
Visitor: We’d have to make a report about that, had they seen a nurse, 
a GP, had they been assessed, any diagnosis, and the condition of the 
person we’d seen before we left.  
JK: You would report on this: would you take any other action? 
Visitor: The custody staff would have to comment on what we put in our 
report and say what they were going to do. 
JK: And if they still didn’t do anything? 
Visitor: I don’t think there’s anything we could do on the night. Maybe 
we could call [the scheme administrator].  
JK: Supposing his phone was on answer? 
Visitor: All we can document is that we’ve gone through the process in 
stages and we have made a comment, we didn’t have a response from 
the inspector [sic] of the custody suite, and that we called the head of 
the scheme and we reported it. 
                                                 
221 e.g., V5. 
222 Identifiers omitted to preserve anonymity. 
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JK: But his phone had been on answer. I was wondering if you would 
have felt you should leave the station and go and call an ambulance, or 
go and speak to the police superintendent. 
Visitor: Could we go over the head of the custody sergeant? 
[JK said it was neither envisaged nor prohibited] 
Visitor: It is a difficult situation, but as I said we could speak to the 
sergeant and put the details down of what he commented at the time, 
and then maybe just223 forward the information on to [the scheme 
administrator] to say that we’ve seen this and we went through the 
stages, we recommended this, this wasn’t done, we informed the 
custody sergeant, and what was our recommendation at the time to be 
done, and we didn’t know if it was followed up or not.  
 
The visitors who took this attitude were clinging to the task of reporting, and 
missing the bigger picture. Zygmunt Bauman characterised this as 
bureaucracy. He highlighted bureaucracy’s propensity to dissociate the 
means from the moral evaluation of the ends, substituting technical for moral 
responsibility.224 The bureaucratic visitors wanted to confine the task to 
reporting, thus discharging the technical responsibility: they would have 
declined to take other steps, safeguarding, which might have saved the 
detainee’s life, and appeared to have no sense of moral responsibility for that 
decision. However, these visitors were in the minority: all the others said they 
would go beyond the custody staff to ensure some action was taken, at least 
by contacting the superior officer at the station, and four visitors said that they 
                                                 
223 Emphasis added. 
224 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Polity 1989) 98. 
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would take the initiative and call an ambulance.225  
 
This review demonstrates that, whatever their background, the concerns of 
most of the visitors about actual cases of deaths in custody seemed 
somewhat muted, even when a death had taken place in the station they 
visited: and this majority included those visitors who had had negative 
experiences of the police and the criminal justice system.226 However, it 
cannot be assumed that the visitors with those negative experiences took a 
more active interest in actual cases of death in custody before they applied to 
become visitors, so their attitudes did not necessarily undergo fundamental 
change. One can say that the socialisation these visitors had received had 
stunted whatever interest they might ever have had in the issue. They 
exhibited the same attitude to actual deaths in custody as most of the rest of 
the visitors. If there had been variations in visitors’ attitudes, socialisation had 
flattened them out.  
 
This review also demonstrates that visitors generally showed no 
understanding of deaths in custody. They had naive expectations that they 
could be told, soon after a death, what had happened and whose fault it was. 
They had, of course, received no training about the subject. Visitors were 
uneasy about some aspects of deaths in custody, but where those attitudes 
were expressed in the actions that the visitors actually took, or rather, the 
actions that they failed to take, almost all the visitors found no fault in the 
conduct of the authorities. The Home Office, the Police and Crime 
                                                 
225 V4, V6, V7 and V23. 
226 See text to notes 28-32. 
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Commissioner and the police had suppressed the connection between 
custody visiting and the issue of deaths in custody, and they had, in particular, 
suppressed the idea that one of the purposes of custody visiting was to deter 
neglect and abuse by the police. Visitors found that, if they had any role, it 
was to let the public know that the deaths had not been the fault of the 
police.227 That same socialisation had also rendered some of the visitors 
incapable of doing anything to safeguard detainees from paying the ultimate 
price. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that custody visiting in the area studied was 
completely controlled by the Police and Crime Commissioner. As well as the 
scheme having no structural independence, the visitors’ attitudes also showed 
their lack of independence, and their attitudes fell largely in line with the views 
of the Police and Crime Commissioner and the police, a crime control 
orientation. Particularly noticeable is their failure to challenge the police: and, 
on the one occasion when I observed a challenge, it was ineffective.228 All the 
visitors except two showed a largely uncritical acceptance of the local 
scheme, and seemed to have bought into the idea being part of a team,229 
and those with earlier negative experiences of the criminal justice system 
moved to a more favourable view of the police. Some, at least, of this can be 
attributed to the impact of three very significant factors: the mono-cultural 
socialisation they received, the crime control ethos, and the power of the 
                                                 
227 See text to note 202. 
228 See text following note 187. 
229 See text to notes 78, 103, 125, 204. 
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police operating on them, in Lukes’ three-dimensional form.   
 
It was disturbing that no visitors had an understanding of the issues involved 
in deaths in custody. This is a startling illustration of the inadequacy of the 
training, but on reflection it is not surprising, since the subject had such a low 
profile in the scheme. In the case of some of the visitors, this led, as was 
shown by their reaction to the hypothetical case put to them, to the adoption 
of a bureaucratic approach to the potential plight of a seriously ill detainee in 
the custody block. The others who had a more humane approach were still 
handicapped by their ignorance of how the system works. And the police 
sought to conscript visitors to promote “state talk”230 about a death in custody.  
 
The attitudes of most of the visitors were not based on a perception of their 
role as regulators of police behaviour in custody blocks. Naturally, those 
attitudes had a profound effect on how effectively they carried out their work. 
If they did not see themselves as regulators, they would be unlikely to act like 
regulators. They would not see the obstacles that were laid in their path, and, 
even if they could see those obstacles, they would not see the point of trying 
to overcome them. It is for these reasons that these issues have been 
considered in this chapter, ahead of the assessment of the effectiveness of 
their work, which is the subject of the next chapter and is also devoted to the 
results of the case study. 
 
                                                 
230 See text to note 206. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CUSTODY VISITING 
 
In Chapter Five I analysed the findings of my empirical research about the 
attitudes of the custody visitors, by drawing on some of the key concepts in 
this research. This chapter continues with the case study, and employs a 
similar process to assess the effectiveness of the work of custody visiting, 
mainly as it operates as a regulator. The chapter starts by reviewing the 
concept of effectiveness; looks at how the other key concepts assist in 
assessing effectiveness; and explains the impact of the context of custody on 
the ability of the visiting work to be effective. The criteria for effectiveness as a 
regulator are applied to my findings about the work of custody visiting. The chapter 
also investigates whether custody visiting fulfils the purposes that are claimed it 
in the official literature.  
 
The principal concept: effectiveness 
Effectiveness is defined as “the degree to which something is successful in 
producing a desired result”:1 whether it achieved its purpose, or, as we shall 
see, its purposes. This thesis argues that custody visiting should provide 
more regulation of police behaviour in custody blocks.2 That is why the main 
thrust of this chapter is to assess the effectiveness of custody visiting in 
providing that regulation. As discussed in Chapter Two, effectiveness of 
                                                 
1 https://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/effectiveness accessed 20.06.2016. 
2 See Chapter One, text to notes 74-90.  
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custody visiting as a regulator of police behaviour in custody blocks is 
assessed by reference to the following five criteria:  
 
1. Whether the visits actually took place, the precondition of effectiveness, 
and the frequency and pattern of visiting. 
2. Whether the police behaved differently towards detainees because they 
knew that custody visitors might arrive at any time, without notice, or 
because a visit was actually in progress. 
3.  Whether visits caused police behaviour to be changed/aligned, either 
at the time or subsequently. 
4. Whether the reporting system caused police behaviour to be 
changed/aligned. 
5. Whether custody visiting enabled the public to know what was 
happening in custody blocks.  
 
Where the third and fourth criteria are applied, change could occur at the level 
of individuals, such as where a complaint by a detainee leads to that detainee 
getting a phone call, or on a general level, such as where one such complaint 
leads to the police realising that detainees are entitled to a phone call and 
offering it to all detainees. In the case of the third criterion, it was very unlikely, 
although theoretically possible, that visitors might bring about general change 
during their visits. The reporting system, subject to the fourth criterion, could 
realistically work only at the general level, as the individuals referred to in the 
reports would have been released long before the reports could be acted 
upon. 
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Performance according to each of the five criteria should have an impact on 
the ultimate measure of effectiveness: that is, whether visiting could 
contribute, or actually did contribute, to reducing the number of deaths in 
custody. The effectiveness of custody visiting in achieving the other purposes 
which are claimed for it in the official literature is assessed according to the 
terms in which those claims are expressed. 
 
My assessment of the effectiveness of custody visiting has generally had to 
be limited to showing whether the work was likely to be effective, not whether 
the work actually was effective. An exercise to show the actual effectiveness 
of the work would have to find some way of measuring the effects of all the 
elements of each visit. It would be very difficult to measure those effects,3  
and it certainly could not be achieved within the confines of this doctoral 
project. So the likelihood of effectiveness of custody visiting is examined by 
reference to the manner in which the work is done, where the effects of 
socialisation discussed in Chapter Five can be seen: and how well the 
individual tasks were performed, whether they were performed thoroughly and 
rigorously, and whether the necessary expertise was applied to the tasks. 
Other issues considered in the assessment of the likelihood of effectiveness 
include: the effects of delays and restrictions at the custody block; 
communication skills; and whether the detainees, police and the public 
                                                 
3 It may be equally difficult to assess whether research makes any difference to policy. See 
Richard Young and Andrew Sanders, “The Forester’s Dilemma: The Influence of Police 
Research on Police Practice”, in The Criminological Foundations of Penal Policy, Zedner L 
and Ashworth A (eds) (OUP 2003). 
 261 
respected custody visiting.    
 
However, I was able to make an assessment of whether at least some of the 
work was actually effective. This came about because in some cases I was 
allowed to observe visitors’ meetings with detainees and then interview the 
detainees later that day. My principal object was to find out from the detainees 
what they thought about the visitors’ interactions with them. I was given the 
right conditions (i.e., some privacy) in which to interview these detainees 
myself, and I was able to take considerably more time on my interviews with 
the detainees than the very brief time the visitors spent with them. The 
accounts of their experience, and their views, are important. It is likely that 
detainees have never been asked about these issues before; if they have 
been asked, their answers have not been published.   
 
The secondary concepts 
The concept of power, and the concept of Herbert Packer’s crime control and 
due process models of criminal justice will be drawn on in this chapter to 
assist in the assessment of the effectiveness of custody visiting, and the 
concepts of legitimacy and accountability will be drawn on where those 
concepts relate directly to effectiveness, and where they are necessary 
attributes of regulators. 
The concept of power is basic in any study of the police, particularly in the 
context of the custody block, which is the setting for the purest expression of 
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their power.4  Chapter Five used Steven Lukes’ concept of three-dimensional 
power as the lens through which to examine the power of the police, 
exercising control by socialisation.5 In this chapter I will seek to draw on 
Lukes’ concept to show that the power of the police operated on the visitors 
and caused them to carry out their work in the way that they thought the 
police wanted them to follow. I will show how this affected the work of custody 
visiting in two distinct ways: first, how the work was carried out, with the power 
of the police affecting the attitudes and working practices of the visitors, and 
preventing the visitors from making challenges; and, second, how the ambit of 
their work was restricted, with the power of the police keeping certain tasks off 
the agenda.  
Packer’s models of criminal justice are used to assess the work that was 
done, the manner in which it was done, and the effect of the restrictions. Did 
the visiting work further the cause of due process, by providing checks on 
police behaviour and safeguards for detainees, and prioritising their rights? Or 
did the work further the cause of crime control, by allowing the police to 
operate without interference, prioritising efficiency over the welfare of 
detainees? The application of Packer’s models provides useful insights into 
the ideology of custody visiting,6 and the ideology of an activity is a key to 
what its purposes are. If the ideology of custody visiting is oriented towards 
crime control, its purpose is not safeguarding detainees. 
                                                 
4 See Chapter One, text to notes 14-73. 
5 See Chapter Two, text to notes 36-45, and Chapter Five, passim. 
6 See Chapter Two, text to notes 47-51. 
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Legitimacy as a regulator is the quality of being authorised, accepted, seen as 
fair, and respected by those involved and the wider public.7 This will turn on 
whether the public had any knowledge of custody visiting which could enable 
them to form a view. Whether custody visiting had the quality of accountability 
will be found to depend on whether the visitors were separate from the Police 
and Crime Commissioner, and whether sufficient information was available to 
enable their work to be scrutinised.8 The concepts of independence, 
impartiality and neutrality play a less important role here than in Chapter Five. 
 
The power dynamics of custody  
The effectiveness of any regulation depends on the context in which it is 
carried out. Custody is essentially a place where one group of people 
coercively detains and investigates another group, some of whom are 
classified as vulnerable, although arguably every detainee in custody is 
vulnerable.9 The police control every aspect of custody, and the power they 
exercise in custody blocks affects all those who are not police, including the 
custody visitors.10 The police use custody to facilitate their investigation of 
suspects11 and to obtain confessions, which need not be corroborated by 
other evidence.12 The outcome of most criminal cases is determined by what 
happens in custody.13 Custody visiting is the only outside agency acting as a 
                                                 
7 See Chapter Two, text to notes 104-124. 
8  See Chapter Two, text to notes 125-141. 
9  See Chapter One, text to notes 64-69. 
10 See Chapter One, text to notes 71-72; Chapter Five, note 19, and text following note 187. 
11 See Chapter One, text to note 17. 
12 Andrew Sanders, Richard Young and Mandy Burton, Criminal Justice, (4th edn OUP 2010) 
255ff, 317ff. 
13 See Chapter One, text to notes 18-27. 
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regulator of police conduct in custody blocks: and it is outside only in the 
sense that the visitors are not police officers.14  
The complete control exercised by the police, and the inadequacies of the 
legal advice available to detainees, discussed below, defeat two principles 
which are generally thought to be essential attributes of the criminal justice 
system. The two principles, very much on the due process side of Packer’s 
spectrum, are adversarialism and the presumption of innocence:15 however, 
neither of these two principles can be found to apply to investigations made in 
the custody block. The adversarial theory of justice is that the truth emerges 
through a battle in which the prosecution’s and the defence’s competing 
versions of events are put forward and tested by an impartial adjudicator.16 
This principle should apply as much to that part of the criminal process which 
is conducted in the custody block as to that part of the process which is 
conducted in a courtroom.17 The presumption of innocence is that everyone 
charged18 with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty by law:19 again, this principle should be expressed as applying just as 
much to the stage which precedes the making of the decision whether to 
charge a suspect. Unfair practices, carried out through coercion during that 
earlier stage, undermine the principle of the presumption of innocence. 
                                                 
14 I do not regard the Joint Inspection Teams (see Chapter One, text to notes 105-106) as 
outside agencies, nor do I think that defence solicitors have much chance of regulating police 
behaviour in custody blocks, particularly in view of the way their access is restricted in the 
new dedicated custody facilities: see text to notes 22 and 24, and Chapter 5, text to note 97. 
15 Andrew Sanders, “Access to Justice in the Police Station: An Elusive Dream?” in Young R 
and Wall D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty 
(Blackstone 1996). 
16 Richard Young and David Wall, “Criminal Justice, Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty” in 
Young R and Wall D (eds) (n 15) 5. 
17 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Art 6(3), and Andrew Ashworth, “Legal 
Aid, Human Rights and Criminal Justice” in Young R and Wall D (eds) (n 15) 68. 
18 Emphasis added. 
19 ECHR Art 6(2). 
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Historically, the courts said that the police had no right to interrogate 
detainees:20 the recognition of the police practice of interrogation as a right 
was supposed to be balanced by the provision of legal advice.21 Yet we know 
that the provision of legal advice is inadequate for this task, for a number of 
reasons, including the continuing reductions of funding for legal aid,22 the 
disappointing performance of some lawyers,23 and the (mis)conduct of the 
police, some of which influences detainees not to seek legal help:24 and some 
detainees have their own reasons for not calling for a solicitor.25  
 
The law requires that arrest is necessary and based on reasonable suspicion, 
that people are held in custody for no longer than is necessary, that they be 
told and repeatedly reminded of their right to free legal advice, and that if 
adjudged vulnerable an appropriate adult be summoned to assist them.26 
These considerations about custody raise issues that one would expect would 
be investigated by any regulator of police behaviour, such as the following. 
Why has a person been arrested? How is the investigation being carried out? 
How long will the investigation take before there is a decision? Is the detainee 
receiving legal advice, and if not, why not? Have the police appointed an 
appropriate adult for a vulnerable detainee, and if not, why not? As will be 
                                                 
20 Satnam Choongh, Policing as Social Discipline (OUP 1997) 7-11. 
21 Sanders (n 15) 255. 
22 e.g., Vicky Kemp, Bridewell Legal Advice Study: adopting a “whole-systems” approach to 
police station legal advice, (Legal Services Commission 2013) 20: 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/research/centres/accesstojustice/usefulresources/broa
derconsequences/blast-ii-report.pdf accessed 10.06.2016. 
23 Daniel Newman, Legal Aid Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart 2013).  
24  e.g. Vicky Kemp, Transforming legal aid: access to criminal defence services, Legal 
Services Research Centre 2010, 36-7: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/27833/1/Kemp%20Transforming%20CD%202010.pdf. 
accessed 10.06.2016. 
25 Research has found that many detainees make their own decision not to obtain legal help:  
Michael McConville, Jacqueline Hodgson, Lee Bridges and Anita Pavlovic, Standing Accused, 
(OUP 1994) 76: Kemp (n 24) 37. 
26 Sanders et al (n 12) chapter 4. 
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shown, visitors did not concern themselves with any of these issues, except 
(usually) to check whether detainees had been told that they could get free 
legal advice. Visitors were not allowed to look into the other issues, and they 
were socialised not to consider why those issues are fundamental.27 Visitors 
did not have the professional understanding of custody, detainees’ rights and 
the limits on what the police are allowed to do. With that professional 
understanding visitors could ask more meaningful questions of both the 
police, including in relation to detainees who were not willing to speak to 
them, and the detainees. But there are a number of restrictions, imposed by 
the law, on the ability of custody visitors to carry out their work effectively. In 
particular, visitors are not allowed to monitor the most significant element of a 
detainee’s stay in the custody block, the police interview.28 In any case, even 
if visitors could monitor police interviews, their ability to act as an effective 
regulator of the interviews would be limited.29  
 
This review of the dynamics of police custody shows the context in which 
effectiveness is to be assessed. The five criteria for effectiveness are now 
applied to the data collected in this research. Some of the criteria could be 
applied to more than one topic, but I have restricted this account to applying 
one criterion to each topic. I have set out this discussion so that it keeps 
where possible to the order of events followed on a visit.  
 
 
                                                 
27 See Chapter Five, text to notes 83 and 116. 
28 2013 Code of Practice para 50: and by para 60, “ICVs must remain impartial and must not 
seek to involve themselves in any way in the process of investigation”. 
29 See Chapter Two, text to notes 150-151. 
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First criterion of effectiveness: whether the visits took place, 
and the frequency and pattern of visiting 
Whether the visits took place is established quite easily from published 
statistics. Regulatory authorities do not specify a level of frequency. The 
Hampton Report took the view that the level should be determined by risk 
assessment, to lessen the economic burden of regulation.30 As regards a 
pattern of visiting, visits should be random, unannounced and unexpected.31 
One of the important techniques of regulation of public management is said to 
be the element of uncertainty achieved by random unannounced visits,32 and 
Lord Scarman thought that visits made “at any time” would be “salutary”.33   
 
Measured against this criterion, custody visiting in this study was found to lack 
effectiveness in the following ways. No consideration, by way of risk 
assessment or otherwise, was made to determine the frequency of visits, and 
the visits were probably not sufficiently frequent. The visiting followed too 
predictable a pattern, with the result that the visiting was not random and 
some of the visits were not unexpected; and, because notice had been given 
of some of the visits in various ways, those visits lost the quality of being 
unannounced.   
 
 
 
                                                 
30 See Chapter Two, note 59. 
31 See Chapter Two, text to notes 154-158, and Chapter Three, text to notes 197-198. Jane 
Warwick (Chapter 1, note 135) told me that the word “unexpected” should be added: I agree 
with her.   
32 See Chapter Two, text to notes 156-158. 
33 See Chapter One, text to note 97. 
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Arrangement of the visits 
The statistics published by the Police and Crime Commissioner in the area 
studied show that, in a recent year, nearly 600 visits were made; about 2000 
detainees were present; and about 1,200 interviews with detainees took 
place, with the remainder being either unavailable or refusing to be seen, the 
latter being a somewhat smaller proportion.34 In common with some other 
schemes, the frequency target was set at one visit per station per week.  
 
Every month the scheme administrator sent out a rota to all the visitors. This 
let each visitor know the five day period35 during which the visit was to be 
made, and the name of the other visitor with whom to make the visit. It was 
then for each pair of visitors to arrange between themselves when the visit 
would take place, within the days allocated to them on the rota. The five day 
arrangement made it more likely that the target of one visit per week to each 
station would be met, but overall the target was not quite met: and there was 
a variation between the stations of nearly 100%.  One visitor thought the rota 
should provide for one visit every three days.36 One detainee I interviewed 
expressed surprise that visits took place only once a week, and thought visits 
should be more frequent: 
 
“The officers are always nice to me and care for me, but I always think: 
what if they don’t? So I value the visitors coming round to check on 
me.”37  
                                                 
34 Only approximations can be given here, to avoid revealing the identity of the area studied. 
35 The five day periods ran consecutively without a break. 
36 V5. 
37 D14. 
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This detainee, who had been in custody on several occasions, had never 
been treated badly by the police, but thought that the visits were for the 
protection of detainees; that, however well the custody staff behaved, there 
was always a risk they might not treat detainees properly; and that the visits 
should be more frequent. We do not know what considerations informed a 
decision on the frequency of visits, nor why it should be the same in all 
custody blocks. There may have been a greater need to safeguard detainees, 
at particular times, in particular custody blocks, but no consideration seems to 
have been given to these issues. Risk assessments could look into the levels 
of police behaviour giving cause for concern, for instance that detainees had 
not been told their rights, or were being mistreated, and into the length of time 
during which no checks would be made or expected.  
However there was a factor that we do know was considered: the importance 
of not creating extra work for the police. The code of practice says:  
 
“Visits must be sufficiently regular38 to support the effectiveness of the 
system, but not so frequent as to interfere unreasonably with the work 
of the police.”39  
 
This wording leaves wide open the questions of how much visiting would be  
effective, how much would amount to interference, and how much 
                                                 
38 The use of the word “regular” is confusing: presumably the writer meant “frequent”. A visit 
made on the same date once in each year would have the quality of regularity but not the 
quality of frequency, and would profoundly lack the qualities of being random, unannounced 
and unexpected. 
39 2013 Code of Practice para 40, following similar wording used in both previous codes, 2003 
Code of Practice para 32 and 2010 Code of Practice para 32, and the 2001 Circular para 57. 
Earlier wordings in the 1986 Circular, para 9, 1991 Circular para 13 and 1992 Circular para 13 
avoided the confusion created by the use of the word “regular”. 
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interference would be unreasonable. The Home Office seem to have been 
trying to support the visiting work and, at the same time, acknowledging that it 
would create extra work for the police, and they were appealing to the 
notoriously subjective concept of reasonableness to provide a balance 
between these two competing priorities. That balance lies on the spectrum 
between Packer’s two models of criminal justice. Crime control looks to a 
smoothly running assembly line of detainees being booked in and processed, 
and due process looks to that process being interrupted to allow the rights of 
the detainees to be safeguarded. 
 
A clearer orientation towards crime control emerges from an examination of 
the incidence of the visits. Visits should be random, unannounced, and 
unexpected.40 No visit was actually announced, except for the “special visits” 
discussed below.41 However, visitors experienced delays on arrival at the 
station, and some visits took place after team meetings in the station or as 
successive visits to custody blocks at different stations on the same 
evening:42 these factors detracted from the quality of those visits as 
unannounced. Visits were not random either: they were patterned. For the 
visits to be random, each time slot should have had an equal chance of being 
selected by a team of visitors, and that is clearly not the case. The visits took 
place mostly on weekdays, early in the evening in the city centre, and later in 
the evening in the suburbs; never, anywhere, later than 10:30pm; and, at 
weekends, only in the mornings.43 At some of the stations the front desks 
                                                 
40 See text to note 31, and the note.  
41 See text to notes 184-197. 
42 See Chapter Five, text to notes 89-92. 
43 Observation, statistics from the annual report in the area studied and remark by AD. 
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were closed during the night, so the visitors would not have been able to gain 
admission to the custody blocks at that time. This presumably resulted in the 
custody staff expecting visits at the usual times, and knowing that visits were 
extremely unlikely at other times: the visits were not unexpected. Custody 
visitors were the only outsiders who visited custody blocks with a general 
remit to check on the welfare of detainees. The consequence is that there was 
little regulation of the behaviour of custody staff during many “unsocial” hours. 
One might argue that random visiting should not be a desirable criterion 
anyway. If the visiting is based on risk assessments, a patterned series of 
visits might be more desirable, and could be established by team co-
ordinators. The pattern should, however, be different from the one that visitors 
had established. One model might be for fewer visits to take place in the early 
evening, but plenty between 6pm and 6am, and on weekend afternoons and 
evenings, which would be the opposite of the pattern I observed. Another 
model (the two could run side by side) would be to visit at what were found to 
be the busiest times, or the times when the rules were most likely to be 
breached. However, there would be a limit to how much visitors would accept 
directions about the times of their visits, and it would be essential that the 
police were not told about the pattern. 
 
Arrival at the police station 
Each pair of visitors usually met outside the police station. This practice did 
not appear to be based on the concern that the first visitor to arrive, waiting for 
the other visitor by the front desk, would give the police more notice of the 
visit. The visitors’ apparent lack of sensitivity to this issue was demonstrated 
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by the occasional practice of arranging visits to take place immediately after 
the visitors had attended a visitor team meeting in the police station:44 the 
custody staff might well learn of the meeting and therefore expect a visit.  
 
Visitors then put on their identity tags and presented themselves at the front 
desk of the police station. The code of practice states: 
 
“ICVs must be admitted to the custody area immediately. Delay is only 
permitted when immediate access may place the visitors or another 
individual within the custody area in danger. A full explanation must be 
given to the visitors as to why access is being delayed and that 
explanation must be recorded by the visitors in their report.”45 
 
However at some of the stations visitors often had to join a queue and wait 
for, say, fifteen minutes, before the front desk staff were able to deal with 
them. When they got to the front of the queue, visitors asked the front desk 
staff to contact the custody staff. The front desk staff then telephoned the 
custody staff. Usually the call was answered, but sometimes the custody line 
was engaged, or the staff were too busy to answer the phone, and/or a 
visiting arresting officer picked up the receiver and then forgot to pass on the 
message. Subject to that, the custody staff responded either by coming to the 
front desk within, say, two to five minutes, or by letting the front desk staff 
                                                 
44 This happened on two of the occasions when I accompanied visitors. 
45 2013 Code of Practice para 49. 
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know that there would be a delay, and the front desk staff then passed this 
information on to the visitors. 
 
The average length of time taken to gain admission on the visits when I 
accompanied visitors was seven minutes, with the longest wait being 20 
minutes. The annual report showed that, in the vast majority of cases, 
admission was within ten minutes, and in about 3% of cases there were 
delays of more than 30 minutes. The report gave reasons for why delays 
tended to take place, but provided no specific explanations for any of the 
actual delays. Sometimes the custody staff gave the reason for the delay, 
such as a violent situation, staff shortages, change-over of shifts, or any 
combination of those factors: but at other times no reason was given. In a few 
cases the visitors were kept waiting for longer than half an hour, after which 
visitors tended to leave the station and abandon the visit.46 On one occasion 
visitors were kept waiting for an hour, because, as they found later when they 
were eventually admitted to the custody block, a serving police officer who 
had been arrested was being detained there: the officer, they were told, did 
not want to see them.47 At the least, this delay was very long and hard to 
justify.  
                                                 
46 C3 said that the block was sometimes so busy with violent detainees that they asked the 
visitors not to come that day, or to give them at least a couple of hours. There was no other 
evidence of visitors being asked to wait that long. 
47 V9: after the visitors finally gained admission to the custody block, they were told that the 
officer being detained did not want to see them. 
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Where there were violent detainees, some visitors thought that, subject to 
safety considerations, they should see for themselves what was happening.48 
One of the custody sergeants took the same view: 
“There’s no reason [for delay] unless there’s a safety issue, and even 
then you [i.e., the visitors] could go to [other parts of the block]. There’s 
basically no excuse for not admitting you within a couple of minutes. 
[Delay] doesn’t reflect good [sic] and is totally unnecessary.”49 
This sergeant thought that no reason, including safety, could justify delaying 
the visitors’ admission to the custody block, and realised that delays created 
suspicion of cover-ups. However, most custody staff disagreed with this view, 
and visitors did not challenge being delayed for safety reasons. It is 
impossible to say whether there were satisfactory reasons for most of these 
delays: but the effect in all cases was that the police had more time to get 
ready for the visit.  
The lengthy delays, noted in the Police and Crime Commissioner’s annual 
report were relatively few in number, but they cried out for an explanation, and 
the absence of explanations gave rise to suspicions of cover-ups. In any case, 
waiting for an hour makes it impossible for visitors to carry out what is 
supposed to be a random unannounced visit. However, visitors did not 
challenge the police about delays,50 and limited themselves to reporting the 
delays and failures to visit to the scheme administrator.  
 
                                                 
48 e.g., V18. 
49 S1. 
50 See Chapter Five, text to notes 181-184. 
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These factors enabled the police to prepare for the arrival of the visitors, 
enabling them to conceal what they would not wish the visitors to see. One 
cannot know whether the police ever did conceal anything, but the delays 
created the potential for concealment, and demonstrated the weakness of the 
visitors in the face of police power, which they generally felt unable to 
challenge. This is Lukes’ three-dimensional power: the visitors just know, 
almost instinctively, what the police allow them to do, and they know not to 
cross that boundary.  
 
Second criterion of effectiveness: whether the police behaved 
differently towards detainees because they knew that custody 
visitors might arrive at any time, without notice, or because a 
visit was actually in progress 
I now attempt to assess whether the police behaved differently towards 
detainees because they knew that custody visitors might arrive at any time, 
without notice, or because a visit was actually in progress. This section 
reviews what happened when the visitors arrived in the custody block, which 
detainees they were allowed to see, and which checks they were allowed to 
make. The sections that follow will demonstrate that restrictions on its ambit 
led to the visiting work being unlikely to have an effect on important aspects of 
police behaviour. Visitors could not enquire into the arrests of the detainees, 
nor could they visit all of the detainees. Visitors were not allowed to make 
checks on the conditions of interrogation, nor to make checks on detainees 
kept in holding areas rather than in cells, or on other suspects in the police 
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station. I conclude this section by showing that it is likely that the police and 
custody staff do not respect the work of custody visiting.  
 
Admission to the custody block and access to the detainees 
Visitors were escorted by a civilian custody staff member to the custody block. 
They spoke briefly with a custody sergeant if the sergeant was not busy with, 
for instance, booking in the latest newly arrived suspect brought in by 
arresting officers. A custody sergeant, or a more junior member of the custody 
staff, told visitors how many detainees were in the cells, sometimes 
mentioning that a detainee had been taken to hospital: visitors did not always 
ask why the detainee had been taken to hospital.51 The civilian staff member 
provided the visitors with some very basic information about the detainees, 
including whether they were male or female, adult or juvenile, but the visitors 
were not supposed to be told the offence the detainees were suspected of 
having committed, or any aspect of the arrest, or the grounds for detention.  
 
Recent research by Vicky Kemp has shown that the police in the Bridewell 
study have been seeking to reach targets set by managers for the number of 
arrests, by “rounding up the usual suspects” when there is no evidence 
against these people.52 This increased the length of the time that these 
detainees spent in custody, because there were long delays before the police 
were ready to conduct an interview.53 The research also found that the police 
often made arrests when only trivial offences were alleged. Some custody 
                                                 
51 See Chapter Five, text to note 185. 
52 Kemp (n 22) 6-7.  
53 Vicky Kemp, Bridewell Legal Advice Study: an innovation in police station legal advice - 
interim report (Legal Services Commission 2012) 6. 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/28246/1/Kemp%20BLAST%20Interim%20Report.pdf 
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sergeants were reported as having commented on the failure of legal advisers 
to challenge these practices.54 Only a small minority of visitors would have 
wanted to raise an issue of this kind, and my observations of visits, interviews, 
attendance at team meetings, and scrutiny of reports submitted to the Police 
and Crime Commissioner indicate that even that small minority did so very 
rarely indeed. In general, if visitors wanted to raise an issue, but thought that 
the police would not want the issue to be raised, the visitors did not raise it. 
Very occasionally visitors were not silent at team meetings: the police 
responded by justifying their practices, and the visitors’ representations would 
make no impact, let alone lead to any change in the practice.55 The scheme 
administrator gave no encouragement to the visitors to raise these issues, 
and they were not covered in the training. 
 
Why did the visitors not raise these issues? There may be several 
explanations, and all could be true at the same time of at least some of the 
visitors. One explanation could be that the visitors had been socialised into 
not seeing these issues as being any of their business. Another could be that 
they were discouraged by the responses of the police when they did raise the 
issues, feeling the power of the police in Lukes’ second dimension: and 
another could be that police power in Lukes’ third dimension prevented the 
visitors from ever raising the issues at all. Lukes’ theory has been invoked by 
Julia Black in her proposal of the use of discourse analysis to assist in 
understanding the relationship between regulator and regulatee, in the terms 
of what language can say about power. Black calls her subject “regulatory 
                                                 
54  Kemp (n 22) 31. 
55 See Chapter Five, text to note 116. 
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conversations”.56 Discourse can be framed by powerful organisations to 
exclude some issues, as has been demonstrated about the media treatment 
of the Bulger case,57 and the same principle can be applied to how regulatory 
discourse is framed by a powerful regulatee. Black’s expression “regulatory 
conversations” should cover not only what is included in the conversations, 
but also what is omitted from them, when regulators fail to say something one 
might expect them to say. To make the point crystal clear, these omissions 
could be termed “regulatory silences”. One could then identify the issues that 
regulators are silent about and investigate the reason for the silences: in the 
case of custody visiting, whether the silences were the result of the regulatee, 
the police, using their power to frame the discourse so that it could never 
threaten their interests. 
 
Some detainees were not available to be seen, because of temporary 
absence from their cell for some reason, such as DNA recording. I observed 
visitors not waiting until their return, so no check was made on their welfare. 
There were certain detainees whom the custody staff advised the visitors not 
to visit. Visitors could not actually be denied access to any detainee except by 
order of an officer of the rank of inspector or above.58 The custody staff 
usually advised against a visit on the grounds that the detainee was violent or 
                                                 
56 Julia Black, “Regulatory Conversations”, Journal of Law and Society, 2002 29,1,163, 191. 
57 See David Green, When Children Kill Children: Penal Populism and Political Culture (OUP 
2012) 173ff, where, in discussing the discourse framed by the media and the police (and, 
elsewhere in his book, by politicians) he points out that in the UK, unlike in Norway, it was 
impossible to excuse children for lying: “ ... the ability to lie ‘unnaturally’ increases culpability 
and the evilness of the perpetrators. In Norway lying when facing accusations from adults 
seems to be something to be expected from children caught doing wrong.” The expression 
“Overton Window” is used in a similar sense to describe the range of policies that politicians 
can support without risking electoral defeat: Joseph Lehman, “A Brief Explanation of the 
Overton Window”, Mackinac Center for Public Policy: http://www.mackinac.org/12887 
accessed 25.07.2016. 
58 Police Reform Act 2001, s 51(4). 
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subject to mental health issues, and the visitors always took the advice 
without inquiring whether a senior officer had made an order. There was, on 
average, one detainee whom visitors did not see for this reason59 for every 
2.5 visits, where the number of detainees in each block might vary from 1 to 
15. Visitors could have asked to check the custody records of the detainees 
whom they were advised not to see, but rarely did so. However the visitors 
were aware that they did need to make some kind of check on each detainee, 
so they almost always ensured that they did at least look in on the detainees 
they were not visiting, either through the hatch or the spyglass. Making the 
check this way did not always enable the visitors to be sure whether 
detainees were actually breathing, particularly when they were lying face 
down, or when their faces were covered by a blanket.60 The advice of the 
scheme administrator was that visitors should always ask the custody staff to 
rouse, in the presence of the visitors, those detainees to whom access had 
been advised against, to check whether the detainees were still alive, as 
whether they were alive was more important than whether they were getting 
enough sleep;61 but I did not observe this advice being followed. 
 
One expert has stated that visitors should challenge the advice provided by 
custody sergeants against visiting these detainees, by asking for a fresh risk 
assessment,62 but the visitors I observed did not ask for fresh assessments. 
The detainees in this category would often be vulnerable people with mental 
health issues or intoxicated with drugs or alcohol. There was nothing to stop 
                                                 
59 i.e., not including detainees in police interview.  
60 e.g., V20. 
61 Observation at team meeting. 
62 Heather Hurford, speaking at the 2014 ICVA national conference. 
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the visitors from raising the potentially life-and-death question of whether 
these detainees should be in custody at all, or whether, for their own safety, 
they should be in hospital,63 but the visitors did not do so.  
 
These restrictions can be compared with the way police restrict the access of 
lawyers and appropriate adults to detainees in custody blocks. The Bridewell 
study has shown that arresting officers and custody sergeants did not 
encourage detainees to seek legal advice and sometimes positively 
discouraged them from doing so. When lawyers did get to the station, they 
were found to have encountered difficulties in simply gaining admission to the 
custody block or certain parts of it.64 Research has also shown that the police 
enable far fewer appropriate adults to assist vulnerable detainees than should 
be the case.65 The police would have been even less able to justify restricting 
visitors' access, but the imposition of restrictions gave the visiting a crime 
control orientation, in its failure to prioritise the safeguarding of all the 
detainees. Even with the detainees the visitors were able to meet, the 
effectiveness of their work was again marred by crime control features of the 
encounters, which are discussed under the third criterion of effectiveness. 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 An issue I saw debated between two custody sergeants during observation in a custody 
block. 
64 Kemp (n 53) 9. Apparently this exclusion did not apply to custody visitors: information from 
Vicky Kemp. On the access of lawyers being restricted and the unacceptable arrangements 
for interviews at the new 60-cell block, see Chapter Five, text to note 97. 
65 There to Help: ensuring provision of appropriate adults for mentally vulnerable adults 
detained or interviewed by the police (National Appropriate Adults Network 2015): 
http://www.appropriateadult.org.uk/index.php/news/9-public-articles/154-theretohelp accessed 
03.07.2016. 
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Checks visitors were not allowed to make 
Police interviews of suspects are the central activity of the police in custody 
blocks. Lord Scarman wanted custody visitors to check the conditions of 
interrogation as well as those of detention,66 but checking the conditions of 
interrogation has never been part of the visitors’ work, nor has there ever 
been any publicly recorded discussion about the reasons for and against its 
inclusion, and no one actually gives any thought to it at all.67 I would suggest 
that the power of the police, in Lukes’ three-dimensional form, has kept the 
issue completely off the agenda. The custody managers and custody 
sergeants I interviewed were very opposed to visitors checking on police 
interviews: they said the checks would interrupt the flow of the interview, and 
cause extra work for the custody staff. They pointed out that interviews with 
detainees were all recorded on audio, and some on video as well,68 and the 
detainees all had the right to have lawyers with them, and appropriate adults if 
they were classified as vulnerable. One of the lawyers I interviewed estimated 
that between 66% and 75% of detainees in the area studied did not have a 
lawyer with them.69 Even those who did see a lawyer might not see them 
beyond the first interview: Kemp’s research indicates that lawyers do not 
attend any second or third interviews because it would eat into their fixed 
fee.70 As regards appropriate adults, research has shown that custody 
sergeants do not appoint them in many cases where the vulnerable detainees 
                                                 
66 Lord Scarman, The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981 (Cmnd 8427 1981), 7.7-7.10. The 
Scarman Report did not deal with the issue of the recording of police interviews. We cannot 
tell whether the late Lord Scarman would still have advocated that visitors should check on 
formal police interviews, now that they are being recorded. 
67 The chief executive of ICVA Katie Kempen told me in interview that she had never 
considered the issue before I asked her about it. 
68 But this is not a foolproof safeguard: see Sanders et al (n 12), 277-281. 
69 L6. 
70 Kemp (n 22) 29. 
 282 
are adults.71 However, I never saw visitors taking any action about a detainee 
who was not getting legal advice, or about a vulnerable detainee who was not 
being accompanied by an appropriate adult.  
 
Many detainees were therefore alone with the police in the interview room. 
Some of the lawyers interviewed thought that custody visiting could be 
improved by visitors taking a role in checking the conditions of interrogation.72 
One told me why, graphically:  
 
“It’s a battle … I’ve had an officer raise his voice at me, I’ve had an 
officer tell the co-accused of my client that there was clearly more than 
a professional relationship between myself and the client … They can 
be very obstructive, very unreasonable, and we’re on our own in their 
domain … I’ve had a door closed in my face by an officer, in the middle 
of me speaking to him, simply because I pointed out to him that he had 
no right to tell my client he couldn’t go home when he was there on a 
voluntary basis: he said, well I’ll lock him up then, and closed the door 
in my face. That’s the way they treat us, so goodness knows how they 
treat the suspects when we’re not there.”73 
 
That lawyer was being harassed as much as the clients. Some police officers 
see nothing wrong with harassing suspects. One custody sergeant told me: 
 
                                                 
71 National Appropriate Adults Network (n 65) 2. 
72 e.g., L6. 
73 Edited extracts from interview with L2. 
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“It’s quite OK to harass suspects in interviews, depending on their 
background.”74  
 
The sergeant presumably thought that the police should harass suspects if 
they came from the wrong background.75 Kemp found that the police arrested 
and detained some people with that as the only purpose.76  
 
For the detainees, what really mattered was when they would be getting out of 
custody: that depended on when the police interview would take place, and 
how long after the interview the decision on how to proceed would be taken. 
Detainees found that they could not get information about these matters, and 
the visitors were equally unable to help them to find out what was going on, as 
the custody staff often said that the investigating officers kept them in 
ignorance about these matters. One of the visitors commented as follows: 
 
“A lot of the time you can’t help them with what they actually want the 
help with. They want their case progressing, they want updates; they 
want to go home.”77  
 
It is not surprising that this is what detainees wanted. They faced the prospect 
of being locked up, in the power of the police, for up to 36 hours, which is 
“boring, scary, uncertain, isolating, disorienting and humiliating”,78 during 
                                                 
74 S2. 
75 For what some police see as the wrong background, see Chapter One, text to note 32. 
76 Kemp (n 22) 6-7. 
77 V12. My own observation, both as a visitor and as a researcher, supports this. 
78 Sanders et al (n 12) 219-220. 
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which time they might be pressured into making confessions.79 Research has 
shown that when police have told detainees that they would have to wait in 
the custody block until legal advice was available, the detainees wanted to go 
home so much that they waived their right to legal advice.80  
 
Not all suspects found in custody blocks are kept in cells. Many suspects 
attend by appointment at police stations, whether the stations are designated 
for custody or not,81 for interviews and other investigations, or to be cautioned. 
While their attendance has not been procured by arrest, these suspects may 
find that they do get arrested if they try to leave before the police want them 
to, as the quote from the lawyer above nicely illustrates.82 These detainees 
are not visited by custody visitors, and they should be. 
 
Another exclusion from the visitors’ remit is making checks on detainees on 
their arrival at the custody block. There could be a delay, with a queue of 
suspects waiting to be booked in. Custody visitors do not check on the 
conditions of detention in the holding areas. Suspects waiting there are just as 
likely to have, for instance, medical needs, as any other detainees. Or matters 
may be much, much worse, as it was in the holding area known as the “Cage” 
                                                 
79 ibid 287 ff. 
80 Layla Skinns, “ ‘I’m a detainee, get me out of here’: Predictors of Custodial Legal Access in 
Public and Privatised Police Custody Areas in England and Wales” British Journal of 
Criminology (2009) 49 3 399, 413, citing previous research. 
81 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 29.  
82 See text to note 73. 
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at Brixton police station where Sean Rigg died, following restraint applied by 
the police with an unsuitable level of force.83  
 
These restrictions can be seen as further demonstrations of the operation of 
Lukes’ concept of power. The power of the police affects the Home Office, the 
Police and Crime Commissioner, the scheme administrator and the visitors. It 
is probably their perceptions of that power which are responsible for restricting 
the scrutiny of the police’s work, and for keeping issues from even being 
discussed. Monitoring police interviews had been a major plank in the 
Scarman Report’s recommendations. The argument against monitoring is that 
the interviews are recorded, but the evidence of the lawyer above, and the 
remark of the custody sergeant, show what can happen even when interviews 
are being recorded.84 
 
 
 
Whether the police and custody staff respect custody visiting 
 
If custody visiting were to have a salutary effect on their behaviour, the police 
and custody staff would have had to accept it as legitimate. Most of them 
appeared to respect the scheme. However, some were prepared to admit that 
they did not respect it. For instance, this custody sergeant said:  
 
                                                 
83 See Chapter One, text to note 132, and “Sean Rigg death in custody: police used 
unnecessary force, jury finds,” The Guardian 01.08 2012: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/aug/01/sean-rigg-police-used-unnecessary-force 
accessed 23.06.2016. 
84 See text to notes 73 and 74. 
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“...very busy day [on the block]: custody visitors came to visit us – no 
problem. But the comment that was left [in their report] was ‘very busy 
block: sergeant appears to have it in hand.’ The thing that always sticks 
in my mind is: how do you know I’ve got it in hand? As a layperson, 
what qualifications, what policing experience are you drawing on, to 
know that I’m complying with everything that I ought to? ... I think it 
would help to have someone who knows the ins and outs, and [the 
visitors] don’t ... People who’ve got a background in law, qualified to 
make a comment, like about phone calls being withheld ... I don’t know 
whether visitors were trained about that.”85 
 
Some of the police interviewees doubted whether custody visiting had any 
serious purpose at all. For instance, in answer to my question about the 
desirability of lawyers being appointed as visitors, one custody sergeant 
laughed at the suggestion, and said: 
 
“I’d be concerned ... if a lawyer was being paid to see whether a 
detainee wanted a hot chocolate.”  
 
This sergeant saw the role of visitors as passing on catering orders.86 If that 
was all custody visiting amounts to, it is hardly likely to be a salutary influence 
on police behaviour.  
 
                                                 
85 S11. A phone call to let someone know the detainee is being detained can be delayed if, for 
instance, it would tip off others who might be arrested in the same connection: PACE Code C 
5.2.1. 
86 S3, who also could not imagine lawyers working as visitors unless they were being paid: 
see text to note 177.  
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I believe these two sergeants were giving me the true picture. It is therefore 
very unlikely, in terms of the list compiled by Holdaway and Reiner of the 
categories police give to outsiders, that the police would see visitors as 
challengers: they might not even seen them as do-gooders.87  
 
 
Third criterion of effectiveness: whether visits caused police 
behaviour to be changed/aligned, either at the time or 
subsequently 
The sections which follow look at the visitors’ meetings with detainees and the 
other checks that the visitors made. Visitors’ meetings with detainees were 
found to be very brief and not private; and the other checks the visitors made 
were haphazard. The visiting was therefore unlikely to identify problematic 
issues and achieve changes, whether for individual detainees or generally. 
 
Meeting detainees 
The civilian custody staff member escorted the visitors to the cells. At each 
cell, the civilian custody staff member opened the hatch and asked the 
detainee whether s/he would like to see some visitors, and if the detainee said 
yes, the civilian custody staff member unlocked and opened the cell door, and 
the visitors entered the cell. One of the visitors then said to the detainee 
something along the lines of the following: 
 
“We’re ordinary members of the public, nothing to do with the police, 
                                                 
87 See Chapter One, text to note 73. 
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here to look after your welfare. Is it OK to have a few words?” 
 
This practice of “self-introduction” had started recently, and resulted in a 
larger number of detainees seeing visitors than under the old system. 
Sometimes the way in which the custody staff used to introduce visitors 
suggested that they wanted to prompt the detainees to refuse a meeting.88 
This recalls the practice of some custody officers, observed by Kemp, of 
dissuading detainees from making or maintaining a request for legal advice.89 
The scheme administrator, and most visitors, thought that seeing a larger 
number of detainees was a good result of the adoption of self-introduction.90 
This was an easy statistic to collect, but it said nothing about the quality of the 
meetings.91  
 
A crucial quality of the meetings was privacy, or rather the lack of privacy. The 
code of practice provides: 
 
“Discussions between detainees and ICVs must, wherever practicable, 
take place in the sight, but out of the hearing, of the escorting police 
officer. Where this is not possible, the police officer will not take any 
                                                 
88 As was observed by Tim Newburn and Stephanie Hayman, Policing, Surveillance and 
Social Control: CCTV and police monitoring of suspects (Routledge 2002) 137-8; and see 
Chapter Five, text to note 188. 
89 Kemp (n 22) 18. The importance of the language used in the custody context is covered in 
depth in Frances Rock, Communicating Rights (Palgrave Macmillan 2007). 
90 AD at team meetings. 
91 One visitor was concerned that self-introduction made it more difficult for a detainee to 
refuse a meeting, as the visitors were already in the cell: but I did observe some detainees 
refusing a visit. 
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active part in the conversation. Police officers should not actively listen 
to conversations between ICVs and detainees.”92 
 
The code has a police officer acting as the escort: it was usually a civilian 
member of the custody staff who acted as the escort on my accompanied 
visits. The homily against “active listening”93 signally fails to solve the 
problem. It was, as one custody sergeant said,94 usually impossible for the 
escorting officer not to overhear the conversation, as the publicity photograph 
reproduced in the text to note 108 illustrates. One visitor put it this way: 
 
“The escorting officer is supposed to be out of sight: no, out of hearing 
but in sight: if someone can ever explain that to me, it would be 
amazing. Nine times out of ten, they’re stood right outside the door, 
which just makes the whole thing pointless. And most of the time the 
detainees are asking us a question, they’re actually asking it to us ...  
and then more often than not, it’s not their fault, the escorting officer 
will answer the questions.” 
 
This visitor thought that the proximity of the staff member destroyed the 
confidentiality of the visitors’ relationship with the detainees and, with it, the 
whole purpose of custody visiting.95 The quote also illustrates how the staff 
often started answering the detainee’s points and dealing with their requests 
                                                 
92 2013 Code of Practice para 58. 
93 This expression is usually encountered as a technical term for a skill used in conflict 
resolution: http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/activel.htm accessed 
10.06.2016. 
94 S2. 
95 V12.  
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straight away.96 Whilst perhaps good for the detainee, this interrupted the flow 
of the conversation between visitors and detainee, and marginalised the 
visitors, as they were not the people sorting things out. Visitors did not 
challenge the interruptions. It is also illuminating to look at this from the 
following angle: visitors were not allowed to attend police interviews, but, if 
they had been, it is unlikely that the police would have reacted passively when 
a visitor interrupted in this way. 
 
I now turn to the interchanges directly between visitors and detainees, and set 
out an edited extract of a specimen interview, with a black male detainee 
about 30 years old. The visitors were both white males, one over 60 years old, 
and the other over 70 years old.  
 
Visitors (talking across each other): We’re members of the public, 
volunteers, nothing to do with the police, and we’re here to see that 
you’re being treated fairly. You should know your rights and 
entitlements: have you seen the leaflet? 
[The detainee showed them his copy.] 
Visitor: It’s a complicated system, I hope you understand it. Does 
someone know you’re in custody? 
Detainee: I haven’t been allowed a phone call the previous night when I 
was arrested and brought to the station. I’m going to see the solicitor of 
my choice.  
Visitor: We’ll look into the phone call.  
                                                 
96 Observation. 
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Detainee: I wasn’t given water on arrival and they turned off the “radio” 
[the call buzzer?]. I had food and drink later, but I still hadn't had the 
phone call.  
[later] Visitor: We’ve spoken to the [civilian staff member] about the 
phone call.  
 
This was a very brief interchange, lasting less than three minutes in all, 
excluding the interlude during which the visitor spoke to the civilian staff 
member. Apart from the extreme brevity of the interview, a number of features 
call for comment. The first is that both visitors started talking to the detainee at 
once. This was not typical, but points to the failure of the scheme 
administrator to train visitors about how to conduct a meeting. The same lack 
of training is very apparent from the attempt at a check on whether the 
detainee knew his rights. The way this was handled, with the use of the 
cumbersome, incomprehensible jargon “rights and entitlements”,97 and the 
casual expression of opinion that it was a complicated system, probably left 
the detainee feeling even more daunted and baffled than he had been before 
the meeting.  
 
When the detainee reminded the visitors about his concerns, the visitors 
spoke to a civilian staff member about one of the concerns, the phone call, but 
not about the other, which may have been the call buzzer being turned off, but 
they did not clarify or investigate this. Moreover, they did not find out whether 
                                                 
97 See Rock (n 89) 258-60, who notes how this phrasing is confusing to detainees, some of 
whom understood “entitlements” as “their possessions which have been taken from them on 
arrival” and others as “what you’re not allowed”. The distinction made in custody jargon 
between “rights” and “entitlements” is bizarre: see PACE Code C 5.2, where one reads of, for 
instance, the right to free legal advice, and the entitlement to food and drink. 
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the phone call was going to be allowed, nor did they clarify with the detainee 
whether the concern was about a phone call being made by a custody staff 
member to someone about the detainee being in custody, or about a phone 
call being made by the detainee himself.98 The detainee raised the issue of 
legal advice. And, unlike on most other visits I observed, these visitors made 
no enquiries about whether the detainee had medical issues or “other 
concerns”. Medical issues, including whether detainees have access to 
regular medication, which they are very unlikely to have been carrying with 
them when arrested, can of course be matters of life and death.99   
 
Most of the interviews I observed were conducted rather better than this, but 
in all the interviews there were many barriers to effective communication. I 
was able to establish this more securely by speaking directly with 17 
detainees about meetings visitors had held with them, on each occasion 
about an hour after I had observed the meetings. The detainees I saw were 
selected by the police, apparently on the basis of risk assessment of my 
safety or whether they were intoxicated, and the group was also self-selected, 
in that some detainees refused to see me. The types of detainees that I 
interviewed were, therefore, similar to those seen by the visitors, and my 
sample was as unrepresentative as theirs. 
 
                                                 
98 Respectively, the right to an “intimation”, that the custody staff inform a person nominated 
by the suspect about the suspect's detention at the police station, and the right for a detainee 
to make a phone call: PACE Code C para.5.2.1. Incidentally, the former is described as a 
right, the latter as an entitlement. 
99 The police at Newtown station, Powys, did not check whether Nicholas Wootton was 
carrying medication when arrested. Having not taken the medication, he died after leaving 
custody:https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/ipcc-investigation-death-powys-man-concludes 
accessed 23.05.2016. 
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Most of these detainees told me that they did not see much benefit in meeting 
the visitors. For instance, one commented: 
 
“The only reason I talk to [the visitors] is because I’m here, you know, 
I’m a captive audience.”100 
 
“Captive” is a very appropriate description for an audience which is both 
detained in custody and suddenly confronted by a visitation in a cell. And the 
meetings were sudden confrontations. Arrest and custody had put some of 
the detainees into a profound state of shock and disorientation, and they were 
all bored and depressed. It is not surprising that some of the detainees had 
dozed off: often the light had been switched off.101 The detainees had no 
notice of the visitors’ arrival.102 The detainees might wonder what the custody 
staff had told the visitors about them. The visitors did not look like people who 
had been in trouble with the police. Although the visitors had introduced 
themselves as “independent members of the community, nothing to do with 
the police”, they carried police-issued identity tags. One detainee thought that 
the visitors were like the police, asking the same questions.103 The veteran 
London visitor, Jane Warwick, told me that she concealed her identity tag 
during meetings with detainees.104 Most detainees were suspicious: one of 
them said: 
 
                                                 
100 D12. 
101 By the staff from outside the cell. 
102 Unlike the police, who did get notice of their arrival. 
103 D10. 
104 Jane Warwick interview. 
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“I wouldn’t trust them, because I had only just met them.”105 
 
This would not be surprising in any event,106 and is even less surprising in this 
context. On top of the visitors being strangers, there is the custody staff 
member, waiting just outside the cell door, as can be seen in the photograph 
reproduced in the text to note 108: 
 
“I wanted to tell the visitors I was annoyed because I had asked the 
guards [i.e., the civilian custody staff] questions two hours ago and had 
got no answers, but couldn’t tell them [the visitors] because they [the 
civilian custody staff] were standing there.”107 
 
This detainee could not tell the visitors about the failure of the custody staff to 
deal with his requests, because the staff would hear him criticising them. He 
went on to say that this would also have prevented him from mentioning much  
                                                 
105 D3. This is confirmed by the evidence of visitors and, by analogy, the evidence of lawyers. 
V4 said that he thought that detainees did not trust him, and that he would be sceptical about 
a stranger who had just come in saying the sort of things visitors say. L5 said that detainees 
were mistrustful of people turning up and asking them questions, when they have not met 
before, and that detainees had all sorts of paranoias and/or genuine concerns about how 
legitimate the lawyer was, and whether the meeting was definitely confidential. 
106 See note 137. 
107 D5. Compiled from an exchange.  
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more serious matters. Some detainees said they would have been frank with 
the visitors in those circumstances, but they also said that they understood 
how other detainees might find that difficult.108 Even those who could be frank 
with the visitors doubted that their frankness would achieve anything: 
 
“I wouldn’t have been confident that they would have been able to do 
anything ... Because when the police do certain things, they do it to 
make sure they can get away with it, so sometimes it’s not worth even 
trying.”109 
 
This comment highlights the deep mistrust many detainees feel about the 
police, and their recognition that they are completely in their power.  
Sometimes visitors could help with serious issues which did not involve 
criticism of the custody staff, but which detainees had not mentioned to the 
custody staff: for instance, that the arrest had rendered them unable to collect 
their children from school. Some detainees who found it hard to talk to the 
custody staff did find that they could talk to a custody visitor. This would be an 
argument for more frequent visits.  
 
Detainees said they would have preferred the interviews to take place in a 
consultation room, where there would have been more time, dignity and 
privacy, but they also said they wanted visitors to see the state of their cells. 
They noticed that the meetings in the cells were very brief, and most thought 
                                                 
108 e.g., D6. 
109 D12. 
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the meetings should have been longer. One detainee compared the brevity of 
the visits in the custody block with the half-hour visits he had received from 
Independent Monitoring Board Members in prison.110 My own meetings with 
detainees for my interviews took place in the relative privacy of a consultation 
room, and it was evident that detainees were far more forthcoming in that 
setting. It is thus easy to conclude that it would have been much better if the 
visitors had met detainees in a consultation room. However, arranging for that 
would have routinely made extra work for the police and custody staff, and 
visitors would likely believe that the police would oppose it, so the power of 
the police may have prevented visitors from even raising the question: or 
maybe they just accepted the status quo unthinkingly. 
 
Cells were a cramped space for a meeting, with no table and chairs, and in 
that cramped space visitors were trained to keep some distance between 
themselves and the detainees, so the visitors stayed close to the door.  One 
detainee said he felt ashamed,111 and another put it this way: 
 
“It’s a bit awkward, having two people in your cell, when you haven’t 
had a shower for two days.” 
 
Being obliged to hold a conversation with people you have only just met, 
without any warning, is not made any easier by having to worry about your 
                                                 
110 D8. 
111 D5. 
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personal hygiene. The custody staff had not told this detainee he could have a 
shower: he found this out from the visitors.112 
 
Some detainees were uncertain about what the visitors were there for.113 
Some detainees welcomed what they saw as a pleasant chat with nice people 
who cared about their welfare,114 and one said that the visitors speeded up 
getting things done, like being allowed to make a telephone call.115 However, 
most detainees said they did not think the visitors were able to help them, 
even if that was supposedly what they were there for: 
 
“They want to help, but they can’t, but it’s nice that they want to.”116 
 
This group thought the visitors meant well, but saw them as ineffective. 
Others found the visitors’ attentions less welcome, and seemed to think that 
the visitors were voyeurs:  
 
“I didn’t think [the visitors] were there to help me, [they were there] just 
to ask questions to find out what it’s like inside.”117  
 
This is hardly a promising context for meaningful communication, where 
detainees would feel able to tell the visitors about anything that mattered. One 
                                                 
112 D7. 
113 Unsurprisingly, one of the detainees I interviewed, D10, thought that the visitors were 
researchers, because of what I said when introducing myself after the visitors had introduced 
themselves. 
114 e.g., D4.  
115 D6. 
116 e.g., D9, who said he was very depressed, and that he found the visit “uplifting”. 
117 D8. 
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detainee, when I asked him what he thought he was going to get out of the 
meeting with the visitors, replied simply, “Nothing!”,118 and another detainee 
described the visit as: 
 
 “Pretty pointless, asking me loads of questions … you can’t do 
nothing, you can’t change nothing, you’re wasting my time.”119 
 
Most of the detainees were not motivated to co-operate in the interview with 
the visitors. And the interview was all over in about three minutes, which must 
have added to the dazed feeling most of them had started with. 
 
The detainees’ impression that visitors were not there to help them was 
confirmed by the visitors’ failure to report back to the detainees on the 
responses of the staff to their requests.120 For example, I observed a detainee 
telling visitors that he had told the staff that he had a food allergy, but that the 
staff had taken no notice. The visitors checked the detainee’s custody record, 
which showed that the allergy had been noted. They asked the staff if the 
detainee was receiving food which did not contain the ingredient that would 
trigger the allergy. The staff told them the food did not contain the ingredient. 
The visitors did not report back to the detainee on this.121  
 
The lack of feedback might have discouraged detainees with previous 
experience of visitors from being candid. And their lawyers might have 
                                                 
118 D3. 
119 D2. 
120 D1 and D2. 
121 Observation. 
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explained to them that legal privilege did not attach to visitors’ 
communications with detainees. As one of the lawyer interviewees said: 
 
“ It seems a bit unfair. You’re there to help someone, and he makes an 
unsolicited comment ... ‘I’ve done it, but they’re not going to be able to 
prove it’, and you go straight to the custody officer and [tell him].”122 
 
The absence of privilege in communications between detainees and 
appropriate adults creates similar problems.123 As well as there being no 
privilege, there is no confidentiality in the relationship between custody visitors 
and detainees: there have been similar findings in research into the prison 
medical service.124 
 
One of the main points of these interviews was to check on whether 
detainees’ rights were being observed. To make those checks effectively, 
visitors would need to know what those rights are. However, I never saw 
visitors in training sessions being given a copy of the standard leaflet as given 
                                                 
122 L4.  
123 Chris Bath, “Legal Problems with Appropriate Adults”, Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 
(2014) 178 27 404. Visitors in the area studied have, very occasionally, been ordered to give 
evidence in court about incidents they have witnessed in custody blocks, but not about 
matters arising during interviews: information from V2 and AD. 
124 For comparative material about the lack of confidentiality of communications between 
prisoners and prison doctors, see Joe Sim, Medical Power in Prisons: The Prison Medical 
Service in England 1774-1989 (OUP 1990): House of Commons Social Services Committee, 
Session 1985-1986, Prison Medical Service, Minutes of Evidence, Wednesday 4th December 
1985, Royal College of Psychiatrists 63, summary para 7 (“Historically, the prison medical 
officer’s role has developed into that of a referee who could be relied on to support the home 
team.”): C Shaw, “Prison Medicine”, Open Mind (1987) 26 April/May 15: Tim Newburn and 
Stephanie Hayman, Policing, Surveillance and Social Control: CCTV and police monitoring of 
suspects  (Routledge 2002) 135-6, and Layla Skinns, Police Custody: Governance, legitimacy 
and reform in the criminal justice process (Routledge 2011) 182-3. At a conference connected 
with the custody visiting scheme in the area studied, I heard a director of a company 
supplying medical care in custody blocks voice concern about the pressures on doctors’ 
independence, the pressures being both commercial and a function of the power of the police.  
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out to detainees on booking-in:125 they were just told which questions to ask 
the detainees. Most of the visitors seemed to be familiar only with the right to 
have someone informed and the right to legal advice, and they did not always 
remember to say that the legal advice was free.126 However, on one 
accompanied visit, I did observe one of the visitors telling a detainee about 
the right to make a telephone call. The custody sergeant who was escorting 
the visitors overheard this, and said that the right was just to have someone 
informed. The rather tortuous position is that detainees are said to be entitled 
to make a telephone call, but that fact need not be communicated orally by 
the custody officer, although the detainee would find out about it by reading 
the leaflet, or PACE Code C, which the detainee had a right to see.127 Two 
factors impaired the visitors’ effectiveness here. First, the visitors were 
ignorant of what the detainees’ rights (and entitlements) were, as the scheme 
administrator had not given them the information. Second, the visitors were 
under the power of the police who misled them, maybe unwittingly. If the 
visitors had been properly informed, and if they had been trained to challenge 
the police, they might have stood up to the police, and they might have made 
a better job of helping the detainees. When neither visitors nor detainees have 
a clear understanding of the rights of detainees in custody, the police’s power 
is enhanced by their superior knowledge.  
  
                                                 
125 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/332266/CodeC
-NoRE.pdf accessed 11.10.2015.  
126 This is significant because research has shown that the take-up of legal advice increased 
when custody sergeants informed detainees that legal advice was free: David Brown, Tom 
Ellis, and Karen Larcombe, Changing the code: police detention under the revised PACE 
Codes of Practice Home Office Research Study 129 (HMSO 1992). 
http://library.college.police.uk/docs/hors/hors129.pdf accessed 11.06.2016. 
127 Sanders et al (n 12) 200; Pace Code C para 5.6.  
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Visitors were given no training about how to conduct these interviews. They 
were encouraged to have a conversation with detainees, rather than adopt a 
“tick-box approach”, about the issues concerning their rights and welfare: this 
encouraged visitors to be more natural, but did create the risk that some 
important questions, such as whether the detainee was on medication, might 
be forgotten.128 Visitors were not trained in communication skills, as the ICVA 
standards say they should be.129  
 
The visitors sometimes asked detainees for permission to view their custody 
records. Custody records were occasionally used to settle an argument about 
whether the custody staff had dealt with a detainee’s request.130 Some 
detainees could not be asked for permission to inspect their records: for 
instance, those who were intoxicated and those who were asleep. Visitors 
were allowed to inspect the records of detainees who were intoxicated. 
However, it was uncertain whether visitors could view the records of 
detainees who were asleep: yes, according to ICVA, no, according to the 
Home Office.131 In any event, I did not see visitors seeking to inspect the 
records of those detainees who were asleep. The visitors’ work would be that 
much more effective if they could check the custody records of all detainees 
they had not been able to see and to talk to, including those who were in 
police interview and those detainees the staff had advised the visitors not to 
                                                 
128 See note 99. The report form used in the area studied, unlike the form I filled in as a visitor 
in Dyfed-Powys, did not in fact have boxes to tick. 
129 ICVA National Standards E1: 
http://icva.org.uk/uploads/publications/11National_standards_PDF.pdf accessed 19.07.2016. 
130 See Chapter Five, text to notes 156-159. 
131 2014 Speech by Ian Smith, then chief executive of ICVA, at a location that cannot be 
disclosed as it would identify the area studied.  
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visit. To enable the visitors to understand the records, training would be 
required. As one inspector admitted to me: 
 
“I think you need a degree in custody records to be able to understand 
them … I know [the visitors] look at them, but I don’t think they … you 
know, it takes me all my time to study a custody record and understand 
it, and even then sometimes you don’t understand it totally.”132 
 
Properly carried out, custody visiting is technically demanding work. The 
scheme administrator gave visitors no idea of what custody records looked 
like, let alone how to analyse them. 
 
Turning now to more general considerations relating to meetings between 
detainees and visitors, I believe the following factors are likely to impair 
communication in this context: the misunderstanding of language: lack of 
trust; prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination; and the unreliable nature of first 
impressions in forming accurate personality judgments. 
 
The misunderstanding of language about rights in custody between police and 
detainees has been investigated by Frances Rock. Visitors tend to use some 
of the confusing language the police use, such as the expression “rights and 
entitlements”, so her research is relevant to communication between visitors 
and detainees.133 She also observed police officers frequently 
misunderstanding what detainees were saying. She gives the example of an 
                                                 
132 M1. 
133 See text to notes 97-98.  
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officer asking a detainee about whether to call a solicitor, and taking the 
answer “I don't know” as a definite “no”. Later in this exchange, the officer 
asked the detainee for confirmation that the interchange had not affected the 
detainee’s decision: the purpose of the officer’s question was self-protection, 
rather than the communication of rights.134 Rock calls this the “multi-
functionality of human interaction” and argues that this factor makes the 
communication problem deeper, beyond people misunderstanding their rights 
or feeling unable to invoke them.135 For the visitors, one of the functions of 
their interaction with the detainees was to gather material for a report, which 
may have made them more interested in obtaining answers than in what the 
answers told them. Similarly, some of the detainees thought that the function 
of the visitors was just to ask questions, and that made them unco-operative 
and less than candid.136 Thus the functions of reporting and questioning 
obstructed the function of helping detainees. 
 
For there to be effective and candid communication in these meetings, it was  
essential that the detainees trusted the visitors and felt able to be candid with 
them. But an immediate barrier to trust was that the detainees had never met 
the visitors before. Most people have been brought up not to trust 
strangers.137 One way of understanding trust is to see it as a relational 
concept, the quality of trust being dependent on the quality of relationships.138 
But detainees have no relationship with visitors, except in the case of those 
                                                 
134 Rock (n 89) 3, 4, 9. The detainee had, of course, not made the decision not to have a 
solicitor: the officer had misunderstood. 
135 ibid 138. 
136 See text to notes 116-123. 
137 For “stranger danger” see e.g.,  http://www.nbcnews.com/id/8331335/#.VxXrJnrh4r8, 
accessed 19.04.2016, which shows how deeply embedded this is.  
138 Russell Hardin, Trust (polity 2006) 16ff. 
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very few detainees who had met visitors before. Hence, in the absence of a 
relationship, even those detainees who had not been socialised into 
mistrusting strangers were unlikely to trust the visitors. Those who designed 
the scheme do not seem to have thought about this point, or if they did, they 
discounted its importance. The elements of mistrust, on both sides, were likely 
to have been exacerbated by other factors, such as prejudice.  
 
The leading academic authority on prejudice, Gordon Allport, wrote that 
prejudice was a world-wide phenomenon, and described it as “an avertive or 
hostile attitude towards a person who belongs to a group, simply because he 
belongs to that group, and is therefore presumed to have the objectionable 
qualities ascribed to that group”.139 Categorisation in a group is said to be 
inevitable: the effect of categories is to engender meaning upon the world, 
resulting from the principle of least effort: this categorisation is rapid and 
automatic, and stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination all have automatic 
aspects. The visitors’ attitudes to detainees were found to be stereotyped, and 
some visitors assumed that detainees must have done something wrong;140 
and there were detainees who thought the visitors were close to the police.141 
With discrimination following that prejudice, visitors treated detainees not on 
the basis of who they were, but on the basis of how they had been socially 
constructed: and the way the detainees saw the visitors was probably subject 
to similar distortions. Arguably prejudice can be ameliorated over time by 
exposure to the reality of an individual’s experiences, character and views. 
                                                 
139 Gordon W Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, 26th anniversary edition (Perseus 1979)  4, 7: 
but prejudice is not universal: 74. 
140 See Chapter Five, text to note 140. 
141 See text to note 103. 
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The meetings between visitors and detainees were overwhelmingly likely, 
however, to be the first time they had met. David Funder’s research into the 
fallibility of first impressions shows that snap judgements of personality are 
almost never correct.142 Those visitors and detainees who were not prejudiced 
were still likely to make unfavourable snap judgments. Those unfavourable 
judgments, on vital issues like trustworthiness, prevented effective 
communication. 
 
For a whole range of reasons, the visitors’ meetings with detainees were not 
effective. The visitors had been able to make certain basic checks, but the 
detainees may not have seen the point of answering all the visitors’ questions 
fully or correctly, and their view was confirmed by the absence of feedback 
from the visitors later. The outcome, which was potentially very harmful, was 
that the detainees could not discuss important issues with the visitors. The 
visitors seemed unconcerned about the poor quality of their interaction with 
the detainees.143 The practice adopted for the meetings was one which suited 
the police: no notice, short, inconsequential, in the cell, the staff present, and 
no follow-up visit.    
 
Checks on other matters 
If there were no detainees to visit, or only a small number, visitors sometimes 
made checks on the physical state of the block. Some of these checks can be 
about matters of life and death and should be made on every visit. The 
physical state of a building can be dangerous, because of ligature points or 
                                                 
142 David C Funder “Accurate Personality Judgment”, Current Directions in Psychological 
Science 2012, 21, 177.   
143 See Chapter Five, text to note 160. 
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loose sharp edges that can be used for harming oneself or others; and, if a 
staff member is not carrying a ligature knife, a detainee may succeed in 
hanging her/himself during the vital seconds it takes to retrieve a knife from 
some other location. CCTV evidence may be essential for an inquest, but I 
never saw visitors checking that the CCTV was working properly. Staff 
shortages could create serious safety concerns: but visitors were discouraged 
from making these comments because they thought they would make no 
impact, at a time of deep cuts in the police budget.144 The general failure to 
make these other checks, and/or to report on them, except on a completely 
haphazard basis, seriously compromised the effectiveness of the visiting.145  
 
 
Fourth criterion of effectiveness: Whether the reporting 
system caused police behaviour to be changed/aligned 
The final part of a visit was the writing of reports by the custody visitors, for 
discussion with the custody sergeant and onward transmission to the scheme 
administrator. The report form that the visitors had to fill in dictated that they 
should write something about each detainee visited or visually checked, with a 
space left for all other issues. As Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty argue, 
knowledge available in a report always depends on, and is secondary to, the 
format.146 I found in this study that visitors used the reports primarily to say 
                                                 
144 e.g., V 4. 
145 Sometimes visitors checked and reported on matters of stunning triviality, such as, on one 
occasion, a ring mark on a countertop where a mug containing a hot drink had been placed 
without a mat underneath it: S8. 
146 Ericson R V and Hagerty K D (eds) Policing the Risk Society (OUP 1997) 357-387. 
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something about each detainee visit, and that they paid little attention to 
“other issues”. 
 
Below are set out examples of the types of reports sent in.147 They all use the 
abbreviation PIC (person in custody) for detainee. Except where stated, they 
are set out in full, and quoted verbatim. 
 
Here is a typical example: 
 
“PIC requested and provided with reading material. PIC stated they 
had no issues and could not have been treated more fairly. PICs no 
issues.” 
 
So, a visit which probably lasted some 30 minutes is reduced to a text of 24 
words. As was often the case, this report concerns only visits to detainees. 
There is no evidence that any other checks were made: if they were, they 
were not reported on. The overall tenor of the report is clearly positive, and it 
is worth noting that visitors were encouraged by the scheme administrator to 
report when detainees praised the custody staff.148 In contrast, another report 
contains the quote from a detainee that he was being “treated like a dog”. No 
details are given of that treatment, and no details about whether, and if so in 
what respect, the visitors agreed with the detainee’s opinion that it was like 
treatment that might be given to a dog; whether the visitors thought it 
                                                 
147 AD compiled these documents and handed out them out in hard copy form at team 
meetings, so they are all from the area studied. I have not attributed them to specific visitors 
here, and some of them were based on reports sent in by visitors whom I did not meet. 
148 Observation at team meeting. 
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necessary to take any steps to get anything done about it; if they did think it 
necessary, whether they actually did so, and with what results; and whether 
they informed the detainee of the outcome.  
 
The next example is rather alarming to read, although the visitors do not seem 
to have been alarmed: 
 
“All areas clean and tidy. PIC did not raise any issues. PIC requested a 
drink and fresh air. A nurse had assessed his cut finger. PIC did not 
raise any issues. Had been offered food and refused. What appeared 
to be blood was all over the wall and door.”  
 
We are not told whether the nurse had taken any action following the 
assessment. There would seem to have been more blood about than would 
be shed from a cut finger. But there is no record of an investigation by the 
visitors about the blood; where it had come from; why it was there; whether 
the visitors thought the detainee should be moved to a clean cell; whether a 
request was made to move the detainee; whether the request was complied 
with; and whether visitors informed the detainee. 
 
These reports are typical, both for their brevity, and for the absence of any 
contextual information and details of any inquiry. An example of a very 
untypical report, set out in Chapter Five, related a difficult situation and the 
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visitor’s frustrations.149 Here are extracts from another report, again untypical, 
this time for the wealth of information it conveys: 
 
“Boiler in the staff room needs to be replaced. Staff have been waiting 
for over a week.  
PIC was annoyed that his prayer beads have been taken away and 
stated he will self-harm by banging his head against the wall if he 
doesn’t receive them. PIC said he has been using the prayer beads to 
pray for his recently murdered brother. Custody Sgt said that the PIC 
has been told he can have the prayer beads when praying. Custody 
Sgt informed that PIC has requested to speak to Duty Inspector.  
PIC in custody for 24 hours and requested fresh air in the exercise 
yard: will be allowed weather permitting and staff availability. 
PIC needs somebody to collect her key as she has left her dog in the 
flat on its own. Also said that she needs methadone. Custody Sgt said 
that PIC can arrange for key collection to look after the dog and that 
the Doctor will be called regarding the methadone request.” 
 
This is a much fuller report than the average. The point about the boiler may 
show that the custody staff thought they might get repairs done more quickly if 
they were reported by custody visitors.150 The report conveys interesting 
insights into the predicament of some of the detainees, and it may be that the 
custody staff first heard about the dog and the methadone from the visitors. 
                                                 
149 See Chapter Five, text to note 153. 
150 V5. 
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We are not told whether visitors told the detainees about the outcomes of their 
requests. 
 
The report was then countersigned by the custody sergeant or some other 
member of the staff. This brought the visitors further under the power of the 
police. This power, as explained by Lukes, was likely to make the visitors 
reluctant to include critical material in the report and thus risk a confrontation 
with the police.151  
 
The system for filing the report was changing to digital, which caused some 
problems for the visitors. It took them a special effort to keep a copy of their 
reports.152 Visitors found the reporting a chore, and several said they found it 
was the least attractive part of their work. Visitors were seriously handicapped 
in trying to follow up points they had made in the originals. Most of them did 
not keep copies of their reports, and only the scheme administrator dealt with 
the information they had provided. The effectiveness of the reporting by the 
visitors depended on what the scheme administrator did with the reports. He 
compiled composite reports covering the visiting done for each team with 
statistics. Copies of these reports were provided only to the visitors who 
turned up at team meetings, and the reports were not publicly available. The 
scheme administrator contacted the inspector about issues visitors had raised 
in the reports, a very small number of which were discussed, weeks or 
months later, at team meetings. The visitors were told little about the 
communications which had passed between the scheme administrator and 
                                                 
151 See Chapter Five, text to notes 179-187 and following note 187. 
152 Something done only by V8. 
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the police, or what the result had been.153 I identified just one example of 
where a visitors’ report achieved a change in police behaviour, where the 
scheme administrator brought about a change in police behaviour.154  But only 
the scheme administrator could assess the extent to which the reporting 
brought about general changes in police behaviour. The closed world 
remained closed. 
 
 
Fifth criterion of effectiveness: whether custody visiting 
enabled the public to know what was happening in custody 
blocks 
The application of this criterion provides an assessment of whether the work 
of custody visiting enabled the public to know what was happening in custody 
blocks. The scheme administrator used the visitors’ reports as the raw 
material for a very general summary, with examples, published in the annual 
report on the Police and Crime Commissioner’s website.155 These cannot be 
set out without disclosing the area studied. As a means of reviewing the type 
of information that is available I have looked at a similar report published in 
the Avon & Somerset Police and Crime Commissioner’s Annual Report for 
2013-2014, and made some comparisons with the report published for the 
                                                 
153 See Chapter Five, text to note 62, where a visitor complained about never getting 
feedback. However, V8, one of the minority of visitors who did keep copies of reports, 
expressed satisfaction with the way the reports were dealt with by the scheme administrator. 
Many of the police and custody staff, except the inspectors, also complained that they 
received no feedback. 
154 See Chapter Five, text to note 188. 
155 A provision that the identity of custody visitors should be published by Police and Crime 
Commissioners was hastily amended to say that the requirement was just to publish reports 
about the operation of the scheme: Elected Local Policing Bodies (Specified Information) 
(Amendment) Order SI 2012/2479, Article 6. 
 313 
study area.156 Some of this was considered under the first criterion. The Avon 
& Somerset report states that the issues raised by the visitors were “primarily” 
related to cleanliness of cells, delays in medical assessment, out of date 
meals, access to toilet paper and shortages of blankets.157 By contrast, the 
report in the study area gives no details at all about issues that were raised.  
 
The next subject in the Avon & Somerset report is delays in access to the 
custody block. Like the report in the area studied, this fails to explain actual 
delays. Could the delays have been caused by deliberate attempts by the 
custody sergeants to delay the arrival of the visitors? Or were these delays 
caused by a serious disturbance? The lack of explanation gives the 
impression that the Police and Crime Commissioners, for both Avon & 
Somerset and for the area studied, did not know, or care, what the actual 
causes of the delays were; and that, if they did know, they were not telling the 
public about it. Other public sources of information are even less 
informative.158 
 
Persuasion was the only means available to custody visiting to act as a 
regulator in enforcing alignment to standards. Regulators may use publicity, or 
the threat of publicity, to back up their attempts at persuasion. Custody visiting 
                                                 
156 http://www.avonandsomerset-pcc.gov.uk/Document-Library/2014/ICV-Annual-Report-
2013-2014.pdf accessed 18.09.2014. Presumably this report is intended to be read not only 
by professionals but also by the general public, so it is disappointing that its authors made the 
assumption that all readers know what a “s 136 order” is. Under Mental Health Act 1983, s 
136, the police may take a person who appears to be suffering from mental disorder and to be 
in immediate need of care or control from a public place to a place of safety: this has in the 
past usually been a police station, and sometimes still is: see Chapter One, note 64. 
157 The reader is left wondering what the secondary issues were. 
158 HMIC/HMIP publish reports of their joint inspections of custody blocks, but they do not 
assist in evaluating the work of custody visiting according to any of the five criteria. And, 
despite the proliferation of official publications, there is no document by which the 
performance of custody visiting can be measured. 
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made no use of publicity or the threat of publicity in its work of regulation,159 
and persuasion seemed to be limited to private communications from the 
scheme administrator. There is no way of measuring the effectiveness of this 
as a means of enforcing alignment. There were no contexts in which visitors 
could have, or did have, a public voice. The message of the scheme 
administrator was that the scheme enabled the public to be confident that the 
police were doing a good job. It was not just a matter of a regulator deciding 
not to use publicity as the means of persuasion: one needs to understand the 
motivation for that choice. The Police and Crime Commissioner’s decision not 
to use publicity is arguably another demonstration of power as conceptualised 
by Lukes: the Commissioner was doing what the police wanted.  
 
Next, the question of whether the reporting gave custody the regulatory 
qualities of accountability and legitimacy. As argued in Chapter Two, 
accountability is a tangible process of accounting, with three stages, 
information, discussion and consequences, including the essential component 
of external democratic scrutiny. In custody visiting this process might be 
located in any of five different relationships.160 The first relationship is that 
between the visitors and the Police and Crime Commissioner. In this case the 
scrutiny is being undertaken by the visitors’ line manager, which cannot 
qualify as external. The remaining four relationships are between the custody 
visiting scheme, in the persona of the Police and Crime Commissioner, and: 
                                                 
159 Contrast the naming and shaming by Australian food regulators: 
http://www.foodauthority.nsw.gov.au/ accessed 02.04.2016, or the England and Wales 
“National Food Hygiene Rating Scheme” - where a 1-5 rating has to be displayed: e.g., 
http://www.bathnes.gov.uk/services/environment/food-safety/food-hygiene-rating-
scheme/national-food-hygiene-rating-scheme-safe accessed 04.04.2016. 
160 See Chapter Two, text to notes 136-140. 
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the voting public; the Police and Crime Panel which scrutinises the work of the 
Police and Crime Commissioner;161 central government; and political 
sponsors.162 In these four relationships there is no process of scrutiny by a 
non-police body: just the provision of a bland report, with insufficient 
information on which to form a judgment, with custody visiting constituting a 
very minor element in the Police and Crime Commissioner’s work. There was 
therefore no chance of anyone questioning the way that custody visitors go 
about their work and calling for more challenging behaviours on the part of 
those visitors: in terms of the three-step test,163 next to no information, no 
opportunity for discussion, and no consequences. As regards legitimacy, the 
vast majority of the general public is extremely unlikely to have heard of 
custody visiting.164 It is therefore impossible to say what the public thought 
about it, and impossible to say whether it was legitimate or illegitimate.  
 
This concludes my assessment of the effectiveness of custody visiting by 
reference to the five criteria. I now turn to assess its effectiveness by 
reference to standards laid down in international human rights law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
161 set up under Police and Social Responsibility Act 2011, ss 28-33. 
162 John Raine, “Electocracy with accountabilities?” in Lister S and Rowe M (eds), 
Accountability of Policing, (Routledge 2016) 111-13. 
163 See Chapter Two, text to notes 132 and 141. 
164 See text to notes 198-206.  
 316 
United Nations standards and the requirement of expertise  
The United Nations have laid down broad principles for visitors to people in 
detention: 
 
“1.  In order to supervise the strict observance of relevant laws and 
regulations, places of detention shall be visited regularly by qualified 
and experienced persons appointed by, and responsible to, a 
competent authority distinct from the authority directly in charge of the 
administration of the place of detention or imprisonment. 
 
2.   A detained or imprisoned person shall have the right to 
communicate freely and in full confidentiality with the persons who visit 
the places of detention or imprisonment in accordance with paragraph 
1 of the present principle, subject to reasonable conditions to ensure 
security and good order in such places.”165  
 
Some of these requirements are met, and the Police and Crime 
Commissioner is, technically, distinct from the police. But custody visitors are 
not qualified, and detainees cannot communicate with the visitors freely and in 
full confidentiality, because the conditions that are imposed rarely, if ever, 
allow this to happen. I therefore conclude that, on the evidence from the area 
studied, the United Kingdom is in breach of this principle. 
 
                                                 
165 Principle 29. Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 43/173 of 09.12.1988. 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r173.htm accessed 06.06.2016. 
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The United Nations have laid down specific criteria for bodies charged with 
regulating the conditions of detention, in an instrument known as OPCAT.166 
Each state is required to establish a “national preventive mechanism” (NPM), 
with certain qualifying characteristics. An NPM has to be a body or group of 
bodies that regularly examine the treatment of detainees, make 
recommendations and comment on existing or draft legislation with the aim of 
improving treatment and conditions in detention. The UK’s NPM is composed 
of several constituent bodies, including the Independent Custody Visiting 
Association, ICVA.167 We can examine some aspects of the performance of 
custody visiting by applying the criteria for an NPM to the findings about 
custody visiting in the area studied. 
 
Each NPM must satisfy certain requirements. First, an NPM must be 
independent of government and the institutions it monitors. Elina Steinerte 
has written that the independence requirement is very important, because it 
is: 
 
“hard to imagine how the NPM would be able to achieve anything if it 
did not have the trust of those deprived of their liberty.”168  
 
                                                 
166 The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other cruel inhuman or 
degrading Treatment or Punishment, a treaty which supplements the 1984 UN Convention 
against Torture. The United Kingdom had signed the convention in 1985 and ratified it in 
1988. The United Kingdom signed and ratified the protocol in 2003, and the protocol came 
into force in 2006.  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCAT.aspx 
accessed 31.05.2015.  
167 See Chapter One, text to notes 118-121. 
168 Elina Steinerte, “The Jewel in the Crown and its Three Guardians: Independence of 
National Preventive Mechanisms under the Optional Protocol to the UN Torture Convention” 
Human Rights Law Review (2014) 14 1-29. 
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This comment is telling when considered in the light of my finding that most 
detainees did not trust visitors.169 Steinerte goes on to say that there is 
supposed to be a:  
 
“transparent process of selection and appointment of members who 
are independent and do not hold a position which could raise questions 
of conflict of interest.”170  
 
She points out that in the UK there was no transparent process: the Ministry 
of Justice just decided which institutions should be part of the NPM. ICVA’s 
members are the Police and Crime Commissioners, which manage the 
visitors: as has been shown, Police and Crime Commissioners are not 
independent of the police, nor are the visitors: hence, this requirement is not 
met.171  
 
Next, the NPM must have certain powers. It must have the power to access 
all places of detention: custody visiting in the area studied did appear to have 
access to all such places, within its remit, except for holding cages and 
locations used for police interviews of suspects who were not formally 
detained. The NPM must be able to conduct interviews in private with 
detainees and other relevant people. As has been shown, not every detainee 
could be interviewed, and no interview was conducted in private: no other 
category of person was interviewed: visitors’ discussions of their reports with 
                                                 
169 See text to and following notes 137-138. 
170 Steinerte cited this as recommended by the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture, First 
Annual Report of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 14.05.2008, CAT/C/40/2, at para 28(c). 
171 See Chapter Two, text to notes 97-103, and Chapter Five, text to note 229. 
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custody staff, and visitors’ conversations with custody staff could not be called 
interviews: hence, this requirement is not met. The NPM must be able to 
choose which places it wants to visit and who it wishes to interview. Visitors 
could choose which places to visit, but might not be admitted to those places 
except, in some cases, after long delays, and interviews with detainees could 
be denied: similarly therefore, this requirement is not met.172 The NPM must 
be able to access information about the number of people deprived of their 
liberty, the number of places of detention and their location; and to access 
information about the treatment of and conditions for detainees. This 
requirement is met: as far as we know, there are no secret police stations, 
and visitors can visit even the police stations which are set aside for terrorist 
suspects. Finally, NPM personnel should have the necessary expertise and 
be sufficiently diverse to represent the community in which the NPM operates. 
The training of visitors was superficial and one-sided,173 but the visitors’ 
diversity did go some way to representing the community.174 
 
The official UK government line is found in the annual reports of the NPM, 
where one reads that all the bodies constituting the NPM are independent, 
and that all places of detention are independently monitored.175 Neither 
statement is true: ICVA is not independent, nor are the visiting schemes, and 
there is no other body taking these roles. The reports have nothing to say 
about all the other issues set out above. I therefore conclude that custody 
                                                 
172 Delay: see text to notes 45-50. Denial of access: see text to notes 58-63. 
173 See Chapter Five, text to notes 63-83. 
174 See Chapter Four, text to notes 36-38, and Chapter Five, text to notes 28-30. 
175 Monitoring Places of Detention: Sixth Annual Report of the United Kingdom’s National 
Preventive Mechanism 1 April 2014 – 31 March 2015 Cm 9160. 
http://www.nationalpreventivemechanism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/NPM-Annual-
Report-2014-15-web.pdf accessed 16.12.2015. 
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visiting in the area studied failed to fulfil most of the requirements for the 
characteristics of an NPM, and that, on the evidence from the area studied, 
the United Kingdom is in breach of OPCAT.  
 
The United Nations’ requirement that those examining custodial institutions 
should have expertise raises the important question of how custody visitors 
should be trained, and whether they would have been more effective in their 
work if, say, they had been lawyers who had worked in the criminal justice 
system. Michael Meacher MP proposed that each group of visitors should 
include a lawyer:176 this idea has never been pursued. The ethos is very much 
against lawyers being involved: many visitors and police officers thought that 
lawyers would be unwilling to act without pay, and that they would be unable 
to restrain themselves from touting for business.177 None of the visitors was, 
or had been, a lawyer with experience of criminal defence work, and few 
visitors had had any previous experience of the criminal justice system. The 
training the visitors received certainly did not make them experts in this 
area.178 The result was that visitors were generally unaware of the legal and 
regulatory framework in which custody operates, and they were also unaware 
of the wide range of discretion enjoyed by the police and how they deployed 
this to achieve their goals. This assessment falls rather short of the picture 
painted by Katie Kempen, appointed chief executive of ICVA in 2015, who told 
me: 
 
                                                 
176 See Chapter Three, text to note 13. 
177 See text to note 86, and Chapter Five, text to notes 189-191. 
178 See Chapter Five, text to notes 63-83. 
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“[The custody visitors] need to be confident that they can challenge 
anything they’re not happy [about] with custody staff ... [to] do that, they 
need to be able to challenge those professionals.” 
 
This language suggests that this is an aspiration, not a description of the 
reality. The aspiration was not met in the custody visitors in the area studied. 
Visitors did not have training and understanding of the professional issues, 
and few had the confidence to make challenges.179  
 
Wider functions of custody visiting 
Claims are made in the official literature that custody visiting achieves 
outcomes which are beneficial to society. This section seeks to assess 
whether these claims can be justified. 
 
The first of these claims is that custody visiting enables volunteers to attend 
police stations to check on the treatment of detainees and the conditions in 
which they are held, and that their rights and entitlements are being 
observed.180 Clearly, the scheme does facilitate this. But the extent and the 
reliability of the information obtained are seriously compromised by the 
numerous defects set out in this chapter.  
 
                                                 
179 See Chapter Five, text to notes 179-187. 
180 2013 Code of Practice para 2. 
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The next claim is that custody visiting offers protections and confidentiality to 
detainees and the police.181 Whatever protections custody visiting does give 
detainees, that protection is compromised in the same way as was noted in 
the previous paragraph. The detainees’ confidentiality is protected by the 
rules of the scheme, and seems to have been respected by visitors.182 The 
“protections offered to the police” may mean the scheme’s provision of 
defences against allegations of poor custodial practices, and reassurance to 
the public, discussed next. The confidentiality afforded by the scheme to the 
police is secured by the visitors being prohibited from making public 
statements except with the approval of the scheme administrator, and from 
participating in making official complaints about the police. 
 
The next claim is that custody visiting offers reassurance to the community at 
large.183 The reassurance could be in the form of general information about 
the scheme, letting people know that independent people visit custody blocks, 
and reassurance also used to be said to be needed at times of “tension in the 
community”, for instance when there has been a death in custody, when the 
police may invite visitors to a station.184 Before reviewing whether this 
purpose of reassurance can be achieved, it is worth looking in more detail at 
these “special” visits, as they are sometimes known. They are different from 
other visits, because they are made at the invitation of the police, and are 
                                                 
181 2013 Code of Practice para 2. In this paragraph (following the 2001 Circular and the 2003, 
2010 and 2013 Codes of Practice) independent custody visiting is described as “a well 
established system”, which may be the nearest those drafting the official literature can get to 
making a claim that the scheme is well known. 
182 There is only one instance in the area studied where this confidentiality was known to have 
been broken, many years earlier: AD interview. 
183 2013 Code of Practice para 2. 
184 1992 Circular para 16. 
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therefore neither unannounced, random nor unexpected. 
 
There has been an occasional practice of visits made at the invitation of the 
police in the area studied. However, none of the visits took place during the 
period covered by this research, so I was not able to observe them for myself. 
Jane Warwick told me how this used to happen in Lambeth until 2008. She 
was called in by the police when there were demonstrations outside a police 
station about how a suspect was being treated. She went into the custody 
block and saw the suspect, and then reported on the condition of the suspect 
to the people outside the police station. The police hoped that this would calm 
the demonstrators down.185  
 
Special visits were made in the area studied in August 2011 when a large 
number of arrests were made during the country-wide riots that erupted that 
month.186 Research has shown that the criminal justice system was put under 
considerable strain by those events, and that a substantial decision about 
prosecution policy appeared to have been made at speed and without 
consultation.187 Arguably, there is a greater need for checks when the system 
is under strain, when one might expect the worst abuses to occur: but the 
motivation was public reassurance. It was the scheme administrator who 
made the decision for these special visits: he told me he thought that the 
                                                 
185 Jane Warwick interview: the last occasion was in 2008. I was told about a recent instance 
in the area studied, but I was unable to investigate it. Simon James gives brief accounts of 
visits made in London at the request of the police in the 1980s in “Guarding the guardians: 
Lay visitors to police stations” Public Law [1988] Aut 432: the author was secretary to visitors’ 
panels in Westminster. Mr James says that the visits were successful in defusing tension.  
186 taking place there at the same time as elsewhere in the country. 
187 Carly Lightowlers and Hannah Quirk, “The 2011 English ‘Riots’: Prosecutorial Zeal and 
Judicial Abandon” British Journal of Criminology (2015) 55 1 65. 
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police would have requested them, but had not yet done so.188 He telephoned 
visitors and asked them to do visits “lite”, which meant observation only, and 
no detainee interviews. The scheme administrator was not able to find the 
reports sent in by the visitors at that time, so I have not seen them. He did say 
that the work of the visitors had not featured in the reporting of the riots, partly 
because of the low profile kept by the police authority, which ran the scheme 
at that time. He said that police officers were grateful for these visits; they 
thought that the visits gave the public confidence in the police, and that 
visitors took that message back to their communities.189 How much of the 
message reached those communities, and which the communities were, are 
both unknown, as there was no machinery for conveying the message to 
communities and visitors lack the status of representatives of the community 
in any meaningful way. As one custody sergeant said: 
 
“If visitors are supposed to represent the public, the public should have 
heard about what they do, but they don’t.”190 
 
Neither the public nor its communities see the visitors as their representatives: 
as I seek to demonstrate, hardly anyone has heard of the scheme.191  
 
                                                 
188 AD interview. 
189 e.g., S12, M3. Some publicity was given in London to the work of reassurance done by 
custody visitors during the 2011 riots: “Independent Custody Visitors have been making extra 
visits to custody suites across London to ensure that detainees are being properly treated and 
we are reassured that no problems have arisen to date:” 
http://www.communitybarnet.org.uk/news.php/125/london-riots accessed 04.01.2016. 
190 S7. 
191 See text to notes 198-206. 
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Jane Warwick also told me about the special visit she made to Brixton police 
station after the death of Sean Rigg on 21 August 2008, which has enabled 
me to complete the account of this that I began in Chapter One.192 Ms 
Warwick was telephoned by the borough commander, who asked her to come 
to Brixton police station, as there had been a really serious incident. Ms 
Warwick made the visit alone. On arrival she was asked to view the area 
where Mr Rigg had died.  She saw what was known as the “Cage”, an area 
just outside the custody block, where there were items of resuscitation 
equipment, and she also saw a corridor where more equipment, packaging, 
and London Ambulance Brigade materials were strewn around. Ms Warwick 
said that the commander told her that the equipment had been used in the 
great efforts they had made to save Mr Rigg’s life. She knew that there had 
been a death, but she was not told how it had happened. She did not meet 
any of the family, and Mr Rigg’s body had already been taken away: he had 
died about two hours before she arrived. Ms Warwick saw a Police Federation 
representative talking with the officers who had been involved. She found that 
the whole place was in lockdown, and that all the other detainees had been 
moved away.  
 
Ms Warwick told me that she believed the police had called her to the station 
as part of what the police called their “openness and transparency”: and she 
realised that the police knew that there was going to be huge public concern. I 
asked Ms Warwick if she felt there was anything else she could have done 
                                                 
192 See Chapter One, text to notes 130-136. 
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that evening. She told me that, because she had no power, there was nothing 
else she could have done.  
 
Ms Warwick told me that she did send a report on her visit to the scheme 
organisers,193 but that she had not kept a copy. I showed her the words 
attributed to her in the Metropolitan Police Service report of the incident,194 
which was referred to in the IPCC report,195 where she was quoted as having 
said she was “content with what she had seen” and that there were “no 
issues”. Ms Warwick told me she did not use expressions like that. The report 
failed to state what it was that Ms Warwick was alleged to have seen and 
been content with: all she had seen was equipment and packaging. As far as 
she knew, neither the police, nor anybody else in authority, publicised the fact 
that she had made the visit and made a report. The first published reference 
to her visit was the note in the IPCC report. Ms Warwick was not asked to 
take part in either of the IPCC investigations.  
 
Why did the police call in this custody visitor? The visitor thought that the 
police were trying to reassure her that everything had been done to save a 
detainee’s life. But she could not confirm that contention, because all she saw 
was the equipment that the police told her had been used, and its packaging. 
However, the police report of her visit,196 which she did not see until I showed 
it to her, conveyed the message that she thought that all had been well. 
                                                 
193 At that time, the Metropolitan Police Authority. 
194 590102014141: L41 Rigg Investigation – MPS – 22.08.2008: IPCCY2254 received from 
the IPCC, not available on the internet. 
195 IPCC Report R3, Report of the independent external review of the IPCC investigation into 
the death of Sean Rigg: Review_Report_Sean_Rigg.PDF accessed at ipcc.gov.uk on 
23.01.2014.  
196 Report cited at note 194.  
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Unless one takes the view that Ms Warwick is mistaken about what she said 
on that occasion, which I personally doubt, given the clarity of her 
recollections and remarks on the matter, it appears that someone invented 
remarks that Ms Warwick was supposed to have made, which were 
thoroughly misleading about her reaction to the aftermath of Mr Rigg’s death. 
  
In the terms of Packer’s criminal justice models, the police called in the visitor, 
and maybe also invented Ms Warwick’s remarks, in order to put a crime 
control spin on the evening’s events, i.e., to reduce criticism of the police 
about the death. The police were trying to achieve the same result, about the 
same subject, deaths in custody, with visitors at team meetings in the area 
studied.197 
 
I now turn to the more general application of the claim that the scheme 
reassured the public. As with the special visits, this must depend on whether 
the message got through. Publicity about the scheme was very sparse. All the 
visitors I interviewed told me that there was very little public awareness of 
custody visiting. Some defence solicitors said they had never met custody 
visitors, and one of them said: 
 
“For the five years I was in custody suites, a number of times a week, l 
bumped into visitors once, maybe twice.”198 
 
                                                 
197 See Chapter Five, text to note 202. This also brings to mind the doctoring of statements by 
the police in the Hillsborough affair. Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel (HMSO 
2012) Chapter 11. 
http://hillsborough.independent.gov.uk/repository/report/HIP_report.pdf accessed 15.06.2016 
198 L6. 
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This quote shows how far below the radar custody visiting was. Some of the 
custody staff told me that they first found out about custody visiting when 
visitors turned up at the station during their shift. An arresting officer told me 
during an observation at a custody block that he had done the work for six 
years, and never before met a custody visitor.199 Solicitors, custody staff and 
arresting officers are people one might expect to know about custody visiting, 
but they knew little or nothing about it. A fortiori, it is very unlikely that 
members of the general public, who did not have a special interest, knew 
anything about custody visiting, and therefore it is hard to see how custody 
visiting could have reassured the general public about conditions in custody, 
or how it could have affected their views in any way. In any case, little 
information is available about what the public think about custody. Criminal 
justice textbooks do not cover the issue of public confidence in custody or in 
custody visiting.200 Specialist books, articles and reports do not address the 
issue either.201 Where surveys do address these issues, the respondents are 
                                                 
199 For good measure, he added that too much was done for the “prisoners” anyway. 
200 For instance, there is nothing in: Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal 
Process (4th edn OUP 2010); Malcolm Davies, Hazel Croall and Jane Tyrer, Criminal Justice 
(5th edn Pearson 2015): Nicola Padfield, Texts and Materials on the Criminal Justice Process 
(OUP 2008):  Robert Reiner, The Politics of the Police (4th edn OUP 2010) ;  Sanders et al [n 
101], Skinns (n124); Lucia Zedner, Criminal Justice (OUP 2004). Tim Newburn (ed) 
Handbook of Policing (2nd edn Willan 2008) 27 does place lay visitors “among attempts to 
allay public concern by providing ...  ‘independent’ scrutiny of police stations”, but gives no 
detail about the issue and no evidence of the outcome of the policy. 
201 For instance: Ben Bradford and Andy Myhill, “Triggers of change to public confidence in 
the criminal justice system: Findings from the Crime Survey for England and Wales panel 
experiment”, Criminology and Criminal Justice 2015 15 1 23:  Katy Sindall, Patrick Sturgis  
and Will Jennings, “Public confidence in the police: A time-series analysis”, British Journal of 
Criminology (2012) 52 4 744: Jonathan Jackson, Ben Bradford, Betsy Stanko and Katrin 
Hohl, Just Authority? Trust in the Police in England and Wales, (Routledge 2013): Jonathan 
Jackson and Ben Bradford, “Crime, policing and social order: On the expressive nature of 
public confidence in policing”, British Journal of Sociology (2009) 60 3 493: Ben Bradford 
“Voice, neutrality and respect: Use of victim support services, procedural fairness and 
confidence in the criminal justice system”, Criminology and Criminal Justice (2011) 11 4 345: 
Office for National Statistics, Crime Survey for England and Wales FAQs: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/surveys/informationforhouseholdsandindividuals/householdandindivid
ualsurveys/crimesurveyforenglandwales/crimesurveyforenglandandwalesfaqs.accessed 
21.06.2016. 
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asked how they would feel about being detained in custody.202 For this 
enquiry, the question would need to be how respondents think people who are 
actually detained in custody feel about the arrangements. I suspect that very 
few of the respondents to these surveys expect to be detained, and that even 
fewer of them have actually been detained in custody: they probably do not 
identify with people who are detained in custody,203 and the typical 
respondent tends to see detention in custody as something that only happens 
to other people,204 like AIDS or bankruptcy. As one custody sergeant put it to 
me: 
“I think the public don’t care what the police do until you call 999.  I 
think the custody visitors’ scheme is pretty much along the same lines 
really.”205   
Whether they care or not, we do not know what the public think about the 
conditions of detention in custody. We know nothing about what people used 
to think about it, and we do not know whether they have changed their minds 
since hearing about custody visiting. There is, therefore, no evidence to 
support the claim that custody visiting reassures the community about 
custody, except for the very occasional instances of demonstrations at police 
stations.206 
                                                 
202 Appendix 4, question 3, in Vanessa Stone, Deborah Agulnik, Catherine Grant and Alice 
Fitzpatrick, “Measuring public confidence in the Police” BRMB 2005 Report prepared for the 
Home Office: 
http://tna.europarchive.org/20100413151426/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/measuring-
pub-conf-police05.pdf accessed 20.10.2015. 
203 AD told me that a typical response to his tweets about custody visiting was that detainees 
were being treated too well.  
204 A point made by S8. 
205 S2. 
206 See text to note 185. 
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Finally, it is claimed that custody visiting contributed to police 
accountability.207 The scheme administrator told new recruits that the visitors 
provided information to the Police and Crime Commissioner, which the 
Commissioner used to hold the police to account,208 but he also told me in 
interview that the Commissioner in the area studied had never used visitors’ 
reports for this purpose,209 and I have not seen anything published by the 
Commissioner in connection with custody visiting that could remotely be 
described as holding the police to account. The public therefore had no way of 
finding out about any of this, and the process of accountability could not be 
described as democratic, beyond the stark fact that the Police and Crime 
Commissioner is an elected official. The scheme administrator, a member of 
the Police and Crime Commissioner’s office, did use some of the information 
privately to correct behaviour by the police.210 To that undetectable extent, 
and to that extent only, the police were being held to account.  
 
In more general terms, the Police and Crime Commissioner and the police 
liked to point to visitors as independent observers of police conduct, providing 
what they called “transparency”. Whether visitors were independent is very 
doubtful, and their socialisation led them to adopt police values, or confirmed 
them in that mindset.211 The quality of transparency was therefore being 
filtered through a lens which transmitted an image which never changed, an 
                                                 
207 2001 Home Office Circular para 4. 
208 See Chapter Five, text to note 72. 
209 AD interview. Katie Kempen asked a colleague to provide me with evidence of this from 
another area, but it has not been produced. 
210 See Chapter Five, text to note 188. 
211 See Chapter Five, text to notes 228-229. 
 331 
image which was always positive about the police, and an image which never 
contained any significant detail.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The scrutiny carried out by custody visitors centred on meeting detainees. We 
have seen how those meetings failed on many levels. But what of the 
detainees the visitors did not see, either because the police prevented the 
visitors from seeing them, or because the detainees did not want to see the 
visitors? These detainees could have things to complain about, but may have 
felt too vulnerable to speak out. Detainees were not able to evaluate whether 
their rights were being respected, because many of them had little idea what 
those rights were, and equally little idea of the limits on what the police were 
allowed to do. And their discussions with visitors were not likely to be fruitful, 
because the visitors were not well versed in those rights either, as a result of 
their socialisation, the lack of proper training, and the restrictions on what they 
can do. If the restrictions were lifted, and the visitors were properly trained, 
they could communicate better with detainees, and ask more meaningful 
questions of both the police about all the detainees, including those they do 
not speak to. That would be a great improvement on what I observed. Visitors 
would need to be strongly motivated and brave enough both to ask the 
questions and to report their findings: and they would need to be confident 
that their reports would be acted on effectively.  
 
 332 
I have shown that custody visiting was either likely to be ineffective, and that, 
in some of the cases where I had interviewed detainees, it actually was 
ineffective. This ineffectiveness can be highlighted further by revisiting the 
power dynamics of custody in the light of my findings. Visitors were unable to 
achieve satisfactory results with the tasks that they were allowed to perform. 
There were many tasks they were not allowed to perform. They could achieve 
nothing at all about issues such as finding out why an arrest had been made 
and when the charge or release decision might be made, let alone the much 
more difficult question of whether the police were carrying out an investigation 
fairly. The visiting was a function of crime control, in that it made no impact on 
how the police ran custody; and custody itself is a crime control environment.  
This systematic failure was not produced by piecemeal lack of attention to the 
welfare of detainees. It is much more likely to have been the result of 
deliberate policy, driven by the strong forces of crime control ideology and the 
power of the police. To draw on Lukes again, the power of the police allowed 
the visitors to do just so much and no more, prevented them from carrying out 
proper scrutiny, and kept many important issues off the agenda. Other 
research shows that the police were quite ready to use arrest and detention in 
custody to harass people against whom there was no evidence, leading to 
lengthy periods of detention and of police bail; to restrict access to detainees 
by lawyers and appropriate adults; and to discourage detainees from 
consulting lawyers. The police, it seems, generally seek to undermine due 
process mechanisms where they are perceived to be getting in their way, and 
there is no reason to expect the police to treat visitors any differently. In any 
case, the design of custody visiting has never been in the hands of people 
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with a due process approach.212 The people who run custody visiting now are 
the Police and Crime Commissioners, who have been elected on a populist 
mandate to reduce crime,213 and are therefore not over-concerned with how 
the police treat detainees.  
Custody visiting was ineffective as a regulator, and it also failed to achieve 
most of the purposes claimed for it in the official literature. But the claim that 
custody visiting reassures the public does throw the operation of crime control 
ideology and police power into vivid relief. We have seen how the police seek 
to conscript the visitors to spread the police line about a death in custody.214 
This is the exact opposite of the role that custody visitors should play as 
regulators, which is to hold the police to account. The primary purpose of that 
regulation would be to reduce the incidence of the worst consequence of 
police misconduct, deaths in custody. None of the police and custody staff I 
interviewed thought that police behaviour was altered by custody visiting, or 
that it needed to be, and some visitors took the same view.215 The evidence, 
such as it is, makes it impossible to say whether custody visiting actually did 
contribute to reducing the numbers of deaths in custody, or whether it was 
likely that it contributed to a reduction. One interpretation of the evidence 
could be that the ineffectiveness of custody visiting, with its existence 
providing an argument against the need for greater regulation, has made 
deaths in custody not less likely, but more likely.  
 
                                                 
212 See Chapter Three, text to notes 135-136 and 179.  
213 Robert Reiner, “Power to the People”, in Lister M and Rowe M (eds), (n 162) (Routledge 
2016) 132ff. 
214 See Chapter Five, text to note 202. 
215 See Chapter Five, text to notes 145-151. 
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Neither detainees, the police and custody staff, or lawyers, saw custody 
visiting as legitimate, and the general public knew so little about it that they 
could not form a view. That leaves just the managers and the visitors thinking 
that custody visiting is doing some good, which gives it, at least for them, a 
veneer of legitimacy. If those few people do not see that it is actually 
achieving next to nothing, and if nobody else either knows or cares, the 
consequence is that custody visiting is actually counter-productive to the 
purposes that it should be serving. That thin veneer of legitimacy disguises 
the need for fundamental reform, which I discuss in the next, and final, 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Custody visiting has been neglected in the study of criminal justice, and very 
few members of the general public have ever heard of it. This thesis seeks to 
provide an understanding of this curious phenomenon. Custody visitors enter 
one of the state’s secret places, and there they observe the interaction 
between detainees and the police. There is uncertainty about the real purpose 
of the visits, and there is no publicity about the details of the visitors’ reports. I 
embarked on this enquiry after working as a visitor myself. I have analysed 
the history of the scheme by desk research and carried out a detailed case 
study of a local scheme, and I have gone further afield for some of the 
research, accumulating a very large amount of data, including archival 
research into the distinctive Lambeth lay visitors scheme, and interviews with 
the key figures of Michael Meacher and Jane Warwick. This has enabled me 
to make findings about custody visiting from the angles of state policy,  
visitors’ attitudes, and the effectiveness of their work, drawing on the concepts 
of power; socialisation; Herbert Packer’s crime control and due process 
models and the allied concept of balance; independence, combined with 
neutrality and impartiality; legitimacy; accountability; and effectiveness. I have 
shown how state policy has neutered custody visiting over the last 35 years;1 
how the visitors were not independent, and that their attitudes were aligned to 
those of the Police and Crime Commissioner and the police;2 and how the 
                                                 
1 Chapter Three, passim. 
2 Chapter Five, text to notes 228-229. 
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work of custody visiting was ineffective, in that it did not fulfil any of its various 
purposes, at least not to a degree discernible by the current study.3 
 
This chapter sets out the answers to the research questions; reviews where 
this research sits in the wider literature on police regulation; notes the 
limitations of this research and the scope for further research; and discusses 
whether, and if so how, the current system could be rebuilt to provide effective 
regulation, identifying the radical changes that would be necessary. The 
chapter concludes by explaining how, politically, those reforms could be 
achieved.   
 
Answers to the research questions4 
I first sought to establish the need for independent scrutiny and regulation of 
police behaviour in custody blocks. Custody is a pivotal part of the criminal 
justice system, but the presumption of innocence, which is thought to be one 
of the key features of criminal justice, does not apply in custody blocks,5 and 
the power of the police is paramount.6 Power is the single most important 
concept identified in this research. The power of the police operates on all 
                                                 
3 Chapter Six, conclusions. 
4 The research questions are set out here again: 
Research Question One: Could custody visiting make a more effective contribution to the 
regulation of police detention? 
Research Question Two:  What is the relation between custody visiting and police  
mistreatment of detainees, including mistreatment that ends in their death? Why is this not  
mentioned in the official literature? 
Research Question Three: To what extent is custody visiting independent, in accordance with 
its branding and statutory obligation? 
Research Question Four: To what extent is custody visiting effective, both as a regulator, and 
according to the claims made for it in the official literature?           
Research Question Five: Are the values of custody visiting in practice closer to the due 
process model or the crime control model? 
5 See Chapter One, text to notes 48-57, and Chapter Six, text to notes 15-25. 
6 See Chapter One, text to notes 14-73.  
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those who visit their territory, the custody block, including the custody visitors. 
This is Steven Lukes’ three-dimensional power, which operates to influence 
people’s behaviour, often through the means of socialisation, without any 
exercise of that power, and without there being any overt conflict.7  
 
Regulation of police behaviour in custody blocks is largely provided by self-
regulation, which is simply not adequate.8 I believe that some of the 
independent scrutiny and regulation needed could be provided by custody 
visiting. Indeed, in the form in which it was born in 1980, custody visiting was 
rather a good idea, and it could have provided just that. But while some of the 
earlier models of custody visiting had a regulatory purpose, governments and 
the police have prevented it from having that function. For the state, the 
principal purpose of custody visiting is to promote confidence in the police, not 
to safeguard detainees.9 
 
As is clear from the findings I made from my observation and interviewing, 
there are very serious, if not fatal, deficiencies in the scheme. The visitors 
were not independent, as they needed to be, and are required by statute to 
be. The visitors tended to start with attitudes more favourable to the police, 
and were subjected to completely mono-cultural socialisation by the Police 
and Crime Commissioner and the police. Custody visitors were not 
professionally trained to understand the world of custody, and as a result they 
were unable, as well as unwilling, to challenge the police.10 The police have 
                                                 
7 See Chapter Two, text to notes 36-45. 
8 See Chapter One, text to notes 74-90. 
9 See Chapter Three, text to notes 67-74 and 190. 
10 See Chapter Five, text to notes 228-229. This is the answer to Research Question Three. 
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all the power in the custody block, and the visiting work was not effective to 
achieve either the purposes of regulation or those other purposes claimed for 
it in the official literature. There were restrictions on what the visitors could 
see and do, and those restrictions, and the practices they followed, reduced 
their chances of achieving any regulatory purpose, let alone of making any 
impact on the death in custody figures.11 As regards the official claims, there 
was simply little or no evidence to substantiate them.12 In terms of Packer’s 
models of criminal justice, the scheme’s orientation was crime control. The 
scheme did not prevent the police from operating as they wished, and, by 
default, giving priority to police efficiency in processing suspects over concern 
for their welfare.13 The implications of how criminal justice values operated in 
custody visiting are discussed further in the concluding section of this chapter. 
 
I have shown that what should be the principal purpose of custody visiting, the 
safeguarding of detainees from mistreatment by the police, has been 
downgraded, and that the issue of police mistreatment that can culminate in 
the death of detainees has been almost completely obliterated, both in the 
official literature and in the minds of the visitors.14 My explanation for this is 
that the scheme is dominated by the police, and that they sideline the issue as 
much as they can. Their policy on how to deal with custody visitors about 
deaths in custody is demonstrated by the evidence I have gathered about the 
aftermath of the death of Sean Rigg15 and my observation of team meetings. 
                                                 
11 See Chapter Six, conclusions. This is the answer to Research Question Four. 
12 See Chapter Six, text to notes 180-211. 
13 See Chapter Five, text to note 228 and Chapter Six, conclusions. This is the answer to 
Research Question Five. 
14 See Chapter Three, text to notes 159-160 and Chapter Five, text to notes 144-150 and 226. 
15 See Chapter Six, text to notes 192-197. 
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The police say as little as possible about the subject. When they do have to 
say something, they claim that deaths are not their fault, ignoring the judicial 
process and the conclusions drawn by coroners and juries, and they ask 
visitors to help them put over their case.16 It is not surprising that the police do 
not wish the subject to be mentioned any more than is absolutely 
unavoidable, and that when it does have to be mentioned, the story is that 
they are not the ones to blame. In the context of custody visiting, where they 
have so much influence, it is not difficult for them to get their way.17 Inquests 
provide a brief interlude of an approach towards due process, but the police’s 
orientation is always crime control.18  
 
Where this research sits in the wider literature on police 
regulation 
There have been no recent studies of custody visiting by scholars, for 
whatever reason. The academic literature on police regulation is the wider 
context where the subject can find its place. Throughout this thesis I have 
linked my empirical study to that wider literature. The focus has been on how 
custody visiting operates, why it operates in that way, and with what effects. In 
this concluding chapter, where I am seeking to chart a way forward for 
                                                 
16 See Chapter Five, text to notes 201-202. 
17 When I was a visitor in Dyfed-Powys, the scheme administrator there asked me to write an 
article about my work as a visitor for publication in the local papers. I included in my draft a 
reference to the issue of deaths in custody. The draft was considered by the communications 
department of the police, who provided that service for the police authority. The police 
communications department deleted the reference to deaths in custody. I did not agree to 
publication in that form, so the article never appeared. 
18 Inquests will be truly due process only when families are entitled to legal aid. The 
Hillsborough affair has confirmed the lengths to which the police pursue crime control policies 
about deaths for which they may be responsible: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/apr/26/hillsborough-inquests-jury-says-96-victims-
were-unlawfully-killed. This paragraph has given the answer to Research Question Two. 
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custody visiting, it is helpful to engage with literature which considers the 
potential for greater regulation of policing, and practical proposals for 
achieving this. In their introduction to the collection of essays under the title 
Regulating Policing19 Ed Cape and Richard Young note the increase in the 
powers given to the police, and the need for regulation of the exercise of 
those powers. Young’s chapter shows how many more penalties are now 
imposed by the police, rather than by a judge. Often these penalties, such as 
cautions and penalty disorder notices, are imposed after a spell of detention in 
custody, a setting where the evidence-gathering process is not subject to the 
safeguards of criminal procedure.20 Cape’s chapter is a wide-ranging survey 
of how the power of the police has increased: it has become lawful for the 
police to make an arrest in respect of any offence, where previously this had 
been the case only in respect of more serious offences; every arrest is 
validated by the custody sergeant; and all suspects are detained in custody 
for investigation. This massive expansion of the use of custody justifies the 
call for more, and more effective, regulation.21 In his chapter in the same 
book, Andrew Sanders points out that police behaviour in custody blocks is 
largely self-regulated, and in his view therefore unregulated, and that deaths 
in custody continue to occur. He sees the benefits that could come from more 
regulation, with greater dispersal of regulatory powers, and thinks that custody 
visitors could contribute to providing some of that dispersed regulation.22 
                                                 
19 Ed Cape and Richard Young (eds), Regulating Policing: The Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984, Past, Present and Future (Hart 2008). 
20 Richard Young, “Street Policing after PACE: the Drift to Summary Justice” in Cape and 
Young (eds) (n 19). 
21 Ed Cape, in Cape E and Young R (eds) (n 19) “PACE Then and Now: Twenty-one Years of 
‘Re-balancing’”. 
22 Andrew Sanders, in Cape E and Young R (eds) (n 19) “Can Coercive Powers be Effectively 
Controlled or Regulated? The Case for Anchored Pluralism”, 45, and Chapter One, text to 
notes 74-90. 
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In assessing what changes in the regulation of police behaviour in custody 
blocks might achieve, Sanders follows Adam Crawford’s definition of 
regulation as monitoring behaviour against a standard (“goal”) and enforcing 
that standard (“realignment”).23 Sanders notes that it is the police who do 
most of the monitoring, and that it is the police who operate most of the 
realignment mechanisms: and while coercive police powers are not usually 
used wrongly, there has to be a system for dealing with the wrongful 
behaviour which does occur.24 In looking for a solution, Sanders25 favours 
“anchored pluralism”26 on the basis that the best way of making regulation 
more effective would be to disperse it among those who have an interest in 
making it more effective. Sanders would favour a network of intersecting 
regulatory mechanisms, but still anchored to the state, as had been 
suggested, but not followed, in the Patten Report for Northern Ireland.27 He 
suggests the following groups for this role: legal advisors, appropriate adults, 
those he calls “watchdogs”, social services, custody visitors, family and 
friends. He notes that these groups would have to be empowered, and would 
propose that they should be able to be present in the custody block whenever 
they wished, subject to some challengeable limits. And he would want greater 
empowerment of legal advisors, who should be there at the custody block, 
and immediately available. As Vicky Kemp has shown, the effectiveness of 
                                                 
23 Sanders (n 22) 50, and Adam Crawford, “Networked governance and the post-regulatory 
state? Steering, rowing and anchoring the provision of policing and security” Theoretical 
Criminology (2006) 10 4 452. 
24 Sanders (n 22) 70. 
25 ibid 70-73. 
26 See Chapter Two, text to note 21. 
27 The Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland, Policing in Northern Ireland – 
A New Beginning (“The Patten Report”) (1999). 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf accessed 12.06.2016. 
 344 
defence lawyers continues to decline, under the pressures brought to bear on 
them by the police and by government policy.28 Even so, I agree with Sanders 
that custody visitors, educated to understand the role of lawyers, and working 
in a radically reformed system as set out below, could work effectively with 
lawyers.29 
 
Police regulation has also been discussed in the collection of essays 
Accountability of Policing.30 Here, John Raine gives a cautious, provisional 
welcome to the new regime of Police and Crime Commissioners.31 However, 
Robert Reiner argues that the Police and Crime Commissioners have a 
populist mandate, which is to reduce crime. It is clear from his analysis that 
the mandate does not include concern for the welfare of detainees,32 and that 
one should not look to these commissioners for this sort of regulation. My 
findings about the role played in custody visiting by the Police and Crime 
Commissioner in the area studied are in tune with the view taken by Reiner. 
 
In his chapter in Accountability of Policing, Richard Young shows the close 
connection between accountability and regulation, and the ideal should be 
that the regulatee should provide an honest and useful explanation for a 
decision taken.33 He argues that self-regulation by the police has not worked 
                                                 
28 Vicky Kemp, Bridewell Legal Advice Study: adopting a “whole-systems” approach to police 
station legal advice (Legal Services Commission 2013) 20: 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/research/centres/accesstojustice/usefulresources/broa
derconsequences/blast-ii-report.pdf accessed 10.06.2016. 
29 See text to note 61. 
30 Stuart Lister and Michael Rowe (eds), Accountability of Policing (Routledge 2016). 
31 John W Raine, “Electocracy with accountabilities? The novel governance model of Police 
and Crime Commissioners” in Lister S and Rowe M (eds) (n 30) 111. 
32 Robert Reiner, “Power to the people? A social democratic critique of the Coalition 
Government’s police reforms” in Lister S and Rowe M (eds) (n 30) 132, 139. 
33 Richard Young, “The rise and fall of ‘stop and account’: lessons for police accountability” in 
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for “Stop and Account”. Looking for alternative sources of regulation, and in 
the light of the remarkable consequences of the mobile phone recording by a 
member of the public of the events leading up to the death of Ian Tomlinson, 
Young argues for the need for regulation by citizen-recording, with footage 
uploaded to a variety of media and regulatory platforms.34 This could not be 
achieved by detainees, who are relieved of their mobiles on being booked into 
custody, a practice which is unlikely to change: but visitors could use their 
phones in this way. So, for example, visitors’ footage might be uploaded direct 
to a website run by the new national organisation I propose for them, and that 
new body could make use of the footage in its regulatory work.35 The footage 
should not be immediately available to the public, because of data protection 
concerns about detainee privacy and the security of police custody blocks.  
 
Another issue in police accountability, the handling of complaints against the 
police, is discussed by Tim Prenzler and Louise Porter in their chapter in 
Accountability of Policing. They write: 
 
“Complaints can ... be used as a key learning tool to inform policing 
practices by modifying training and procedures in response to patterns 
of allegations ... ”36 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Lister S and Rowe M (eds) (n 30) 18, 18-21. This author also notes the use of regulation to 
make the most of good practice: see the text at note 55.  
34 ibid 38. 
35 See text before note 62. 
36 Tim Prenzler and Louise Porter, “Improving police behaviour and police-community 
relations through innovative responses to complaints” in Lister S and Rowe M (eds) (n 30) 49.  
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They stress the need for greater independence in the investigation of 
complaints. The link with custody visiting is that Michael Meacher MP 
suggested that visitors should have a role in pursuing police complaints, an 
idea which has been firmly rejected by policy-makers ever since.37 I believe 
this would fit well with the visitors’ work of regulation, and include it in my 
recommendations for reform below.38  
 
 
Limitations on this research and the scope for further 
research 
The access to the area studied for this research was generally very open, and 
the work has been carried out on an in-depth basis. However, the research 
has been conducted in one area by one researcher. I have had to be careful 
to keep this project within manageable limits. One aspect which I have 
excluded is the consideration of visiting at custody blocks where people 
suspected of having committed terrorist offences are detained. Research 
about the effects of the special arrangements which have been made for visits 
by custody visitors39 to these special blocks would be useful.  
 
The Independent Custody Visiting Scheme operates throughout the United 
Kingdom. I have worked in one scheme in Wales and studied another in 
England. I noted that there were some differences between them, but the 
                                                 
37 See Chapter Three, text to notes 10, 71-2. 
38 See text following note 65. 
39 See Chapter Three, text to notes 171-174. 
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differences were not about issues of principle. I have been told,40 in very 
general terms, that there are wide differences between schemes. The 
question arises as to how much the findings of this research are likely to be 
true of other schemes. A starting-point is that the same statutory framework41 
and the same code of practice42 apply to all the schemes. It is therefore likely 
that there are no differences between schemes about issues of principle. But 
it would be useful to have comparative material, not only from other parts of 
England and Wales, but also from Scotland and Northern Ireland, where 
similar schemes are operated. Beyond the United Kingdom, custody visiting is 
also found in some other countries,43 and I have not looked at those: similarly, 
they could be subjects of further research. It could also be useful to look at 
and make comparisons with Joint Inspection Teams which inspect custody 
blocks,44 lay observers who inspect the conditions in which detainees and 
prisoners are escorted and held in custody by contractors,45 and the members 
of Independent Monitoring Boards who make inspections in prisons and 
immigration removal centres.46 Beyond the criminal justice system, 
                                                 
40 By Katie Kempen of ICVA. 
41 Police Reform Act 2002 s 51. 
42 2013 Code of Practice. 
43 Schemes in the Netherlands, Hungary and South Africa were reviewed, along with those in 
the United Kingdom, in The Impact of External Visiting of Police Stations on Prevention of 
Torture and Ill-Treatment, (Council of Europe 1999). That information is somewhat dated now, 
and I have not seen any further information about the schemes in those countries. The 
Independent Custody Visiting Association (ICVA) has delivered training programmes about 
custody visiting in some countries, but I do not know whether this has led to schemes being 
set up in those countries.  
44 See Chapter One, text to notes 105-106. 
45 http://layobservers.org/about-us/ accessed 26.05.2016. This webpage uses the term 
“prisoner” indiscriminately to refer to detainees as well as prisoners: see Chapter One, text to 
notes 48-50. 
46 http://www.imb.org.uk/ accessed 21.06.2016. There is some useful literature about Boards 
of Visitors, the predecessors of the Independent Monitoring Boards, showing strong 
similarities in matters of structure, remit, ethos, accountability, independence and 
effectiveness: Mike Maguire and John Vagg, The “Watchdog” Role of Boards of Visitors 
(Home Office 1984); John Vagg, “Independent Inspections: the Role of the Boards of Visitors” 
in Maguire M, Vagg J and Morgan R (eds), Accountability and Prisons: Opening up a Closed 
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comparisons could be made with inspections carried out in environments with 
similar features, such as the arrangements for children who are looked after 
by a local authority, and residential homes providing care for the elderly.47  
 
As well as looking at custody visiting in different locations, research could also 
usefully be conducted in locations in the United Kingdom where there are 
known differences in the arrangements from those encountered in the area 
studied, with a view to studying the effects of those differences. The first 
difference of which I am aware relates to the organisation of the custody 
visiting schemes. In at least one part of the country, managing the 
volunteering aspects of the local scheme has been outsourced by the Police 
and Crime Commissioner to a voluntary organisation.48 It would be interesting 
to know what effect that has on the ethos and effectiveness of the scheme. A 
second opportunity for comparison arises from differences in the organisation 
of the workforce in custody blocks. In the area studied, civilian custody staff 
have been hired by the police to act as detention staff and to carry out all the 
functions in the custody block except those of the custody sergeant, a process 
known as “civilianisation”, but these civilians continued to be managed by the 
police. In some other areas, the role of the provider of those staff members 
has been outsourced, a process known as “privatisation”. Layla Skinns noted 
that legal advice was more readily available in custody blocks where this 
                                                                                                                                            
World (Tavistock 1985); and Review of the Boards of Visitors: A Report of the Working Group 
chaired by the Rt Hon Peter Lloyd MP (Home Office 2001). 
47 The Care Quality Commission hires and pays people known as “Experts by Experience” to 
inspect care homes: they have personal experience of caring and spend much more time on 
their visits. http://www.cqc.org.uk/content/involving-people-who-use-services: accessed 
12.06.2016. 
48 In Dyfed-Powys, to, amongst others, PAVO (Powys Association of Voluntary 
Organisations): conversations with Dyfed-Powys visitor and PAVO officer, 
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privatisation had taken place than in custody blocks where it had not taken 
place.49 It would be useful to find out whether privatisation had any effect on 
visiting. It is the detention staff with whom the visitors have to deal for most of 
the time during their visits, although the custody sergeant very much sets the 
tone. 
 
Finally, there are the usual notes of caution about this kind of qualitative 
study. First, my observational work suffers from the same kind of limitations of 
custody visiting itself, in that I could not be everywhere at once, my 
observation periods were relatively brief, and the police (and others) may 
have altered their behaviour in my presence. Second, while the interviews 
provided many useful insights into the views and attitudes of the participants, 
it is unwise to assume that claims made in interviews are always reliable, or 
that interviews can ever nail down precisely what someone thinks and 
believes. Third, the sample of visitors interviewed was subject to a high 
degree of self-selection and cannot be regarded as representative: the way I 
see them is as providing insight into a range of experiences, attitudes and 
beliefs. Despite those notes of caution, there is no doubt that this study has 
collected far more empirical evidence on which to base its conclusions and 
recommendations than anything previously undertaken in this area.  
 
Recommendations for Reform 
The research question which remains to be answered is whether custody 
visiting could make a more effective contribution to the regulation of police 
                                                 
49 Layla Skinns,  Police Custody: Governance, legitimacy and reform in the criminal justice 
process (2011 Routledge) 114. 
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detention.50 I believe that, with fundamental changes, custody visiting could 
achieve this, but before setting out my reform programme I will return to the 
issue of how to provide better regulation in custody suites, for which I have 
been drawing on the work of Andrew Sanders.51  
My proposals for the reform of custody visiting which would fit it for this role  
involve fundamental change. There would need to be a careful reassessment 
of the basic principle of outsiders making random unannounced visiting, and 
the benefits of a patterned system, with a view to ensuring that the visitors’ 
scrutiny could be as effective as possible. The basic principle is for the visits 
to be random, which means that any time and day has the same chance of 
being picked by the visitors. The other solution would be to seek to get the 
visits to conform to a pattern which resulted in the visits taking place at the 
times when they would be most effective. In the case study, visitors were 
found to visit whenever they like, and they preferred certain days and times. 
Their choices could not be interfered with if the random principle were 
followed. However, if the visits were patterned, some direction could be given 
to the visitors to achieve either true randomness or a pattern designed to 
ensure true effectiveness.52   
 
Establishing how to build on the principle of unannounced visits (whether 
patterned or random) would depend on a fundamental reconsideration of 
policy. The broad policy issues would be: how to deal with the power of the 
police; the purpose of the scheme, which depends on its ethos; the 
                                                 
50 This is Research Question One. 
51 Sanders (n 22).  
52 See Chapter Six, text following note 42. The direction would be given by the new body, not 
the Police and Crime Commissioner: see text to note 67. 
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independence of the scheme; the recruitment and training of the visitors; 
better rights of access for visitors to the custody blocks and to the detainees; 
clear channels for reporting and publicity; having effective sanctions, and 
whether that could be achieved by publicity alone; and the overall 
effectiveness of the scheme as a regulator.  
 
How to deal with the power of the police would be a key question in designing 
a new scheme. In the same way that power has been the most important 
concept in this research, dealing with that power would be the most important, 
and the most difficult, issue in the design of a new scheme. And the issue 
would have to be faced squarely and openly, as is certainly not the case at 
present, and it would have to be kept under constant and rigorous review. 
One would need to devise a scheme which the police would take seriously. I 
found that I only had to scratch the surface to find that the police have little 
respect for custody visiting.53 To get the police to take custody visiting 
seriously, the visitors would need to be taken seriously by the state as 
regulators, and they would need to be given substantial statutory powers. This 
would in its turn enable the visitors to take themselves seriously, and to be 
prepared to challenge the police.  
 
The ethos of the scheme should be focussed, in Packer’s terms, on due 
process, the rights of the detainees, not on the crime control orientation, the 
convenience of the police. The purpose of the scheme would need to be firmly 
tied to its role as regulator of police behaviour. Its remit should be seen as the 
                                                 
53 See Chapter Six, text to notes 85-87. 
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safeguarding of the welfare of detainees, and respecting them as suspects, 
not following police culture and denigrating them as “prisoners”,54 and visitors  
should challenge that abusive culture. There should be open and honest 
acknowledgment that the ultimate purpose of custody visiting is to reduce the 
number of deaths in custody. The purpose of the scheme would not be to 
promote confidence in the police and reassure the community, unless the 
scheme’s findings backed that point of view: but, if the findings were 
favourable, they should be made use of and applied elsewhere where 
practices are found to be deficient. As Richard Young says, citing John 
Braithwaite et al: 
 
“effective regulation requires not just critique and enforcement when 
things go wrong, but sharing and reinforcing of good practice where 
things go right.”55 
 
Full knowledge of the facts, derived from rigorous regulatory activity, would be 
the right basis from which to reassure the public about custody, in contrast 
with the current scheme, where the authorities seem to believe that the mere 
existence of the scheme is sufficient to reassure the public.56   
 
Custody visiting would have to be detached from the Police and Crime 
Commissioners. They are too close to the police, and they are not sufficiently 
focussed on the welfare of detainees. A new body would need to be set up, to 
operate nationally and locally. Visitors would be recruited by an independent 
                                                 
54 See Chapter One, text to notes 49-52, and Chapter Five, text to notes 98 and 167.  
55 Young (n 33) 21. 
56 See Chapter Six, text to notes 198-206. 
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agency with a remit to find a genuine cross-section of people, without any 
short cuts via organisations well-disposed towards the police.57 Custody 
visitors should have expertise, and they could gain that expertise from work 
in, or experience of, the criminal justice system. That work or experience 
would not disqualify them on the grounds of lack of independence and a more 
sophisticated means would have to be found to assess that quality. Lawyers 
could be recruited with an understanding of the custody issues, as has 
occasionally been done, with the agreement of the police, to monitor 
demonstrations.58  
 
The trainee visitors would need to be given a full briefing about custody by a 
range of the professionals who are involved, including defence lawyers and 
the police, and by those with experience of custody, former detainees. Visitors 
would in particular need to be fully briefed about deaths in custody and their 
aftermath, and the long delays before inquests are held.59 I found that visitors 
do not have a high opinion of defence lawyers:60 this probably arises from the 
fact that they do not understand their role. In a reformed system, the role of 
defence lawyers would be properly explained to visitors. Visitors would be 
able to work with defence lawyers in safeguarding detainees: visitors could 
telephone detainees’ lawyers to update them after a visit.61 Generally, the 
training would be much more detailed, and a much more rigorous approach to 
the visiting style would be inculcated. Visitors would be expected to take a lot 
                                                 
57 See Chapter Five, text to notes 46-50. 
58 See Liberty’s Report on legal observing at the TUC March for the alternative March 2011: 
https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/libertys-report-on-legal-observing-at-
the-tuc-march-for-the-alternative.pdf.  
59 See Chapter Five, text to note 214. 
60 See Chapter Five, text to notes 189-191. 
61 A suggestion made by L6.   
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more time and care over the visits, particularly with the interviews with 
detainees. Visitors’ reports would be fully detailed, and where possible 
accompanied by audio or video footage.62 Consideration would have to be 
given to paying visitors for the work. Visitors would need to have some kind of 
tenure: at present they have none at all.63 In contrast with the current scheme, 
arrangements could be made enabling visitors to make visits to custody 
blocks in areas other than where they are members of a particular scheme, 
accompanied by a local visitor. The observations made by the visitors from a 
different area about the operation of the local scheme, and the discussions of 
those observations with the local visitors, would be passed on to the new 
national organisation, and would be useful in developing policy and best 
practice.  
 
An important provision would be that visitors must be given pass codes or 
pass keys to custody blocks, with the right of the visitors to take the matter to 
a judge for immediate attention if access was delayed or denied. Another 
provision would be needed to give visitors the right to meet each detainee, 
subject only to an order of a superintendent64 setting out the reason for the 
denial of access. Each meeting should take place in a safe, private 
consultation room, without the staff being able to overhear the conversation or 
watch the meeting. Information given by detainees to visitors would be subject 
to the same protection from forced disclosure as that given to lawyers.65 If 
                                                 
62 See the suggestion of Young (n 33) at text to note 34. 
63 Chapter Five, text to notes 38-39. 
64 rather than as present, an inspector: L4 said that denial of access should be the 
responsibility of this more senior officer, and that it should be made as hard as possible to 
prevent visitors from seeing detainees. 
65 Another point made by L4. 
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detainees did wish to make complaints against the police, it should be the role 
of the custody visitors to facilitate the process. This can be contrasted with the 
present regime, where visitors have to refuse to get involved; they may, at 
best, advise the detainee to talk to a lawyer when many of them do not have 
lawyers; and visitors are then supposed to tell the custody sergeant that the 
detainee had spoken to the visitor about wanting to make a complaint. 
 
The independence issue could be tackled by setting up, by statute, a new 
nationwide body to be run by visitors, with local schemes operating from their 
own premises, each with their own administrative support. The new 
nationwide body and the local schemes would have to be funded by the state, 
but they could be made more independent of the state than, for instance, the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission, by reporting to a House of 
Commons committee, rather than to ministers.66 The new national body would 
publish its own reports based on thorough investigations by visitors. High-
profile publicity could be a sufficient sanction, with effective means being 
found to bring these matters to public attention, including the prominent 
display of notices at the custody block, similar to the notices about hygiene 
which food outlets are required to display:67 but the effectiveness of this would 
need to be kept under review. The Independent Custody Visiting Association, 
ICVA, would need to be dissolved, as its members, the Police and Crime 
Commissioners, would no longer be responsible for custody visiting. Those 
employed by ICVA and the Police and Crime Commissioners to operate 
custody visiting schemes might apply to work for the new national and local 
                                                 
66 A suggestion made by Lord Harris of Haringey at a lecture at the University of Birmingham 
on 08.10.2015.   
67 See Chapter Six, note 159. 
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bodies: care would have to be taken to prevent the new bodies being taken 
over by those who would not sympathise with the change in policy and ethos, 
avoiding regulatory capture.68 As the scheme would be democratically 
accountable to Parliament, a national accountability mechanism would be in 
place, and there would also be machinery providing local accountability, by 
reporting to local government committees.  Visitors, and their national and 
local organisations, could contribute to debates about how custody is used, 
the numbers of people detained, the length of their detention, in what sort of 
cases arrest and detention are necessary, and how legal advice can be made 
much more available to detainees, for instance by contributing to inquiries by 
relevant Parliamentary committees, and by responding to government 
consultations. 
 
That is how I would like to rebuild custody visiting. Primary legislation would 
be needed to set up the new arrangements, and, for the detail, there should 
be statutory instruments which would give the detail the force of law which is 
absent from the current code of practice and has been absent from all 
previous circulars and codes.69 Thought would have to be given to funding. 
My impression is that the current arrangements are run so as to be as cheap 
as possible: the total national expenditure on custody visiting appears to be 
about two million pounds.70 However, in the current climate it is unlikely that 
any more money would be found. It might be possible to set up improved 
arrangements with the support of a voluntary organisation rather than paid 
officials.   
                                                 
68 See Chapter Two, text to notes 75-76. 
69 See Chapter Three, note 164-165, and text to note 165. 
70 Based on figures from the area studied. 
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That leaves the key question of whether all these improvements would give 
custody visiting the effectiveness and regulatory clout it would need to make 
an impact on police behaviour and reduce the number of deaths in custody. 
Here it may be helpful to think about just some of the findings in my empirical 
research regarding the absence of effectiveness. All of the following would 
need to be reversed. The police did not worry that a visit might take place 
while they were on duty, and at least one did not think the visitors were able to 
assess what was going on in their block. The police could predict the likely 
times when visitors might arrive,71 they could delay the visitors’ admission to 
the custody block,72 and they could deflect the visitors from seeing certain 
detainees.73 Neither the visits nor the reporting system caused police 
behaviour to be changed or aligned. Custody staff could overhear the visitors’ 
conversations with the detainees, making it very unlikely that detainees would 
dare to disclose any significant criticism of the staff. The staff could see and 
hear for themselves how ineffective the visitors’ meetings with the detainees 
were, which the custody sergeants, with their experience and understanding 
of what was happening on their block, also knew. They knew which aspects of 
custody were beyond the visitors’ remit, and they found that the visitors made 
no challenges. They knew that no information critical of the police ever 
reached the public as a result of the visiting scheme. They attended meetings 
with custody visitors on their own territory. The cumulative effect of these 
deficiencies being remedied, and the fundamental change in the 
management, orientation and ethos of custody visiting, would, I believe, go a 
                                                 
71 See Chapter Six, text to note 42.  
72 See Chapter Six, text to notes 45-50. 
73 See Chapter Six, text to notes 58-63. 
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long way to making it more effective as a regulator of police conduct in 
custody blocks. 
 
Final Remarks 
To conclude this thesis, I want to give some thought to the role the state takes 
in custody visiting, and why the state allows it to continue. In Chapter Three I 
noted that the police gave custody visiting, in terms of Packer’s models of 
criminal justice, a crime control orientation. I questioned why the police did not 
oppose custody visiting altogether, when it appeared to retain some due 
process features.74 In the case study I confirmed that some due process 
features were found in the appearance of custody visiting, but that its reality 
was crime control. The existence of the scheme, and the fact that visitors 
make checks on the conditions in custody, give custody visiting the 
appearance of due process. The reality of custody visiting as crime control is 
exposed by the attitudes of the visitors and the ineffectiveness of the work. 
Custody visiting never makes any waves, never criticises the police, does not 
cost very much, and never causes the state any problems. Custody visiting 
poses no threat to the state institution it should be regulating. The state has 
made a thorough job of neutering custody visiting. This suggests that the state 
keeps custody visiting in operation because it sees no need to get rid of it. 
 
The argument can be taken a step further. Andrew Sanders, Richard Young 
and Mandy Burton analyse the effect on the police of due process values in 
the criminal justice system. They say the effect can either be inhibitory or 
                                                 
74 See Chapter Three, para in text following note 203. 
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presentational. If the effect is inhibitory, due process values prevent the police 
from doing something. If the effect is presentational, due process values do 
not stop the police from doing something; but they do have the very significant 
effect of legitimising police conduct.75  Custody visiting is not effective to 
inhibit the police in their treatment of detainees, but at the same time it gives 
the false impression that it inhibits the police. Custody visiting therefore 
achieves one highly significant result: that of helping to legitimise everything 
that goes on in custody blocks.  
 
The most likely explanation is, therefore, that the state allows custody visiting 
to continue not only because it does not want to get rid of it, but because of a 
positive reason: it actually wants to keep it. Behind and beyond the official 
purposes of reassuring the public about custody and promoting confidence in 
the police, which custody visiting fails to achieve anyway,76 the state has 
found that its legitimising function fulfils its deeper purpose, something to be 
taken very seriously: the purpose of justifying the absence of further 
regulation. The state can point to the custody visiting scheme, and the state 
can say that, because of the scheme, there is no need for more regulation of 
the police, those powerful agents of the state, operating in the state’s secret 
places, custody blocks.  
 
However, this analysis attributes to the state an irrational and malevolent 
personality, and treats it like a monolith. Scholars have looked at the dispersal 
                                                 
75 Andrew Sanders, Richard Young and Mandy Burton, Criminal Justice, (4th edn OUP 2010)  
67-8, and, on the gap between due process rhetoric and crime control reality, 741ff. 
76 See Chapter Six, text to notes 198-206. 
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of the means of delivery of the state’s policy,77 and seen this pluralism as 
going beyond the mere modes of delivery and constituting a new form of 
state, as a process, with contradictions as well as convergences, and 
 
“a site (or series of sites) where claims for social justice are forged, 
fought over, resisted and sometimes implemented.”78 
 
One part of the state can hold another to account: for instance, Parliamentary 
Select Committees summon ministers. So, parts of the state other than the 
government could look at custody visiting and possibly with different eyes: but 
only if the subject is brought to their attention. Members of Parliament have 
never been informed about custody visiting, and do not know that the 
system’s pretensions to being legitimate,79 or, at best, to not being illegitimate, 
are unjustifiable.80 The legitimising effects of custody visiting erect a barrier to 
the greater regulation of police behaviour in custody blocks. Those 
legitimising effects depend on the survival of what I believe I have shown is a 
false picture of custody visiting. E P Thompson made many trenchant 
criticisms of the operation of the law in the eighteenth century, but he also 
wrote: 
  
                                                 
77 See Chapter Two, text to notes 20-24. 
78 Roy Coleman, Joe Sim, Steve Tombs, David Whyte, “Introduction: State, Power, Crime” in 
Coleman R, Sim J, Tombs S, Whyte D (eds) State Power Crime (Sage 2009) 9, 14. 
79 Being accepted, taken for granted, is sufficient to be legitimate : see Chapter Two, text to 
note 120. 
80 See Chapter Six, text around note 164. 
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“If the law is evidently partial or unjust, then it will ... legitimize nothing. 
It cannot be seen to be [just] without upholding its own logic and criteria 
of equity: indeed, on occasion, by actually being just.”81 
 
Similarly, the state institution of custody visiting cannot legitimize anything if it 
is not effective in ensuring that the police respect the rights of detainees and 
safeguard their welfare. But its ineffectiveness is not something that Members 
of Parliament or the wider public could know about, because it operates in the 
state’s hidden places, and custody visitors themselves are prohibited from 
publicising how it really works. As has been shown, it is unlikely that any 
visitors would have wanted to publicise it in that way, largely because of their 
socialisation: and, until now, no in-depth research has been carried out and 
published. So the appearance of the legitimacy of custody visiting has been 
maintained without there being any substance. My research has revealed the 
lack of substance, and publicising the research will cause it to lose the 
appearance of legitimacy as well. The loss of legitimacy could lead to 
Parliament, maybe through the Home Affairs Committee, holding the 
government to account about the issue, and that might lead to the reform of 
custody visiting. My proposals may meet the same fate as those made by 
Meacher and Scarman, and be watered down, postponed and neutered, but if 
my thesis is brought to the attention of Parliament, that would at least open a 
window for the consideration of some measure of progressive reform. 
 
 
                                                 
81 E P Thompson, Wigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (Breviary Stuff Publications  
2013) 205. The emphasis is in the original. 
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